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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The end of the Cold War 
The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War.1 Soon, by 
3 October 1990, both Germanys re-united and the Eastern defence organisation, the 
Warsaw Pact, ceased to exist. The unsuccessful ‘coup d’état’ of conservative forces in 
the Soviet Union during the winter of 1991/92 marked the definite end of the country’s 
world power, leaving the United States of America as the sole superpower. Some con-
sidered this to be the end of history with Western values prevailing, and the definite 
proof of the supremacy of liberal democracies.2 However, one important institution, 
which had guaranteed the Western world the security it needed to develop in prosperity 
during the Cold War, now faced growing problems: the armed forces. 
Practically overnight most of the Western European defence sectors, with their Cold 
War structures, became seemingly obsolete. The Cold War strategies were no longer 
suitable in the world of the 1990s, now that their basis, the antagonism of the two su-
perpowers, had vanished. Territorial defence strategies and large territorial armies with 
heavy equipment, whether in the German lowlands, the Scandinavian Polar Regions, or 
the Eastern flanks of the Anatolian highlands, were especially subject to increasing 
criticism. Where they had once contributed to the success of the West, being a necessary 
condition to territorial defence, they had now became obsolete and, above all, too ex-
pensive. The costs of the Cold War had after all been considerable: ‘It consumed na-
tional wealth, by giving rise to large and costly defence establishments …’3 
Change to armed forces is rather common, but the pace of change since 1989 had 
been extraordinary. Most armed forces in the Western world had faced serious downsiz-
ing. Moreover, ‘the main challenge for the armed forces is that changes stemming from 
the external strategic context and domestic society are not occurring sequentially but 
simultaneously. Adjusting to both the international and domestic sources of change in-
volves the difficult task of reconstructing the organisation structures, equipment, doc-
trine and cultural ethos, which were inherited from the past’.4 The policy output of most 
Western defence sectors no longer fitted the demands of the changing environment or 
the expectations of society. Thus their legitimacy was undermined and they faced an 
institutional crisis. 
However, new - or during the Cold War overlooked - conflicts flared up, and it was 
these conflicts that had guided most military adaptations in Western Europe. Peacekeep-
ing and peace enforcing became as important as conventional territorial defence tasks. 
Due to domestic pressure and pressure from their (security) environment most Western 
European countries made similar choices when it came to the restructuring of their 
armed forces: downsizing and the change from invasion forces to forces with crisis 
management capacities. There were, and are, however, major differences in the way 
these forces were manned. For example, Germany and the Scandinavian countries chose 
to uphold the system of military conscription, while France, Spain, and the Netherlands 
abandoned it.5 The question arises why some Western European countries abolished 
military conscription after the Cold War and why some did not. 
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1.2 Defence policy and conscription after the Cold War 
An answer to the empirical question might be found by looking at the transitions from 
mass army to ‘force-in-being’ that many Western armed forces underwent. The Ameri-
can sociologist Burk argues that external reasons lay at the base of the changes most 
armed forces underwent after World War II, that is from ‘mass armed forces’ to ‘forces-
in-being’. The term of mass armed forces refers to large standing armies, as they existed 
until the end of World War II. After 1945, those armies were transformed into ‘forces-
in-being’. This means that only a selection of soldiers was active and that a large part of 
the organisation consisted of units that could be mobilised in case of a threat. 
Van Doorn distinguishes three meanings of the term mass armies. Firstly, ‘mass 
army’ refers to the large-scale forces of the nineteenth century governing military opera-
tions. The increase of size, up to one million soldiers under Napoleon, contributed to the 
nationalisation and democratisation of the military. ‘The ‘levee en masse’ of the French 
Revolution was continued in the system of general conscription which gave rise to the 
concept of ‘Volk in Waffen’ (nation in arms). The mass army is therefore quite rightly 
seen in relation to the draft.’6 Secondly, ‘mass army’ can refer to an army ‘with a highly 
undifferentiated and homogeneous composition.’7 Thirdly, ‘mass’ in the sense that mass 
armies played a role in the appearance of mass societies, refers to the capability of a 
society to mobilise ‘their members for large scale collective objectives.’8  
There are differences between nations in the extent and ways they convert their 
mass armies to forces-in-being, especially with concern to the abolition or maintenance 
of military conscription. These differences can be explained by national factors such as 
national traditions about the military’s ‘place’ in society and prevailing patterns of na-
tional integration.9 Important factors for abandoning conscription might also be the 
combination of the geo-strategic position of a country with the financial burden of all-
volunteer forces and social inequity between those who serve and those who are ex-
empt.10 Klein (1998) indicates the importance of alternative service or weapon-free ser-
vice for conscious objectors in some societies. As Burk already assumed ‘ending con-
scription is not a necessary outcome of the decline of mass armed forces.’11 The reason 
to abandon conscription obviously depends on national paths.  
In order to explain differences between Western countries in dealing with the con-
scription issue after the Cold War, the Swiss sociologist Karl Haltiner points to the so-
called conscription ratio. This is the ‘percentage of conscripts compared with the total of 
a country’s regulars without reserves’. 12 In his opinion, it is wrong just to look at the 
presence or absence of conscription. It is more important to look at the conscription 
ratio in order to understand incremental changes, which will lead - in the end - to aboli-
tion (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: A typology of Force Structures and Expected Changes (Haltiner 1998: 18) 
 
Looking at the conscript ratio, Haltiner differentiates between four types of armed 
forces: 
 
o Type 0. These forces are purely all-volunteer forces, like the An-
glo-Saxon states; 
o Type 1. In these forces less than 50% are conscripts. This is why 
they are called pseudo-conscript forces. This type fosters the un-
equal burden-sharing of the young men within a nation. Only a 
minority of every year-class is obliged to serve; 
o Type 2. More than half, but less than 66% of the armed forces 
are filled with conscripts; 
o Type 3. Above 66% of all soldiers are conscripts. Regulars and 
volunteers, often short contracted, have overall cadre or technical 
functions. 
 
The arrows indicate changes that had already materialised after 1989 or were to be ex-
pected. 
Haltiner’s analysis is valuable for overcoming the dichotomy trap of conscription. 
Purely differentiating between the sheer existence and absence of conscription leads to 
unreliable conclusions about the future of conscription. The declining conscript ratio is 
an important indicator for an incremental process towards the abolition of conscription 
in many countries. By pointing to the gradations, a first step is set to explain differences 
in content and speed of national changes of the conscript system.  
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1.3 The conscription puzzle 
Haltiner’s innovative analysis refers to social and political pressure for the abolition of 
conscription. According to him these pressures rise due to the fact that ‘conscription is 
only practised selectively and not universally’13 in many type I and type II countries. In 
other words, due to the increasing inequality of selective draft, conscription will face a 
growing loss of legitimacy in the countries where it still exists. The author concludes 
that the choice to uphold or abandon military conscription depends on ‘the combination 
of being a member of a defence alliance and being far from a direct national military 
threat and participating frequently in international missions.’14 This last point in particu-
lar seems to be of importance, since it is common procedure in all Western democracies 
that conscripts are not obliged to serve in crisis-management missions.  
As valuable as Haltiner’s explanation is, it does not tell us anything about the actual 
policymaking processes within the respective defence sectors, the more he does not 
elaborate this hypothesis in his article further. Moreover, his approach implies that he 
does not look at the complex processes within which policymaking in Western democ-
racies takes place, relying instead on a few structural explanations.15 These structural 
constraints, such as military threat and being a member of a defence alliance, do not 
automatically induce or prevent policy and organisational changes. Nor does the in-
creasing loss of an institution’s legitimacy automatically lead to pressure on the gov-
ernment by social actors. We therefore must open the ‘black-box’ of the policy process 
in order to understand why and how states with conscription respond differently to the 
same international changes. In particular, we have to focus on the behaviour of policy 
actors within (inter)national structures. 
Since both ‘agency and structure are ... the defining components for the understand-
ing of human interaction within a society and of the explanation of social phenomena,’16 
policy outcomes can only be understood by analysing actors’ choices, their willingness 
to choose, within the possibilities the structures provide. In the end, we still do not 
know for certain how we have to study the political and administrative processes that 
led to the abolition or maintenance of military conscription in Western Europe after the 
Cold War. But knowledge about those processes does tell us more about pivotal ques-
tions regarding the extent, form and timing of abolition: why did some countries trans-
form conscription while others abolished, and why did some change policy soon after 
the Cold War while others did not? 
This study argues that the post-Cold War changes in Western European defence sec-
tors have to be understood as a consequence of the critical junctures in the security envi-
ronment of a country. The threats and opportunities those episodes in a sector’s history 
offer to the political, military and societal actors within a country might help to alter the 
status quo. Crises can break open a path that would otherwise have been closed for pol-
icy change, yet whether or not the conscript system is actually changed depends on the 
policymakers’ choices. Although Haltiner admits that the end of the Cold War was im-
portant, he only offers partial explanations: ‘Strategic and military goal bound factors 
such as the end of the Cold War and new missions for the armed forces (peace keeping, 
peace enforcement) seem to be of more importance for the recent changes of force 
structures in Western Europe [than socio-economic modernisation].’17 Furthermore, he 
introduces the tool with which incremental processes towards change in conscription 
can be recognised, but neglects to go deeper and describe those processes. Are there 
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dominant actors in these countries, who managed to influence different outcomes? Is 
conscription a routine or non-political policy issue or can we see political and bureau-
cratic struggles about this societal institution that had influenced the relation between 
the citizens and the state for centuries? To answer those questions, the black box of de-
fence policymaking after the Cold War needs to be opened.  
This study takes a closer look at two cases from Haltiner’s analysis to show that 
there might be more than structural constraints to national defence policy and that ana-
lysing the policy process in greater detail offers a more adequate and precise under-
standing of how and why states responded to the end of the Cold War in this domain. 
The study investigates the role of leadership in instigating or opposing reform efforts. It 
uses a functional approach to leadership and applies it to Sweden and the Netherlands. 
These cases mark two distinctly different modes of adaptation to the changed environ-
ment with regards to conscription within Haltiner’s typology stated in Figure 1.18 In 
short, the key empirical question of this study is: Why did the Netherlands abandon 
conscription soon after the Cold War and why did Sweden not do so?  
In the past, defence policy and the defence organisation as such had been undeserv-
edly neglected in the study of public administration.19 Mayer & Khademian claim that 
scholars neglect defence policy because they do not find it representative for policymak-
ing in general. The authors conclude, however, that defence policy is not merely an ex-
tension of foreign policy. Decisions taken in defence policy also influence national pol-
icy. In the past, political scientists concentrated on disarmament and polemological 
questions. 20 Furthermore, they described changes of defence policy from a historical 
perspective. 21 Especially within Dutch public administration studies only few academic 
studies have opened the black box of political-administrative defence decision-making, 
using relevant political and administrative theories. Van Brouwershaven, for example, 
describes the strategic management at the Dutch Ministry of Defence during turbulent 
times22 and Van den Hoogen deals with the defence budget decision-making. 23 
This study will contribute to the rich sociological tradition of armed forces research 
by bringing the insights of policy research to the attention of scholars studying civil-
military relations. The origins of large-scale policy changes in the 1990s within the sta-
ble defence sectors of the Cold War deserve a widespread attention by many different 
academic disciplines. By paying attention to those changes this study hopes to contrib-
ute to an important debate in political and administrative studies about the origins and 
processes of large-scale reforms in Western policy sectors in general. Unravelling the 
conscription puzzle in the Netherlands and Sweden serves as an example for the com-
plexity of reforms and policy change in consensual democracies and the role of leader-
ship in those processes. The key theoretical question of this study is, how similarities 
and differences between the Dutch and Swedish cases can be explained by patterns of 
leadership in the defence policy sectors of both countries. That is why in the following 
chapter a theoretical framework will be developed, which takes account of structural 
constraints, yet emphasises the key role of strategic choices made by policy makers in 
leadership positions. 
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1.4 Some methodological considerations 
Comparing two countries with regard to the outcome means it is necessary to select 
cases on the dependent variable. That is a rather tricky strategy. King, Keohane & 
Verba emphasise that while following such a strategy one has to avoid falling into three 
common pitfalls. Firstly, dependent variables should be dependent.24 This study wants 
to study policy processes with regard to conscription after the Cold War, as an example 
for leadership in reforms and in order to explain differential outcomes. Conscription is 
closely connected to larger reform processes, i.e. downsizing, restructuring, and refor-
mulating the use of the national armed forces; yet it is unlikely that countries choose to 
reform their armed forces because their first intention is to abandon conscription. 
Throughout the centuries, conscription had been dependent on governments’ choices in 
foreign and defence policy; however, it had never been the aim. This study considers the 
environment of national defence policy and leadership actions to be the independent 
variables explaining variation in national outcomes. 
Secondly, do not select observations based on the dependent variable so that the 
dependent variable is constant.25 Sweden and the Netherlands differ on the outcome. 
While the Netherlands in 1993 chose to postpone the draft, in Sweden conscripts are 
still drafted while this study is being written. At the same time, in respect to some of the 
possible explanatory variables, e.g. with regard to their institutional structures for public 
policymaking, both countries are often considered most similar cases.26 The causes re-
sponsible for the different outcomes are expected to pertain to the people, organisation 
and their interactions in post-Cold War defence policymaking processes in both coun-
tries. In particular, this study will try to ascertain to what extent and in which way po-
litical and bureaucratic leadership has affected the policy process and outcomes regard-
ing the future of conscription.  
Thirdly, choose a dependent variable that represents the variation we wish to ex-
plain.27 In other words, ‘we need the entire range of variation in the dependent variable 
to be a possible outcome of the experiment of the outcome in order to obtain an unbi-
ased estimate of the impact of the explanatory variables’.28 Due to previous quantitative 
research, a broad range of variety had been established. As is shown in Figure 1, the 
variety of outcomes is broader than the mere absence or presence of conscription. 
Haltiner points to four types of outcome. Type 0 and Type III incorporate cases where 
we saw almost no change at all after the Cold war. They are static. What is more inter-
esting to our research - remember, this study does not only try to explain differences in 
outcome, but particularly leadership in reform - are countries where conscription un-
derwent different degrees of change, which are found in Types I and II. The Netherlands 
and Sweden are examples of countries in transition from Type II to Type I (Sweden) 
and Type I to Type 0 (Netherlands). Moreover, and this will challenge Haltiner’s expla-
nation, though Sweden is no official member of a defence alliance, it contributes to 
military crisis management operations, which are considered to be influential on a coun-
try’s choice to abandon conscription. In this sense, Sweden can also be considered a 
crucial case, used to establish causal inference that cannot be provided by rough quanti-
tative research. 
In both countries, documents in the archives of the Ministries of Defence and the na-
tional archives have been analysed. Together with official documents, such as the De-
fence White Papers, and a media analysis, they contributed to the triangulation of data, 
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which increased the reliability of this study. The media analysis mainly served as a his-
torical source. In both countries more than 40 interviews with decision makers, civil 
servants and soldiers were conducted. These interviews provided a more in-depth analy-
sis than mere document analysis might provide. Where possible, already existing studies 
have been used to support empirical evidence. All these efforts contribute to as com-
plete a picture as possible of the policy processes in both countries. This process trac-
ing, or historical analysis, enables us to establish causal relations.29 The author is, how-
ever, aware of the fact that the small number of cases aggravates causal inference about 
the possible influence of leadership in defence reforms in Sweden and the Netherlands. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to show or to reject that leadership, at least partially, contrib-
uted to the outcome in both countries. 
1.5 Overview of the book 
In chapter 2 the theoretical arguments will be developed. Challenging the hypothesis 
that crisis leads to reform, insights of crisis and reforming literature are used to establish 
causal relations: when and under what conditions can crisis lead to reform? The actors’ 
behaviour during an institutional crisis is one of the important identified explanations. 
Crucial questions concern the strategies of these actors, whether they are reforming or 
conserving, and the amount of room they had to manoeuvre while striving for change 
within consensual democracies. In chapter 3 the theory is operationalised in order to test 
empirics.  
For both cases, the Netherlands and Sweden, the historical, empirical and analytical 
chapters are structured similarly. In chapters 4 and 7 the history of conscription in the 
Netherlands respectively Sweden will be described. Until World War II many parallels 
can be found between both countries, where the armed forces and conscription were 
often used subjects during conservative and liberal struggles for power in foreign and 
defence policy. This is why the period from the 19th century to the Great War receives 
special attention in both chapters. Other important episodes in both countries for the 
development of the armed forces and conscription in particular were the inter-bellum 
and the Cold War period. 
The empirical chapters (5 and 8) start at the end of the Cold War. First, the respec-
tive structures of the defence policy sectors are described. Following that the post-Cold 
War conscription policymaking process in both countries is depicted. The cases differ in 
time and in the number of actors involved. While in the Netherlands the process took 
place within four years, the Swedish process is still going on while this study is being 
finished. Because of this, the structures of the two empirical chapters differ. 
The analytical chapters (6 and 9) have a similar structure. After a short introduction, 
the main actors, their strategies and the respective outcomes in both cases are described. 
When describing the actor’s calculations and the leadership opportunities a limitation to 
the crucial actors is necessary. Central to both chapters is the analysis of three stages 
within a reforming or stabilizing process: Why do leaders reform, how do they reform 
and what is the outcome in terms of policy change and crisis management effectiveness?  
The concluding chapter 10 parallels the structure of the analytical chapters, yet it di-
rectly compares the processes in both countries offering a theoretical discussion of lead-
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Chapter 2: Crisis and change in policy sectors: the role of leadership 
2.1 Institutional crisis: a window for reform? 
The stability of Western democracies and the incremental nature of their policy dynam-
ics have been the subject of much research in Political Science and Public Administra-
tion. In recent years, more attention has been paid to the notion of change of and within 
state institutions. Indeed, it has been observed that ‘institutional change and institutional 
reform are hot on the agenda of Political Science and Public Administration’.1 A key 
question that has emerged is how to explain the occurrence of reform within seemingly 
stable institutions or sectors. Many existing explanatory tools, i.e. (neo-) institutional 
theories, fall short in explaining those changes, since they tend to focus on explaining 
continuity.2 
As far as defence is concerned, there exists a broad variety of literature about mili-
tary change and the change of armed forces. As the Dutch historian Blom puts it: ‘In 
general, one can say that defeated armies do two things: analysing and reorganising. By 
the way: winning teams tend to do the same, yet, they are not so keen on reorganising – 
never change a winning team’.3 Wars often lay bare the weak spots of a nation’s de-
fence. Yet, there are many explanations for military changes other than wars. 
Generally speaking, it seems that technical innovation often triggers changes in 
armed forces.4 Rosen considers talented soldiers, time, and information to be at the base 
of those innovations, but less so civilian leaders. However, technical innovation falls 
short in explaining armed forces’ changes after the Cold War in the Netherlands and 
Sweden, where - at least in the case of the Netherlands - the decision to postpone the 
draft came too soon after the end of the Cold War to let revolutionary technical innova-
tion be a main cause for this. Societal and political forces catalyse military change. Of-
ten ideas or interests lead to those changes, like the late 19th century naval change in 
Great Britain, where social upheaval led to ‘the construction of cultural images of state 
and war’.5 
Cortell & Peterson point to the role of individuals in processes of change. It is state 
officials, who ‘decide when and how to seek change in existing institutional configura-
tions’.6 U.S. President Truman, for example, overcame conservative resistance in re-
formulating the American defence strategy after the Second World War. While conser-
vatives feared the end of United States isolationism, a high defence budget, and the ris-
ing of a garrison state, the post-war American president prolonged and extended Amer-
ica’s world supremacy.7 Moreover, the changing nature of threat alone does not account 
for military change, it is civilian leadership that appears to be important in guiding mili-
taries towards new missions.8 
Change in armed forces’ tasks, innovation, and reduction cannot fully solve the con-
scription puzzle. For example, Burk asserts that: ‘in an era of the force-in-being, when 
the technological requirements of war seem to dictate establishing a professional volun-
tary force, whether citizens have a military obligation depends rather more on the pres-
ence of border and constitutional crisis which threaten the nation or, in the absence of 
these, on the exigencies of electoral politics and the opportunities to gain which a par-
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ticular policy position might provide.’9 Burk’s explanation points to two important fac-
tors: external or internal state crisis and domestic political calculations by state actors, 
but he does not elaborate much on their specific nature and role. We need to turn to 
other scholars of policy change to obtain a sharp insight.  
From crisis to reform? 
An important explanation for non-incremental change in otherwise deeply institutional-
ised policy domains is the so-called crisis-reform thesis. In this explanation, institutions, 
which are normally in stable equilibrium, are destabilised by crisis and face critical 
junctures that may open up strategic choice opportunities that otherwise are foreclosed. 
Krasner calls this ‘punctuated equilibria’.10 The original notion of ‘punctuated equilib-
rium’ in evolutionary biology, which is formulated for the most part by Stephen J. 
Gould, finds causes for interruption of the stable evolutionary process outside the sys-
tem e.g. meteorites, volcanic explosions or solar fluctuations. Translated to the world of 
governance, this suggests that changes from outside the institution can be, among other 
things, electoral changes, government cutbacks, technological changes or a changing 
balance of power.11 It is through those critical episodes in an institution’s life that non-
incremental change can be initiated. These critical junctures can develop and destabilise 
existing equilibria, which in turn lead to change.12 In this study the term institutional 
crisis will be used. A policy sector is in crisis ‘when its institutional structure experi-
ences a relatively strong decline in (followed by unusually low levels of) legitimacy’.13 
A sector is defined here as ‘an institutional field of actors, rules and practices associated 
with state efforts to address a particular category of social issues and problems’.14 
However persuasive this line of thought might be, it is doubtful that crises always 
lead to change or that change can only be initiated by crises. Cortell & Peterson (1999) 
formulate two critiques of punctuated equilibrium explanations. To start with, the crisis-
reform thesis does explain ‘most visible episodes of state formation and transformation’ 
(p. 178) but overlooks the cumulative effect of more incremental institutional changes, 
which are more probable than drastic changes in an institutional life.15 The second criti-
cal observation regarding the notion of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ concerns the under-
stated role of individuals in processes of change. Major changes do not just ‘happen’, 
not even in the chaos of crisis. It is state officials who ‘decide when and how to seek 
change in existing institutional configurations’ (p. 179). Interruptions from outside or 
inside sectors trigger an intensified search for solutions, including plans for new policies 
or major reorganisations that wait for the ‘right’ moment to be launched.  
2.2 Managing institutional crisis: strategies and outcomes 
If not every reform is the result of a crisis,16 the opposite holds true as well: not every 
crisis leads to reform. It is argued here that the outcomes of crises are contingent upon 
the strategies political and administrative leaders choose to adopt in a crisis.17 Reforms 
are defined here as ‘deliberate and sustained attempts at non-incremental change in the 
substance and process of government.’18 Military change is closely connected to this. 
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Farrell and Terriff define it as ‘change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of 
a military organization.’19 
Four ideal-typical outcomes of an institutional crisis can be discerned: reform, unin-
tended change, disillusion and restoration (Table 1). This typology assumes that key 
policy makers face a strategic choice during a crisis, i.e. whether to try to uphold or 
change the status quo – the key policy principles and institutional structures – of the 
policy sector. Furthermore, it also assumes that policy makers do not control the out-
comes of their efforts. There may be a big gap between design, implementation, and 
effects, due to the volatile context of crisis, the behaviour of other stakeholders in the 
sector, and so on. Hence, the typology looks at both intended and unintended conse-
quences of crisis management strategies. 
 
 
 Crisis Management orientation 
Crisis Outcome Reformist Conservative 
Reform Reform Unintended change 
No Reform Disillusion Restoration 
Table 1: Crisis response strategies and outcomes: alternative sectoral futures (based on: Boin & ‘t 
Hart 2000, Boin & Otten 2000) 
 
Reform. In the top left box the reform strategy initiated by leaders turns out to be effec-
tive. Trust in and legitimacy of the sector is (re-) established by introducing new struc-
tures and/or a change of the basic ideas – the paradigm – on which the policy of the sec-
tor is grounded. 
The economical reforms in Australia from 1983 on are an example of successful re-
form. A continuing recession, high unemployment figures, and an annual inflation of 
11% and a current account deficit above AUS$ 6 billion indicated a deep economical 
crisis.20 Reasons, amongst others, were the reliance of the Australian economy on tradi-
tional farming products, which faced an ever growing protectionism in the EU and the 
United States; low production of highly competitive, high-tech products; and a high 
tariff barrier to protect its weak economy.21 At the same time, the growing welfare state 
and the costs stemming from that put even more pressure on Australia’s national econ-
omy. When in the election night, 5 March 1983, the new Prime Minister-elect and his 
designated treasurer Keating found out that the deficit would be almost AUS$ 10 bil-
lion, they knew that his labour government would not be able to implement Keynesian 
economic policies to perfect the welfare state.22 Prime Minister Hawke and the treasurer 
managed to reform the Australian economy and welfare state, by making use of the 
strong momentum of crisis feeling, created in the days that followed the election night. 
Among others, they replaced the system of an adversarial bargaining structure with a 
neo corporatist pact. Due to that arrangement, the Australian economy became interna-
tionally competitive; inflation could be cut and it was possible to trade higher wages for 
new jobs. Those reforming efforts not only led to a stronger and more stable economy, 
but also to five election victories in a row. By showing resolve to the crisis in combina-
tion with the positive outcome, Prime Minister Hawke showed economic superiority to 
his political opponents.23 
Many authors point to the fact that it is not sure if and for how long changes persist 
and can withstand the ‘normalising’ thrust of daily routines in large administrative or-
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ganisations.24 Another problem is that it is difficult to evaluate those reforms and their 
implications. This, however, is beyond the aim of this paper. 
Unintended change. Crisis managers may try to re-establish trust in the old struc-
tures, but the sector may eventually end up being reformed. Since this study defines 
reforms as intended, the term ‘unintended reform’ would be a contradiction in itself. 
Yet, if managers choose a conservative strategy but the outcome is a change of the 
paradigm of the sector, this is a third order change. This sort of change under conserva-
tive strategy is most likely due to influences from outside the organisation e.g. parlia-
mentary inquiry or media pressure during the process, or this may be due to amplifica-
tion effects of seemingly minor changes. 
In the beginning of the 1990s the Netherlands faced unprecedented escapes from se-
cured prisons, cell shortage and a growing uncomfortable feeling in society with regard 
to criminality. Although dramatic, these escapes could be seen as normal incidents in 
prison sectors.25 People try to escape; otherwise it would be a boarding school. Yet, the 
high frequency of the incidents and their dramatic nature - using helicopters and knotted 
sheets out of windows - in combination with the public opinion, put strong pressure on 
the sector. Within a short time the sector faced three reforms that were unthinkable be-
fore the public and political attention: one Supermax prison (instead of four), where all 
heavy criminals are imprisoned, was established and the sector let go of the policy of 
one person per cell. The most radical change, however, was the presentation of a new 
White Paper, which announced a new policy of toughening up the penal system. What 
in the first place appeared to be (intended) incremental changes, in the end turned out to 
be unintended third order changes, since effective changes became permanent and spon-
taneous measures were afterwards upgraded.26 
Disillusion. When an intended reform fails, the sector faces disillusionment. The in-
tended reform did not re-establish trust and confidence in the sector and its legitimacy. 
Political and civil servant leaders proved their inability to cope with the crisis. Often, 
the professional future of these actors is at stake with their reform plans, and when these 
plans go awry, they may be forced to leave. The leaders asked the followers to trust 
them and due to the failure - often according to public opinion, which is expressed by 
mass media – they seemed to have abused that trust. ‘Ill-guided reform efforts may ac-
tually enhance uncertainty and conflict between stakeholders or even induce chaos in 
policy implementation ...’.27 This process of disillusion can trigger the next institutional 
crisis. 
Boin & ‘t Hart refer to the criminal justice sector in Belgium, where a series of crisis 
mismanagement by the sector authorities led to a loss of legitimacy of the sector. It 
started in the 1980s, when a violent gang terrorised supermarkets. Though justice never 
managed to catch the members, it had been without structural implications for the sec-
tor. In 1985 it turned out that the drama in the Brussels’ Heizel stadium - tens of sup-
porters were killed during a European soccer final - could not have been prevented, be-
cause of the rivalry between different police forces. A few years later, the French-
speaking socialist in Liège, Andre Cools, was murdered; his murder was never solved. 
The crisis in the Belgian criminal justice sector reached its climax with the capture of 
the child molester Marc Dutroux. During the investigation and even after the arrest of 
Dutroux, ‘the system showed a dramatic lack of competence and learning capability.’28 
After an early release from prison after being convicted for child rape, Dutroux turned 
out to be a recidivist. The police failed to catch him in first instance, though they 
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searched his home but failed to find two missing girls in a custom-built cell in his 
house. After his capture, Dutroux managed to escape and was only caught after a dra-
matic car chase. Contrary to what one might expect with regard to those incidents, the 
sector authorities and the government refused to reform. Even after hundreds of thou-
sands of citizens marched in organised protests, major reforms still mainly exist in 
blueprint.29  
Restoration. In this type of situation, political and administrative leaders who 
choose a conservative approach, manage the crisis successfully by restoring legitimacy 
of the sector within its old structures and its existing policy paradigm. 
A case in point may be the restoration of the Dutch crime-fighting sector. After a 
severe institutional crisis, with huge media attention, two resigned ministers and parlia-
mentary inquiries, the sector restored its legitimacy through incremental changes made 
by the political and administrative leaders. ‘[T]he changes made were limited to im-
proving the implementation of criminal policy; they did not touch upon the substance of 
penal law, nor did they call into question organizational principles of the criminal jus-
tice system.’30 
In reality it is possible that only parts of the sector are reformed whereas other parts 
persist, or that reform in some parts of an organisation, institution or sector produce 
spin-offs, which lead to unintended or far-reaching changes in other parts. Whatever the 
outcomes of institutional crises and their reform struggles will be, those cannot be un-
derstood unless one takes a closer look at the strategic choices that senior policy makers 
within the government make soon after a crisis manifests itself.  
Process of crisis management 
There are two ideal-typical approaches to crisis that have been discerned, i.e. reformist 
and conservative: 
 
‘A reformist approach is aimed at re-balancing or re-designing the in-
stitutional features of the policy sector in order to ensure a new ‘fit’ 
with the changed environment. This is essentially an approach of 
structural adaptation, because the sector authorities attempt to modify 
processes and structures in order to bridge the performance gap and re-
store faith in the sector. A conservative approach aims to maintain the 
institutional essence in the face of change (Terry 1995). The core idea 
is that incremental improvement rather than radical redesign of exist-
ing processes and structures will best enhance the sector’s perform-
ance.’31  
 
Taking a closer look at crisis management helps to open the black box of the policy 
process, after a crisis in a policy sector has manifested itself. In other words: the course 
and outcome of the crisis management process is considered to be crucial for the direc-
tion a sector takes under pressure. In times of turmoil, deterministic constraints loosen 
up and it is up to the actors to make use of the ‘window of opportunity’. Structures in-
fluence or might predispose actors within a sector to think about reforms. Yet, the tacti-
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cal and strategic relations between these actors and the influence and steering ability of 
some of them, are influential on reform courses.32  
In recent years, deterministic views on the relation between crisis and reform gave 
way to more actor oriented studies.33 It is strategies by different actors, which might be 
of explanatory value either as an intervening variable, or by enforcing crisis dynamics. 
Especially the notion of institutional leadership came more to the fore. Can organisa-
tional leaders ‘master the process of institutionalisation – to a degree where we can 
speak of institutional design or re-design – in the face of massive and pervasive con-
straints’?34 Studies by Wilson (1989), Boin (2001), ‘t Hart (2000), ‘t Hart & Gustavsson 
(2002), and Goldfinch & ‘t Hart (2003) show that leaders at least sometimes can and do 
have influence on a policy sector’s future, not merely by coincidence, but in deliberate 
and intended ways. In addition those studies suggest that the institutional history of the 
sector has some bearing on the strategies of the leaders.35 This study wants to build on 
the studies referred to above. It will show that structures and path dependency are nec-
essary conditions for a sector’s future when facing institutional crisis, but that both are 
not sufficient to explain crisis outcomes. Actors, to be more specific leaders, are impor-
tant intervening variables. They therefore deserve more attention in literature aimed at 
explaining crisis policy processes in public sectors. The question then is how leaders 
might reform a sector or manage to preserve its structure and organisational integrity. 
The answer is found in the concepts of reformist and conserving leadership.  
 
2.3 Institutional crisis management as a leadership challenge 
 Why policy makers reform or conserve conscription 
The key important intervening variable between ‘crisis’ and ‘reform’ that will be exam-
ined in this study is the behaviour of key policymaking actors. According to Cortell & 
Peterson (1999) ‘agent’s’ perceptions, preferences and calculations mediate between a 
window of opportunity and structural change’ (p. 188). They suggest that four factors 
can lead officials to make use of environmental changes and strive for domestic struc-
tural change. Firstly, policy officials are agents of change if their perceptions are influ-
enced by the environmental conditions i.e. the triggers. It is important that the officials 
recognise that not acting – in this case not altering the institution – might raise costs and 
would worsen the problem. Secondly, policy officials are influenced by political calcu-
lations. The authors identify two different conditions under which policy makers initiate 
institutional change: on the one hand they ‘seek structural reform the more secure they 
are in their positions and the longer the time horizon before they will be held account-
able for their actions’ (p. 188). On the other hand, and this seems quite the opposite, 
they act in the hope to improve their weak political (power) position. Thirdly, ideology 
is an important source for the will to act. It is important that actors have ‘well-formed 
views on the needed reform’ (189). Views they often ventilated in election campaigns 
and which brought them into office in first place. The last explanation Cortell & Peter-
son point at, is the ‘policy maker’s position within the institutional structure. That is, 
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existing institutions help define actor’s preferences for change’.36 In other words, policy 
makers are path-dependent in their choices. 
Translated to analytical tools for empirical research we can formulate hypotheses for 
each of the four factors, for taking and avoiding action: 
 
1) The higher the subjective crisis awareness of the policy makers, 
the higher the likelihood that they initiate reforms. On the con-
trary, reformulated for conservative leadership, the lower the cri-
sis awareness of the policy makers, the higher the likelihood that 
they adopt a conservative approach.  
2) The stronger the leaders’ position within the system and the 
longer it takes before they are held responsible for their actions, 
the higher the likelihood that they initiate reforms. For the con-
servative leader it can be said, that the weaker the positions of 
the leaders and the shorter it they are held responsible for their 
actions, the higher the likelihood for conserving strategies.  
3) The more policy makers are convinced of the need to change, the 
higher the likelihood of reforms. The opposite holds true for con-
serving strategies: the more policy makers are convinced for the 
need to conserve, the higher the likelihood for conserving strate-
gies. 
4) The higher the expected gains (or the smaller the expected dam-
age) for the political position of the policy makers and the or-
ganisation of which they are part, the more they will commit 
themselves to reforms. On the contrary, it can be said that the 
lower the expected gains (or the larger the expected damage) for 
the political position of the policy makers and the organisation, 
the more they will commit themselves to conserving strategies. 
 
 
2.4 Leadership orientation: reformist versus conserving crisis management 
strategies 
Reformist leadership 
The notion of reformist leadership helps to open the black box of institutional changes. 
It is the link between a critical moment of an institution or sector and its (supposed) 
rescue. The public opinion often asks for drastic changes when a sector loses its legiti-
macy, and the strong and convincing leader is the personification of that change. In 
other words, reformist leaders are the actors who make use of the ‘windows of opportu-
nity for reform’.37 It is important to notice, however, that leadership can function only 
as an intervening variable, which makes use of the situation. ‘ ... [S]uccessful reformists 
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amplify critical situational attributes and exploit their institutional positions to affect the 
content and course of reform struggle.’38 
The outcome of crises also depends on the institutional context within which leaders 
act. It is therefore wise for the reformist leader not to enforce changes at all costs. Re-
forming leadership is a political and administrative craft that asks for strategic behav-
iour and a good portion of political sensitivity. Alliances have to be made, political op-
ponents have to be outflanked and public support has to be gained. 
The will to initiate change is important. Without a strong conviction that reforms are 
necessary, it becomes difficult to initiate and to carry them through in a political and 
organisational environment where many actors are bound to be hostile to change. Often 
not only the external environment has to be convinced. Resistance may come from the 
inside, too. Resistance from operational agencies or ideological struggles within the 
sector may frustrate the plans of the lone reformer, who often starts with high hopes and 
loses heart during the long ‘march through the institutions’. Five hypotheses for suc-
cessful reformist leadership have been postulated by Goldfinch & ‘t Hart (2003) and ‘t 
Hart & Gustavsson (2002). The successful reformer combines communication and coa-
lition building skills. The first three hypotheses are concerned with the communication 
skills of the leaders. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The more dramatically reformist leaders portray current events or issues 
as a serious and acute crisis, the higher the likelihood of reform success. 
 
Crises and critical events have to be used by reformist leadership in order to initiate 
change by making clear that only (drastic) reforms can lead out of the crisis. By discred-
iting the old structures as inadequate in solving current problems, leaders appeal to the 
inner feelings of insecurity in their followers.39 They verbally de-institutionalise the 
sector, if necessary even by constructing a crisis.40 
An example is the already mentioned Australian Prime Minister-elect Hawke and 
his designated treasurer Keating in 1983. During his electoral victory celebration Hawke 
received a telephone call from the secretary of the Treasury, Stone. He requested a 
meeting for the next day. In this meeting he told Hawke and Keating that the budget 
deficit was not A$6 billion, as published by the previous government, but around A$ 9.6 
billion. Through this shocking news it immediately became clear to the new leaders that 
their planned and promised changes in economic policy, i.e. the introduction of a more 
Keynesian policy, were off. Still they managed to use the crisis to transform Australian 
economic policy for the next decade. ‘After some debate, they decided to devaluate the 
Australian dollar with 10%. Waving the treasury document [Stone’s report, JEN] in 
front of all the TV cameras at the dramatic announcement two days later, and by consis-
tently coming back to it in the months and years to come, they succeeded in thoroughly 
discrediting the Liberals’ claim to be naturally superior in managing the economy and 
maintaining fiscal responsibility’.41 
  
Hypothesis 2: Successful reformers form a cohesive unit, committed to demonstrating 




After the first step, the de-institutionalisation, reformist leaders need to take control of 
the process – i.e. take the lead - by offering the solution. They have to come with a clear 
vision, to convince followers and to prevent the opposition taking over. ‘t Hart & Gus-
tavsson (2002) point to the concept of political will: ‘reformist leadership requires a 
clear sense of vision, and the ability to espouse a deliberately partisan view of the direc-
tion that policy should take.’42 
However, successful reformist leaders should prevent themselves from becoming 
owner of the problem. Offering complete solutions at the beginning of the reform-
process bears the danger of over-commitment. It seems that partnership formation for 
reform enhances reforming success. Not solely the chief executive or most senior policy 
maker, but combinations of important actors, who are influential in the sector or organi-
sation, stand a better chance. They are referred to as political tandems or ‘small-scale, 
hardcore coalitions of reformers.’43 Those tandems are not restricted to political couples 
or tandems of civil servants. On the contrary, the combination of senior policy makers 
and senior civil servants enlarge reforming success. Both have the chance to gain sup-
port in their respective arenas, viz. political and ministerial.44 
A good example is again provided by the Australian experience of Hawke and 
Keating with the combination of de-institutionalisation through threatening language 
and offering an alternative by devaluating their currency and introducing new economic 
plans. ‘t Hart (1999) shows that they already worked on deregulation of the financial 
system, when they came into office. Without their ability to communicate those plans, it 
would have been difficult - or even impossible - to overcome the strong opposition to 
reform that existed in Australia. 
 
Hypothesis 3: If reformers develop and employ strategies targeted at persuading their 
political environment that the proposed changes are both desirable and inevitable, as 
well as practically feasible, they are more likely to be successful. 
  
The best plans are useless if leaders are not able to sell them to the stakeholders and the 
public. Reforming leaders have to convince the other actors that they have a good plan 
and persuade them to follow. Moreover, those plans are not only good, but the best! In 
order to communicate that, leaders might exaggerate the advantages of the options and 
play down concurring policy options. 
During the process of re-unification Helmut Kohl promised his fellow countrymen 
‘blühende Landschaften’ (flourishing landscapes). If they would elect him in the 1990 
election campaign, he would ensure that the re-unification would be conducted without 
raising taxes. This was a promise to the Western part of the country. He promised the 
East-Germans that nobody would suffer from the re-unification. Instead, everybody 
would gain from the healthy economy.45 
 
Gaining public support for reforms by persuasive rhetoric is insufficient to overcome 
resistance. It is important, too, to build coalitions and control the process within the de-
cision arenas. This might involve careful calibration of reform packages to muster sup-
port. Two hypotheses can be formulated that address this dimension of reformist institu-
tional crisis management:  
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Hypothesis 4: Successful reformist leaders manage to secure early support of imple-
menting actors for their crisis response strategy. 
 
Public support is necessary but not sufficient. Reforming leaders have to strive for sup-
port within the Parliament and/or from bureaucratic and societal ‘veto-players’. Often 
reforms are announced in White Papers or laws. Often, however, the political process 
does not end with the approval of the official policy. Opponents and critics still try to 
influence the outcome of the process during the implementation. Successful reformers 
secure early support, since other actors can help the reformers when (political) obstacles 
arise. 
All German chancellors, from Adenauer to Kohl, faced similar institutional con-
straints. Yet, it is interesting to see, how different they reacted to crises. All chancellors 
had their own inner circles of advisors, the so-called ‘kitchen cabinet’. Those advisors 
often had more influence than any minister of the official cabinet. Yet, during the hay-
days of terrorism in the 1970s, Helmut Schmidt had chosen to incorporate the opposi-
tion in the decision-making process. Helmut Kohl, the leader of the opposition party 
CDU, joined the most important decision-making consultations. By doing this, Schmidt 
not only had more influence on concurring policy-options, but he enlarged the legiti-
macy of his choices, as well46. 
  
Hypothesis 5: The tighter the leadership’s control over the crisis management process, 
the higher the likelihood of reform success. 
 
‘t Hart & Gustavsson (2002) point to the importance of ‘procedural’ leadership. Leaders 
can use their institutional powers to steer the crisis management process in their pre-
ferred directions. They can do so by making use of their ability to set the agenda, by 
selecting people in key positions (especially commissions), and by controlling the flow 
of information.  
After the Cold War, the Dutch Minister of Defence presented a White Paper in 
1991. It was full of insecurities and conservative views, which show that the makers 
mainly thought in Cold War terms. Many people from the defence organisation and for-
eign affairs worked on the paper and influenced the outcome. Traditionally the Com-
mander of the Army was highly involved in the process. As the environment was chang-
ing rapidly, the Minister was forced to re-write the paper within two years. Yet, for the 
writing of this White Paper, in which more severe cuts and downsizing were to be an-
nounced and the obligation for conscripts to enlist was virtually suspended, the minister 
opted for a very small and close circle. Only a few close assistants and military worked 
on it. This meant that any possible points of conflict - especially with the army, which 
had not been included in this process as much as it had been in the 1991 policy process - 
were excluded by selection. 
Conserving leadership 
Reformist leadership is a rare phenomenon in Western democratic politics. This is not 
just because of the many obstacles that reformists face, including the dispersal of veto 
powers within the system.47 Organisational inertia and national sentiments contribute to 
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the delay of the decline of mass armies.48 Often politicians and civil servants tend to be 
conservative in their actions. Those actors will not initiate changes without perceiving 
the need. Even if there seems to be a publicly or politically indicated need for change, 
some actors will try to stick to the old structures for as long as possible. In a compara-
tive case analysis, Boin et al. (2001) show that in four out of five cases, crisis managers 
initially will adapt a conserving strategy when facing an institutional crisis. A possible 
explanation lies in the basic nature of an institutional crisis that threatens the normal 
way in which things are done. Two behaviours appear to be important. On the one hand 
crisis managers will try to blame the threatening situation before they try to change the 
structures.49 On the other hand ‘[t]he centralization reflex of bureaucratic organizations 
[endows]... political-administrative elites with special authority to preserve what is.’50 
Terry introduces the term ‘administrative conservatorship’. This refers to ‘the will-
ingness of administrative elites, out of traditional loyalty and moral principles, to pre-
serve authority and distribution of power with regard to the propriety of an institution’s 
existence, its functional niche, and its collective institutional goals. ... [It] is concerned 
with the preservation of institutional integrity.’51 A sector or institution can change; 
indeed it must from time to time, but not at any price. The administrator has to protect 
the integrity of the institution, that is, ‘the completeness, wholeness, soundness, and 
persistence of administrative processes, value commitments, and unifying principles 
that determine an institution’s distinctive competence.’52 
It is in this sense that the conservation of the integrated organisation developed be-
cause of leadership practices. According to Selznick and Kaufman, institutions evolve 
by leaders applying ‘integrative techniques.’53 Terry’s theory helps to understand the 
preservation and protection by leadership of the institution once it exists, whether exe-
cuted by the same or different leaders. Conserving leadership has to protect the institu-
tional paradigm, preventing a third order change. 
Although Terry has proposed a normative theory, designed with the American con-
stitutional situation in mind, this study modifies it to enhance our empirical understand-
ing of the role of leadership in fostering and blocking institutional changes in general. 
Contrary to Schon’s (1970) notion of ‘dynamic conservatism’, where the structures of 
the social system resist change, it is leadership within the sector preventing change. 
There is, however, the possibility of (incremental) change within certain boundaries: 
 
‘Change and innovation sought by the administrative conservator is ... 
to respond to new forces and demands in the environment and to pre-
serve an institution's integrity. This type of change is equivalent to the 
Burkean notion of reform. The change and innovation initiated by the 
administrative conservator is guided by a fidelity to the institutions’ 
values and unifying principles.’54 
 
Two different styles of conservative leadership can be distinguished: initiating and pro-
tecting. According to Terry, these styles mark the end of a continuum (Figure 2).  
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Leadership Role Initiating Leadership Protecting Leadership
Type of Change Strategic Incremental
(Frame-breaking/ (Fine-tuning/adaptation
 frame-bending)  and zero change)  
Figure 2: A continuum of leadership roles performed by administrative conservator and corre-
sponding types of change. Source: Terry 1995: 63 
 
Initiating Leadership. Terry distinguishes between two types of strategic changes i.e. 
‘frame-breaking’ and ‘frame-bending’. The first are changes initiated in response to a 
threat of the institution’s integrity. ‘These changes require a radical break from an insti-
tution’s established conduct.’55 These changes are revolutionary and, according to 
Terry, because of that reason hard to implement, due to a larger number of external con-
straints.56 The threat can come from inside or outside the organisation and may be un-
foreseen. This distinguishes them from the latter, frame-bending changes, which are 
also made in response to external occurrences. Yet, these events are foreseeable; leaders 
can prepare their response strategy. The crucial difference between frame-bending and 
frame-breaking changes lies in the fact that the former do not require a drastic departure 
from existing structures or policy paradigms. 
 
Protecting Leadership marks the other end of Terry’s continuum of conserving leader-
ship. Intended change here is incremental or even zero. Incremental changes ‘are de-
signed to increase efficiency and co-ordination of institutional functions and processes 
as well as to reinforce values, beliefs, and myths [= fine tuning]’.57 On the other hand, 
incremental changes can be adaptive, made in order to react to external events. Yet, 
these changes are only minor and aim to improve slightly existing task-performance, 
without revolutionising or abandoning it. 
A good example for protecting leadership is the case of the Dutch top civil servant 
Docters van Leeuwen, head of the Dutch national secret service in the beginning of the 
1990s. In the aftermath of the end of the Warsaw Pact, the legitimacy of the service 
came under severe pressure as a result of a negative report about the functioning of the 
service and the so-called Gladio-affair58. Yet, headed by Docters van Leeuwen, who 
was supported by the Minister of Interior, the service regained legitimacy and even a 
broader task description. The head of the service reorganised the service and practiced a 
new openness that had been unprecedented. Nobody demanded the dissolution of the 
service anymore.59 Docters van Leeuwen managed to balance the delicate relation be-
tween responding to the demands of the organisation’s environment and protecting the 
organisation’s autonomy and values.60  
Terry’s theory is primarily normative. Yet, it is possible to formulate certain testable 
hypotheses in accordance with Terry, which constitute a partial inversion of the hy-
potheses on reformist leadership formulated above. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The more conserving leaders succeed to define the situation as a non-




Protecting leadership is, indeed, different from the reforming leader who re-structures 
the sector and tries to introduce new ideas, on which the sector’s policy is based. In or-
der to protect the sector from reform, the conserving leaders follow different strategies 
than the reforming leaders do. The conservers convince the sector, and in particular its 
environment, that the problems of the sector are temporary and that the roots of the 
problems lie outside the sector. While reforming leaders emphasise that the causes for 
crises are endogenous and structural, conserving leaders manage to show causes for 
crises outside the organisation or sector, which are incidental. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Successful conserving leaders form a cohesive unit, committed to prevent 
major policy and institutional changes. 
 
Stakeholders and media - the public opinion - turn themselves against a sector in crisis 
and ask for accountability by institutional or sectorial leaders. Old incidents are re-
interpreted in the light of ‘new’ evidences. Conserving leadership calms the situation by 
following de-politicisation strategies leading attention away from structural changes. 
One strategy might be soothing the tensions between environmental changes and an 
existing policy by slightly adapting the latter.61 This is easier the more the old structures 
have proven their value and the more the sector is resilient. Tandems of leadership or 
coalitions of conservers enlarge the success of conserving strategies. A navigator or 
lieutenant can be of great help to the helmsman in sharing work, responsibility, and in 
convincing different publics. 
 
Hypothesis 8: The more conserving leaders succeed to persuade their political environ-
ment of the undesirability and unfeasibility of reform in the sector, the higher the likeli-
hood of persistence of the status quo. 
 
To prevent changes, conserving leadership will develop a ‘rhetoric of reaction’.62 Just 
stating that changes are undesirable is not convincing. The possible consequences of 
reform have to be framed as a threat to the sector, its stakeholders and their future. 
Therefore, the leader will persuade his followers that reform has to be avoided.  
 
Until now, the three hypotheses on conserving leadership were mirror images of the 
hypotheses on reforming leadership. For the remaining hypotheses on support and pro-
cedural control, the differences between the two types of leadership behaviour are not 
that obvious. Conserving leadership needs support, too. Conserving leadership has to 
control the process, too. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that there may be dif-
ferences between the two leadership types in reaching those aims. 
 
Hypothesis 9: The greater the conserving leadership’s ability to secure the support of 
implementing actors for its strategy, the higher the likelihood of persistence of the status 
quo. 
Hypothesis 10: The tighter the leadership’s control over the crisis management process, 
the higher the likelihood of conserving success. 
 
Since conserving leadership tries to restore the legitimacy of the old institutional struc-
ture of the sector, it is important to prevent criticism as much as possible. Conserving 
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leadership cannot succeed if it tries to prevent reforms by mere delay and obstruction. 
On the contrary, leaders have to point to the proven values and gains of the sector, and 
they have to solicit support from actors who incorporate this success and help to restore 
the legitimacy of the sector. 
Conserving leadership controls the process of conservation to restore legitimacy of 
the sector. It prevents commissions or other actors from coming up with reform plans 
that have a fair chance of success. It is necessary for the leaders to influence the compo-
sition of commissions, decision forums, appointing allies to strategic positions within 
the chain of policy process or setting the agenda to enlarge the chance of conserving 
structures and paradigm of the sector. Note that those are the same tactics that reforming 
leaders use. So, hypothesis five, formulated at the reforming leadership section, does 
not discriminate between reforming and conserving leadership. We need to know, how-
ever, if the leader - conserving or reforming - is able to control the process following 
institutional crises. Leadership is after all about leading. And controlling the process is 
an important instrument. Therefore, hypothesis five needs to be considered in empirical 
testing of the theory, too. 
2.5 Leadership style: active versus passive leadership 
Whether it is about conserving or reforming leadership, until now this study hypothe-
sised leadership as active: leaders define situations or control processes and strive for 
coalitions. Terry states that ‘[f]rom an institutional perspective, administrative conserva-
torship is an active and dynamic process of strengthening and preserving an institution’s 
special capabilities, its proficiency, and thereby its integrity so that it may perform a 
desired social function.’63 
It is, however, arguable if this activism is the only feasible road to achieving one’s 
aims as a leader during a crisis. Depending on the severity of the crisis, the animosity of 
the institutional environment and the existence of veto-players within and outside the 
sector, the political space to manoeuvre for leaders might be more or less limited. In 
addition, sometimes leaders do not take the lead in crisis management, but deliberately 
choose to let other actors do their bidding. More reasons can be added, such as bureau-
politics or the relative power position of an actor within the sector. To rephrase James 
Davis Barber, whose famous study ‘The Presidential Character’ pronounced the active-
passive distinction in the analysis of political leadership styles: ‘activist [leadership] 
may run smack into a brick wall of resistance, then pull back and wait for a better mo-
ment. On the other hand, [leadership which sees itself] as a quiet caretaker may not try 
to exploit even the most favourable power situation.’64  
This study is not about the analysis or prediction of leaders’ political actions with 
the help of political-psychological techniques.65 This study uses a functional approach 
to leadership, which should not be confused with the rather popular notions of psycho-
logical traits of leaders or their personal style.66 Moreover, it is not about United States’ 
presidents but about political, bureaucratic, and military leadership in consensual de-
mocracies. The outcome of the leadership’s process depends on the constant interaction 
between the leaders with each other and their leadership environment. It is a dynamic 
process during which leaders may change their styles, depending on the situation.67  
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The concept of leadership in this study lies in the tradition of Greenstein’s interac-
tive method, further elaborated by Elgie: ‘[it] implies that political leaders operate 
within an environment which will both structure their behaviour and constrain their 
freedom of action. At the same time, it also implies that political leaders do have the 
opportunity to shape the environment in which they operate, so giving them potential to 











Figure 3: Leadership and its environment 
 
Figure 3 shows the interactive method adapted to this study. The policy outcome, policy 
reform or stability, depends on the subtle relation between the different leaders within 
the sector with each other and their environment. Does the leader lead or is he led by his 
institutional environment? At which moments is the one or the other more important for 
the direction that the policy process takes? Or, more precisely, when is the leader ac-
tively taking the lead and when is he passive within the system? The degree of leader-
ship and its success determines the environment’s possibility to influence the outcome. 
Therefore this study will concentrate on three stages within the reforming or stabilizing 
process: Why do leaders reform, how do they reform and what is the outcome in terms 
of policy change and crisis management effectiveness? 
Crisis management in context: Policymaking and leadership in consensual and West-
minster democracies 
The theories central to this study, i.e., conserving leadership by Terry and reforming 
leadership by ‘t Hart,69 were developed by using insights of policy processes in majori-
tarian or Westminster democracies. While Terry elaborated his normative theory within 
the American bureaucratic system, ‘t Hart tested his theory on the large economical and 
fiscal reforms in Australia of the 1980s. But Sweden and the Netherlands, the cases cen-
tral to this study, are so called consensual democracies. The question arises whether 
these theories are also applicable to these two countries and if so, under which condi-
tions. 
‘t Hart admitted that the reforming leadership style described in the propositions 1-5 
fitted the Australian system with its one-party government, strong institutional position 
of the prime minister and a dominant position of the state in some policy sectors.70 He 
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already pointed to possible constraints to active leadership in consensual policy sys-
tems, where strong leadership often bears negative connotations. With regard to the 
Netherlands he stated: ‘Where institutional rules spread influence due to checks and 
balances en political culture fosters reluctance against leaders, an other leadership style 
[than in Australia] is necessary’.71 
Indeed, at first sight the possibilities for leadership in consensual democracies seem 
limited  the ‘hindrance powers’ seem stronger than those in Westminster style political 
systems. Lijphart distinguishes ten differences between majoritarian and consensus de-
mocracies spread over two dimensions. They are listed in Table 2 and illustrate some of 
the relative freedom or constraints leadership might face in the respective democracies. 
 
 Westminster democracy Consensus democracy 
Executive-party dimension Concentration of executive 
power in single-party majority 
cabinets 
Executive power-sharing in 
broad multiparty coalitions 
 Executive-legislative relation-




 Two-party system Multiparty system 
 Majoritarian and dispropor-
tional electoral system 
Proportional representation 
 Pluralist interest group sys-
tems with free-for-all compe-
tition among groups  
Coordinated and ‘corporatist’ 
interest group systems aimed 
at compromise and consulta-
tion 
Federal-unitary dimension Unitary and centralized gov-
ernment  
Federal and decentralised 
government 
 Concentration of legislative 
power in a unicameral legisla-
ture 
Division of legislative power 
between two equally strong 
but differently constituted 
houses 
 Flexible constitutions that can 
be amended by simple majori-
ties  
Rigid constitutions that can be 
changed only by extraordinary 
majorities 
 Legislatures have the final 
word on the constitutionality 
of their own legislation 
Laws are subject to a judicial 
review of their constitutional-
ity by supreme or constitu-
tional courts 
 Central banks that are de-
pendent on the executive 
Independent central banks 
 Table 2: Differences between Westminster and consensus democracies (Lijphart 1999: 3-4) 
 
Although the Netherlands and Sweden are not pure consensual democracies, they score 
relatively low on the executive-party dimension and can be considered consensual de-
mocracies on this dimension. Sweden has a multiparty system with a dominant social 
democratic party.72 During the 1990s governing with minority governments was the 
practice, the government therefore had to solicit the support of different actors, often 
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depending on the policy issue. Sweden scores average on the executive-legislative bal-
ance of power. This indicates that the parliamentary government (in contrast to presi-
dential governments) has an average duration.73 The country has a proportional repre-
sentation with list proportional representation; the voters vote on a party list and the 
seats are allocated according to the percentage of the votes in the whole country.74 Yet, 
the election system also fosters regionalism,. The members of parliament are chosen in 
29 different constituencies , who take the effects of their decisions on their home region 
into account. It is a very corporatist country.75 
The Netherlands has a multiparty system without a dominant party.76 It has a long 
tradition of coalitional governments. The country is a parliamentary democracy, with an 
average executive dominance.77 Like Sweden it has a list proportional representation78 
with a clear dominance of parliamentarians from the highly industrialised region called 
the ‘Randstad’, which includes the four largest cities of the country. The Netherlands is 
a corporatist country as well.79 
According to Lijphart, Sweden has a lower degree of consensus on the federal-
unitary dimension than the Netherlands.80 In contrast to the Netherlands, considered 
semi-federal with medium-strength bicameralism, Sweden is a unitary and decentralised 
country with one chamber.81 Moreover, Sweden has a very flexible constitution that can 
be changed with ordinary majority and that knows a weak judicial review of the laws, 
while in the Netherlands a two-thirds majority is required and no judicial review ex-
ists.82 
In their six-country times four-sector study about success and failure in public gov-
ernance, Bovens et al. hypothesised the Netherlands as a ‘(c)onsociational system where 
neocorporatist bargaining (the ‘polder model’) has combined institutional endurance 
with flexible policy style.’83 In their opinion Sweden is a ‘corporatist, unitary system 
with strong social engineering ethos, long viewed as the paradigm ‘welfare state’ faced 
with economic recession later than most other European countries.’84 The authors hy-
pothesised both countries as strongly consensual with a moderately proactive (Nether-
lands) and strongly proactive (Sweden) policy style.85 
Following Richardson, Bovens et al. define a policy style ‘as a more or less stable 
pattern of policymaking that arises from the interaction between a government’s ap-
proach to problem solving and the relationships between government and other actors in 
the policy process.’86 Proactive means that a government is considered able to foresee 
and anticipate social problems before they manifest themselves in a critical way. In the 
reactive approach to problem solving, on the other hand, the state only acts when prob-
lems have already manifested themselves. The aim of their actions is then to reduce the 
urgency of the problem. This view is based on a so-called realist philosophy, where the 
policy maker’s abilities are bounded by ‘laissez-fair’ ideology, all-encompassing uncer-
tainty about the causes of social problems, organisational complexity and value con-
flicts.87 
The second dimension, besides style, is the state’s autonomy towards other social 
actors. Central to this dimension is the question whether the state is able to impose its 
policy upon the other actors or not. At one end of the continuum one finds the strong 
executive that dominates the process. Decisions are sanctioned politically by a legisla-
ture that operates independently from interest groups.88 The other end of the continuum 
marks the consensus type of policymaking: ‘institutionalised concertation [consultation] 
between state and various social actors who in effect possess veto powers.’89 Keeping 
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Bovens’ et al. conclusion in mind, i.e., that policy styles can differ depending on the 
policy area90 and that ‘the consensual element of the policy style explanation does ap-
pear to reveal a good deal about the way government is able to perform its tasks’,91 this 










Sweden   Netherlands 
 
Figure 4: Country selection and hypothesised national policy styles. Bovens et al. 2001: 16, 19 
 
Although consensual politics may limit leadership’s space to manoeuvre, the active 
problem solving style in the Netherlands and Sweden might encourages leaders to strive 
for change. The relation between leadership and its environment is influenced by the 
needs of the society and the institutional structures.92 Consensus democracies offer 
room for dispersed leadership, where formal leadership responsibilities are compart-
mentalised among the ministers.93 Yet, it is expected that, in the cases under study, the 
actual strategies and actions of reforming and conserving leaders will differ from those 
in majoritarian type democracies.94 The differences between the political systems are 
related to the different types and styles of leaders in policy change. 
In the case of the Netherlands, the Prime Minister as ‘primus-inter-pares’ is consti-
tutionally much weaker than many of his counterparts in Westminster-type systems. He 
has little influence on setting the agenda and he ‘lacks the formal powers to give in-
structions to ministers, to dismiss ministers, or even to reshuffle the government.’95 Fur-
thermore, the lack of a spoils system in any form brings ministers into office with little 
political assistance and a high dependency on the civil service. Other constraints imbed-
ded in the political system are the electoral system, which promotes coalitional govern-
ments and, due to decentralisation tendencies, is a hindrance power to active leadership 
ubiquitous.96 
The Swedish system entails similar though somewhat less stringent constraints. The 
prime minister is more powerful than his Dutch colleague, the more he is also party 
leader. Party leaders in Sweden are closely involved in every stage of the government 
formation. The prime minister directly appoints the other ministers of the cabinet and 
the power of the single ministers is restricted (by and large) to collective decision mak-
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ing of the cabinet. An important factor complicating leadership in Sweden is the strong 
will of the political actors to seek broad consensus for policies deemed important to the 
small neutral state’s survival, particularly in defence and foreign affairs.  
Systemic constraints in combination with reluctance by the population for power 
executed single handed, leads to the fact that leadership in consensual democracies 
might often be exercised by a variety of public servants, whether civil or political. 
Though this study starts from the analysis of the formal organisational, institutional 
leaders, this focus is by no means exclusive. This study concentrates on the level of po-
litical decision-makers, their parliamentarian counterparts and civil servants who might 
turn formal leader postings into institutional leadership. Above all, it wants to empha-
sise the passive side of leadership, a leadership style that is expected in consensual de-
mocracies. 
Combining types of leadership, i.e. conserving vs. reforming, with styles of leadership, 
i.e. passive vs. active, leads to a two-dimensional typology of institutional leadership 












Figure 5: Leadership types and styles 
 
(I) Active-conserving leadership. This resembles the leadership style presented in 
hypotheses six to ten. Following Terry’s notion of conserving leadership, the 
leaders actively try to de-politicise the situation by convincing the environment 
of the incidental character of the crisis. They persuade their environment that the 
old structures had proven their values and that changes are undesirable and un-
feasible. Dynamically they are striving for coalitions to conserve what is. Again, 
different from Schon (1971), this is dynamic leadership not ‘dynamic conserva-
tism’ of the structures. 
(II) Active-reforming leadership. This is the type of leadership studied by ‘t Hart 
(2000), ‘t Hart & Gustavsson (2002), and Goldfinch & ‘t Hart (2003). Making 
use of the window of opportunity to change by dramatically portraying events, 
showing resolve and actively striving for strategic support. Goldfinch & ‘t Hart 
explicitly state ‘that Westminster systems [might be] more conducive to nonin-
cremental reforms because of their ability to produce major political pendulum 
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swings in government, although in many cases federal structures encourage and 
sometimes force a degree of compromise and negotiation in policy change.’97 
The British system, which is the prototype of the Westminster system,98 is con-
sidered to be more advantageous to reforming leadership than most western de-
mocracies. The institutional setting is favouring leaders who want to change pol-
icy on a basis of an individual political vision,99 which is an important element 
of Goldfinch & ‘t Hart’s theory.100 
(III) Passive-conserving leadership. This might be a leadership style that is often 
found in consensual democracies. In those systems, negotiation rather than 
strong resolve is more rule than exception. Institutional crisis might open the 
window to change by weakening or taking away structural constraints, but that 
does not mean that leadership can now be exercised in an institutional and po-
litical vacuum, or, that all actors want to exploit the situation. Other actors make 
use of the window of opportunity, most of the time with opposite aims and lead-
ers will not change, cannot change, have no well-defined plans and the skills to 
conserve. In short, they fail to exercise leadership. Moreover, moral and ideo-
logical constraints can prevent actors from making use of critical situations, 
where often policy seeking is confused with office seeking. This also holds true 
for the fourth and last type. 
(IV) Passive-reforming leadership. Leadership in consensual democracies is different 
from the Westminster model. Coalition governments are the rule rather than the 
exception. Active leadership can lead to unrest and political instability. It is wise 
to reform through consensus and leaders tend to govern with a ‘steady hand’. 
This expression of Germany’s Chancellor Schröder refers to the avoidance of 
action that leads to fears and commotion within the population, leading in fact to 
the opposite effect of (intended) reforms. The rules of the game encourage back 
room strategies, where negotiations take place in small circles, rather than in 
large arenas. Commissions serve to find consensus since leadership in public of-
ten makes politicians suspect. Leaders act wisely by waiting to see which way 
the wind blows. They first have to fathom common ground, before explaining 
their strategy in public, whether reforming or conserving. Procedural skills seem 
more important than rhetorical tricks. Those who know how the system works 
and those who make use of the institutional abilities enlarge their chances for 
success. As Moon hypothesised: ‘Innovative leadership in systems with many 
institutional vetoes seems hard, simply because of the need to mobilize diverse 
political forces and to either capture or win support from a range of institutions 
and interests.’101 Yet, passive-reforming leadership is more than substantive and 
procedural managerialism, though those are the skills needed. It is one of the 
few possibilities in Western consensual democracies to exercise innovative, suc-
cessful leadership in overcoming structural constraints. 
 
This study maintains an even-handed approach. However, institutional characteris-
tics of Swedish and Dutch political systems might be more conducive to passive than to 
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Chapter 3: Research design and methods 
 
3.1 Studying leadership in action 
Studying leadership in consensus democracies is navigating between ideological 
schools and different sciences. The concepts of leaders and leadership are studied, 
among others, in history, sociology, economy, psychology and political science. This 
not only implies that every science developed its own image of leadership, but that 
those images are difficult to combine. Rost refers to a thousand different and often con-
tradicting definitions of leadership.1 The different perspectives on leadership depend on 
the tradition and the branch of the scientists who investigate this phenomenon. 
Most of the studies concentrate on the single powerful leader. The political-
psychological analyses by Hermann or Winter are only a few examples of how science 
tries to shed light on the motives of presidents as an engine for their political ambi-
tions.2 However, it is difficult to incorporate the political and societal context in studies 
on leadership. Students of leadership writing biographical studies and concentrating on 
the ‘great men’ run the risk of overlooking structural constraints to the single leader. 
Moreover, it is tempting to talk about influence while it is difficult to establish causal 
relations within complex multi-actor systems, which most policy sectors in consensual 
democracies are. On the other hand, in the last decennia there have been several politi-
cal leaders who – according to (neo-Marxist) structural tradition – should either not ex-
ist or not play a prominent role. Examples of this are the German Chancellors Helmut 
Kohl during the German re-unification and Willy Brandt with his famous East-policy, 
or Michael Gorbachev with the Soviet glasnost. 
This study considers leadership as a function that is necessary to give direction to 
the members in society, to ensure enduring social cohesion and cooperation.3 According 
to ‘t Hart, leadership fulfils crucial tasks within politics and society: community build-
ing, simplification and setting norms. All three are an expression of political leadership 
and pattern breaking, taking crucial decisions and taking responsibility, which in turn 
are all three part of administrative leadership.4 A third form of leadership that is consid-
ered to be important in the subject of this study is bureaucratic leadership. In consensual 
democracies where political responsibility of representative elected politicians is cru-
cial, the normative political and public administrative science often ignores the sheer 
existence of bureaucratic leadership. It is however open to question, why only a handful 
of politicians – the Minister and the Junior-Ministers – might exercise leadership in 
complex policy sectors, while senior civil servants with their expertise and profound 
knowledge of the sector, its stakeholders and environment, might only patiently follow. 
Whether desirable or not, the possibility that bureaucratic leadership exists has to be 
tested in empirics. Therefore, the object of this study is not only the single powerful 
leader, but it also includes other actors who might exercise conserving or reforming 
leadership. 
This study also emphasises an aspect of military leadership that differs from com-
mon perspectives. An incredible amount of literature exists about military leadership on 
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the battlefield or about the military role of leader in education, training and economical 
management. Yet, little is known about military leaders as policy makers, especially in 
times of non-military crises, when they are expected to re-legitimise the sector in the 
political and bureaucratic trenches. What are their plans and strategies to reach their 
aims? Do they actively strive for support from influential actors, such as parliamentari-
ans, civil servants and politicians? In short, this boils down to the question whether 
military leaders merely function in their own organisation, or whether they exercise 
leadership in the whole sector. In particular, in Western democracies it is interesting to 
know what the limits of military leadership are. How small or wide is the room to ma-
noeuvre between political loyalty and loyalty to the organisation? 
As already indicated in chapter 2, leadership does not operate within a vacuum, but 
in relation to its environment. Moreover, this study is not about proving leadership as 
the sole cause for policy change or reform. In the empirical chapters, decision structures 
and political features of regimes - which have proven their importance for policy change 
in former studies,5 - will be presented, too. The concept of leadership as it is used in this 
study will serve to fill a gap that structural explanations cannot fill or can fill only very 
roughly.6 This study will try to determine how plausible leadership is for the outcome of 
the defence policy processes in Sweden and the Netherlands after the Cold War, without 
neglecting the importance of other factors, which, however, cannot be elaborately em-
pirically tested in this study.7 In short, this study will show that who leads matters and 
how predominant leaders will deal with political constraints in similar environments in 
different ways.8 
In the remainder of this chapter the operationalisation of the relevant hypotheses 
will be elaborated on. First, however, the methodological choices will be elucidated: 
why conduct a comparative case study and why compare the Netherlands and Sweden? 
3.2 A comparative case study 
To study the role of leadership in institutional reform we will use the comparative case 
study method. In addition to the already indicated pitfalls in the introduction, several 
methodological demands that have to be taken into account need to be pointed out, es-
pecially when working with few cases where the independent variables exceed those 
cases to such a degree that it is impossible to draw statistical valid inference.9 It is there-
fore important to emphasise that case studies are more analytical generalisations than 
statistical ones. Case studies deepen and generalise theories, which in turn build on ear-
lier empirical studies.10 In this study we will test the theories of reforming and conserv-
ing leadership by ‘t Hart respectively Terry as presented in the foregoing chapter.  
We are using the method of most similar system design and process tracing to guar-
antee more valid causal inference. It is important to underscore that in this study we 
want to accentuate the causal strength of one variable, i.e. leadership. However, we are 
aware that many more factors contribute to the outcome, i.e. whether or not maintaining 
a certain form of military conscription. We want to show to what extent leadership con-
tributes to this outcome.11  
The most similar system design resembles to a great extent the method of difference 
by Przewoski and Teune’s, following J.S. Mill’s demand for valid experimental de-
signs.12 The method serves social sciences, especially historical researchers, who cannot 
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rely on experimental designs, to eliminate potential sufficient causes. With the method 
of difference ‘the outcome is present in some cases and not present in others. Hence, 
any hypothesised cause that is shared by all the cases cannot by itself be sufficient for 
the outcome, since not all cases with the hypothesised cause experience the outcome of 
interest.’13 
In Sweden and the Netherlands we have different outcomes with regard to conscrip-
tion.14 Whereas the Netherlands postponed the draft in 1993, Sweden is still drafting 
soldiers for military service. In many ways Sweden and the Netherlands are similar. 
Both are Western democracies with an advanced economy, high welfare state provisions 
and a high level of technological development. In addition, both are consensus democ-
racies with well-defined corporatist structures.  
The countries differ largely in their ways of (defence) policymaking. While the 
Netherlands have a plural society which - on the political level - is often expressed in 
oversized cabinets, the Swedish non plural society15 often brings minority governments 
to the fore. Another important difference is the question of alliance. While the Nether-
lands is a member of NATO, Sweden has for centuries been relying on its own ability to 
defend the country. It is expected that the domestic political system and international 
constraints provide different opportunities for reforming or conserving leadership within 
the defence sectors in both countries. 
 The Dutch defence policymaking process is less formalised than the Swedish, espe-
cially during the beginning of the 1990s when the ministry changed from a matrix to a 
corporate business structure. The Minister of Defence has the ability to include or ex-
clude actors in his organisation during different stages of a policy process. However, he 
depends on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is responsible for the foreign and secu-
rity policy parts of the Defence White Papers. 
In the Swedish system more (political) actors are involved in the defence policy-
making process and often they have to strive for consensus. Defence policymaking is 
highly formalised and often exercised by minority governments (at least during the 
studied period). In different stages many political, military and societal actors are offi-
cially involved in the process, having the opportunity to comment on defence policy 
plans by writing a dissenting opinion that is formally referred to in governmental propo-
sitions.16 
To show the relation between the dependent and independent variable, we use the 
method of process tracing. Process tracing aims at identifying the causal mechanics 
linking those variables and ‘avoid mistaking a spurious correlation for a causal associa-
tion.’17 This important tool to comparative historical analysis with small-N establishes 
causal paths between variables by linking consecutive variables together. Or, as Tarrow 
states, it is ‘to connect the phases of the policy process and enable the investigator to 
identify the reasons for a particular kind of decision through the dynamics of events.’18 
This method is valuable to the institutional perspective we are using, which strives for a 
comprehensive approach. Rather than focussing only on the single powerful leader, we 
try to identify relations between actors and their domestic and – where necessary – in-
ternational institutional environment. 
In this study the policy process will be reconstructed not only in chronological or-
der, but more importantly, also in causal relations.19 Focus was given to policy deci-
sions (papers, parliamentary debates), on the actors that might have been influential in 
this decision-making and on how this relates to the outcomes in both countries. By us-
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ing parliamentary documents, documents from the archives of the different ministries, 
armed forces, and commissions, newspaper archives and interviews, an effort was made 
to show as exact a (non) relation as possible between the hypothesised dependent and 
independent variables. 
However, there still remains a certain validity problem. Not all documents were ar-
chived or available for research. Some actors refused to be interviewed or had already 
passed away and even if they cooperated, sometimes it still was difficult to show which 
actor reflected reality (in cases where all other relevant documents were missing), in 
particular when actors were contradicting each other. Some relations that were hypothe-
sised could not have been traced. The question that will remain is whether those rela-
tions were not existent at all or whether practical research problems prevented the writer 
from establishing those relations. 
Though logical reconstruction seems to provide an outcome to this problem, tradi-
tional problems of actor centred research could still not have been solved in this re-
search. The first example of this is the power and influence of certain actors and antici-
pation by others to this influence. In particular when interviewing military actors and 
when reconstructing the policy process within the military organisation, it was not al-
ways clear if actors had anticipated the (presumed) leaders’ preferences or if they used 
the influence of their superiors as an ‘excuse’. Secondly, more often then not, there 
might be doubts about the origins of policy plans. In large-scale ‘garbage can’ organisa-
tions in particular, it is difficult to show which actors dominated the (internal) processes 
of policy formulation. This may even be more difficult to establish the longer ago the 
process took place. An important ‘handicap’ for the Dutch researcher is the directive 
that personal policy papers of crucial actors in the defence sector are not available to the 
public. 
Those problems are associated with the general problems in leadership research we 
already referred to above (leadership does matter). Instead of trying to prove the leader-
ship’s influence on the outcome, an effort will be made to establish causal relations, by 
eliminating concurring or flawed explanations, of which leadership is a plausible ele-
ment. In terms of policy tracing, an attempt will be made to eliminate spurious correla-
tions. The small-N, however, does not allow for generalisations to other cases, which is 
a limitation to this study. Conclusions that might be drawn, if empirical evidence allows 
this, are not applicable to other cases. Yet, it is expected, that the empirical evidence 
and the theoretical explanations will guide future research on defence policy changes, 
reforms in policy sectors, and leadership in Western democracies.  
3.3 Operationalisation 
This section is devoted to the actual methods for the collection and interpretation of data 
used in the empirical investigation. A crucial step here is the operationalisation of the 
theoretical concepts put forward in the three clusters of theory development as de-
scribed in sections 3 to 5 of chapter 2. Each cluster will be dealt with separately below. 
What is important to note here, is that studying the policymaking behaviour of more 
or less contemporary political and particularly bureaucratic leaders in an empirically 
rigorous fashion is a challenging task, for which no methodological panacea has been 
found by any of the scholars working in this area.20 Indeed, leadership analysis at large 
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has produced a plethora of methods to grasp various aspects of a leader’s personality, 
world view and generic leadership style21, but this is much less the case for the actual 
process of leading on concrete policy issues. 
Moreover, there are many constraints on data availability when one is studying con-
temporary leaders: minutes of crucial meetings are not yet available, nor are the internal 
memos and confidential documentation. Interviewees working with or under leaders are 
much less likely to be candid when talking about incumbent leaders than about past 
leaders. And in the dominant logic of the relations between politics and bureaucracy, 
top civil servants (including military leaders) are supposed to remain invisible to outside 
researchers as much as possible. 
With not too much to go on as far as pre-existing operationalisations of key vari-
ables and easy access to data sources is concerned, an effort will be made to establish 
and find plausible indicators in this study for the variables at stake. Let us first turn to 
the first cluster of hypotheses concerning leader’s motives to reform and conserve. 
Why policy makers reform or conserve conscription 
As stated in section 2.3, the four propositions on leader motives refer to the subjective 
crisis awareness of the policy makers, their political calculus, their conviction about the 
need to change and their institutional position. The key independent variables in these 
propositions are stated below. The dependent variable, e.g. inclination to take a reform-
ist or conserving approach in response to an institutional crisis, will be measured by 
proxy. We shall confine ourselves to those high level political and bureaucratic officials 
who have actually displayed conserving or reformist behaviour, as defined below and as 
became evident from the reconstruction of the course of events in both cases. There is, 
of course, an important distinction between motivation to behave and actual behaviour. 
There may well have been actors in the two cases that wanted to take a proactive re-
formist or conserving stance, but did not have the institutional position to do so, or oth-
erwise felt constrained to act upon their inclination. While acknowledging this impor-
tant difference, it is all but impossible for an outside, post-hoc researcher to maintain 
and ‘measure’ this distinction. For each of the independent variables, one or several 
indicators have been developed:  
 
- Leader’s crisis awareness. Policy maker’s crisis awareness can be measured by the 
felt threat potential of the external task environment and of the political environ-
ment. In other words: to which extent do leaders think and show to the public that 
doing nothing might worsen the situation? To measure this public statements by the 
leaders have to be analysed in order to understand whether they referred to or were 
concerned about both financial costs and non-financial implications, if an institution 
would not be changed. 
- Political calculus of the expected gains and damages. Translated to empirical reality 
we have to examine the size of the coalition majority and the period during which 
the political business cycle leaders initiate change. It is assumed that a larger major-
ity produces more stable governments and because of this, policy makers will have 
more room to manoeuvre. In addition, following Cortell & Peterson’s hypothesis 
that elites might be more likely to reform the longer it takes before they are held ac-
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countable,22 an indicator will be the duration between the date of policy change and 
important elections. There rests the problem of transferability of this hypothesis and 
its related operationalisation to non-political leaders. Remember, this study also 
concentrates on bureaucratic and military leaders. To them political accountability, 
measured in majorities and timing within the political business cycle is less applica-
ble. A good indicator for those non-political actors might be a career calculus. In 
how far are those actors convinced that reforming or conserving the sector will serve 
their personal career planning?  
- Inner convictions regarding necessity of change. What are the ideas, the ideological 
points of reference for the leader? What role do defence and conscription play in 
this ideology? Did the leader have ‘well-formed views on the needed reform’23 or 
did he want to maintain the status quo? It is not only important that leaders express 
their inner convictions in public, but also that their actions do not contradict them. 
Preferably those statements should date back preliminarily to the reform period by 
the policy makers, whether in speeches, media, or election programs, or evidence 
might be found by interviewing close political and civil servant assistants. 
- Institutional position of the leaders. Since financial indicators tend to be good indi-
cators for political effects, empirical questions to test this hypothesis will concern 
the calculated effects of reforms on the budgets of the defence and the different parts 
of the armed forces. The more that leaders lose their financial sources in the policy 
process, the weaker their institutional position will be. In addition, one can ask what 
the relative autonomy of the sector is in the reform proposals. Do sectorial leaders 
have great autonomy; do they have to arrange policy with other political leaders, 
such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister, or does reforming or 
conserving the institution help the leaders improve their position? 
How leaders reform or conserve conscription 
In 2.3 hypotheses have been formulated. It appears that sets of hypotheses can be 
formed, since the theories about conserving and reforming leadership are closely con-




Dimension Set Reforming Conserving 
I. 1) The more dramatically re-
formist leaders portray current 
events or issues as serious and 
acute crisis, the higher the like-
lihood of reform success. 
6) The more conserving lead-
ers succeed to define the situa-
tion as a non-recurring, exoge-
nous incident, the higher their 
chances of preserving the insti-
tutional status quo. 
II. 2) If reform leaders gather to-
gether allies to form a cohesive 
team in support of important 
changes, prospects for success 
are enhanced. 
7) Successful conserving lead-
ers form a cohesive unit, com-
mitted to prevent major policy 
and institutional changes. 
Communication 
III. 3) If reformers develop and 
employ strategies targeted at 
persuading their political envi-
ronment that the proposed 
changes are both desirable and 
inevitable, as well as practically 
feasible, they are more likely to 
be successful. 
8) The more conserving lead-
ers succeed to persuade their 
political environment of the 
undesirability and unfeasibility 
of reform in the sector, the 
higher the likelihood of persis-
tence of the status quo. 
Coalition IV. 4) Successful reformist leaders 
manage to secure early support 
of implementing actors for their 
crisis response strategy. 
9) The greater the conserving 
leadership’s ability to secure 
the support of implementing 
actors for its strategy, the 
higher the likelihood of persis-
tence of the status quo. 
 V. 5) The tighter the leadership’s 
control over the crisis manage-
ment process, the higher the 
likelihood of reform success. 
10) The tighter the leadership’s 
control over the crisis man-
agement process, the higher the 
likelihood of conserving suc-
cess. 
Table 3: Sets of hypotheses 
 
Translated into empirical testing, the following operationalisation of the hypotheses will 
be used: 
 
- Problem definition. The operational question is, whether the situation will be framed 
by the leaders as a threat to the sector that needs to be resolved by reforms, or – 
quite the opposite – whether they ensure the public that either the situation is non-
recurring, or that changes in the sector would be wrong. The rhetoric of the policy 
makers in the sector will be analysed. Do they depict the situation as a crisis threat-
ening the sector, or do they play down the situation? The more that leaders share the 
definition, the more likely it prevails. It is, additionally, hypothesised that reforming 
actors who are not associated with the order they deinstitutionalise are more likely 
to succeed. For the operation that means that actors relatively new to the sector 
might have a higher chance of convincing their environment. 
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- Committed leadership. Whatever the definition of the situation is, whether threaten-
ing or non-recurring, the conclusions that leaders draw from their definitions are 
what is important. The leaders have to offer a solution to take the lead. For the 
analysis, it is important to know how motivated they are, both internally and exter-
nally. The question is, whether the resolve leaders offer is merely lip service or a 
clear sense of vision. To find this out, actions and rhetoric of policy makers have to 
be tested on congruency. In addition, analysis is needed of whether the reformers 
form a cohesive unit or whether they tried to change the system single-handedly. 
- Leadership’s persuasion tactics. Whether reforming or conserving, leadership has to 
offer ways out of a crisis. Three indicators can be used to test the hypotheses of 
leadership’s ability to persuade the public. Firstly, if the leader promises resolve or 
simply proposes slight adaptations to structures that have proven their value in the 
past, his plans should be clearly stated. It is therefore necessary that the leaders pre-
sent one well-defined specific plan. Secondly, how do they present the plan; which 
channels do they choose to convince relevant actors? Thirdly, how useful are the ar-
guments? What is the pattern of argumentation? How good are they compared to the 
opponents’ arguments? Hirschman24 provides us with good research tools, espe-
cially for identifying conservative strategies, which should not be confused with 
conserving leadership. While the latter tries to prevent far-reaching changes of the 
sector, because the leaders are convinced of the values, beliefs, and integrity of the 
sector, the conservative strategies try to prevent changes as an aim in itself. They are 
veto-players rather than conservers and display hindrance power rather than leaders 
responding to the environment’s demands. Writing about ‘The Rhetoric of Reaction’ 
Hirschman distinguishes three reactive-reactionary theses.25 First, the perversity the-
sis, where reactionary rhetoric points to the fact that possible changes to improve a 
situation are actually intensifying the condition one is trying to improve. Secondly, 
the futility thesis, where actors underscore that the intended changes will make no 
difference to the situation. Finally, the jeopardy thesis, pointing at rhetoric that un-
derscores the negative consequences of change by pointing at the fact that reform 
measures endanger important and precious achievements of the past.26 Opposite this 
rather negative annotated conservative strategy is ‘t Hart’s positive look on success-
ful reforming leadership. According to him, reforming leaders are more successful 
the more they intensively argue that their reform proposals are more inevitable, de-
sirable, and feasible than alternative competing plans.27  
- Building broad support. Different from set II, this set of hypotheses is about solicit-
ing support by leadership teams within sector and organisation. Together the leaders 
have already formulated the tactics and strategies. This stage is about actively con-
vincing other actors who are important during the implementation phase to agree on 
those plans, since many successful policy outputs in the past were frustrated in the 
implementation phase by the actors who felt neglected in the policymaking phase. 
There is not much empirical research guiding this part of the study. Yet, it is sup-
posed that leaders are gaining support top-down: consecutively at the political offi-
cial top of the sector/ministry, other relevant ministries, and the executive parts, in 
this case the armed forces. 
- Controlling the process. The best strategies are useless if the leaders are not able to 
steer the outcomes. Procedural leadership is very important during the whole proc-
ess. ‘t Hart & Gustavsson (2002) point to the importance of ‘procedural’ leadership.. 
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From zero-change to abolition of conscription: policy outcomes operationalised 
 
 Degrees of change Characteristics 
0. No change Policy remains the same as before (zero-
decision) 
I. Adjustment change Degree of the effort in the chosen basic 
instrument is increasing or decreasing 
and/or the degree of the receiver 
changes. Analytic or routine consecutive 
changes. Change is led by technical ex-
pertise. The overarching policy goals and 
instruments remain the same, i.e. what is 
done, how it is done and the motive for 
why it is done remains the same.  
No or moderate change 
of prevailing policy 
II. Instrumental change  Change in the range of instruments used 
(new and/or others), level of engagement 
and degree of the expressed effect. Less 
frequent (than the adjustment change) 
and the change happens rather as a re-
sponse to dissatisfaction with old policy 
than as a reaction to new events. The 
change is led by people within the bu-
reaucracy. What is done and how it is 
done changes whereas the aim or the 
goal for the reason remains unchanged. 
III. Problem and/or goal 
change 
The initial problem or goal for which the 
policy was designed is changed or obso-
lete. The aim in itself changes. The same 
characteristics as before change (above) 
plus statements and actions that are in-
compatible with earlier goals or problem 
definitions, alternatively openly an-
nounced but prior goals have been 
changed or that policy is missing (new 
goal).  
IV. Paradigmatic change of 
procedures 
A significant shift of a power centre for 
policy. Change is led by politicians, who 
share the control over policy in addition 
to the normal policy setting.  
Substantial change of 
prevailing policy 
V. Paradigm shift  Dramatic change in both, word and deed, 
which often have an international aspect. 
Accumulation of anomalies, experiment-
ing with new policy forms and policy 
failures. Changes often touch upon dif-
ferent policy areas and their underlying 
hierarchy of the goal and basic instru-
ments. The basic goals and assumptions 
about the cause and effect can no longer 
be seen as a given. Changes led by poli-
ticians. 
Table 4: Characteristics for the six possible results of the dependent variable; source Lindgren 
2003: 36 (Translation D. Hansén and JEN) 
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The leaders have to use their institutional powers to steer the policymaking process. The 
best way to do so is by making use of their ability to set the agenda, to select people in 
key positions including commissions, and to control the flux of information. Questions 
to be asked are: what is the structure of the policy sector? Is it an open or more closed 
sector, with fewer actors from outside? Has the sector been structured very hierarchi-
cally, or does it consist of horizontal networks of equal actors? It is important to analyse 
which procedural obstructions opponents, or veto-players, can use to slow down or even 
prevent the reform process. Factors, amongst others, are the judicial aspects of the re-
form process and the political and institutional formal and informal rules, like the power 
of Parliament in a dual system. Finally, not only parliamentary power can thwart re-
forms, governmental structure can do this as well. Especially in coalition governments, 
powerful opponents within the administration are able to block/prevent, influence, or 
take over reform plans 
Reforms - in this study defined as deliberate and sustained attempts at non-
incremental change in the substance and process of government28 - mark only one ex-
treme of a broad range of policy outcomes aimed at fostering or preventing change. 
Lindgren (2003) gives a comprehensive and exhaustive overview of six characteristics 
of foreign policy change (Table 4) based on the works of Herman (1990), Hall (1993), 
and completed with thoughts by Visser & Hemerijck (1997), Sylvan & Voss (1998), 
and Wallensteen (2002). In this section, those ideas will be translated to changes in de-
fence policy. Since our study concentrates on the decision making process and less on 
the implementation process, it is important to note that the possible changes in this 
study focus on the policy output and less on its outcome. Especially since some of the 
processes are still going on while writing this study - i.e. the handling of the conscrip-
tion issue in Sweden - we could only give indications of or prospects for policy out-
comes in the long run. 
The most far-reaching reform within the defence sector would be a paradigm shift. 
For example, for the armed forces after the Cold war that could mean the change away 
from a territorial defence towards crisis management forces, which are actually sent 
abroad. The old paradigm of the territorial defence had lost its legitimacy with the dis-
appearance of a large and threatening enemy. The process is accompanied by a change 
of basic instruments - in our study the abolition of conscription - and is led by the politi-
cal leaders in the sector and it is not just a case for the senior military. 
A paradigmatic change of procedures is a lesser reform, yet still far-reaching for the 
organisation and the sector. Politicians lead it. The shift of the policy power centre is 
not so much within the sector, which means that it is still the Minister of Defence who 
takes the lead, but more a shift within the organisation as such. For the post-Cold War 
forces it is expected that the Army and its leaders who were powerful actors in the terri-
torial defence concept might lose influence. The (organisational) policy is much more 
influenced by branches suited for the new tasks. The instrument - in this study: con-
scription - loses its importance for these new tasks, yet the last step – abolition – is not 
taken. 
Again at a lower level, but still within the substantial change of the prevailing pol-
icy, is the problem and/or goal change. The territorial defence of the Cold War, in par-
ticular in the German lowlands, could lose its legitimacy with the German re-unification 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A change of the armed forces was to be ex-
pected. The defence doctrine, certain (heavy) material, and – as far as conscription is 
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concerned – large quantities of soldiers are incompatible with the new goals that have to 
be defined. 
The last three possible outcomes of the policy processes within the Swedish and 
Dutch policy sectors since 1990 are not reforms, but no or moderate changes of the pre-
vailing policy. The most far-reaching are instrumental changes. For example, in this 
study this could be a new doctrine – which is traditionally an important task for military 
leaders – that is still aimed at territorial defence. Rosen points to the fact that ‘[c]hanges 
in the formal doctrine of a military organisation [may] leave the essential workings of 
the organisation unaltered.’29 Important for this category is that the changes are not con-
nected to the changes in the external security environment, but more initiated by dissat-
isfaction with (in this example) the old doctrine. As far as the subject of this study is 
concerned, not so much abolition of conscription or a change in the laws can be ex-
pected, but rather changes in the rules of physical and psychological examination. Those 
latter are important tools to steer the quality and quantity of the draftees. This is also 
closely connected to possible adjustment changes. The complete organisation of de-
fence and its aims remain the same (deterrence with large forces and heavy armament), 
yet certain branches of the forces have been modernised or lost their purpose because of 
technical innovations. With this, it is not so much the quantity of draftees that is chang-
ing, but their quality (talent and military training). For example, a new, modern 
autonomous artillery howitzer needs better technically skilled, but less strong soldiers. 
The last possible outcome of the policy processes in Sweden and the Netherlands after 






1 Rost in Elgie 1995: 2 
2 E.g., Hermann 1977, 1996, Winter 1973, 1991 
3 ‘t Hart 2000: 18 
4 ’t Hart & Ten Hooven 2004: 37 
5 Compare East, Salmor & Hermann 1978 
6 Compare Hagan’s (2001: 6) explanation of the importance of decision-making in international relations. 
We referred in chapter 1 for example to the lack of Haltiner’s (1998) quantitative analysis to explain 
differences in timing of changes in conscription. 
7 Compare also East , Salmor & Hermann 1978: 22-24 
8 Hermann et al 2001: 84 
9 King, Keohane & Verba: 118f. 
10 Haverland 1998: 32 
11 Compare Boin 1998: 80-81 
12 Mahoney 2003: 341; Haverland 1998:31 
13 Mahoney 2003: 342 
14 At least, so it seemed at the time the cases were selected. After closer analysis they turned out to be 
much more similar. While the Netherlands postponed the draft, Sweden nowadays only drafts those 
who want to serve, a form of voluntary service based on draft. Yet, the basic idea behind the organisa-
tion of defence is – at least on paper – different in both countries. This will become clearer in the 
analysis chapters (6 and 9) and the concluding chapter 10. 
15 Lijphart 1984: 63 





17 Mahoney 2003: 363 referring to George and McKeown 1985  
18 Tarrow 1995: 472 quoted in Haverland 1998: 32-33 
19 Redundancies or not chronological lines cannot always be avoided, in particular when following an 
institutional approach. 
20 See, e.g. the rather fuzzy empirical strategy of Kingdon’s classical book, Kingdon, 1995; or see the 
almost complete neglect of methodological considerations in Moon, 1995 and Goldfinch and 't Hart, 
2003 
21 E.g. Blondel 1980, Elgie 1995, Burns 1978  
22 Cortell & Peterson 1999: 188 
23 Cortell & Peterson 1999: 189 
24 Hirschman 1991 
25 Hirschman 1991 
26 Edelman 1991: 7 
27 ‘t Hart 2000 
28 Goldfinch and ‘t Hart 2003: 3 
29 Rosen quoted in Farrell & Terriff 2002: 4-5 
 
Chapter 4: The History of Conscription in the Netherlands and the 
structure of the defence sector 
4.1 Introduction 
After the French Revolution in 1789 and the occupation of the Netherlands by France 
(1795-1812), conscription in the Netherlands had closely been related to nation building 
and to the question who was commanding the army: the King or the Parliament? This 
was not only important for the internal struggle about the organisation of the army, 
cadre-militia or all voluntary forces, but also for the use of the army. Was it only in-
tended for the defence of the country’s borders or was it also an expeditionary army 
fighting abroad? 
Conscription had never been popular among those who had to serve. It used to be a 
provision of cheap labour and it made the build-up of large forces possible. To the citi-
zen, conscription was a form of natural taxation. Therefore, establishing the duration of 
training and conscription had been a matter of weighing up the armed forces’ needs for 
trained, dedicated soldiers against the citizens’ will to contribute to the country’s secu-
rity or the government’s ambitions. 
This chapter describes the development of conscription in the Netherlands. It covers 
almost two centuries of the development from partial to general conscription and the 
political struggle for authority over the armed forces. In addition it discusses the devel-
opment of the army, since both conscription and the organisation of the army (without 
navy and air force) are intertwined. Knowledge about the past of the draft serves the 
understanding about the abolition of conscription after the Cold War. It is not only 
about path dependency, but also about the utilisation of the institution and the political 
calculus of the regents throughout the centuries. In conclusion the chapter presents the 
political system, the structure of the sector at the end of the Cold War and the formal 
leaders within defence and foreign policy in the Netherlands.  
4.2 King William I  
The Union of Utrecht of 1579 marked the starting point of conscription in the Nether-
lands only in a theoretical sense. The citizen soldiery and militias were not under the 
command of a central government but formed a layer between the government and the 
population. The citizen soldiery was in that sense an institute of the class society.1 Until 
1795 the con-federal state deployed professional and mercenary armies. It is therefore 
wrong to backdate military conscription in the Netherlands prior to the Napoleonic era. 
In addition, it had only been the French administrative system, which made a bureau-
cratic registration possible. Conscription means that all men of a country within a cer-
tain age are registered by the government. The words enlisted and enrolled resemble the 
practice of conscription. 
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As in most European countries, the French revolution marked the starting point of 
modern conscription in the Netherlands, too. When the revolution started, mass enrol-
ment was a non-issue, however. On the contrary, as became obvious from the warnings 
of the Frenchman Guibert. In line with the revolutionary tradition he admitted the popu-
lation’s right to arm itself in its struggle against the tyrannical government, but he re-
jected the use of that popular army in the struggle outside the country’s borders. That 
was, according to Guibert, the prerogative of the King and his professional army.2 
This conservative view changed with the appearance of the radical Jacobins. The re-
former of the French army, Carnot, claimed that – ‘Tout citoyen est né soldat’ – every 
citizen was born a soldier.3 To serve the country was, according to the ideology of the 
revolution, an important task of the citizen. With the appearance of Napoleon, the 
French view on conscription fulfilled two more functions. On the one hand, a mass 
army could spread the ideals of the revolution all over Europe. On the other hand, those 
who were part of the huge Napoleonic expansionist army could not agitate at home. 
This was one more reason to introduce conscription in the occupied Netherlands. 
After the annexation of the Netherlands by France in 1810 and the end of the French 
occupation in 1814 almost 30000 Dutch men were called to arms. They served in Napo-
leon’s expeditionary army, which was also important to the emperor’s tactics. Only by 
using the fighting potential of young men in the occupied countries, could the expan-
sionist machinery roll on, militarily and financially. This form of warfare was incredibly 
expensive. In the end, it not only bankrupted France, but it also was a financial warning 
to the reactionary rulers of the post-Napoleonic era. 
There was only one problem: ‘Since the national government discovered the peo-
ple’s armament as a means to form an army, it will not abandon it. That holds true for 
the French revolutionist regime, that holds true for Bonaparte and that holds even true 
for the monarchs of the Restoration, including our own King William I’.4 It should be 
therefore no surprise that, with the appearance of the monarchy in the Netherlands in 
1813, conscription did not disappear. 
The Dutch military historian Amersfoort points to the addictive nature of the mili-
tary draft, since it provides the state with large numbers of cheap soldiers. Amersfoort 
continued that ‘even the conservatives considered conscription to be an instrument for 
strengthening the emotional relation between government and citizens’5. However, the 
German historian Frevert shows that - with regard to Prussia - this argument often con-
tained a circular reasoning: ‘The state appealed to the patriotism of the subjects, in par-
ticular the higher classes, but assumed at the same time that this patriotism was shaped 
by the military service’6 Considering the often ambiguous relation of the Dutch with 
conscription, it is reasonable to assume that this argument also holds true for the King-
dom of the Netherlands. In the beginning of the 19th century, the King also used the 
military to gain loyalty and support within the country. 
In view of the developments of the post-Napoleonic era, a fostered and strengthened 
patriotism made sense. Since 1795 the country had been a centralised state for the first 
time and after the withdrawal of the French after Napoleon’s defeat, the country got a 
King (1813) and it was united with Belgium, after the congress of Vienna in 1815. The 
creation of an army was part of the nation-building concept of the young monarchy. 
Yet, the inability to attract sufficient highly educated citizens to the armed forces did 
not mean that the Dutch population was anti-militaristic. It was more non-militaristic, or 
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indifferent.7 It took the Netherlands until the end of the 19th century to change that rela-
tionship, which will be described in the historical description in the parts to follow. 
The young monarchy of 1813 needed a strong defence to reinforce the power of the 
weak King. With special regard to his position on the continent, the King was con-
vinced that he needed an army of 50,000 men to support the allied powers against Na-
poleon. This was consistent with the demands of the allies, especially the English. The 
Dutch had to have enough fighting power to delay possible French expansions to the 
Northern parts of Europe, for as long a time as necessary for the English army to land 
on the continent and turn back the intruder.8 
The King aimed at a force’s structure of the pre-revolutionary era with a large pro-
fessional army, only obeying the King’s orders. However, conscription was the only 
realistic and affordable possibility to man the army. Many mercenaries had been incor-
porated in Napoleon’s army and had fallen in Russia; to a large extent the Dutch con-
scripts drafted by the French emperor had become prisoners of war, spread all over 
Europe.9 Compulsory service to the country became very unpopular after the French 
occupation. It was for that reason that the King emphasised that every comparison be-
tween the conscription of the French and his new ‘volksbewapening’ (people armament) 
was wrong. To support his argument the King came up with cosmetic measures. All 
men between the age of 17 and 50 should only be called up to arms for the defence of 
the countryside, the so-called ‘landstorm’ (regional protection force). This ‘landstorm’ 
would provide the recruitment pool for the country’s militia. Its members would be se-
lected by ballot. After having been selected by ballot, the person would still have the 
chance to have himself replaced by a so-called ‘remplaçant’ (substitute). The ‘land-
storm’ in that form lasted for a short time only, or, to be more precise, it existed only 
partially.10 The main forces, the standing army that could also be deployed abroad, 
would be manned by professional soldiers. 
With the introduction of the militia laws on 27 February 1815, two parallel armies 
took shape: the voluntary army and the militia, manned with conscripts. Yet, this system 
did not last long either; especially the manning of the voluntary army still proved to be a 
problem. By the autumn of 1815 the King therefore announced a reorganisation of the 
system. This reorganisation showed that the influence of the Parliament on the armed 
forces was still weak, since it had no to say on the militia under arms. An additional 
result of this reorganisation was the merging of voluntary recruits with the drafted con-
scripts; something the opposition of the Parliament could have prevented in the begin-
ning of 1815.11 
From 1817 onwards, the Second Chamber increasingly resisted the King’s army 
plans, above all as a result of his financial policy.12 The standing army as the preroga-
tive of the King and his intention to see the army as an instrument of foreign policy im-
posed the liberal attitude to consider conscription as an effective counterbalance to the 
King’s power.13 Eventually, all reorganisations led to a cadre-militia army in the Neth-
erlands from 1820 onwards, with voluntary serving soldiers forming the commissioned 
and non-commissioned cadre and conscripts. This formed a compromise between the 
King and Parliament. It also led to a heavier burden for the conscripts who had to fulfil 
military service. This mix of the army’s composition also led to an expanded influence 
of the Parliaments on the use of the army. The Basic Law of 1815 gave them the right to 
prevent the use of conscripts beyond the country’s borders. With the disappearance of a 
clear distinction between the units, that right was expanded. 
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In the period 1813-1828 there was a clear shift from the size of the standing army to 
the militia. With the advantage of having less difficulty to find volunteers, this shift led 
to financial savings, since a conscript army that will grow during wartime is cheaper 
than large standing forces.14 The reorganisation, which also had the aim of merging the 
armies of the Southern parts of the Netherlands (the later Belgium) with those of the 
North, led to a shift of the share of conscripts in the total army. While in 1814 the stand-
ing army with its 37,026 men had a share of 62,8% of the army compared to the number 
of 21,920 (37,2%) conscripts, the latter contingent was clearly larger by 1819. In that 
year there were 83,858 conscripts, (74,3% of the army’s size) compared to 28,960 sol-
diers of the standing army (25,7%).15 Those are the figures in a wartime situation. Dur-
ing peacetime, the change in these figures would be less over five years, as Table 5 
shows. 
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Total 58 946 100 49 924 100 
Table 5: Present size autumn 1814 and 1819. Source: Amersfoort 1988: 90 
 
Yet, the liberal opposition, which influenced the acceptance of conscription within large 
parts of the wealthier citizenry until the end of the 19th century, had made some impor-
tant gains. Since the armed forces had no use for every soldier of each year-class, those 
who needed to be drafted had to be selected by ballot. Yet, Parliament stipulated that 
those who were selected had the possibility to switch numbers with potential recruits 
with a higher number. As well as the previously mentioned replacement procedure, the 
number switching had now been introduced. This meant that the Netherlands now nei-
ther had a general nor a personal army service.16  
This substitute system was one of the reasons why conscription in the Netherlands 
caused social difficulties. Especially the rich had the possibility of buying themselves 
out of the service when, someone less wealthy (often men with no chance of a job) was 
willing to take up arms for money. This ‘scum of society’ had no high reputation among 
the militia.17 Also, a person who had drawn an unlucky number could buy someone 
else’s number, which figured so high on the role that actual service duty was improb-
able. This substitute system and the number sweeping led to an unequal representation 
of the social classes in the armed forces.18 
Amersfoort also points to the political - ideological factors. According to him the 
left-wing liberals had always maintained a tense relationship with the armed forces. 
They preferred a people’s army that served for a short period only or – even better – not 
at all.19 ‘The liberal of 1848 had only little interest in the army, expected the growing 
economical relations between the countries would decrease the chance for war, and dis-
trusted the army as a reactionary instrument and toy in the hands of the King.’20 
During the 19th century the conservatives and subsequently also the right-wing lib-
erals dominated the perception of the armed forces. According to them, only a profes-
sional army could be a real army. Conscripts received too short a military training and 
education to be dedicated soldiers. In short: the King and his followers wanted to copy 
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the structures and strategies of the neighbouring countries. However, that was incom-
patible with the population’s perception of the armed forces21. People did not feel the 
necessity for strong armed forces. In addition to that the Dutch Parliament developed 
the tendency to keep the costs and the individual burden of the forces low. Yet, in the 
19th century the reasons could not so much be found in the anti-militaristic attitude of 
Parliament, as in the struggle for power between the King and Parliament throughout 
that century, in which conscription had been such an important feature. ‘The liberals 
demanded a voice, which had to be settled by defence laws, while the King and the mili-
tary establishment - supported by the anti-liberal forces in Parliament -, saw defence as 
their exclusive domain. They even refused to discuss any changes.’22 With the change 
of the power-structure on the continent in the second half of the 19th century by the 
Prussian expansion and the French refusal to no longer adhere to the demands of the 
restoration of 1815, the structure of the armed forces and the role of conscription 
changed once again and with it, the liberal influence on defence. The creation of the 
German Empire disturbed the continental balance of power, which, among others, fed 
the need for larger armed forces. 
4.3 Neutrality till World War II 
Taking the size and territorial position of the Netherlands into consideration, this coun-
try had no other choice than to stay out of the struggles on the European continent. Neu-
trality became the most important weapon of the Dutch foreign and defence policy. It 
came along with a revision of the country’s defence and its conscript system. 
The conservatives won the struggle about the tactical future of the army at the be-
ginning of the second half of the 19th century. Though technical innovations, especially 
the improvement of the artillery, had case some serious doubts on the system of fortifi-
cations, the conservatives wanted to proceed with building and maintaining the existing 
defence constructions.23 Along with the use of inundation, which was the weapon with a 
long tradition in the country with its relatively small army and technical defence possi-
bilities, the conservative militaries adhered to and planned for the static warfare. 
Though in decades to come this planning turned out to be outdated, it was understand-
able in the light of the defensive army, trying to prevent aggressors intruding the coun-
try. It also fitted the idea that a possible aggressor would always aim at areas of vital 
importance for the country’s economy and administration. 
Around that time, it became obvious that there was still a contrast between the sup-
porters of a standing army, manned with professionals, and those who supported the 
militia, manned with conscripts. The conservatives succeeded in 1861 when new militia 
laws were made. By defining the main parts of the army as a standing army, they em-
phasised the authority of the King over the forces. The militia contingent, under the au-
thority of the Parliament, had been defined as a supplement to this army.24 The law be-
came necessary after the reform of the Constitution in 1848 when it was found that the 
historical structures of the armed forces conflicted with the constitutional demands. The 
Dutch military historian Bevaart emphasised that one of the central problems had been 
the mix of standing (= professional) army and militia (= conscripts), a problem that has 
already been described earlier.25  
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Apart from the political and constitutional law implications, the militia law of 19 
August 1861 also defined the organisation of conscription and the implications and bur-
den for the individual conscript. Here, the struggle between the conservatives and liber-
als became obvious. Once again the choice was between a long basic training that trans-
formed citizens into soldiers - to the conservatives a minimum of two years had been 
imperative -26 and between an individual minimal service duty, an option supported by 
the liberals. In the end, the law stipulated the maximum number of the militia army to 
55,000. In consequence, with a conscription period of five years, the annual maximum 
draft had been set to 11,000 men.27 The organisation of the draft, however, had been 
performed according to liberal demands.28 
Taking into account that a regular year-class contained 33,000 young men, the 
maximum limit of 11,000, with 7,500 at first, would have been less than one third of 
every school year. By 1861 almost half of every levy had been exempted from service 
for different reasons and the rest still had the possibility to hire a replacement or to 
change places in the enrolment list that had been complied as a result of the ballot. Ap-
proximately 13,7% of the 1861 militia had been replaced and 14,7% had changed their 
enrolment number.29 This system survived the militia laws of 1861 because of the resis-
tance of the liberals, but also of the conservatives, Catholics and independent members 
in the Chamber. The first basic training had been set to a maximum of one year and an 
annual refresher training of maximally six weeks for the following four years. The draft-
ing age had been set at twenty.30 Those figures, however, were only barely achieved 
during the 1870s.31 Moreover, the obligation to serve in the citizen soldiery had been 
added to the duty to serve in the militia. Introduced in 1814, these local units have ex-
isted until 1907. They fulfilled police tasks, while resorting under the Home Office. 
Only in case of war would the citizen soldiers be deployed as a reserve to the regular 
army.32 
From royal to parliamentarian armed forces 
By the second half of the 19th century, while the traditional army structure and defence 
strategies were more or less continued, Prussia established itself as a hegemonic power 
in the heart of Europe. Within ten years, Prussia led three huge military campaigns33 
that exposed the shortcomings of the Dutch defence, even though the country itself was 
not involved in anyone of them. Like in most European states, the successes of the Prus-
sian conscript army impressed the Dutch conservative military and politicians. 
Before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the Netherlands had al-
ready declared their neutrality. While England guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, as 
established in the treaty of 1839, because of the strategic importance of the port of Ant-
werp, they did not guarantee neutrality to the Dutch.34 This forced the Dutch govern-
ment to mobilise its army and navy, in order to maintain neutrality. While the mobilisa-
tion of the individual was progressing well - almost 29,500 soldiers on leave were regis-
tered - the defence organisation was showing a number of considerable material, organ-
isational, and juridical shortcomings.35 The liberals, who were in power, modernised the 
armed forces. A more rigorous conscript system was administered together with an in-
crease of the defence budget.36  
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There were also societal reasons for the changes in the conscript system. More and 
more people considered the replacement allowing system as socially unfair. An addi-
tional reason was the bad quality of the replacements, which was deemed problematic 
by the military and the politicians. Bevaart distinguishes four lines of arguments in fa-
vour of personal conscription between 1839 and 1874. As well as two military argu-
ments (keeping up strong armed forces and guaranteeing qualitatively good soldiers), a 
social argument (replacement is inequitable), and a military-sociological argument (the 
army has to regain its prestige) can be put forward.37 
It took almost 30 years of political struggle until the replacement system and ballot 
number gave way to a system of personal conscription. The personal draft became law 
in 1898. As from that time the Netherlands deployed a personal conscription system but 
still not a general conscription.38 
In 1901 two laws were passed to abolish various exemptions, which would lay the 
grounds for the modernisation of the army in accordance with the latest technical and 
tactical demands: viz. the militia law and the civil defence law. The militia law set the 
figure for annually drafted conscripts to 17,500. Of this figure, 12,300 men had to train 
the full period of eighteen months (mounted arms), respectively eight and a half months 
(not mounted). The rest, 5,200 men, would be drafted to a short-term training period of 
four months. The total conscription period was set to eight years and after that period 
the soldier had to join the civil defence for another seven years. The civil defence law 
also determined the end of the citizen soldiery. It is interesting to note that the so-called 
’four-month-servers’ were mainly deployed to guard the empty garrisons during the 
winter period, when those men who had served for eight and a half months had left.39  
The different laws of the turn of the century, which concerned the structure of the 
army and conscription, opened the way to a field army of four divisions with more than 
80,000 men. The total number after mobilisation would have been around 200,000 
men.40 However, the laws had some shortcomings too. The influx of higher educated, 
wealthier men exposed the military to more critical comments. Especially the discipline 
system, created for the lower layers of society who usually had been drafted in the im-
personal drafting system, was no longer suitable.41 
With the new militia law of 1912, most of the earlier problems had been solved. 
Those laws, known as Colijn’s laws, set the yearly contingent to 23,000. The short-term 
training of four months for those who had been pre-trained had been abolished and for 
certain groups the eight and a half months’ training had been shortened by two months. 
The number of those who had to serve for a long period had been set to 4,000, with the 
possibility of replacement. The physical demands had been increased, so that the sur-
plus of those capable of serving would diminish.42 In addition to this law, the 1913 laws 
for the civil defence and the regional protection force (Landstorm) were passed. All in 
all, the combined laws made it possible that the Dutch army could theoretically mobilise 
up to 367,000 men.43 
This was an impressive figure at the eve of the First World War and in the years 
1914-1918, the country was in fact able to mobilise 200,000 soldiers who were reasona-
bly trained and modernly equipped.44 However, during that period it became obvious 
that an incoherent relation existed between the duties of the citizens and their rights. 
The process of having been called up and living in barracks for four years with hardly 
any distractions, led to unrest among the citizens in the army, who in their hearts were 
more civilian than dedicated soldier. In part the renewal of both conscription and society 
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in order to meet the demands of the new middle-class emancipation can be considered a 
result of the experiences during the war.45 
War fatigue and military economics 
The First World War showed the cruelty of battle, with its ‘mass slaughters in the 
trenches’ and the newly introduced weapons like airplanes, gas, tanks and heavy artil-
lery.46 The new army laws of 1922 had been made under the impression of the cruelty 
of war and financial and social-economical problems.47 The struggle between the neces-
sity for modernising the wartime organisation (the mass army had been characteristic 
for the First World War), and the socio-economical and financial limits, had once again 
determined the outcome of the military reforms in the beginning of the 1920s. The 
peacetime army should be relatively small, but well equipped and trained. In case of 
war, it should have the capability to grow from 200,000 to 250,000 men, who would 
serve in eight smaller divisions. To enlarge the mobility of the army, a light brigade had 
been formed. Though the inundation line still existed, the fortifications lost their mili-
tary use.48 
The manning of the new army had been guaranteed by the new conscription law of 
1922, which was an amalgam of compromises to please the societal will. The annual 
draft would consist of 19,500 men instead of 23,000. That resembled around one third 
of an annual cohort. Those, who had been selected by ballot, had to serve fifteen years, 
resulting in a relatively old field army.49 On the other hand, the duration of the first ba-
sic training was reduced from eight and a half months to five and a half months and the 
short-term training was reinstated for those with pre-training experience. These men had 
to serve for a period of six weeks, which was a concession to the confessional and left-
liberal parties.50 
The intention of the government and the military was that the shorter period for the 
first basic training could be compensated by a more intensified training and refresher 
sessions. Amersfoort & Hoffenaar point to several shortcomings of the 1922 system, 
which combined with the economics of the next decade led to a weaker army and there-
fore weaker a defence than intended. Some of these shortcomings were, amongst others 
things, the imbalanced burden-sharing and a short first training, but also a small and 
relatively old professional cadre. Due to organisational changes, the possibility of re-
hearsal training and refresher sessions also diminished.51 When in May 1940, the Dutch 
troops could not resist the attacks of the German army, it became clear that the catching 
up in training and equipment material for the Dutch military in the second half of the 
1930’s had come too late. 
Summary  
Looking back on the history of conscription in the Netherlands from Napoleon to World 
War II, some changes and some constant factors can be identified. Throughout 125 
years, only a small part of the male population was obliged to serve, most of the time 
around one third of an annual cohort. While the conservatives, especially the King, saw 
the conscript system only as a means to fill the ranks in times when a large army was 
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needed, the (liberal) opposition tried to have larger parts of the forces manned with 
short-term serving conscripts, in order to maintain influence on those forces. Yet, in the 
eyes of the opposition, the individual burden of the citizen and the share of the profes-
sional volunteers had to be kept low. It was therefore not only a constitutional struggle, 
but also a struggle about the quality of the forces: well-trained forces serving for a 
longer period versus a large short trained contingent with training over a short period. 
During the 19th century, this contrast influenced the structure of the military organisa-
tion and the prestige of conscription. 
By the second half of the 19th century, the thinking about conscription had changed 
in a positive manner, especially in conservative circles. Still sceptic, the King and the 
conservatives followed the signs of the times, i.e., the successes of the Prussian con-
script-army. At the same time, the liberal and confessional opposition in Parliament 
gained more and more influence over the budget and the army laws. While losing the 
struggle over the militia laws in 1861, the opposition put its print on the army building 
in 1901 for decades to come and shortly before and after the First World War. It can be 
concluded that the King and the conservatives treated conscription as a stepchild, only 
accepted because it came with the possibility of building up large forces. The moment 
they started to love it, around 1870, the child had grown up and gotten engaged with the 
bourgeois who never let it go. 
Yet, the marriage between the bourgeois and conscription was a marriage of con-
venience. In 1901, conscription became personal, for all classes, but since only a small 
part actually had to serve, it still was not a general conscription. Shortly before the First 
World War, the quality and size of the Dutch troops was very good, with over 200,000 
men in the mobilised army. The changes of the late 19th century and the 1912 militia 
law showed effect. After World War I, however, this advantage was not continued. 
Economy rather than naivety, and the will to limit the individual burden of conscription 
to just a small group, led to the fact that consecutive governments saved on equipment 
and refresher training. As a result, the armed forces were less trained and relatively old, 
when on 10 May 1940 a supremely equipped and trained enemy crossed the border. 
4.4 Conscription and the Dutch defence: the initial post-war years 
While the experiences of May 1940 influenced the reconstruction of the armed forces, 
and in particular the conclusion that neutrality did not prevent occupation52, the military 
operations in Indonesia after 1945 and especially the Cold War accelerated that reform-
ing process.  
The sending of conscripts to Indonesia marked a new era in the defence system: for 
the first time conscripts fought outside the metropolitan territory. The experiences of the 
Second World War and the growing Western alliance during the Cold War, on the other 
hand, facilitated the acceptance and popularity of the armed forces and conscription. 
The Netherlands forged strong economic and military connections with the United 
States and Western Europe. That step was also inspired by the fear that the democratic 
societal structure was threatened by communism.53 
It was not obvious that conscripts had to fight during the police actions in Indonesia 
from 1946-1948. According to Dutch law, they were allowed to participate only on a 
voluntary base. However, the first conscripts of the 1st and 2nd Division were sent 
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abroad on the legal base of a Royal Decree issued on 22 June 1944. This Royal Decree 
stated that conscripts could be sent to every place in the world where the enemies of the 
Kingdom had to be fought.54 Afterwards, the Dutch Parliament approved this cabinet 
decision. By the end of 1946, the voluntary serving clause had been completely deleted 
from the law.  
Since large parts of the armed forces were used in the struggle against de-
colonisation, whereby the country was concentrating on Indonesia with plenty of per-
sonnel, it delayed the build-up of the armed forces at home. After 1949, when Indonesia 
became independent, the Netherlands demonstrated a strong dedication to their British 
and American allies and after some pressure by those allies, they were willing to invest 
large sums in their defence and in the defence structure of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO). During the late 1940s and early 1950s there had been some 
clashes about the guns vs. butter question between politicians and the military though. 
The country had to be rebuilt and there was not enough money to have high investments 
both in infrastructure, industrialisation and housing and in the armed forces. 
The Korea crisis from 1950 till 1953, however, marked an important turning point in 
Dutch defence. The defence budget was set to 1,5 billion Guilders (compared to 800mln 
in the first post-war years).55 The perceived higher threat from the Soviet Union led to 
the demand by politicians and the military that the standing units be kept in readiness.56 
This decision had direct implications for conscription: the annual contingent of a levy 
was set to 42,000 men, with a basic training period of 20 months (24 months for the 
specialists), in order to provide one division. In 1954 and 1957 the size of these standing 
units was even expanded to a second division after recurring international tensions and 
recommendations of the NATO council.57 
The Dutch defence sector developed steadily. Defence was rebuilt according to the 
demands of a modern home defence within the structures of the Western Alliance, 
NATO. These demands often required a lot from the people and the organisation, such 
as the stationing of parts of the army in Northern Germany during the 1960s.58 Regu-
larly the organisation of the ministry was changed to improve the management of the 
forces59, but the largest part of the fighting and supporting units was structured accord-
ing to NATO’s needs and plans. 
The security policy faced some major changes with the introduction of NATO’s 
flexible response in the 1960s and the decision to station cruise missiles in the Nether-
lands led to a huge protest in the beginning of the 1980s. However by and large the 
main task remained unchanged. For forty years the most important task of the Dutch 
armed forces had been the common allied defence against the enemy from the east. 
 
4.5 Dutch conscription during the Cold War years 
During the Cold War, almost 2,000,000 young men were drafted. The active duty varied 
from 14 months, around the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, up to 24 months, during 
international tensions in the 1960s. The exact period of service and the physical and 
material circumstances of the conscripts varied, however. It was a pendulum, sometimes 
swinging into the direction of contribution to international demands under the pressure 
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of international political and military tensions and sometimes the pendulum swung in 
the direction of interior political calculus, societal protest, and economics. 
As already mentioned, during the 1950s the hot phase of the Cold War led to the 
creation of standing forces in readiness. The implications for conscription consisted not 
only of a prolongation of the basic training period up to twenty months for the majority 
of the conscripts, but also a change in the training system as such. The recruits received 
an individual training of four months and afterwards they were placed in already exist-
ing units. That guaranteed a steady high level of standing units, with the disadvantage of 
not being always optimally attuned.60 This measure provoked societal resistance against 
the extraordinary long burden. Due to the individual training, it proved possible to re-
duce the real basic training to eighteen months, with a prolongation of the refresher pe-
riod.61 
During the second half of the 20th century societal protest against the military bur-
den, but also against the disciplinary system and military rules, was repeatedly raised. 
Often the answer had been a broad political, military or mixed committee trying to find 
solutions, pleasing recruits and society, but enabling the continuation of large Cold War 
forces. Sometimes, however, the solution of a problem had been induced the other way 
around, as in the case of the foundation of the conscript unions. 
First conscription commissions after the war 
In 1958-1959 Lieutenant General (ret.) Baron van Voorst tot Voorst led an interdepart-
mental commission, which advised on the issue of the duration of the actual period of 
service, taking into consideration any NATO obligations and societal effects of that 
period of service. The commission concluded that the actual period of service could be 
reduced if the share of voluntary service personnel would be enlarged. However, it ac-
knowledged budgetary problems to implement those plans.62 At that time, conscripts 
had filled many postings that were originally to be filled by professionals. During the 
entire first half of the 1960s, the shortage of personnel had been considerable. Yet, the 
large organisation needed soldiers, conscripts and professionals in order to keep up its 
fighting-power. One solution was the introduction of professional short-term contracts. 
Other possibilities were a leaner organisation, a new training and remanning system, 
based on entire units and – as a consequence – a new mobilisation system.63  
Due to the post-war baby boom, more young men were available for active duty 
than had been required, starting with the 1966 draft. By the end of 1963 the Commis-
sion ‘Dienstplichtvoorzieningen’ (military service facilities) started to look for a solu-
tion for this problem. In 1966 the commission recommended the reduction of the actual 
period of service to sixteen months, starting in 1967. It also introduced the term ‘ex-
traordinary conscript’, referring to the surplus conscripts.64 
With regard to conscription, the year 1966 had been important for another reason. 
On 4 August 1966 the first conscript union, the ‘Association of Conscript Militaries’ 
(VVDM), had been founded. A rather small incident of unfair treatment of a soldier led 
to the foundation of the VVDM. In years to come the association, and since the 1970s 
another conscript union, AVNM, repeatedly channelled protests of conscripted soldiers. 
They strived for improvements of the conscripts’ circumstances: better payment, better 
serving conditions and they questioned disciplinary punishment and military tradition.65 
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The foundation of the VVDM was closely connected to the societal changes of the 
1960s. It marked the penetration of the armed forces by the civil society. 
Conscription and social change 
At the end of the 1960s, the institution of conscription had been questioned for the first 
time in the political arena. Reasons had been the large size of the levies and conse-
quently the growing unequal burden-sharing between those who had to serve and those 
who had been excluded. Other arguments had been the emancipation of the conscripts 
and the ineffectiveness of the system, where conscripts followed a relatively long train-
ing with only short military gains.66 From 1968 until 1976, the commission on conscrip-
tion policy (Peijnenburg-commission) worked on further improvements of the recom-
mendations of the 1966 commission. The commission also had to analyse if it might be 
possible to come up with an alternative national service to meet the negative implica-
tions of the unequal burden-sharing as a result of the surplus of conscripts. The commit-
tee advised to maintain the conscript system, because of the difficult labour market and 
the need for standing forces in readiness.67 Many proposals were realised, such as the 
introduction of a new medical examination system to decrease the surplus of young men 
and the lowering of the drafting age from 18 to 17 years.68 
During the work of the Peijnenburg-commission, another commission was created. 
In 1971 the Van Rijckevorstel commission had a much broader assignment. Its task was 
to analyse the Dutch defence and her share in NATO, taking into consideration the 
growing gap between financial resources and necessary modernisation. It advised, 
among other things, that given the modern weapon systems and the technical skills 
needed, an all-volunteer army would be preferable. Yet, the Commission admitted that 
there was hardly any room for that plan. A commercial consultant suggested introducing 
a system with variable periods of service as a starting point towards all-volunteer armed 
forces. It appeared, however, that in years to come even the social democratic Minister 
of Defence, H. Vredeling, was unable to introduce that system. Yet, in the Defence 
White Paper 1974 he promised to reduce the active period of serve from sixteen to 
twelve months. A first step was taken in 1976, when the period decreased from sixteen 
to fourteen months. It would take fourteen years to reach the next step, when in 1990, 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Minister of Defence announced a period of service 
of twelve months. 
The Mommersteeg commission of 1975 had been the most far-reaching commis-
sion, at least with regard to its assignment. That committee had the task to examine if it 
was feasible and possible to introduce all-volunteer armed forces. But when the com-
mittee came with its conclusion in 1978 it was divided. A minority rejected a profes-
sional army because of societal reasons. The majority was in favour of abolition of con-
scription, but thought that it was not possible or very risky to introduce an all-volunteer 
force. Two huge problems came to the fore: the financing of those forces and the antici-
pated low recruitment figures. There had always been a strategic necessity of conscrip-
tion. According to the committee, only conscription could have guaranteed the manning 
of the huge territorial army necessary for the NATO defence along the Iron Curtain. 
Conscription had not only been important for the active units, but it was also important 
in the army’s reserve concept. Huge parts of the territorial forces’ hardware had been 
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stored and only in the case of an emergency would those units have been filled with 
soldiers of the reserve. It was therefore very expensive to have large professional 
forces.69 
The last committee worth noting is the committee ‘Serving in the Future’ (1978-80). 
That committee came up with a rough plan for a mixed army of conscripts and volun-
teers and a varied set of active periods of service. Yet, the then Minister of Defence, 
P.B.R. De Geus, concluded that - taking into consideration the findings of all commit-
tees - no system existed that could meet all the personnel and financial demands and 
that was better suited than the actual system.70  
 
Commission Period Task Advice 
Van Voorst tot Voorst  1958-1959 Duration service pe-
riod.  
Reduction only if the 
voluntary part could be 
enlarged 
Military Service Facilities  1963-1966 Strategies to cope with 
the baby boom surplus 
• Reduction of service 
period to 16 months 
• Extraordinary con-
scripts (surplus not 
needed) 
Peijnenburg 1968-1976 • Further improve-
ments previous 
commission 
• Alternative duty 
• Maintain conscript 
system 
• New medical exami-
nation system 
• Drafting age from 18 
to 17 years 
Van Rijckevorstel 1971-1973 Analyse Dutch defence 
and its part in NATO 
All-volunteer armed 
forces favourable 
Mommersteeg 1975-1978 Feasibility and possi-
bility of all volunteer 
armed forces 
Minor advice (pro con-
scription), major advice 
pro abolition, but: fi-
nancing and expected 
low budget figures 
Serving in the Future 1978-1980  • Mixed armed forces 
• Variety of periods of 
service  
Table 6: Overview of Dutch conscription commissions during the Cold War 
Legitimacy of conscription in society 
The military and conscription in the Netherlands had never been more accepted than 
during the Cold War. The historical analysis until 1945 shows that military and con-
scription had always had a difficult stance in society. Those institutions had never been 
that important to the citizenry and they tried to serve as short a period as possible. Con-
scription had also held a difficult position in the country with regards to ideology. The 
liberals and the ideological left opposed it as a power instrument in the hands of the 
King/State and for almost a century the conservatives had considered conscripts ama-
teurs. Add to that the successful neutrality during World War I and permanent cuts on 
the defence budget making the low acceptance of conscription a fact. 
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 63 64 68 74 78 82 83 84 85 86 88 89 90 91 
Necessary & nec. Evil 93 83 82 86 88 82 79 77 82 77 71 66 80 65 
Necessary 59 48 47 45 51 52 47 42 48 44 38 38 39 42 
Necessary evil 34 35 35 41 37 30 32 35 34 33 33 28 41 23 
Hardly necessary 3 5 6 8 8 9 10 10 7 11 11 16 10 18 
Unnecessary 3 7 6 6 3 9 9 6 8 9 10 11 5 10 
No opinion 1 5 6 0 1 0 2 6 3 3 9 7 5 7 
Table 7: Necessity of Armed Forces, 1963 – 1991 in %, Source: Everts 1992: 38 
 
The acceptance of the armed forces from the 1960s until 1991 was always around 80%. 
There had been a slight negative trend in the 1980s, but during the Gulf War 1990/91 
after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the acceptance increased again, but only for a short 
moment. The reasons for that trend during the 1980s might be the result of the fact that 
the fear of a large-scale war between NATO and Warsaw Pact diminished.71 Another 
reason could be the broad discussions on the NATO double strategy of the late 1970s, 
early 1980s and the huge protests against the placing of cruise missiles in the Nether-
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Necessary & nec. evil Necessary Necessary evil
 
Figure 6: Necessity of Armed Forces, 1963 – 1991 in % (graphical version of Table 7) 
 
It is difficult to translate the acceptance of the armed forces to the legitimacy of con-
scription, especially because opinion polls on that issue were held less frequently. In 
1974, when asked to react to the statement ‘A professional army is more preferable than 
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armed forces with conscripts’, 71% of the population supported the statement. After 
reformulating the statement in a more neutral way, the polls of 1976 showed that 55% 
supported armed forces with conscripts, whereas 32% preferred an all-volunteer army. 
Everts provides two possible explanations. On the one hand the change in opinion was 
due to the change in questioning, on the other hand it could be because of the discus-
sions on that issue.72 See for that last point the history of Dutch committees and the his-
tory of the conscripts’ unions (both above).  
 
Although there have been several committees and two, more or less progressive, unions 
for conscripts during the Cold War, conscription had not been abandoned. As stated 
above, the reasons were various. Firstly, the strategic necessity to man the active and 
reserve units demanded a conscript system that also served to fill the reserve pool. Sec-
ondly, the conscript unions never actively strived for abolition of conscription. On the 
contrary, they turned out to be supporters of the system, mainly because of the democ-
ratic control of and the good relation with society by the armed forces. The focus of the 
unions had been the improvement of the quality of active duty and of the social circum-
stances for conscripts. 
Taking also into consideration the relative support of conscription by the population, 
it can be concluded that neither interior political necessity nor external security devel-
opments urged policy makers to abolish conscription in the Netherlands until 1990. 
Even at the beginning of the 1990s it had been far from obvious that conscription in the 
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Chapter 5: Leadership in postponement of the draft 
5.1 Introduction 
Conscription in the Netherlands still exists. It is the draft, which has been postponed. 
This is not only a legal distinction, but also an important compromise at the end of a 
policy process of two years. The road to the postponement of the draft and the accom-
panying ‘de facto’ abolition of military service had been paved with resistance by influ-
ential political and bureaucratic stakeholders, such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs H. 
van den Broek and the Army Commander, General M.J. Wilmink. While both had a 
prominent role in the formulation of the Defence White Paper 1991, due to their experi-
ence and ensuing institutional power position, the new Minister of Defence, R. Ter 
Beek, grew in office over the years. This will be shown in the sections to come. 
The analysis in this chapter eludes the sparse public discussion, the parliamentary 
debates, and the actions of the formal leaders and other important stakeholders in the 
Dutch defence sector. It is important to focus on those actors within the Dutch defence 
sector at the beginning of the 1990s in order to answer the question, why the Nether-
lands abandoned the draft so soon after the Cold War. This is why in the next section 
the structure of the sector will be presented. 
 
5.2 Dutch defence politics 
This section will explain the Dutch defence policymaking at the beginning of the 1990s. 
This is necessary for a better understanding of the empirical chapter. Furthermore, it 
will illustrate the changes in the organisation of the ministry and the ensuing changes in 
the development of Dutch defence policy at the beginning of the 1990s. 
On 7 November 1989, the third cabinet of the Christian Democrat R. Lubbers came 
into office. It was a coalition government consisting of Christian Democrats (CDA) and 
Social Democrats (PvdA). With 35,3% of the votes for the CDA and 31,9% of the votes 
for the PvdA, the governmental parties held 103 of the 150 seats in Parliament (the Sec-
ond Chamber/Tweede Kamer). 
Several actors were involved in the defence policymaking in the Netherlands. The 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Van den Broek, and Defence, Ter Beek, and the Junior 
Minister of Defence, B.J.M. van Voorst tot Voorst, were responsible for the official 
Policy White Paper 1991. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the chap-
ters on foreign and security policies. The Minister of Defence and the Junior Minister 
are responsible for the organisation of defence within their respective portfolios. The 
portfolios are not fixed, but can change, depending on political necessity, personal pref-
erences of the politicians at the ministry, and coalition demands.  
Several parts of the Ministry of Defence would be involved in the defence policy 
planning process. First, and most importantly, political deliberation would take place on 
Monday morning.1 Participants would be the Minister and Junior Minister, the Secretary 
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General, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Directors-General of Procurements, Person-
nel, Economies and Finances, the Director of Policy Affairs, the Director of Information 
and the Director of Legal Affairs.2 
Starting with the Defence White Paper 1991 the ministerial deliberation would be a 
tool to prepare defence policy. Its members were the Secretary General M. Patijn (chair-
man), the Chief of the Defence Staff General P.J. de Graaff, the Commanders-in-Chief, 
and the Directors-General.3 Yet, decisions were taken in the Defence Council. From 
1989 until 1993 its members were the political top of the ministry, the Secretary Gen-
eral, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Commanders-in-Chief, the Commander of the 
Military Police, the Directors for Policy Affairs, Information, and Juridical Affairs, and 
the Directors-General, plus some extraordinary members. The defence council, how-
ever, became less important in the period between 1989 and 1993. According to the 
Minister it was a ‘big, bureaucratic company without an exchange of ideas.’4 
The decision making within the organisation was complicated by the organisational 
model and the relations between the political, bureaucratic, and functional military lines. 
Until 1992 the ministry had been organised according to the so-called matrix structure. 
In 1976 this structure had been replaced by the so-called three pillars structure, in which 
navy, air force, and army each had their own Junior Minister. The matrix structure was 
expected to be more flexible and above all, efficient. Yet, it turned out to be ineffective, 
since the different actors at central level and at the different branches of the armed 
forces could not reach an agreement on their share of authority. Due to that fact, the 
bureaucracy increased and the decision making slowed down.5 
With the concern - or line-staff - structure the army, navy, air force (and military po-
lice) were no longer part of the central organisation. They were, however, more in-
volved in the policymaking process due to the ministerial deliberation (above). With the 
concern structure the Commanders-in-Chief gained more responsibility. The restructur-
ing towards the concern structure started in 1992 and it ended in 1993.6 This means that 
it coincides with the period of analysis of this study. In relation to either matrix or con-
cern structure, both De Graaff and Van Brouwershaven pointed to the fact that the Min-
ister of Defence Ter Beek (1989-1994), generally tended to avoid doing direct business 
with the Commanders-in-Chief in the organisation.7 This will be elaborated more 
deeply in the empirical parts and the analysis.  
The highest soldier within both organisational forms was the Chief of the Defence 
Staff. The function had been introduced in 1976 and one of the reasons was the felt ne-
cessity by the politicians at the ministry to centralise defence policy.8 The relation be-
tween the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Commanders-in-Chief within the matrix 
organisation was in fact a temporary solution:  
 
o The Commanders-in-Chief were as Chiefs of Staff responsible for 
the operational policy of their respective parts of the armed 
forces. They reported via the Secretary General and the Chief of 
the Defence Staff to the Minister.  
o The Commanders-in-Chief were at the same time Commanders-
in-Chief of their part of the armed forces. In this function they 
were responsible for the operational use of their part and they re-
ported directly to the Minister.9 
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Therefore, in military matters, the Chief of the Defence Staff served purely as military 
advisor to the Minister and the Junior Minister and he was not part of the line organisa-
tion. 
However, with the organisational change towards a new structure the role of the 
Chief of the Defence Staff also changed. Due to international changes, the Dutch de-
fence organisation had to be more flexible to be able to react with the right resources. 
The Commanders-in-Chief gained more power, since they became the sole commanders 
of their section of the armed forces. The functional directors became subordinated to the 
Commander-in-Chief and the councils of the respective sections stopped being influen-
tial.10 
The Chief of the Defence Staff was given the right to formulate a vision for the fu-
ture and the test and exploration of new tasks for the armed forces as an additional task. 
In addition he became the senior advisor for operational policies, but his operational 
responsibility was restricted to peace operations. Those rights were given to the Chief of 
the Defence Staff in February 1992.11 The direct chain of command between the Minis-
ter and the Commanders-in-Chief continued to exist, while the relation between the 
Commanders-in-Chief and the Chief of the Defence Staff was not hierarchical. This 
situation began to change in 1995, which is beyond the analysis of this study. The new 
structure had several implications for policymaking in general. In the empirical chapter 
we will see which implications the changing structure of the Ministry would have for 
conscription. 
5.3 Rethinking defence policy: the 1991 White Paper 
In the campaign for the parliamentary elections in 1989, defence and conscription were 
no issues in the Netherlands.12 In addition, the issue of conscription seldom reached the 
news. Neither politicians nor the public were interested in the subject. From April 1989 
until the end of that year, only fifteen articles had been published in the national news-
papers about conscription. Only three of the authors were in favour of abolition, the rest 
argued that military service had to become more attractive and that the unequal burden-
sharing of 35% has to be soothed. However, in the light of the upheaval of the world 
order, the newly formed Dutch cabinet of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
that had come into office on November 7th 1989, just two days before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, had to react to the new situation. Foreign and defence policy were back on 
the political agenda, as was conscription. 
Right in the beginning of the year 1990, the first sustained publicity about the future 
of conscription appeared 13. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the public and political 
interest in the issue grew. On 25 January 1990 the national newspaper NRC-
Handelsblad reported that de coalition parties, CDA and PvdA, intended to reduce the 
active period of service from fourteen months to twelve months. Less than two months 
later the CDA politician, A.B.M. Frinking MP, who was a retired commissioned officer 
and one of the defence specialists of his party parliamentary group, published an article 
in the Volkskrant, another national newspaper, in which he demanded the abolition of 
conscription.14 His main argument was that the armed forces would reduce in size and 
that therefore the unequal burden-sharing between those who had to serve and those 
who did not would grow increasingly. 
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After the publication of this article, the discussion not only took place in the media, 
but was also put on the political agenda.15 More and more politicians and (former) sol-
diers contributed to the media stream, by stating arguments in favour or against con-
scription. Already in March 1990 a former high-ranking officer had pointed to calcula-
tions supporting the argument that it would be difficult to recruit enough volunteers. 
This was supported by another argument: ‘Abolition of conscription? Volunteers do not 
guarantee quality’, this was the headline of a contribution by Army General (ret.) and 
former Chief of the Defence Staff, G.L.J. Huyser.16 Though the publication was in a 
minor daily newspaper, it is worth noting. Later on the general with his outspoken opin-
ion became, as member of a commission investigating the future of conscription, one of 
the actors in the decision process towards the postponement of the draft. 
Throughout the years 1990 until 1992, the supporters of conscription wrote that the 
societal commitment of the armed forces could only be guaranteed with conscripts.17 
The opponents of conscription argued that this commitment was not necessary anymore 
or that it was also guaranteed with volunteer forces.18 To some writers, conscription was 
a service to society, which could even be extended to women19, whereas others thought 
of the conscript system as a barbarian system.20 It is interesting to note that the pros and 
cons did not depend on political or societal backgrounds. And even among the soldiers, 
whether conscripts or not, no unanimity could be found.21 
In the articles concerned the authors, mainly people involved in the sector, not only 
pointed to the unequal burden-sharing of those who actually had to serve, around 35% 
of the male population, but more and more they pointed to the fact that conscription was 
no longer necessary in the case of smaller armed forces. Even the Junior Minister of 
Defence as well as an influential Defence spokesman of one of the governmental par-
ties, Frinking from the Christian Democrats (CDA), gave their opinion on the subject. 
While the Junior Minister, Van Voorst tot Voorst, had been in favour of conscription, 
because of societal reasons, the Member of Parliament was against it, because of the – 
already mentioned – unequal burden-sharing.22  
At the same time, a broad consensus grew on shortening the active period of service 
for conscripts. During the last years of the Cold War Dutch conscripts had to serve for 
fourteen months. By the end of 1990 it became obvious that the period of service would 
be reduced to twelve months. In fact, this had been the implementation of a recommen-
dation of the Mommersteeg-commission. Yet, another issue was put forward repeatedly: 
the possibility of yet another state commission that should advise the government on the 
issue of military conscription. It took until 1991 before the opinion of the Minister of 
Defence on conscription and a possible commission became known to the public. It was 
in January of that year when the first concept of the new Defence White Paper leaked to 
the public. The Minister, Ter Beek, was in favour of conscription and he planned to in-
stall a commission, which would advise him on the future of conscription. The Minister 
of Defence was in this sense one of the few who supported the conscript system in pub-
lic.23 Moreover, he remained a supporter for a long time, mainly because of his social 
democratic background.24 The rest of the public opinion seemed to be in favour of abo-
lition. Even the editorial of a traditional pro conscription newspaper, the Christian Con-
servative Trouw, argued in April 1991 that it would be time for abolition, because of the 
military technical innovations and the unequal burden-sharing.25 
On March 10th 1991 the Minister of Foreign Affairs –responsible for the foreign pol-
icy and security analysis – and the Minister of Defence presented the new Defence 
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White Paper. For the sake of argumentation in this report, it is important to concentrate 
on three topics of the Defence White Paper: the new security policy, the reform of the 
Royal Army and, indeed, conscription. 
 
Security policy and military reforms. While the break-up of the Warsaw Pact fed the 
hope for eternal peace, different conflicts or events came to the fore, which made clear 
that defence was not solely yesterday’s issue. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and eco-
nomical problems in the Soviet Union put their mark on a future Dutch army. While the 
Ministers of Foreign Policy and Defence welcomed the end of the conflict between the 
East and West, they still pointed to the danger of the military potential of the Soviet 
Union and the political and economical instability in that country. They concluded that 
fostering the political dialogue and cooperation was important, yet, that ‘the security 
policy of the government and the allies aims at maintaining an adequate defence …’.26 
In addition to the traditional NATO deterrence task of the armed forces, new opera-
tions outside the NATO treaty area took place. The defence of the alliance remained the 
first task. Because the time of preparation in case of an emergency increased from six 
months to two years, depending on different threat scenarios, it seemed a reduction of 
the active and reserve parts of the forces would be possible. Consequently, three out of 
ten army corps brigades were dissolved and the remaining brigades would become lo-
gistically independent in anticipation of a future multi-national army corps. Two bri-
gades would be transformed to one airborne and one light-armoured brigade. Interesting 
for this study is also the announcement of the structure change of the ministry of De-
fence from a matrix organisation to a concern (or integrated management) structure, 
referred to in the beginning of this chapter.27 
Though the security situation required prepared forces, cutbacks were in order. In 
particular the Army had to reduce its personnel, most of them conscripts: up to 20% 
between 1991 and 1995. The Air Force was expected to have almost 35% fewer con-
scripts. This may seem a lot, but with 4,195 conscripts it was not as huge a change for 
the Air Force structure as for the army with its 41,122 draftees. In terms of Conscript 
Ratio, ‘defined as the percentage of conscripts compared to the total of a country’s regu-
lars without reserve’28, we find that a total of 44,77% are conscripts. For the regular 
armed services this figure differs: 63% army (40,500 out of 64,100), 8% navy (1m400 
out of 16,000), and 21,9% air force (3,500 out of 16,000).29 
Conscription. The restructuring of the armed forces had implications for the con-
script system. About one-third of the chapter on personnel policy has been reserved for 
that subject. Notwithstanding a reduction of the drafted personnel up to one-fifth, the 
Minister of Defence showed no intention of abolishing conscription. Although he rec-
ognised the ‘unequal distribution of conscription ratio’ (Dutch Defence White Paper 
1991: 40), three arguments were central to his decision. Firstly, conscription ‘creates a 
link between the armed forces and society’. Close to this argument is the second one 
that the throughput of young men provides the military with a conscious feeling of what 
is happening in society. The third and most important reason was that conscription 
guarantees well-educated personnel. The Minister of Defence recognised that conscrip-
tion had to become more attractive. Therefore he announced the creation of a commis-
sion that would consider a reform of Dutch conscription. Abolition was not mentioned 
as an option. 
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The 1991 Defence White Paper represented a first cautious step in the direction of 
modelling the armed forces according to ‘détente’, yet with a conservative security 
definition. Insecurity about the prospects of political developments in Russia prevailed, 
as did the will to put the defence of the alliance first. Therefore, the White Paper saw 
only little chance for extensive reductions of the armed forces. 
Van Brouwershaven identifies three factors why the White Paper only indicated 
small strategic changes: (1) the international environment changed so quickly that long-
term planning was useless; (2) as a result ‘conservative forces inside and outside the 
armed forces managed to restrict the changes to cuts in the existing tasks’. (3) The de-
fence organisation was not used to fundamental change after 40 years of (static) Cold 
War.30 With ‘conservative forces’, she referred to the dominant Minister Van den Broek 
who was politically superior to Ter Beek31 and the military top of the army: ‘together 
with Van den Broek they had been convinced that they should be careful with the initi-
ated changes’.32 This had direct implications for conscription, since only large forces 
(either in readiness or cadre) could guarantee an adequate territorial defence and only 
conscription could guarantee those large forces. 
1991 White Paper and conscription in the parliamentarian debate 
When on June 10th 1991 the standing defence commission of the Dutch Parliament de-
bated the White Paper 1991, the discussion about conscription took a different direction 
than officially intended by the Minister of Defence. First, it appeared that the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs tried to take the credits for the paper and the political responsibility. 
When confronted with further cuts in the defence budget the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
threatened to withdraw the Defence White Paper: 
  
‘Mister Van Traa (Labour): Is the Minister of Foreign Affairs saying 
that he resigns if there is another reduction of even one more cent? 
Minister Van den Broek: Who says that? 
Mister Van Traa (Labour): You are saying that it is almost unaccept-
able and that the limit has been reached. Let us bring that back to 
normal proportions. 
Minister Van den Broek: Allow me to use my own words. One thing 
should be clear: the Defence White Paper will be withdrawn if you 
demand further cuts. I guess you know, what that means for the future 
of the cabinet. 
Minister Ter Beek: I am responsible for what happens with the White 
Paper in the first place. 
Mister Weisglas (VVD [chairman of the commission, JEN]): May I 
know who of the both ministers talked on behalf of the government 
during the last thirty seconds? It would be useful to know, at five min-
utes to eleven p.m.’33 
 
Van den Broek immediately de-escalated the situation by supporting the Defence Minis-
ter’s statement. At the same time he emphasized that further cutbacks would thwart the 
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implementation of the White Paper, ‘as repeatedly talked about with the Minister of 
Defence.’34  
Secondly, during the same meeting, two members of both government parties i.e., 
the Christian Democratic (CDA) MP, G. Koffeman, and the Labour (PvdA) MP, H. 
Vos, put forward a motion, which influenced the task of the future commission on con-
scription. The defence spokesmen of those parties considered it an odd procedure to let 
the commission think about the future of Dutch conscription without giving it room to 
think about abolition. That is why CDA and PvdA requested the minister to change the 
task of the commission: at first it should analyse the future of conscription, whether or 
not to uphold it, before thinking about any instrumental reforms or technical adapta-
tions. And they restricted the time of investigation to one year. 
The MP’s engaged in the drafting of that motion had several reasons to put it for-
ward. Large parts of the CDA distrusted the cabinet. According to the CDA members in 
Parliament the cabinet was too much inclined to cut back the defence budget. By stick-
ing to conscription, the army would unequally gain more financial resources than the 
navy and the air force.35 As early as the 1980s, Frinking regarded the system of con-
scription as outdated. He had introduced a parliamentary motion in 1988, which sof-
tened the cabinet’s decision of the 1950s that allowed conscripts to be sent all over the 
world.36 To him abolition was necessary mainly because of the unequal burden-sharing. 
A second important reason was the bad treatment of the highly educated conscripts. In 
the eyes of Frinking they were abused in a mass army instead of efforts being made to 
develop their potential. The reasons were different again for the Labour MP’s. They 
distrusted the military and had been supporting conscription for a longer time than the 
CDA, due to the societal imbedding of the armed forces, its broad representation of so-
ciety, and the strategic necessity during the era of mass armies (= Cold War). Yet, they 
had their doubts and for this reason demanded a closer look. M. Zijlstra MP (PvdA) 
admitted more than ten years later that the CDA had taken the lead in the discussion.37 
It is worth noting that Parliament demanded that the minister produce an evaluation 
of the White Paper within two years, given the hectic international political develop-
ments. That revaluation, which later was named the Priorities White Paper, and its 
preparation turned out to be very influential on the ministers’ course of action on con-
scription. Moreover he had learned one important lesson from the realisation of the 
White Paper 1991: many people working on a White Paper means little influence for the 
minister. For this reason he limited the participants in the Priorities White Paper. Only a 
close inner circle was actively concerned, while the armed forces mainly served as sup-
plier of facts and figures.38 
To Ter Beek the evaluation offered an outspoken chance to put his fingerprint on the 
future of the armed forces and to correct the White Paper of 1991, when he was less 
influential and when he realised the dual role of the Commanders-in-Chief as advisors 
to the Minister and as advocates of the interests of their respective organisation.39 Fur-
thermore he had some serious problems with the Dutch decision to send troops to the 
1990/91 Gulf War.40 However, at that moment, the summer of 1991, conscription was 
not an issue to the Minister of Defence. The commission served to wait and see from 
where the wind blew.41 He was pragmatic: he did not loose any sleep over the subject 
and he ‘contracted the problem out’ to the commission.42  
How important the Priority Paper was for conscription in the Netherlands became 
obvious in March 1992 when the commission had reached its half way stage and the 
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Minister gave a sensational speech. Before addressing this, the commission, its operat-
ing procedure and its outcome will be discussed. 
5.4 The commission on conscription: the beginning 
On September 30th 1991, the Minister of Defence installed the commission of conscrip-
tion, also called the Meijer-commission (after its chairman). The Minister of Defence 
actively influenced the choice of commission members.  
The first brainstorm sessions on a future commission on conscription took place as 
early as 1990. By the end of that year, the Director General Personnel W.J.M. Bunnik 
wrote a note to the Minister, the Secretary General Patijn, and the Director Policy Af-
fairs D. Barth. That note was not more than a preliminary draft of a future commission 
on the future of conscription, putting some thoughts on paper uttered on 3 December 
1990 in a meeting of these senior policy makers. The Director General Personnel ended 
that note with a personal remark stating that he preferred a broader task for the commis-
sion. The commission should not only consider the organisation of conscription, but 
also if it would be desirable and/or necessary to stick to conscription after the actual 
planning period, taking into consideration the unequal burden-sharing by the unhappy 
few who got drafted, the costs, and the adequate supply of new personnel.43 
The plans for the formation of the commission took a more concrete form around 
April 1991. The first names circulated around May 1991.44 From that shortlist of 13 
names, three persons would take place in the commission in the end: W. Meijer, the 
chairman of the commission to be and a political and personal friend of the Minister; 
J.J.C. Voorhoeve, conservative (VVD) and director of an influential think tank for for-
eign affairs, the Netherlands Institute for International Relations (Clingendael), and the 
already mentioned retired Army General Huyser, who at that moment was, among other 
things, working as a columnist for several regional newspapers. While the task of the 
commission became more concrete after the parliamentary debates on the Defence 
White Paper 1991, the creation of the commission took a little longer. 
The Minister discussed the potential of other members of the commission with the 
chairman to be. The social democrat Meijer was junior secretary for Culture, Recreation 
and Social Work in the Den Uyl cabinet (1973-1977), MP from 1977-1988, from 1981-
1982 he was chairman of the PvdA parliamentary group. From 1988 until 1992 Meijer 
was the Queen’s Commissioner of the province Drenthe. During the entire work of the 
commission he stayed in that position. Also engaged in the formation– though at differ-
ent stages – were the Secretary General of the ministry, Patijn, the Director ‘Algemene 
Beleidszaken’ (Policy Matters), Barth, the Director General Personnel, Bunnik, a num-
ber of senior civil servants, one important ideological thinker of the PvdA, B. Peper, 
and Prime Minister Lubbers.45 He was consulted, because the Minister of Defence 
needed some recommendations on a CDA member, who might join the commission.46 
There had to be a representative in the commission of the four largest parties to guaran-
tee the political backing of the result. Yet, it had to be small to prevent a time-
consuming process and to make it more ‘manageable’.47  
In the end, they presented seven members, who were chosen according to their po-
litical and/or professional background. Four politicians from the largest parties, who did 
not belong to the political leadership of their parties, a retired general, a civil servant 
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from the department and a social scientist. It seemed that the choice of the scientist took 
the most time, because the one who had been the first choice, withdrew. After having 
fulfilled a similar task for another state commission, this person preferred not to advise 
the central government for the time being.48 Table 8 shows the final composition of the 
commission. 
Due to the parliamentary motion, mentioned above, the commission had a dual as-
signment. On the one hand, it had to investigate the desirability and feasibility of aboli-
tion of conscription and on the other hand, it had to come up with concrete suggestions 
of how a future conscription should be organised in case of non-abolition. Conse-
quently, the commission followed the so-called ‘maintenance track’ and the ‘abolition 
track’. 
 
Name Party Other relevant function 





Mayor Katwijk, Chairman commission 4/5 
May 
M. Jager Liberal – D’66 Mayor Wageningen 
J.J.C. Voorhoeve Liberal – VVD Director Netherlands Institute for Interna-
tional Relations (Clingendael) 
G.L.J. Huyser  Army General (ret.), former Chief of the 
Defence Staff 
P. Lehning  Professor of Social Science 
L.V. Mazel, secretary  Deputy Secretary General ministry of De-
fence 
Table 8: Members of the commission on Conscription 1991 
 
The Minister referred to this double task in the installation speech on 30 September 
1991. After a short survey on the history of conscription and the subsequent preceding 
commissions on conscription, the minister denoted the ‘drastic international develop-
ments’ and the ‘intensive discussion about the societal implications of conscription’, 
which had called for this special commission. The Minister pointed to the fact that the 
acceptance of the institute of conscription was no long a matter of course because of the 
unequal burden-sharing. On the other hand, he continued, we were faced by the prob-
lems of the societal embedding of the armed forces, which was guaranteed by conscrip-
tion, and the military necessity. The Minister was referring here to the army-building 
and mobilisation system. 
Minister Ter Beek emphasised that the Defence White Paper 1991 elaborated on the 
future tasks for the armed forces and that those tasks were not subject to the commis-
sion’s analysis. Yet, he continued – and this is worth noting in-depth, because later on it 
appeared to have influenced the commission’s work – ‘[i]t is obvious that the accep-
tance of conscription in society is influenced by the perception of the international secu-
rity situation and the related ideas about the task of the armed forces. The international 
security situation develops and changes very rapidly. The commission has to be aware 
of those developments, because its advice has needs to be supported by a careful inter-
pretation of those developments.’ The Minister continued that even if the commission 
would advise the abolishing of conscription, he had to look into this in great depth. 
Even if he would decide to follow such advice, the abolition process would take years in 
order not to endanger the functioning of the armed forces. He concluded, that he by no 
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means wished to impose on the commission how they should conduct their analysis; 
‘the members of the commission have all their own political, societal, and administra-
tive background . . . Furthermore the assignment of the commission would guarantee its 
independent position, which is a necessary condition for an unprejudiced judgement.’49 
The chairman of the commission, Meijer, underscored most of the Minister’s issues 
in his reply. Meijer observed that the limitation of the investigation time to one year 
made it necessary to set priorities. His priorities were: does the commission find that 
conscription in its actual form should be abolished? If yes – what should replace it and 
when should that happen? If not – which changes have to be made to meet the criticism 
about the actual conscription system? Can the period of service be shortened?50 The 
chairman acknowledged that he could neither answer any of those questions at that 
moment, nor could he do so without the approval of the commission. He admitted that 
there had been several commissions on the subject in the past, but he emphasised that 
‘… I think that we probably have to take a step further than our predecessors did. Since 
World War II, conscription as societal duty has never before been such a fundamental 
subject for debate as it is at present.’51 
For the commission’s routine the double track meant that the members of the com-
mission had to ask questions in both directions during their interviews with experts and 
stakeholders and while visiting several army garrisons, where they talked to command-
ers and conscripts. The commission also engaged a consulting company ‘Research voor 
Beleid’ (Policy Research) – specialised in governmental advice – which conducted an 
analysis of the labour market. Furthermore, the commission made use of the expertise of 
the army to calculate different models of how a future army might look. There was in-
tensive contact between the army command and the commission to discuss those mod-
els at length, because the army would carry the main burden of abolition of conscrip-
tion. This will be discussed later on. 
A few weeks after the installation of the Meijer-commission, one of the headlines of 
the Telegraaf, a conservative newspaper very popular among the military, stated that the 
end of conscription was nearby, since a majority of the Dutch Parliament expected abo-
lition within five years. It was Vos, initiator of the parliamentary motion that influenced 
the commission’s work, who declared that his party, PvdA, no longer explicitly ex-
cluded the possibility of abolition. An important argument was the recruitment of short-
term volunteers, who guaranteed the exchange/relation between the armed forces and 
society, an important issue for the Social Democrats. Hans Hillen (CDA) emphasised, 
according to the same article, the unequal burden-sharing and the professionalisation of 
the military, which could not be met with short-term conscription. His colleague, S. van 
Heemskerck (VVD) added to this the issue of arising planning insecurity if conscripts 
would be part of units deployed for international crisis management.52 This was one of 
the implications of a parliamentary motion by Frinking (CDA) who in 1988 had de-
manded that sending conscripts outside the NATO-area could only take place on a vol-
untary base. With this motion, he had weakened the government’s ability to send con-
scripts abroad, which had been possible since the colonial wars in Indonesia after the 
Second World War.53 The final headline of 1991 concerning conscription was that one 
of the ‘unions’ for conscripts, the ‘Algemene Vakbond voor Nederlandse Militairen’ 
(General Union for Dutch Military – AVNM), had changed its opinion in favour of abo-
lition, while the other conscript’s union, the ‘Vereniging Voor Dienstplichtige Mili-
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tairen’ (Federation for Conscripted Military – VVDM), was still in favour of conscrip-
tion.54 
After 363 days, on September 28th 1992, the commission gave its advice. It was – 
unlike most commissions on conscription before – unanimous: it recommended against 
abolishing conscription. It became obvious that at that moment the political stream and 
the work of the commission had drifted apart: a political majority started to support abo-
lition. Before going into this further in part 5.6, the commission’s work will be dis-
cussed in the next section. 
5.5 The commission at work 
Though it seemed that the majority of the commission was in favour of conscription, the 
members agreed on an open and above all pragmatic attitude. ‘They were looking for 
common ground and suggestions.’55 Yet, towards the end some members had the im-
pression that the will to find consensus eventually led to hasty conclusions.56 At an early 
stage, already in spring 1991, the top of the ministry of Defence had set the outlines of 
the future work of the commission. They had in general followed the motion of the Par-
liament. In first orientation sessions, Meijer agreed on the lines set out.57 The commis-
sion did the same in its first session. 
The commission collected arguments in favour and against conscription by placing 
advertisements in newspapers and by conducting an analysis of literature on the subject. 
Yet, it did not use those arguments to deduce any recommendations. In the commis-
sion’s opinion the arguments were in balance. In a later comment on the commission’s 
report, two members of the staff of the Chief Defence Staff concluded that this collec-
tion of arguments presented no highlight of scientific research. The arguments were not 














Figure 7: Conscription or voluntary forces? Source: Commissie Dienstplicht 1992: 31 
 
The opinion poll (Figure 7) assigned to the ‘Stichting Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht’ 
(Foundation for Society and Armed Forces – SMK) and conducted by a professional 
Dutch bureau for opinion research, ‘Nederlands Instituut voor Publieke Opinie’ (Dutch 
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Institute for Public Opinion – NIPO) was scientifically sounder. The poll exposed that 
within two years the public opinion on conscription had changed drastically: While in 
1989 49% of the population was in favour of a defence force with conscripts (36% was 
pro voluntary forces), only 32% was in favour of conscription in 1991, while 55% of the 
Dutch population wanted an all-voluntary army.59  
Respondents and advisors to the commission60 
Contrary to former commissions on conscription the Meijer-commission chose to ask 
the opinion of only a few experts. The official reason for that was the limited investiga-
tion time. One of those experts was the ‘Maatschappelijke Raad voor de Krijgsmacht’ 
(Societal Council for the Armed Forces – MRK). This Council was composed of a 
broad variety of societal and political groups and was advising the Minister of Defence. 
It recommended, in a report to the commission, to abolish conscription, on the condition 
that there would be enough volunteers. Until such time the quality of military service 
had to be improved. 
Two other organizations, which contributed to the commission’s work, were the two 
unions for volunteer armed forces personnel, i.e., the ‘Algemene Federatie voor Militair 
Personeel’ (General Federation of Military Personnel – AFMP) and the ‘Koninklijk 
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Reserve Officieren’ (Royal Society of Dutch Reserve 
Officers – KNVRO). The first organisation was in favour of abolition, because the ar-
gument that conscription guaranteed a positive relation between armed forces and soci-
ety was outdated. The latter organisation was in favour of conscription because in their 
opinion they found reserve-personnel important, acting as ambassadors of the armed 
forces. Without conscription there would be fewer people available for the reserve-
forces. 
The trade unions for conscript personnel (AVNM and VVDM) had the same mes-
sage to the commission. The latter changed its opinion just shortly before the commis-
sion questioned it. At management level, however, the AVNM had decided to strive for 
abolition as early as the summer of 1990. They did not emphasise in public though that 
due to tactical reasons, abolition of conscription should be used to reach short-term aims 
in the improvement of the quality of conscription and to get the active period of service 
reduced.61 During the interview with the commission, the AVNM was in favour of abo-
lition, because the advantages of conscription, like learning Russian or getting manage-
ment experience, were only applicable to a few conscripts. The VVDM observed that a 
key function of conscription, i.e. the democratisation of the armed forces, would be 
taken over by other organisations. 
Civil and military leaders 
On 29 January 1992 the commission interviewed the commander of the First Army 
Corps, General Van der Vlis, who became the Chief of (Defence) Staff in May 1992.62 
He was in strong favour of conscription. Yet, the report itself referred to none of his 
reasons. The report only stated the commander’s view on conditions to conscription. To 
Van der Vlis, the actual period of service should not be reduced to nine months, which 
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had been one possible option to make the service more attractive, because that was too 
short a period for training. The conscripts would be trained for their actual tasks. How-
ever, for real-life missions they should get extra preparation time, obligatory in other 
(professional) armies. Another important point of the commander of the First Army 
Corps was the difficulty that young men have to become soldiers. Most of them, how-
ever, were enjoying their time after a short habituation period. Just a small number of 
conscripts, approximately 10%, had difficulties adapting to the circumstances, but, Van 
der Vlis added ‘[m]any of those boys would have had the same difficulties elsewhere’.63 
The commander’s way of thinking about conscription contrasted sharply with the 
experiences of the almost 300 conscripts, who the members of the commission talked to 
during visits of garrisons in the Netherlands and Northern-Germany. Those conscripts 
were mainly in favour of abolition. This impression was supported by scientific re-
search, conducted by the commission. In this research 1,649 conscripts and 1000 men 
aged 27 to 32 years were asked for their opinion. Around two-thirds of them were 
against conscription.64 The main reasons were boredom, low salary and the interruption 
of their civil career.  
One important respondent was the Minister of Defence. This had been a rather odd 
procedure. As the initiator of the commission, who clearly defined the tasks of the com-
mission, any further contact with the commission could have been interpreted as politi-
cal interference and consequently as endangering the independence of the commission. 
He appeared before the commission in June 1992, after an invitation by the chairman. 
The invitation came shortly after the Minister held a speech on his view on the future of 
the armed forces. In this speech, held on March 31st 1992 at the ‘Nederlands 
Genootschap voor Internationale Zaken’ (The Netherlands Society for International 
Affairs – NGIZ), he defined the security situation as substantially different from the one 
stated in the White Paper 1991. Due to recent events, mainly the decline of the Soviet 
empire and the changes of NATO tasks, he concluded that the army might be reduced 
drastically. He also suggested in his speech, which in the remainder of this study will be 
referred to as NGIZ-speech, that the future of conscription was unsure. The speech will 
be discussed in detail in 5.6. 
Change and friction 
Just one month before that speech, the commission had an expert meeting on the current 
foreign and security policy situation at the Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 
where Voorhoeve was the director. In that session, most people concluded that times 
were changing, however, at the same time it was felt that the situation was still too inse-
cure to reduce the armed forces drastically, which would have implications for the fu-
ture armed forces. As long as there were still strategic threats to NATO and Dutch terri-
tory, abolition of conscription was not possible. In this sense, the outcome of that meet-
ing contrasted with the view of the Minister of Defence in his speech on 31st March. 
The chairman of the commission had phoned the Minister on the evening of 31 
March and blamed him for not taking the commission seriously. He stated in a letter the 
next day, that it seemed that the White Paper 1991 was no longer the point of departure 
for the future armed forces and that the future reforms would be very drastic. That, Mei-
jer continued, was in sharp contrast to the terms of reference of the commission, i.e. the 
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Defence White Paper 1991. The commission asked the Minister to come and explain 
what the basis for the commissions work ought to be exactly: ‘The […] explanations in 
your speech endanger the continuation of the commission’s work. After all, until now 
the commission based its work on terms of reference, which by now are apparently out-
dated, without having any views on the implications of our work with regards to your 
newly chosen objectives. In order to continue its work, the commission urgently needs 
to know – as soon as possible – which terms of reference it should use’.65 
On June 18th 1992 the Minister explained to the commission that the security situa-
tion had changed and that the future tasks of the armed forces were to be dual. On the 
one hand they would function as crisis-reaction-forces and on the other hand they would 
have to fulfil their classical strategic task as guardians of the integrity of the NATO-
area. As a consequence, the future armed forces would need three different types of 
units: crisis-reaction-forces, territorial deterrence forces, and forces prepared for a stra-
tegic conflict.66 The Minister then referred to two models for future armed forces, as 
designed by the Royal Army: the maintenance model and the abolition model. The 
Army had designed those models on behalf of the commission, since the commission 
itself was small and it therefore had to consult experts. Both models will be presented 
later on in this study in more detail, when the process within the army will be presented. 
Important at this point is the following quotation of the Minister before the commission: 
‘I want to emphasise that those models are by no means definite versions. Within the 
department further research will be conducted. So far I have not yet formed any opinion, 
nor have I indicated any preferences.’67 The Minister proposed a ‘begeleidingsgroep’ 
(support group) to improve communications between the ministry and the commission. 
However, that group was never used.68 
The commission acknowledged the changed security situation and the fact that this 
touched upon its core task: conscription. For this reason the commission organised the 
orientation session at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations, mentioned 
before. Together with speeches of the Minister of Foreign Affairs69 and the NGIZ-
speech of the Minister of Defence and in addition to his subsequent appearance before 
the commission on 18 June 1992, the commission thought that it had enough informa-
tion on the governmental security definition, without anticipating the ensuing revalua-
tion of the Defence White Paper. This was important since the definition of the security 
situation was the responsibility of the government and explicitly not that of the commis-
sion. 
One important study on behalf of the commission was the analysis of the Dutch la-
bour market by the institute ‘Research voor Beleid’ (Research for Policy). Departing 
from the abolition model, ‘Research voor Beleid’ concluded that it would be difficult to 
recruit the required 13,500 volunteers, of which 10,000 would be needed for the army. 
In particular the recruitment of highly qualified personnel - around 75% of the newcom-
ers would have to meet that demand - would be difficult in times of economic prosper-
ity. The commission concluded that given the macro-economical and social-political 
figures, volunteer armed forces would be difficult to achieve.70 
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The report 
All members of the commission participated in drafting the report. Repeatedly the mem-
bers discussed different versions and changed them, sometimes completely when neces-
sary.71 The commission concluded in its report that the world had not become safer 
since the end of the Cold War and that the commission had to consider an insecure fu-
ture. The future tasks of the armed forces would be dual. Firstly, quickly deployable and 
professional units would be necessary for dealing with smaller conflicts and relief skills 
had to be guaranteed. Secondly, the possibility of a large-scale conflict was small and it 
would be sufficient to have units kept in readiness and to train them on demand. 
Though the commission underscored the negative implications of unequal burden-
sharing, it came with it’s the unanimous advice that – at least in the nearby future – con-
scription could not be abolished. The considerations for that advice were:  
 
1) The commission is convinced that the Dutch armed forces should 
be capable and available for the maintenance of the international 
order based on law. That can be done with a larger, better-
organised and therefore more efficient crisis management capac-
ity embedded in the armed forces. 
2) Because of the uncertainties in the security situation, the com-
mission underscores the necessity of a mobilisation component 
that can be deployed to a considerable war capability. And fur-
ther ‘[t]he model of the professional army incorporates a drastic 
reduction in the peacetime organisation, while the mobilisation 
component will be divided almost in half. The commission con-
siders this one of the important disadvantages of the model for a 
professional army.’72 
3) The analysis of the employment market shows that it is espe-
cially difficult to recruit persons with a higher education. The 
commission doubts that the armed forces are able to compete on 
the employment market in the short run. 
4) The commission thinks that the Constitution has to be changed in 
case of abolition. Even when only the draft would be postponed, 
the adaptation of the Conscription appears to be the only way. 
The expected procedures would be very time consuming, which 
in turn would frustrate the demands of a short transition period 
towards an all-volunteer force. 
5) Conscription is important for the societal support of the armed 
forces. 
 
The commission wrote: ‘The considerations prevent the commission from advising the 
abolition of conscription. The commission concludes that it is necessary to maintain 
conscription. The reasons for conscription to exist are unchanged according to the 
commission, yet the manner in which the armed forces exist are organised, however, 
should be reconsidered. […] The commission concludes therefore that a drastic reform 
of conscription is necessary’.73  
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Though in the end the conclusion of the report was unanimous, some members had 
their doubts if they should recommend maintaining conscription.74 Yet, they did not 
express their doubts at the end of the process and did not formulate a minority (dissent-
ing) opinion. The reason was that all commission members could underscore the report 
for different reasons. Voorhoeve had been satisfied with the recommendation in the 
conclusions of the report to change the constitution, which, according to the advice of 
constitutional lawyers, was crucial to abolish conscription in the future.75 Van Mont-
frans, who had a rather critical attitude towards the military and conscription, supported 
the conclusion because of the international situation, thereby following the line of Van 
den Broek. However, she too was glad with the implicit recommendation of the report 
that eventually, when the international situation would be more predictable, abolition 
might be an option.76 Those who had their doubts about the continuation of conscription 
also agreed on the final conclusion because of the expected negative recruiting figures 
stated in the report by the external advisor ‘Research voor Beleid’.77 Jager, who was a 
strong supporter of conscription, admitted that this recommendation had been a gesture 
towards the political resistance and the fact that the commission foresaw the financial 
and employment market problems for large armed forces.78 General (ret.) Huyser fol-
lowed his strict line of conserving until the end of the commission’s work. He admitted 
that he had few contacts with the military top, but that they could hardly have influ-
enced him since most of them followed the same line: conscription.79 
Political reactions to the report 
A few days before the presentation, the first conclusions were leaked to the press. The 
largest newspaper Telegraaf quoted spokesmen of both trade unions for conscripts, who 
rejected the decision of the committee to stick to the conscription, though reduced to 
nine months.80 The weekly opinion paper Vrij Nederland printed a large article on 26 
September 1992 about the ‘still secret advice’, foreseeing that Ter Beek would face hard 
times if he would follow the advice not to abolish conscription. On the day itself almost 
all political parties rejected the commission’s conclusion instantaneously. Within half 
an hour after the presentation, the defence expert of the CDA, Hillen, declared that the 
report was to be rejected. He and most of his colleagues demanded an end to military 
conscription.81 He knew, as a seasoned politician, that every weakness in his criticism 
would be in favour of the pro-conscription faction. For this reason he opposed the report 
fiercely, without even knowing it in detail.82 He had based his criticism both on the 
leaked conclusions of the report and on confidential information from members of the 
commission.83 Until today supporters and opponents mutually blame each other for that 
leak.84 
Even the Social Democrats rejected the conclusions of the report. They left no illu-
sions when talking to Meijer a few days before the presentation of the report. It seemed 
that the chairman of the commission had asked his political friends how the report 
might be received. Two defence specialists of the PvdA in Parliament, Zijlstra and Vos, 
told him that they had changed their opinion, because of the unequal burden-sharing and 
the uncertainty of filling the crisis management units and that they therefore would not 
support the conclusion of the report.85 
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As from Monday 29 September 1992 all national and a few local newspapers wrote 
about the report and its presentation. Most articles stuck to the facts of the report but 
stressed the broad rejection of its conclusions by Parliament and the possible problems 
Minister Ter Beek could face86. A few comments pro (again Huyser) and con conscrip-
tion and even an interview with the chairman of the committee were printed on that day. 
In that interview Meijer underscored the important conclusions of his committee: ‘no 
professional army that is unwanted, because you cannot get enough volunteers, and, 
Europe is not that safe’ (Volkskrant 29-9-1992). It is interesting to note that even the 
national newspaper Trouw – traditional a supporter of conscription – argued in its edito-
rial pro abolition, since the security situation was not as dangerous as the committee had 
written to justify conscription. Ter Beek was quoted that the report would strongly in-
fluence his opinion on the subject and that he would present a conclusion in December 
199287. 
Still, it took the social democratic Minister more than two months until he publicly 
announced the decision to change the forces into all-volunteer forces. In the next three 
sections the actions of the Minister and his advisors and the tactics of the military will 
be described and this empirical chapter will be concluded with an analysis of the media 
stream between 1989 and 1992. 
5.6 The Minister changes his mind 
The previous section highlighted the preferences of the political environment of the 
Minister of Defence. Though there had been different opinions, even within political 
parties about the future of conscription, the defence spokesmen of the governmental 
parties preferred abolition. This became obvious shortly after the presentation of the 
report of the Meijer-commission. That commission, composed of all relevant parliamen-
tary parties, recommended keeping military conscription and the draft. Now that we 
know the preferences of the institutional environment of the political and military lead-
ers, it is important to focus on their own preferences. In the next sections, the prefer-
ences with regard to the draft of the Minister of Defence and his closest assistants will 
be described. Part 5.7 will concentrate on the military leaders. 
Keeping conscription low on the agenda 
From late 1989 until March 1992, the Minister and the Junior Minister of Defence sel-
dom projected their opinion about the subject in public. Their sparse comments on con-
scription were always pro conscription.88 The Minister repeatedly defended the argu-
ments of the White Paper 1991 and accredited his opinion to his social-democratic con-
viction. To him conscription was a service to society by young men from all social 
strata. Or, as he wrote in his memoirs: ‘There are rights in our country, but duties, too. 
This is important to me and at that time I believed that the general conscription was just, 
since it made no difference between the son of a worker and the son of the chairman of 
the board’.89 It was important to the Minister that a future commission on conscription 
should think about reforms, but not necessarily about complete abolition. 
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In the 1991 Defence White Paper the passage about the commission was not very 
explicit on the possibility of abandoning conscription. The abolition of conscription had 
not been high on the Minister’s agenda. The commission served as an instrument to gain 
time and to see which way the wind would blow. The Minister also hoped that the 
commission might come up with strong arguments in favour of conscription. Another 
important reason lay in the politically delicate nature of abolition. Some political friends 
advised the Minister to establish the commission because such far-reaching decisions 
needed a broad political and societal consensus.90  
The NGIZ speech of March 31st, 1992 
A few months after the (unsuccessful) ‘coup d’état’ in the Soviet Union, Ter Beek held 
the aforementioned speech before the Netherlands Society for International Affairs 
(NGIZ), in Hotel Babylon in The Hague. In this speech the Minister for the first time 
presented his analysis of the new security situation and its possible implications for the 
future armed forces. In his opinion, the security situation had changed more than most 
people had expected one year earlier, when the Defence White Paper 1991 had been 
presented. Ter Beek summed up four changes that could influence future armed forces. 
Firstly, and most important, due to the decline of the Soviet Union, the threat of its 
forces invading the West had almost disappeared. Secondly, the Minister pointed to the 
changes in NATO since the summit in London (July 1990) and the summit of Rome 
(December 1991). The political character of the alliance had become more important, as 
had become its support for the states of the former Warsaw Pact. The Minister expected 
the NATO to change even more. Thirdly, the European component on security had be-
come more important and fourthly, the United Nations and its peace operations had in-
creased in importance. The Minister summed up the implications of those changes for 
the Dutch armed forces in ten points. 
In the first nine points the Minister expressed the necessity for a smaller army. It 
should be more flexible for use in territorial defence and for peace-operations outside 
any NATO area. Furthermore, a future army, embedded in the alliance always acting 
together with other international forces, should consider increased task specialisation. 
That implied, that in the long run, every country in the alliance should be specialised in 
one or more combat and support units, e.g. transport and logistics, or artillery, or mili-
tary engineering, instead of trying to have all military units in one national army. In this 
way, every country could do what it was best at, and at the same time reduce forces and 
save money. According to the Ministers’ opinion that specialisation would not be possi-
ble in the short term. However, the Netherlands had to discuss complementary tasks 
with its allies. In the tenth point of his speech, the Minister referred to conscription. He 
referred to the work of the commission and stated that it had been its job to think about 
the future of conscription in the light of the revolutionary changing security situation. 
He stated that although abolition would be a radical and far-reaching decision, conscrip-
tion itself was just a means, not an aim.91 It is interesting to note that the draft stated that 
the Minister ‘took abolition seriously into account’. Just minutes before the speech he 
toned that down into ‘he might have to take abolition into account.’92 
The timing and content of the Minister’s speech were remarkable. The definition of 
the security situation is the task of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as has been men-
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tioned before in the White Paper 1991 description. The Minister of Defence, however, 
had not consulted his colleague, Van den Broek, about this speech. He wanted to avoid 
any interference with his plans. At the same time it was customary within the cabinet to 
inform the responsible Minister. The Minister of Defence and his assistants came up 
with a tactical move. They printed the speech with double line spacing so that it covered 
45 pages and they faxed it to the ministry of Foreign Affairs just hours before the Min-
ister addressed the NGIZ. His colleague had no chance to prevent or modify the speech. 
One of the few people outside the inner circle who received the speech seemed to be the 
CDA defence expert Frinking. Ter Beek: ‘We were together in one coalition, it seemed 
convenient to me … Passing the speech to Frinking was a tactical, political game.’93 
A controversial speech: political reactions 
The next day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to his colleague of the min-
istry of Defence. In the letter, the Minister stated fiercely that his ministry received the 
speech just hours before it had been delivered, ‘while it already had been in possession 
of some of the members of the parliamentary defence commission. I consider this an 
odd procedure for a speech containing 75% matters of foreign affairs.’94 For Van den 
Broek this speech had been another sign that the Minister of Defence had his own 
agenda, from which Van den Broek had been excluded.95 He emphasised in an inter-
view that ‘it would have been better if the Minister of Defence would not have taken 
him by surprise. It would have been more prudent if I had received the speech in 
time’.96 
It took over a week before Van den Broek rebutted Ter Beek in public. The Minister 
of Foreign Affairs had believed for a long time that the threat potential from the Soviet 
Union was still high and that only large and comprehensive Dutch forces would guaran-
tee protection.97 ‘I am pointing to the fact,’ the Minister of Foreign Affairs said in an 
interview ‘that the speech of Relus [ter Beek, JEN] is emphasising the role of the army 
in peace operations too much. He says that all future material in the armed forces and its 
structure has to be suited for peace operations. Yet, I wonder: what will happen with the 
classical defence tasks?’98 Van den Broek continued to point to the large Russian army 
of 1,3 million men and its nuclear arms. In combination with the unstable situation in 
the follow-up states of the former Soviet Union, this represented a high threat potential. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs showed his concern about a Dutch solo mission and 
emphasised repeatedly that any reform of the Dutch armed forces, which was inevitable, 
could only take place within the future defence concept of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation.  
This was closely connected to another important reason for Van den Broek’s resis-
tance to Ter Beek’s plans. An all-volunteer army would be smaller. As a consequence 
there would have to be a change of the army structures: no army corps and that would 
mean less impact within international organisations. According to ministry of Defence 
officials, several senior policy makers of the ministry of Foreign Affairs were afraid that 
NATO would not take the Netherlands seriously anymore and that they would be re-
garded as of equal military importance as Luxembourg.99 A letter of Van den Broek of 6 
April 1992 supports this valuation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs reacted more elabo-
rately to Ter Beek’s NGIZ speech in this letter. The tone resembled the abovementioned 
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interview in the Volkskrant of 11 April. However, Van den Broek much more empha-
sised the future role of Dutch defence within the alliance: ‘To what extent will there be 
a structure in the future that is suited for ‘traditional’ large-scale combat operations? We 
cannot seriously expect from our allied friends that they have to carry the burden of 
defending our soil, while the Netherlands restrict themselves to operations with a 
peacekeeping nature.’100 
There were more reactions by stakeholders in the sector. A few days after the NGIZ-
speech, several interest groups reacted to the speech in the newspapers. The VVDM, 
acknowledged that abolition of conscription made them obsolete, but that in principle 
they were not against abolition.101 The Association of Professional Soldiers accused the 
Minister of having made plans without consulting them and of only communicating 
with the military through the media.102 Even the top of the military had no clue what Ter 
Beek would say. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army Wilmink was furious when he 
heard of the speech. Neither he nor the Chief of the Defence Staff, De Graaff, had been 
informed.103 Yet, they did not complain in public.  
On 4 April 1992, the Minister gave an interview to the Volkskrant. In that interview, 
he defended his speech and talked about the future of conscription. While he stated on 
the one hand that he did not want to anticipate the conclusions of the Meijer-
commission, he acknowledged on the other hand that in the ‘near future’ the Nether-
lands would have a professional army. The reasons he stated for this were the following: 
the unequal burden-sharing of those who actually had to serve and the availability for 
peace missions.104 Two days before that interview and on the day of the interview com-
ments of the former CDS, General Huyser, were published in two regional papers. 
While in New York, doing research for the Meijer-commission of which he was a 
member, he blamed the Minister of Defence of confusing the military with the boy 
scouts.105 According to the General, the Minister used the wrong arguments for aboli-
tion. General Huyser concluded that the ‘abolition of conscription did not depend on the 
tasks of the armed forces’. 
One of the reasons for Ter Beek to present his speech without prior consultation is a 
previous experience with the drafting of the White Paper 1991. To Ter Beek the NGIZ 
speech 1992 was his keynote speech.106 With that speech he wanted to set the parame-
ters for a new defence policy. That is why he initiated the date and place to give his 
speech.107 The items in that speech formed the route along which the evaluation paper, 
later to be titled ‘Priorities Paper’, should run. That paper was expected in the beginning 
of 1993. The Minister had tried to do the same before, on his way to the Defence White 
Paper 1991 with the so-called ‘terms of reference letter’.108 In that letter, the Minister 
had wanted to outline the plans for a future army. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, how-
ever, resisted the content of the letter, when he got hold of it. After political negotiations 
at the highest level, between the coalition leaders, the Prime Minister Lubbers and the 
vice Prime Minister, his coalition ally Kok, the letter was held back. Ter Beek never 
wanted to face such a situation again.109 
A second reason why the timing was striking was that the speech was held during 
the heydays of the Meijer-commission. It had already been indicated that the chairman 
of the commission was not amused and had asked Ter Beek to talk to the commission. 
Ter Beek tuned his speech when following the invitation. Even when asked directly, he 
denied that he wanted conscription to be abolished.110 It is interesting to note that in-
between the speech and Ter Beek’s appearance before the commission, he had changed 
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his mind, as he afterwards admits and as the already referred to interview in the 
Volkskrant of 4 April indicated. Still he was supporter of conscription, but pragmatic 
reasons seemed to change his opinion: 
Two days after Ter Beek held his NGIZ speech, the commander of the army, Gen-
eral Wilmink, went to the Minister to tell him that the army was unable to provide a 
medical company for a UN mission in Cambodia. The problem was not the equipment 
or the companies - the Dutch army had several of those - but the difficulty was the man-
ning of the company for a longer period than half a year. The army was unable to find 
enough volunteers for the mission and conscripts could not be ordered to go abroad. 
Maybe it was possible to send a first group, but who would relieve the soldiers after six 
months? According to the Minister of Defence it was on this 2nd of April 1992 that he 
reached the conclusion that only a volunteer army could prevent those problems.111 
His closest assistant on the ministry, Barth, also referred to that day when thinking 
of his change of opinion. He was deeply impressed by the situation, when Ter Beek 
asked his Director of General Policy Affairs (DAB) to come into his office while the 
Minister was talking to the General. Barth acknowledged, however, that once he had 
changed his mind he did not strive openly for abolition; he did not want to be perceived 
to be lobbying: ‘For me it was no Saul turning into Paul situation,’ he stated ten years 
later. 112 
It seems that the relation between the Minister and Barth was very close. Apart from 
the fact that the DAB was the head of a very influential political directorate, there was 
another reason for that close relationship. Just a few weeks before Ter Beek’s predeces-
sor, F. Bolkestein (VVD), had handed over the ministry to Ter Beek, he had appointed 
his political friend Patijn as the new Secretary General of the ministry. This was a very 
unusual procedure in Dutch politics. It was absolutely ‘not done’ and due to this Patijn 
had a weak position at the ministry and a poor relationship with Ter Beek.113 
The origins of the NGIZ speech 
The NGIZ-speech had been far-reaching and important. It marked a shift in how the 
political level of the ministry of Defence thought about the future of the armed forces. It 
marked a change from conscription as an independent policy item to just a part of the 
larger restructuring plans, the Priorities Paper. Confrontations with the Foreign Minister 
and the military could be expected. Considering this and knowing that at the moment of 
publication of the speech the Minister and his closest advisor, Barth, were still not con-
vinced enough to abolish conscription, it is important to trace in-depth the origins of the 
speech.  
Minister of Defence Ter Beek wanted to address the sector with a keynote speech. 
Amongst others it was his spokesman, Bert Kreemers, who belonged to the inner circle 
of the Minister, who had recommended holding a major political speech. The Minister 
would need a forum to communicate his plans about the future armed forces and to re-
gain a better institutional position with regard to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Instead 
of waiting for an invitation by the rather prestigious NGIZ organisation, Kreemers 
asked the chairman of the NGIZ if he would be interested in a keynote speech which 
would pay off for both, the Minister of Defence and the organisation.114 
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The author of the speech was Jacques de Winter, deputy director at DAB who was 
known as a very intelligent and independent mind, who was never seen at any recep-
tions or other potential lobby events.115 De Winter worked at home on that speech for 
one week. In retrospect, this speech was one of the most important speeches he wrote 
during his career.116 Although he regularly consulted Ter Beek and Barth117, he was 
given a lot of freedom to state his views. To De Winter, the events since November 
1989 were representing a major shift. In his opinion, many people talked about it, but 
did not think about it. De Winter did. He formulated the future of the armed forces and 
their possible assignments in ten points.118 
Ter Beek and Barth acknowledged ten years later that De Winter was more ad-
vanced in his thinking and planning than they had been.119 Barth and De Winter often 
discussed the issue of conscription, since Barth was an emotional and traditional sup-
porter of conscription, whereas De Winter opposed that institution from a technical and 
pragmatic point of view: ‘Endless talks, endless models … everything had been done to 
convince people like me.’120 Though they differed on the subject in the first place, Barth 
was rather proud of the speech, since it was an important product of his directorate.121  
Discussions held about conscription at DAB were not only a bi-lateral affair be-
tween the Director and his deputy. In September 1991, when the commission started its 
work, the mood at the ministry of Defence had not been pro abolition. De Winter re-
membered the situation ten years later as being emotionally pro conscription. According 
to him, many civil servants simply did not understand the changes.122 Yet, especially at 
the political directorate DAB, people often talked about the subject. And there, the at-
mosphere was sometimes emotional as well, not only during the staff meetings, but also 
at Monday morning coffee when the issue was frequently discussed.123 
Ter Beek was reluctant to plead in public for the abolition of conscription. That be-
came obvious in the toned down reference to conscription in his NGIZ speech, his dip-
lomatic phrase in the Volkskrant interview of 4 April 1992, and his appearance before 
the commission as described earlier. According to the Chief Defence Staff (CDS), Van 
der Vlis, the Minister had still been positive about conscription in June. He had told his 
chief military advisor that he would prefer a mixed model, with the armed forces partly 
manned with volunteers for peace operations and partly with conscripts for traditional 
deterrence tasks, as a fair solution for the future.124 The Minister in turn appreciated the 
opinion of the CDS, but admitted that he did not follow all of his advice. Sometimes, in 
particular with regard to conscription, he did not want to listen to all the generals any-
more with their repetitive, old arguments: ‘I knew their arguments. [...] I was astonished 
myself that I dared to resist those generals, but after that long time at the ministry [two 
and a half year, JEN] I knew a lot [...] The generals had to realise that times had 
changed.’125 
De Winter’s memo 
After the presentation of the Meijer-report De Winter again played an important role. 
The Friday before the presentation, the only commissioned officer at the DAB, Marine 
Colonel D.C.L. Schoonoord, received parts of that report. His superior, Barth, requested 
that he prepare a presentation on the report for the upcoming Monday morning meeting 
at the DAB. In that presentation Schoonoord emphasised two weak spots in the report: 
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the funding of the plans for the ‘New conscription’ and the half-hearted plans them-
selves.126 
After the presentation, Schoonoord received the order to rewrite his presentation as 
a memo for the Minister. De Winter joined the drafting process and finished it in his 
critical and eloquent style. Since the memo was only meant for the Director of Policy 
Affairs and the Minister, the deputy director wrote a very open memo without any res-
ervations. De Winter and Schoonoord literally crushed the report of the commission on 
conscription. In their opinion the report was using a ‘worst-case scenario’ when describ-
ing the actual security situation.127 The commission had completely ignored the NGIZ 
speech of the Minister and the explanatory memorandum to the defence budget of 1993. 
The commission had functioned as a mouthpiece of one part of the armed forces, the 
army, since it only concentrated on the maintenance model, calculated by that same 
army.128  
When talking on the phone to Barth, who was abroad, De Winter asked if he should 
distribute the note among the small group working on the so-called Defence Priorities 
White Paper. Somewhat to De Winter’s surprise129, his superior agreed, though hesi-
tantly, and De Winter sent his memo to the members of the steering commission for the 
Defence Priorities Paper via the Secretary General of the ministry.130 While already 
reading the memo, the Secretary General quickly understood its political dimension.131 
In an unprecedented move, he recalled all copies of the memo on procedural grounds. 
Unfortunately to him, it proved almost impossible to retrieve all copies. Within a short 
period of time, the five original copies of the memo were copied and almost magically 
multiplied. When the Secretary General received the original copies back all the staples 
had been removed. A military police’s investigation counted 117 copies that had been 
made in very short time. And two of those copies had disappeared: they had found their 
way to the press.132 It is almost certain that the De Winter-memo accelerated the process 
towards postponing the draft. 
When director Barth saw the headlines soon after his arrival at Schiphol Airport, it 
was too late. The news had already reached the chairman of the commission, Meijer. 
Meijer was very upset and wrote a letter to the Minister in which he rejected every criti-
cism on the commission. He emphasised that he and his colleagues worked strictly ac-
cording to their assignment. Even during the Minister’s talk with the commission in 
May and June 1992, he had not given the commission the impression that it should 
change or even postpone its mandate. If members of the ministry disagreed on the 
points of departure of the commissions’ task, those members should have spoken out 
before. Meijer concluded that the commission rejected the criticism since the results of 
its work were judged on a not-given task, with non-provided facts because of tactics that 
lay beyond the influence of the commission.133 
Two days later, the Minister replied that he only could answer briefly, since his min-
istry was working on an elaborate answer to the report of the commission. This answer 
would be used for the cabinet meeting. The Minister denied that he had been vague 
when he talked to the commission. According to him, the commission had not applied 
his analysis of the security situation. Instead, it had relied on its self-organised meeting 
at the Netherlands Institute of Foreign Affairs (described above, JEN) and two speeches 
held by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Defence regretted the leaking 
of the De Winter-memo; yet, it was just one opinion among others at the ministry, 
which contributed to the general policy discourse within the ministry.134 
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Headlines stated that the civilian leadership at the ministry was convinced that a 
professional army was within reach.135 The coverage on conscription got a new impetus 
and was revived. Two clear streams could be separated. On the one hand were the op-
ponents of conscription who rejected the conclusions of the commissions and pointed to 
the difficult situation the Minister of Defence was in. According to them the Minister 
had committed himself to the commission, yet he faced strong political opposition136. 
On the other hand were the supporters of conscription, who launched the proposal of 
‘social draft’: social service to society, which everybody was obliged to fulfil. A promi-
nent representative on that view was the party leader of the CDA in Parliament, L.C. 
Brinkman.137 Two days later, his own party and Parliament colleague, Hillen, demanded 
– together with a PvdA politician - a clear statement of Ter Beek on the subject. The 
latter example was typical for the public discussion on the subject which leads to the 
conclusion that there was no clear-cut majority pro or con conscription. The fault lines 
even ran through parties and parliamentary groups. 
Abolition announced  
On 1st November 1992 the Minister of Defence announced – for the first time to a 
broader public – that conscription in the Netherlands was going to be abolished.138 This 
occurred during the so-called ‘Battle at Leusden’, an internal policy conference of the 
ministry with the Minister and the Junior Minister of Defence, the Secretary-General, 
the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Directors-General Personnel and Economy and Fi-
nances, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and both coordinators of the steering 
committee for the Priorities White Paper. The meeting took place in a restaurant near 
Amersfoort.139  
The last two speakers that day were the Junior Minister and the Minister. The Junior 
Minister, Van Voorst tot Voorst, said that as far as he was concerned the conscription 
could be abolished. The Minister knew that Van Voorst tot Voorst would say: both men 
had talked about Van Voorst tot Voorst’s contribution during the car trip to the meeting 
- and he looked relieved. Now it would be easier for him to announce his decision.140 
That decision still took some of the military by surprise. General Van der Vlis, the Chief 
of the Defence Staff, had not expected this. He went by the words spoken by the Minis-
ter in June. Apart from that, he did not talk to the Minister about the subject during the 
rest of the summer.141 
On 1st of November 1992 the Chief of the Defence Staff realised that the matter of 
abolition had been decided. It was his colleague Hans Couzy, commander of the army 
since September 1992, who would make headlines in connection with the abolition. But 
before turning to this, the action of the military forces will be described chronologically.  
5.7 Military leaders and the conscription issue 
It is wrong to talk about ‘the military forces’ when analysing the process that led to the 
abolition of conscription in the Netherlands. Actually, it was foremost the Army that 
was concerned about the implications of abolition. Already at an early stage, around the 
creation of the Defence White Paper 1991, the navy and air force restrained from any 
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comment when it came to the subject. To those parts of the Armed Forces conscription 
was not vital, since conscripts manned only a small part of their respective organisa-
tions. Even during two important conferences about the Priorities Paper, on 13 May and 
10 June 1992, they stayed out of the discussion about an army reform and the future of 
conscription. After all, every reduction of the Army plus new tasks out of the NATO-
area could only be positive for their organisations. For this reason, only the Army and 
the defence staff will be taken into consideration in this part of the report. 
When the Meijer-commission was established, it was obvious that the army would 
be most concerned when it came to matters of conscription. It was therefore not unusual 
that a former Army General, Huyser, became a member of that commission. He was not 
only an expert for the security analysis, but he was also an expert on army-matters. 
The commission visited several garrisons, where they talked to hundreds of young 
conscripts and their superiors. The commission visited these places and talked to the 
soldiers to get an impression from the people who were directly involved and not only 
through books or senior officers. The commission needed the assistance of the army 
organisation for the visitations and interviews with 300 men and a large-scale opinion 
poll among 1500 men. Fifty army-places were appointed and were informed by the Di-
rector Personnel of the army. The latter urged the commanders of the different units to 
co-operate with the commission, ‘… because of the huge importance of the research of 
the commission.’142 
The commission’s importance for the army also became obvious in the appointment 
of the Deputy Commander of the Army, General Couzy, who became Commander of 
the Army in September 1992, as liaison for the commission. His commander, General 
Wilmink, had appointed him to provide the commission with figures and models. The 
models were calculated by the staff-officers of the Deputy Commander and contained 
different scenarios for a future army. In January and March 1992 the General presented 
two models as serious options, the so-called maintenance model, model 3, and the aboli-
tion model, model 2. Those models were refined and represented during two confer-
ences for the preparation of the Priorities White Paper to the Minister and the Chief of 
the Defence Staff on 13 May and 10 June 1992.143 
Modelling the future armed forces 
The commission formulated the conditions for the models. The figures and numbers 
concerning the restructuring and reduction of the army as stated in the Defence White 
Paper served as point of departure, with up to 20% reductions of conscripts between 
1991 and 1995. The same holds true for the financial resources. The models were to be 
calculated until 2001. For the army, the commission expected that 75% of the soldiers 
replacing conscripts would serve for two years and 25% would serve for four years (so 
called temporary professional soldiers - BBT). The volunteers should meet certain lev-
els of education (not explicitly stated). These were the parameters the army had to use in 
all calculations. 




1. They expected to have 23,000 positions for conscripts in 1996 
and 18.000 in 2001; 
2. They expected that 100% of the BBT would serve for two years, 
25% of those would prolong their contract; 
3. The basic military education had to be increased two to six 
months, since the BBT soldiers had to function immediately in 
their position; 
4. After the service the BBTs’ would have to serve twice in their 
active service time in the mobile reserve; 
5. The average costs will be 59,000,- guilders per soldier. 
 
Taking all conditions into consideration, the army came up with a requirement need of 
9,200 recruits per year in case of abolition. A figure that was difficult to achieve, ac-
cording to the labour market analysis of the appointed bureau ‘Research voor Beleid’ 
(described above). 
 
 Model 3- Maintenance Model 2 - Abolition 
Army Corps Yes No 
Division 2 (1 prepared/active and 1 mobi-
lised) 
1 (partially prepared/active)  
Crisis manage-
ment 
Quick deployment  Quick deployment, less capacity to 
relieve 
Bottleneck Financial Operational 
   








(Forced) leavers 5.000 3.500 6.500 9.500 
Recruitment 5.000 3.500 10.000 5.000 
Costs personnel* + 100  + 100 + 400 - 500 
Costs social 
frame* 
1.200 850 1.600 2.300 
Conscripts 17.000 20.000   
Peacetime org. 46.000 47.000 43.500 29.000 
Wartime org. 110.000 110.000 94.000 ?** 
Table 9: Models compared. Sources: Answer Couzy to commission.144 Introduction of the Minister 
of Defence for meeting with commission 18-06-1992,145 note Reitsma 30-9-92.146 PLC = Profession-
als with limited contracts (BBT = Beroeps Bepaalde Tijd); * In million guilders; ** their question 
mark 
 
According to the calculations, the abolition model had more negative side effects than 
the maintenance model. Note the question mark in Table 9. One important uncertainty 
factor for the army had always been the recruitment of professional forces.147 It ap-
peared that for those calculations, the staff of the deputy commander of the army had 
used so many limiting conditions, that they could not come up with any attractive model 
without conscription. The limiting conditions seemed to be used in anticipation of the 
wishes of the Commander of the Army, General Wilmink. He was such a strong propo-
nent of conscription that nobody dared to oppose his opinion.148 One respondent stated: 
‘If the Commander in Chief of the Army has a dominant point of view, this penetrates 
the organisation.’149  
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In spring 1992150, one general in the staff of the army commander was convinced 
that giving some serious through to the abolition of conscription was not so bad after 
all. General J.W. Brinkman was one of the ‘young Turks’ – young generals, like the 
Deputy Chief Defence Staff, Van den Breemen or the Army General R. Reitsma – 
whose roots were not so strongly connect with the Cold War as those of the Chiefs and 
Commanders. Brinkman, who was Deputy Chief Planning, was convinced that his 
commander was too stubborn when it came to the subject of conscription. Brinkman 
wrote a note to General Wilmink. In that note he stated that it would be difficult to up-
hold conscription. He stated up three reasons. Firstly, Brinkman pointed to the funda-
mental and structural change of the strategic military situation in Europe. Now the old 
threat ‘close to home’ had disappeared, conscription had become obsolete. Secondly, 
Brinkman argued that society’s support for conscription was in decline. Thirdly, he 
wondered whether conscription would still be effective from a management point of 
view. He demonstrated that the calculated mix model led to differences in payment and 
that it would be disputable if the long military preparation periods for the conscript part 
would still be valid. Brinkman was afraid that the army staff would not give enough 
thought to the possibility of an all-voluntary army, although the process would lead ul-
timately in that direction. The actual models 2 and 3 were too short sighted and they 
would cause too many negative effects in the long run, if abolition would be a fact. 
Brinkman presented the note to his direct superior Couzy, Director Operations, who 
recommended destroying it. Couzy saw the points of the note, but said: ‘if you think 
that General Wilmink will change his opinion due to your note, you are naive. I know 
exactly what will happen: you will both quarrel. You’re already fighting with General 
Wilmink. What exactly do you want?’151 Yet, Brinkman took it to his commander to 
open his eyes. General Wilmink reacted fiercely. He was so furious that from that mo-
ment on no one in the organisation dared to talk about the end of conscription either in 
public or to the Commander.152 It seemed that Wilmink feared that, once concrete plans 
for an all-volunteer army would exist, those plans would be implemented.153 The Com-
mander himself stated ten years later that he took this stand because he did not want any 
discussion as long as the Meijer-commission had been engaged. Furthermore, to Wil-
mink it was important that the Army had sufficient qualified personnel to fulfil its 
tasks.154 At times, General Wilmink even pointed his subordinates to the fact that they 
should think and act more in favour of conscription. He repeatedly thought that Couzy 
was too honest to the commission. The General had answered every question of the 
commission quite openly, without always keeping the army’s interests in mind.155 
One of the effects was that even potential collaborators, like the Defence Staff, 
knew that Wilmink opposed abolition very strongly, but sometimes they found it diffi-
cult to find out what the exact plans of the Commander in Chief of the Army really 
were. ‘The army had been a sealed book’ to the Defence Staff156 
The commander of the army was not the only strong supporter of conscription; the 
Chief Defence Staff was one too. Like his colleague, he committed himself to all mod-
els in favour of conscription. Whether it concerned a mixed model with one part of the 
forces for out-of-area tasks and one part for territorial defence, or a model that was 
closer to the existing situation. During the second conference, 10th June 1992, Wilmink 
presented the mixed model (model 3a). Van der Vlis was positive about the model and 
the Minister noticed that he, too, was a supporter of that model (see above). Van der 
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Vlis was a supporter of conscription because of the quality of the personnel and because 
he considered an all-volunteer force alien to the Netherlands.157 
The General talked about a lot of other issues that had to be discussed in the Priori-
ties Paper with the top of the ministry, but not about conscription.158 Van der Vlis ad-
mitted that the process took place without him: ‘it was a political process, I was a mili-
tary officer, and so I didn’t do anything. There were others who did it.’159 In his opinion 
he was unable to turn the pro-abolition stream. He was convinced that it had something 
to do with the Nederland Inc., a phrase for Dutch pragmatism. The political stream was 
so dominant that a soldier had no possibility to stop it.160  
November 1st 1992, when the minister declared himself an abolitionist, was a very 
difficult day for Van der Vlis. Asked why he did not resign that day, he answered: ‘to 
me the abolition was unpleasant. I explicitly opposed it. Yet, at that moment I had been 
Chief of the Defence Staff for just six months and there was a Priorities Paper to come. 
So, I concluded that resigning at that moment would be ineffective.’161 
Contrary to General Van der Vlis, General Couzy had already expected the aboli-
tion, not at least because of his work for the commission.162 During the November con-
ference in 1992, he immediately told the Minister that he needed five years to change 
the army into an all-volunteer force. The Minister did not want to discuss the issue with 
the General, since he was already convinced of that time schedule. “Don’t preach to the 
converted” he replied to his Army Commander-in-Chief.163 Yet, Couzy thought that he 
had to inform his organisation. He used the national newspaper NRC as a medium. In an 
article on 10 November he wrote that the Minister had decided to abolish the conscrip-
tion and that the organisation would need five years for the transition process. 
Neither the Minister nor his Secretary General was amused. The Minister wanted to 
talk about the issue three days later in the cabinet, and now Couzy’s timing frustrated 
his own agenda. The Secretary General wanted to stop the publication, but Couzy re-
fused using the argument that he wrote nothing in his article that was different from the 
Minister’s opinion. In his view it was just supporting the Minister’s policy.164 The Sec-
retary General of the ministry Patijn even forced Couzy to sign a declaration of loyalty, 
stating that he would not interfere in political matters. 
The incident was once more proof to Couzy that the Minister was not interested in 
his opinion. He often felt that he had no direct access to the Minister and that the Minis-
ter’s door was often closed for him.165 The incident showed once more that the relation-
ship between the political leadership and the Army Command was poor when it came to 
this paper’s issue: conscription. 
5.8 Cabinet politics 
It seems that the Dutch cabinet had only twice explicitly discussed the issue of conscrip-
tion, when the Defence White Papers 1991 and 1993 had been discussed.166 Most minis-
ters are so busy with their own portfolio that there is scarcely any discussion on the 
portfolio of the colleagues. Any likely differences are overcome on the level of civil 
servants and only if that does not work, is the issue put on the cabinets’ agenda, as are 
important policy issues. 
The conscription issue had been mentioned, for example, during a cabinet meeting 
held in the summer of 1991, when the conditions for the conscription commission had 
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been discussed. It was no hard-fought dispute, more a wish of some of the persons pre-
sent, that the task of the conscription-commission should be extended to the issue of 
social conscription. That was a popular item, in particular among Christian Democratic 
politicians.167 As early as 6 November 1990 Prime Minister Lubbers and the director of 
the ‘Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau’ (Social Cultural Planning Office – SCP), Van der 
Staay, talked about the armed forces and social conscription. On 19 December 1990 the 
director wrote a note to the Prime Minister, in which he stated that it was difficult to 
make a choice in favour of either military or social conscription purely based on finan-
cial calculations.168 When the Meijer-commission accomplished its work, the aforemen-
tioned report found its way into the commission’s files, as did a conclusion of several 
reports or talks on the subject. 
In the end the issue of social conscription, also called civic duty, found its way into 
the annexe of the report as a reflection of the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the 
Netherlands. With it came the recommendation of the commission to start a broader 
investigation on the subject.169 However, with the rejection of the report, that idea dis-
appeared from the agenda as well, though the Prime Minister brought it up one last 
time: during the cabinet meeting on 13 November 1992.  
A letter to the cabinet 
The minister of Defence wrote a letter for that meeting that was a first draft of the De-
fence Priority White Paper 1993. After a short introduction, the letter stated: ‘In antici-
pation of the White Paper we outline the future armed forces. Central to those outlines 
is our proposal to abandon – de facto – the draft and the related administrative proce-
dures and to come gradually to all-volunteer armed forces. The conscription as such will 
not be abandoned. It may be that the draft needs to be re-activated in case of a renewed 
military threat. It is therefore necessary to continue the registration of young men, but 
not to have them medically, physically, and mentally examined. The plans will have 
severe implications for the Royal Army’.170 
The Minister referred to the two models calculated by the army (referred to in the 
section on the armed forces, above). He briefly emphasised the similarities of the two 
models and continued with the criteria necessary for a good judgement in favour of one 
of those models: were there enough guarantees that the army could be sent out of a 
NATO area? How many conscripts would be part of the army and would this be socially 
acceptable? Could enough personnel be recruited for all-volunteer armed forces? What 
were the financial implications of both models? 
He continued that three considerations supported his choice for the all-volunteer 
model. He first referred to the usability of an army partially manned by conscripts. In 
that scenario he pointed to two flaws in the design. The training time was too short for 
conscripts, in particular if conscription would be brought down to nine months, and the 
problem of voluntary service abroad by conscripts. Though there were no constitutional 
limitations for the use of conscripts abroad, the Parliament – more or less – forced the 
government to accept that conscripts can refuse to go at the last moment. The sugges-
tions of the Meijer-commission, to ask the conscripts to voluntarily go abroad at an 
early stage, during the medical examinations and the actual draft, offered no solution. 
Since such a ‘declaration of willingness’ would not be binding and could therefore not 
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be enforced. Even if it could be enforced, there was no guarantee that enough conscripts 
would volunteer, and – more importantly – even if they would, their training would be 
too short to use them in military demanding situations. It referred to the (aforemen-
tioned) Frinking motion of 1988. This motion hampered a probable Dutch participation 
in the Balkans, where an international solution under the United Nations flag was in-
creasingly considered as an option. 
The second consideration was the societal acceptance of conscription. The Minister 
estimated that, in view of the declining figures of the acceptance since the 1950s, the 
acceptance of conscription would reach an all-time low of 27% by 2000. Reducing the 
actual period of service to nine months, together with the decline of a levy to 90,000 
men, of whom only 18,000 would have to serve, would not stop the loss of legitimacy. 
Yet, there would only partially be a conscript army, since the ratio volunteers-conscripts 
would fall to 39% in 2000, compared to 63% in 1990. Adding to the argument that the 
maintenance model with its mix of conscripts and volunteers would lead to a two-class 
army, where the volunteers would do the dangerous peace-enforcing, while the con-
scripts would do the less risky peace-keeping and humanitarian jobs, he stated the le-
gitimacy would decline even further. According to the Minister a percentage below 27% 
would have been acceptable during the Cold War, but not in times when the Dutch terri-
tory was not endangered directly. He referred also to the unasked reaction of the Socie-
tal Council for the Armed Forces (MRK) on the Meijer-commission’s report, which 
supported his argument.171  
The last consideration the Minister referred to was the cost. Further reductions of 
costs would make it difficult to uphold an army where only 15,600 positions would be 
filled by conscripts and where, at the same time, minimal standards for crisis manage-
ment had to be met. 172 It had become obvious in the cabinet meeting one week before, 
on 6 November 1992, that further reductions had to be made. The cabinet agreed on 
further cuts in the general 1993 budget of 2,75 billion guilders. The Defence budget had 
to be cut too,173 originally by 667 million guilders, but after Ter Beek’s threat to resign, 
the figure was brought back to 380 million guilders.174  
The Minister admitted that there would be some insecurity175 regarding the recruit-
ment of volunteers, but he rejected the conclusions of the Meijer-commission, that the 
armed forces would be unable to recruit enough professional soldiers. According to Ter 
Beek, the commission had put too much emphasis on actual circumstances in its calcu-
lations, had assumed an unchanged policy, and a specific size of the forces. The Minis-
ter estimated that the army needed to recruit 6,000 volunteers per year.176 He continued 
that the difficulties in recruiting new personnel could be overcome by more flexible 
employment contracts and a more effective recruiting policy. If necessary, the primary 
and secondary working conditions had to be improved. The Minister concluded with 
some thoughts about the imminent transition period. He appealed to his colleagues to 
approve his plans, also because of the need of clear signals towards the military person-
nel. 
As already indicated in the operationalisation sections of this study, the minutes of 
cabinet meetings in the Netherlands remain classified for 25 years. For that reason, it is 
almost impossible to give an exact account of the actual debate within cabinet meetings. 
Yet, it seems that at least Lubbers and Van den Broek were still arguing against aboli-
tion.177 It is, however, difficult to reconstruct the quality of their arguments or the com-
mitment within their argumentation. 
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After the cabinet meeting of 13 November 1992 Prime Minister Lubbers said that 
the cabinet had not taken any decision, but he indicated that the cabinet was considering 
a gradual abolition.178 It was a ‘de facto’ abolition, since the conscripts would not be 
drafted anymore, as the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant already knew on 19 November 
1992. That it was not a ‘de jure’ abolition was due to the difficulty of changing the con-
stitution and the last resistance against abolition. Not the least in Parliament. 
During the debate about the defence budget 1993, on 26 November 1992, Defence 
Minister Ter Beek repeated most of the arguments he had already put forward in the 
cabinet meeting of 13 November 1992. The Minister recognised that there were still 
open questions with regard to a possible change of the Dutch constitution. He promised 
to put that question forward to the ‘Raad van State’ (the Council of the State), the high-
est law-making advise body. 179 
A second point that came to the fore during this debate was the criticism NATO 
might have on the Dutch plans to downsize and to ‘de facto’ abolish conscription. This, 
together with the de-prioritisation of the common defence, might endanger the classical 
deterrence and defence capabilities of the alliance. The opposition parties VVD and 
D’66 asked for an extra debate to discuss the criticism by NATO and by the soldier un-
ions as reported in the media. The debate took place on 14 December 1992. This debate, 
however, had been de-politicised by a meeting between Ter Beek and the Secretary 
General of NATO, Wörner, whereby the Dutch Minister had been able to convince the 
Secretary General that an extra brigade should be retained.180 However, afterwards, it 
seemed that the criticism by NATO, especially on postponing the draft, had not been so 
harsh as the media coverage and the reactions by the oppositional parties might have 
suggested.181 There is reason to believe that the opponents of abolition had slightly ex-
aggerated the criticism by NATO.182 
One week after the cabinet decided to change towards all-volunteer forces, the Mei-
jer-commission, which still worked on some minor issues concerning the draft, re-
signed. It was newsworthy, yet of no high importance. Once the decision had been made 
to postpone the draft, the issue seldom reached the news. Even the final lawmaking pro-
cedure and some constitutional quarrels about the issue, whether to change the Constitu-
tion or not, was barely news anymore. In general, it is difficult to prove a causal relation 
between news coverage and public opinion or political stream. In the case of conscrip-
tion in the Netherlands, it appears that the news followed the events in politics. The 
peaks in the news coverage were around important political moments, such as the 
March 1992 speech of the Minister of Defence and the presentation of the report of the 
Meijer-commission. It is difficult, too, to decide exactly at which moment certain issues 
were placed on the agenda. Conscription in the Netherlands was a recurring issue in the 
news. This often concerned former members of the army, whether or not conscripts, 
who commented pro or con abolition, mainly because of personal experiences. There 
seems to be one exception. Many respondents, who were interviewed for this study, 
could remember the first article by Frinking MP (above) from March 1990 that put the 
issue on the political agenda. Though societal, military and political representatives ex-
pressed their opinions on the subject in the papers, it is fair to state that the discussion 
about conscription was not a public hot issue. 
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5.9 Priorities White Paper and conscription in Parliament 
The making of the Priorities White Paper 
Due to the fast changes within the security environment of the Netherlands, the Dutch 
Parliament, during the consultations about the Defence White Paper on 10 June 1991, 
approved a motion that obliged the government to evaluate this Paper within two years. 
The first preparations of this evaluation paper had started as early as November 1991. It 
would exceed the range of this study to elaborate in depth on the subject, yet it is neces-
sary to give at least a short overview of the process and the main results of that Paper, 
since the drafting of the Paper and the conscription issue are closely connected. 
In contrast to the White Paper 1991 the evaluation had taken place in small circles. 
The Defence Minister was very influential this time, not in the last place by taking the 
lead with his (already discussed) NGIZ speech. Another contributing factor to the influ-
ence of the Minister was the minor role of the defence council, a deliberate choice by 
Ter Beek. While influential during the making of the White Paper 1991, this council 
had been marginalised during the evaluation, where small ad-hoc circles were more 
important.183 Different from the first plans, the evaluation did not become part of the 
explanatory memorandum to the defence budget, but a White Paper in its own right, 
called Priorities White Paper in a later stage. Ter Beek stated the work of the Meijer-
commission, which lasted until the end of September 1992, as an important reason for 
this.184  
Being well-seasoned by his experiences during the making of the White Paper 1991 
- the defence council had turned out to be a debating club that slowed down decision-
making - the Minister of Defence appointed a small steering commission with two co-
ordinators. One coordinator was Van den Breemen, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, 
and the other was Barth, Director Policy Affairs and close bureaucratic advisor of the 
Minister. Van den Breemen turned out to be an influential actor, the more so in May 
1992 when the Chief of the Defence Staff, General De Graaff, retired. Van der Vlis, 
who needed some time to settle in his job, succeeded him. The other members of the 
steering commission were the political top of the ministry, the Secretary General and 
the Chief of the Defence Staff. The functional directors and the Commanders-in-Chief 
of the different forces had been consulted face-to-face by Ter Beek only when neces-
sary. Working with confidants and in small circles – even with parliamentarians – be-
came the preferred style of the Defence Minister.185 
The Priorities White Paper 
On 12 January 1993 the Minister of Defence Ter Beek and the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, P. Kooijmans - since January 1 1993 the successor of Van den Broek - presented 
the Priority Defence White Paper 1993. In this paper, they announced that ‘the govern-
ment had decided to ‘de facto’ abolish the draft or to postpone it…’186 The government 
decided in this way against the recommendations of the Meijer-commission. Though it 
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acknowledged the importance and gravity of the idealistic arguments pro conscription, 
it argued that several practical and pragmatic considerations had been decisive:187  
 
- Professional armed forces would facilitate the operational use of the 
army. The conscript training system with its soldiers partially on 
leave and partially training within the unit would not be suited for 
crisis management. 
- Conscripts could only be sent outside the NATO area for crisis 
management tasks on a voluntary base. 
- Due to downsizing of the armed forces and the ongoing transition 
from tasks traditionally fulfilled by conscripts towards professional 
soldiers, a process already started years before, the percentage of 
conscripts compared to the annual levy would decline below the 
limit acceptable to the government. 
- Considering the data available, the government would expect to re-
cruit sufficient volunteers. 
- A conscript army could be larger, yet, in the long run this would be 
at the expense of necessary modernisation investments.  
 
The government planned the transition from conscript to all-volunteer forces to be fin-
ished by 1 January 1998, a period of almost five years. 
Apart from conscription, this evaluation was about setting priorities for the future 
armed forces within a changed security environment. Other important issues were: 
 
- A security analysis. The most important conclusion was that a 
large-scale conflict could not be excluded, but that new security 
risks came to the fore, in particular small-scale conflicts in the 
(Middle)-East. 
- Shift of tasks. Due to the new forms of conflicts, the tasks of the 
armed forces had to shift from a merely territorial defence to cri-
sis management.188 
- International cooperation. Due to the downsizing several bri-
gades became obsolete, which in turn jeopardised the army corps 
structure. This would only make sense with sufficient brigades. 
This is why the Dutch forces have strived for more international 
cooperation, like the German/Dutch army corps.189 
Postponing the draft vs. abolishing conscription 
One of the recurring issues in the debate on conscription was the necessary change of 
the Dutch constitution. The legal experts quarrelled whether the Constitution was allow-
ing abolition of conscription with or without change. Even the possibility of having the 
draft postponed had been subject to legal debates. For a long time, it looked that this 
administrative procedure needed constitutional revision, too. A change of Constitution, 
however, is complicated in the Netherlands. It requires a qualified majority in Parlia-
ment, which has to be dissolved and then needs to agree on the change after new elec-
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tions. It is not only procedurally complicated but it is also considered a tool, which 
should be used wisely.  
As early as the first internal policy papers and advice, the civil servants and legal 
advisors of the ministry of Defence were convinced that a change of constitution was 
necessary to abandon conscription. Even the formula ‘postponing the draft’ requested 
constitutional clarification. Introduced to convince the last sceptics and opponents, it 
also served for many reformers as a tool with which to arrive at all-volunteer forces, 
without complicated constitutional debates.190 
However, the political calculation that achievement of postponement might be 
reached in an easier way seemed to be thwarted by a legal advice of the Council of State 
of 29 April 1993. As part of the law making process, the Council had given advice after 
a request by the government. This, in turn followed the advice of the Meijer-
commission, which recommended in its report to request the Council of State to formu-
late an advice, in case conscription might be abandoned in the future.191 It concentrated 
solely on the question if the draft could be abandoned or postponed, not conscription 
and military duty as such. The council concluded that the plans of the government were 
incompatible with the constitutional article 98.1 stating: ‘Armed forces exist for the 
protection of the state’s interests. They consist of voluntarily serving personnel and con-
scripts.’192 Therefore, the council recommended a change of the constitution, politically 
the least feasible option. 
Reasons were amongst others: 
 
1) In view of the dual character of the expression ‘… for the protec-
tion of the state’s interests’, i.e. on the one hand, security for the 
state, on the other hand, duty for the citizen, the binding element 
for the citizen is not decisive when answering the question if 
abandoning or postponing the draft is compatible with the consti-
tution.193 In other words: the state’s interests come first. 
2) Conscripts, parallel to volunteers, have continuously been part of 
the armed forces since the introduction of constitutional rule in 
1887. It therefore never presented a discrepancy between reality 
and constitutional rules.194  
3) The council concludes that the phrase ‘… consisting of …’ or-
dains the use of conscripts in the armed forces. In other words: a 
‘de jure’ abandoning or postponement of the draft leads to a ‘de 
facto’ abandoning of conscription. This is against the constitu-
tion.195  
 
Therefore, the council concluded that a constitutional change would be is necessary. It 
would pass the issue on to the Second Chamber, i.e. the legislator. 
Legislative consultations 
On 13 and 17 May 1993, the Parliamentary Defence Commission debated about the 
Priority White Paper.196 In this debate the Minister of Defence indicated that the gov-
ernment was willing to prepare a change of the constitution regarding the planned aban-
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doning or postponement of the draft, as recommended by the Council of the State. The 
exact content of the proposal had yet to be decided: whether to solely change the bind-
ing character of article 98.1, which states that the Dutch armed forces have to have con-
scripts, or to go for a broader change of the constitution.197 The Minister urged the 
commission (and thus Parliament) not to delay the debate until the cabinet reached a 
conclusion, since postponing the draft was an important part of the Priority White Pa-
per. He even threatened to resign, if a delay meant that a decision would not be taken 
before autumn.198 In the end, the commission decided to postpone its own debate until 
17 May 1993 in order to digest the exact content of the advice of the Council of State.  
The debate on 17 May already indicated that the decision, taken by the government 
and demanded by a majority of Parliament, was still difficult to decide and implement. 
The Minister was not in favour of the suggestion of some parliamentarians to abolish 
conscription and re-activate it a few years later, if the recruiting figures would not meet 
the demand. This, the Minister said, would contribute to uncertainty within the armed 
forces.199 
There were reasonable doubts if the Minister’s move - to follow the advice of the 
Council of State - had been the right one, not only in Parliament, but also among consti-
tutional experts. This constitutional discussion had been part of the debate since the rec-
ommendation by the Meijer-commission of a constitutional change.200 The fact, how-
ever, that the Minister of Defence put the issue to the Council of State did not necessar-
ily mean that he had to follow its advice. The constitutional expert E. Jurgens (MP 
PvdA) even blamed the Minister for having no backbone. According to Jurgens the ad-
vice was biased, since it put too much emphasis on the situation of one hundred years 
ago, when article 98.1 had been added. Above all, Jurgens continued, it is only an ad-
vice from the Council. ‘Don’t forget that the legislation, government and parliament 
determine the interpretation of the constitution. … If the majority of cabinet and Par-
liament considers the abolition of the draft not contradicting the constitution, than this 
explanation is decisive.’201 
In the end Ter Beek received broad support for his Priority White paper, though at 
first it seemed that the coalition partner CDA wanted to play a hard game about a fifth 
brigade in readiness.202 Above all: Ter Beek succeeded to get broad support by Parlia-
ment to strive for the abolition or postponement of the draft by starting a (time consum-
ing) constitutional change according to the advice of the Council of State. One com-
mentator analysed it correctly, when he stated: ‘to Ter Beek the advice of the Council of 
State that for the abolition of the draft the constitution had to be changed might come as 
a blessing, since a constitutional change is very time consuming …’203 
In the end, the constitution was changed on 10 July 1995 and 29 March 1996. The 
government followed the advice of the Council of State and changed, amongst others, 
article 98 into: ‘1. The armed forces shall consist of volunteers and may also include 
conscripts. 2. Compulsory military service and the power to defer the call-up to active 
service shall be regulated by Act of Parliament.’204 With this phrase the imperative of 
having conscripts had been removed. When the debate on the Priority White Paper in 
May 1993 took place, Ter Beek indeed gained time and political peace that enabled him 
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Chapter 6: Explaining the postponement of the draft: hidden-hand 
leadership and policy change in Dutch defence policy 
6.1 Introduction 
The postponement of the draft in the Netherlands marked a major change in the policy 
paradigm and the organisational structure of the defence sector. After almost two centu-
ries of military conscription, the parliamentary decision in May 1993 to postpone the 
draft marked the ‘de facto abolition’ of conscription. Technically, every young man in 
the Netherlands is still conscripted, but no one is summoned to serve. The fact that the 
armed forces of the Netherlands only consist of professional soldiers signifies a non-
incremental change in the substance and process of defence policy. The interesting 
question here is to what extent these changes were the result of deliberate and sustained 
attempts of the key actors in the sector. In other words: to what extent did leadership 
shape the reform process and its outcomes? And which type and which style of leader-
ship marked the defence policy process in the Netherlands after the Cold War?  
The process towards this decision to postpone the draft has been described in the 
foregoing chapter. This chapter will try to test the theory of leadership in an institutional 
crisis by analysing the case. Firstly, the outcomes will be discussed in terms of the de-
gree of change entailed, i.e. in defence strategy, in the structure of the armed forces, and 
in the role of conscription. Section 6.3 will analyse the reasons why various policy 
makers chose to reform or conserve the key tenets of the existing conscription system. 
Key terms are crisis perceptions, the institutional position of leaders, inner convictions 
regarding the necessity of change, and their political calculus of the gains and losses 
associated with attempts to change or stabilise policy. Next, the actual behaviour of the 
policymakers will be analysed. How did they aim to foster or prevent policy change? 
The ten hypotheses regarding reformist and conserving leadership will guide this sec-
tion of the analysis. After having distinguished the different types of leaders in the 
Dutch defence sector, it is important to analyse their style. The theoretical section of this 
study questioned the active styles of leadership advocated by ‘t Hart (reforming) and 
Terry (conserving). While acknowledging that the active type of leadership might be 
successful in Westminster type democracies, the current case casts some doubts about 
its efficacy in consensual democracies with multi-party dualistic governance styles of 
governing. These structural constraints might force leaders to pursue more surreptitious 
and consensual tactics.  
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6.2 Setting the stage: actors, strategies and outcomes 
Policy outcomes 
After the conserving Defence White Paper of 1991, which indicated ‘business as usual 
but with lesser means’, the Defence Priorities Review of 1993 marked a paradigm 
change in the goals and procedures of the Dutch armed forces. It not only announced 
further downsizing of the armed forces but a fundamental change of the tasks of the 
armed forces: from territorial, Cold War forces to forces capable of international crisis 
management.1 In addition the paper emphasised the growing importance of closer inter-
national military cooperation. As a consequence of the restructuring and downsizing, 
the Dutch armed forces could not fulfil all tasks by themselves. One of the implications 
had been the establishment of the 1st German Dutch Army Corps, in which the only 
Dutch Army Corps had been completely incorporated.  
With the paradigm change in the defence organisation came a paradigmatic change 
of procedures. The abolition of conscription would have been a ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’ 
paradigm change, yet the postponement of the draft was a paradigmatic change of pro-
cedures within the organisation. It is important to note that there is an obvious causal 
relation: because of the necessity to downsize and the change of the task, conscription 
had been postponed. The empirical chapter 5 indicated the decisive influence of the dif-
ferent leaders and their choices on the outcome.  
In crisis management terms, the reformers managed to restore the legitimacy of the 
sector by abandoning the draft and with this the ‘de facto’ compulsory military service. 
The growing inequality - with only a small number of an annual year-school drafted - 
and the decision by many actors that conscription was not the only tool to guarantee 
democratic forces, contributed to the mounting loss of legitimacy of the institution of 
conscription.  
Actors and strategies 
Three different types of leaders are of interest for our analysis: political, bureaucratic 
and military. Those leaders followed different strategies, i.e. conserving or reforming, 
during the policy change in the Dutch defence sector. The key political leader was De-
fence Minister Ter Beek. Starting as a defender of conscription and following a conser-
vative strategy regarding conscription at the beginning of 1991, he began to follow a 
reforming course with regard to the structure of the Dutch defence sector in March 
1992. By the end of September 1992 he came out in favour of reforming the conscrip-
tion policy as well. Two top civil servants at the Ministry of Defence from the director-
ate Policy Affairs, Barth and De Winter, gave input and shape to Ter Beek’s reforms of 
the armed forces. Barth followed his minister in the characteristic fashion of a tradi-
tional, loyal civil servant. De Winter personified a different type of civil servant: also 
loyal, but with a more proactive style. 
On the senior military level, four generals were most involved in the policy process. 
They took different positions regarding the conscription issue and followed different 
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strategies. The Chief of the Defence Staff, Van der Vlis, and the Commander-in-Chief 
of the army, Wilmink, had been supporters of conscription and followed conserving 
strategies to prevent its abolition. During spring 1992, General Brinkman tried to 
change the conservative tactics by launching a policy paper favouring a restructured 
army of the all-volunteer kind. The fourth general was Couzy, Deputy Chief of the army 
and the army’s liaison to the Meijer-commission. Starting out as a defender of conscrip-
tion, he at least was willing to think about its abolition. During the process he became 
caught between the demands of his superior (Wilmink) to remain loyal to army tradi-
tions and therefore to conscription, and the political willingness to contemplate far-
reaching reforms. 
One actor took on a less active role towards the policy outcome than might have 
been expected. Minister of Foreign Affairs Van den Broek, who was influential during 
the security analysis in 1991, soon disappeared to the background during the process 
towards the postponement of the draft. His role was only marginal, since he was too far 
removed from the conscription issue to exercise leadership, though he sometimes tried 
to put his conserving mark on the process of armed forces restructuring. 
What about the Members of Parliament and the members of the commission? Some 
of them were highly visible during the process either as entrepreneurs during different 
moments in the process, such as Frinking, who put the issue on the political agenda at 
the beginning of 1990, or Vos and Koffeman, who influenced the course of the Meijer-
commission with their motion during the 1991 Defence White Paper debate. However, 
none of them were in an organisational position to exercise enduring and/or decisive 
leadership within the sector. 
Meijer and his committee played a special role in the process. Given its mandate, the 
members of the conscription committee had the ability to influence the outcome. They 
gathered all relevant information, had official and unofficial contacts with all relevant 
political, bureaucratic and military actors, and moreover, Meijer had been a political 
friend of Ter Beek. In short: either the whole committee or at least individual members 
were in a position to exercise leadership. At the beginning of their work, the committee 
agreed to remain as open as possible, though the majority of individual members had a 
clear opinion on the issue. In the end, the committee presented its unanimous recom-
mendation not to abandon conscription. Yet, several members indicated afterwards that 
they had in fact had a dissenting opinion but had chosen not to push the matter to the 
hilt. Throughout the analysis the role of the members of the committee will be incorpo-
rated. When possible, it will be indicated if, when, and how they exercised leadership. 
The puzzle 
Though small countries within world economics are known as rapid reformers, which 
adapt rather fast to changes within their environment,2 it is astonishing that a country 
like the Netherlands almost completely changed the tasks and the structure of the armed 
forces within a period of four years. In particular since the changes took place in peace-
time. We already referred to Blom,3 who acknowledged the willingness to incur change 
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in defeated forces, but pointed out less readiness in successful ones: never change a 
winning team. 
So, the first question that puzzles us is the speed of the change. We doubt the con-
clusion of Haltiner4 that countries in an alliance have room to abolish conscription, 
since the Netherlands had obligations towards their allied partners. An alliance in this 
sense is more a constraint for reform than a catalyst. This was a recurring issue in this 
case, when some leaders tried to prevent change by pointing to the ongoing debate 
within NATO about the strategic future of the alliance. The second puzzle is the chang-
ing majorities in this particular case. In the beginning of 1992, there was no majority in 
Dutch politics for a comprehensive change within the defence sector and especially for 
abolition of conscription. How then did this majority come about?  
The last puzzle, which is central to our study, is why and how leadership within the 
sector crystallised. While there is evidence that until the summer of 1991 the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and the military, in particular the Army seniors, influenced the policy 
process, as from the autumn of 1991, their influence on the process diminished. Who 
then did exercise leadership within the defence sector? Who was influential in the mak-
ing of the Priorities Review 1993? And, how can we explain the change? Those are the 
questions central to the analysis.  
  
6.3 Leadership opportunities and actors’ calculations 
Leader’s crisis perceptions 
Immediately after the Cold War, few actors and stakeholders in the defence sector felt 
the urge to drastically change the defence organisation. Abolition of conscription was 
not on anyone’s agenda at that time. The 1991 Defence White Paper’s security analysis 
foresaw only size reductions, but the tasks, structure and personnel policy were largely 
left in tact. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the top of the armed forces were impor-
tant in defining the security analysis.5 The Minister of Defence, Ter Beek, was less visi-
ble, as were his advisors. He was new to the sector, having been a foreign affairs 
spokesman of his party and less versed in defence matters.6 The White Paper did ac-
knowledge that in consideration of the changes in the international environment, an ad-
visory committee on conscription had to be established to recommend ways to consoli-
date the legitimacy of conscription within Dutch society.7 
During the debate about the White Paper 1991, various Members of Parliament of 
the coalition parties requested the mandate of the committee be broadened. Firstly, it 
should analyse whether or not conscription should be upheld at all, before making rec-
ommendations for an organisational change. Their reasons for advocating a broader 
mandate for the committee had nothing to do with the perception of a need to reform in 
view of any sort of crisis. They were merely concerned about the unbalanced size of the 
army, air force and navy, the unequal burdens put upon the few young men serving, the 
use of conscripts for crisis management and the tedious service for those who had to 
serve.8 
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At a later stage of the process, when wholesale abolition of conscription became a 
possibility, some key policy makers became convinced that far-reaching changes were 
necessary. Yet, neither De Winter, General Brinkman, nor – at a later stage – the politi-
cal leadership of the Ministry of Defence indicated that doing nothing would lead to or 
intensify an institutional crisis of the Dutch defence sector. The opponents of abolition 
indicated that downsizing the armed forces – a key corollary of abolition – would seem 
to ignore the continued threat potential of the Soviet Union (Van den Broek) or would 
be negative for the organisation (Wilmink, Van der Vlis). 
The process does not support the hypothesis that actors initiate change because of 
high crisis awareness. Initially, many actors had thought that a change in the paradigm 
of the Dutch defence policy, i.e. territorial defence, or a change in the armed forces as 
such, i.e. downsizing and abandoning the corps’ structure, and/or the abolition of con-
scription, would jeopardise national security. Yet, from 1992 on, some key actors, like 
the parliamentarian defence spokesmen of the coalition parties and De Winter and later 
on Barth at the Ministry of Defence, changed their perceptions. However, those changes 
and the presentation of those changed perceptions were less radical than crisis studies 
would predict. The political and bureaucratic leaders sensed that in the light of the in-
ternational changes the direct military threat disappeared, but they emphasised that ‘se-
curity risks resulting from tensions and conflicts in various regions must still be given 
serious consideration.’9 The top of the Ministry of Defence saw the crisis coming from 
another direction. With imminent cuts of 1,1 billion guilders, they were aware that the 
changes toward flexible and mobile forces must be carried on.10 Seen in this light, it was 
rather a crisis of the organisation than the national security crisis many opponents of 
change tried to claim. 
Political calculus of expected gains and losses 
The Dutch case supports the hypothesis that it is the actors’ calculus of the expected 
gains and damage that entails reforms. The conserving actors were convinced of the 
negative effects that strategy change, downsizing and abolition would bring to the 
armed forces. The reforming actors waited with concrete proposals to abolish conscrip-
tion until majorities had been clear and Ter Beek held a strong position with regard to 
military and political opponents of abolition. 
In theory, the coalition parties CDA and PvdA had a solid majority in Parliament to 
push through reforms, even more than the two third majority necessary for constitu-
tional changes that might be required.11 Yet, although the coalition parties held 103 of 
the 150 seats in Parliament from the start of the policy process until autumn 1992, the 
abolition of conscription split the coalition parties, even internally. There were oppo-
nents and supporters of conscription across all parties. When the issue was finally de-
cided upon in Parliament, there was a broad majority agreeing on the postponement of 
the draft. 
One explanation for this decision might be found in the hypothesised timing of the 
issue within the election cycle. The decision to postpone the draft was taken almost two 
and a half years after the first election and almost one and a half year before the upcom-
ing elections. Within the election cycle of four years, it seems that this was an ideal 
moment for major reforms. The newcomer into office, Ter Beek, had had enough time 
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to be institutionalised in the sector. Additionally, the time to the next elections was long 
enough for the issue not to be influential for elections. However, since the issue had not 
been controversial in public, this factor was less important. Moreover, there was no em-
pirical evidence – either in written minutes or acknowledged by the interviewed actors – 
that any consideration of this type had been influential for the decision to postpone the 
draft.  
More important for the conservative actors were the international political calcula-
tions, not considered in Cortell & Peterson’s theory.12 In the spring of 1992 the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs still considered the Soviet Union a serious threat to Dutch national 
security. To him, every change in the strategy and size of the Dutch armed forces would 
endanger the defence potential of the country.13 Although this is more interesting for the 
first hypothesis (the environmental condition), it is mentioned here, because it was 
closely connected to Van den Broek’s second consideration. By downsizing the Dutch 
armed forces unilaterally, the Netherlands would place themselves outside NATO: ‘We 
cannot seriously expect from our allied friends that they have to carry the burden of 
defending our soil, while the Netherlands restrict themselves to operations with a 
peacekeeping nature.’14 Van den Broek sensed that the Netherlands would loose influ-
ence and prestige on an international scale if there would be changes in the strategy, 
size, and conscription of the Dutch defence system. 
The considerations of the conservative military leaders tended to be similar, though 
political calculations might not have been as important to them. To Wilmink the ex-
pected damage seemed to be larger than to Van der Vlis. In the army commander’s 
eyes, downsizing the Armed Forces would have specifically meant downsizing the 
Army. The commander thought that it was difficult to fulfil the Army’s tasks with a 
downsized organisation and probably less qualified personnel.15 Additionally this in 
turn would have shifted the relative importance of the army in relation to navy and air 
force, since its size would have been cut down relatively more than that of the other 
two.16 To Van der Vlis, as Chief of the Defence Staff, the relative size of the army was a 
less important point. Yet, he feared for the quality of the organisation in general. To 
Van der Vlis conscription was something he did not think about a lot. To him: ‘it was a 
political process, I was a military officer, and so I didn’t do anything.’17 It seems 
unlikely that for Van der Vlis any political calculus, neither for him nor for the organi-
sation, was of any importance. Van der Vlis simply was a-political. 
Quite the opposite calculus can be found among the reformist leaders Ter Beek, 
Barth and De Winter. For the two civil servants the political equation was probably less 
important than for the politician Ter Beek. Barth was proud that a major speech like the 
NGIZ-speech came from his directorate. However, most of the time he acted as a loyal 
civil servant, i.e. supporting the minister above and beyond any personal views and 
gains at stake.18 This will be elaborated further on in this chapter. De Winter was more 
of a partisan actor, advancing the position of his unit in the bureau political struggle 
between Policy Affairs and the Defence Staff. To him it was important to take the lead 
in the discussion toward the restructuring of the armed forces and with that the abolition 
of conscription, since the rest of the policy makers and military did nothing. In his opin-
ion, many people talked about it, but they did not think about it.19 
The most explicit calculus about the expected political gains and losses can be 
found, not surprisingly, with Ter Beek. In the beginning of the process, during the mak-
ing of the Defence White Paper 1991, there was no military or political necessity for the 
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Minister of Defence to put the issue on the agenda. By referring in the White Paper to 
an advisory committee on conscription, he scored threefold: firstly, abolition was a non-
issue; secondly, in case it might become important, he signalled that he was looking for 
broad consensus; thirdly, he gained time by keeping the issue off the political agenda. 
The political gains for the minister by taking any clear position with regard to conscrip-
tion had been vague for a long time. Even in spring 1992, when he set the first outlines 
for the Priority White Paper and on 18 June 1992 when talking to the Meijer-
commission, the political gains for Ter Beek with regard to conscription had been too 
diffuse to announce reform. So far as the restructuring of the armed forces had been 
concerned and with regard to the security re-definition, which he presented, political 
calculus can be found. However, not in the way that domestic political calculation can 
be reduced to elections and majorities. Political calculus was set more broadly and very 
strongly intertwined with the fourth hypothesis about the policy makers’ position. That 
became obvious, not in the least, in the NGIZ speech intended to strengthen the position 
of the Minister and Ministry of Defence regarding foreign affairs and this was only pos-
sible because Ter Beek had room to manoeuvre without considering a possible collapse 
of the coalition.  
Still, the political gains (again, political gains as more than just regarding elections) for 
the Minister of Defence were not obvious with regard to conscription. It took until the 
presentation of the Meijer-commission report for the minister to express his view. When 
it became evident that a large parliamentary majority would at least support the post-
ponement of the draft, Ter Beek publicly became a member of the camp of abolition 
supporters. Many respondents underscored that this was always one of Ter Beek’s 
greatest political assets: to sense exactly the political climate and to gain from it by first 
seeing where the majorities were.20 
Inner convictions regarding necessity of change 
During the first years after the fall of the Berlin Wall none of the key actors felt the urge 
to abolish conscription, but some of them changed their minds later on. After the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, De Winter became convinced that the 
military capabilities of the Soviet Union no longer posed a serious threat. In his opinion, 
this gave room to change the tasks of the defence organisation, from the defence of 
Western Europe to crisis management. Central to the re-organisation should be the idea 
of task-specialisation, which would enable the Dutch armed forces to downsize and thus 
to abolish conscription.21 
It appears that Barth and Ter Beek successively changed their opinion as well. Ter 
Beek refers in his memoirs to 2 April 1992, when Wilmink told him about the difficulty 
of finding sufficient manpower for relieving the medical battalion in Cambodia.22 Barth 
refers to the same occasion as an eye opener.23 
At the end of March, Ter Beek deemed it not the right moment to announce aboli-
tion, which became obvious in his last-minute change to the NGIZ speech: from ‘taking 
abolition seriously into account’ to ‘that I may have to take abolition into account’.24 In 
the first case he would have portrayed himself as actively striving for abolition, in the 
latter abolition was presented as something that appeared to have been forced upon him. 
Even before the commission in June 1992 the minister showed increasing doubt about 
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the need to maintain conscription; yet, he did not make any commitment about aboli-
tion.25 It may well be that he already had changed his opinion in the beginning of April 
199226, or later in September 1992 after his visit to the Dutch contingent in Cambodia27. 
Most likely however, Ter Beek remained ambivalent, not in the least because his sup-
port for conscription throughout the years had been unequivocal. 
During the whole process, the military leaders Wilmink and Van der Vlis remained 
convinced that abolition was undesirable and unfeasible. Important reasons might have 
been the relative decline of the army organisation compared to the navy and air force, 
the dubious prospects of recruiting qualified personnel and – connected to this – the fear 
that the Army would have been no longer able to fulfil its tasks. Van der Vlis felt that 
there should be only a partially change because of the quality of recruits and the interna-
tional security situation. In addition, he felt that the introduction of professional forces 
ran against the Dutch defence system’s key structures and traditions. Yet, he was aware 
that new tasks for the Dutch forces were going to come. That is why he preferred the 
mix-model with professional units for crisis management tasks and conscript units for 
territorial defence. 
The hypothesis that a strong personal conviction is necessary for leaders to adopt re-
forming strategies finds only partial support. There is a clear distinction between re-
forming and conserving actors in the Dutch case. The conserving actors kept their 
strong conviction that change was unfeasible, whereas the reformist actors changed their 
conviction towards the necessity for change, after changes in the security structures, i.e. 
the perceived decline of the Soviet military capabilities to invade NATO soil. At least 
one important leader, Ter Beek, probably kept his doubts throughout the process. While 
being more and more convinced that abolition was useful and feasible, his old social-
democratic commitment to conscription pulled him in the opposite direction for quite 
some time after 2 April 1992. Nevertheless, in the end, Ter Beek was one of the major 
forces behind the postponement of the draft. In summary, the Dutch case study suggests 
that a strong conviction might be a useful leadership asset, yet it seems neither a neces-
sary nor a sufficient condition for successful reform or conservation. 
Institutional position of the leaders 
Besides political calculations, formal and informal institutional positions of the leaders 
appear to have been important. Within the foreign and security policy field, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Van den Broek held a strong position. He was experienced and respon-
sible for foreign policy and security strategy. Hence one might expect him to be influen-
tial within the defence sector as well. Yet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs seemed to 
play a minor role in the policy process towards the abolition of conscription. The politi-
cal and administrative leaders at the ministry of Defence framed the issue more as an 
organisational sectorial defence issue than as a strategic security policy issue, as ex-
plained in 6.2. In other words, although the Minister of Foreign affairs might have the 
formal position to influence the direction of Dutch defence policy, he has no formal 
institutional influence on the organisation of its military implementation. This is the 
prerogative of the Minister of Defence. Moreover, in 1993 Van den Broek became a 
commissioner of the European Union. His interest in national defence matters at the end 
of 1992 was probably less than at the beginning of the year, plus his own party was one 
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of the driving forces pro abolition. This strengthened the institutional position of the 
Minister of Defence.  
To Ter Beek the drafting of the Priority White Paper 1993 offered the possibility to 
articulate his hitherto diffuse political vision for the sector. The double task of the 
committee, which the parliamentary commission had demanded, was in fact a favour-
able move for Ter Beek. He came out in favour of major changes in defence policy, a 
new armed forces structure necessary to implement these changes, and therefore also an 
abolition of conscription. Another institutional advantage was the change of generations 
at the top of the armed forces. The new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
(May 1992) and the new Commander-in-Chief of the Army (September 1992) had to 
conform to the Minister of Defence and not vice versa.28 
The empirical evidence also relates to the possible importance and influence of the 
bureaucratic and military leaders. As stated in chapter 3, organisational positions and 
relations to other important actors are relevant tools for leaders, too. As far as the top of 
the ministry is concerned, it can be said that those civil servants advocating reform, i.e. 
Barth and De Winter, had a relatively strong position within the ministry. Both were 
experienced civil servants at the Policy Affairs Directorate of the ministry, which was a 
section Ter Beek held in high esteem at the expense of other top level civil servants in-
cluding the Secretary-General, Patijn. He had only little support from the minister and 
only little experience at the ministry as such, having been catapulted into office in the 
autumn of 1989 by a predecessor of Ter Beek.29 This lack of experience was not com-
pensated by the support of the Deputy Secretary General, Mazel, who became engaged 
in the Meijer-commission, and therefore was less available for daily ministerial duties. 
The position of the military leaders within their branches was, however, different 
from those civil servants, since they generally enjoyed a strong position. The Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army, Wilmink, and the Chief of the Defence Staff, have hier-
archical authority, which is one of the core elements of the military system of order and 
obedience. Van der Vlis became Chief of the Defence Staff in May 1992. Within the 
Ministry of Defence and the defence organisation, the formal position of the Chief of 
Defence Staff was relatively weak: no hierarchical relation existed between him and the 
Commanders-in-Chief.30 Yet within his staff he was the military authority and no open 
discussion about conscription took place.31 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was formally a strong actor within the Dutch 
defence. General Brinkman - one of the few among the army leaders who was in the 
main positively inclined towards abolition - had a less senior position, being subordi-
nated to army chief Wilmink. This made any solo-action impossible and a simple order 
prevented him from further action. The same holds true for the then deputy army chief 
Couzy. On the one hand, he had to be loyal to Wilmink, his direct superior. On the other 
hand, he felt the necessity to answer the questions of the committee openly.32 In fact, 
Couzy occupied a strategic position due to his role as liaison between the armed forces 
and the Meijer-commission, though he complained that he had no rapport with Ter 
Beek, whose ‘door was closed to him’.33 
While institutionally strong in their own organisation and thus acting with authority 
vis-à–vis the Meijer-commission, Van der Vlis and Wilmink were less visible in the 
larger political arena of defence policy with regard to the conscription issue. In particu-
lar, with regard to the civil and political actors their contact appears negligible. They 
refrained from active lobbying work. Wilmink, because he thought that any action 
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might open the box of Pandora of abolition and Van der Vlis, because he felt he was a 
soldier and not a politician. From 1992 on, the position of representatives of the army 
towards the minister became increasingly difficult. One important reason was that by 
then Ter Beek had become more self-assured and felt that he ‘knew the arguments of 
the generals’.34 Secondly, the closest military advisors and confidants to the minister 
had been marines, who represented the thrust towards the modern expeditionary forces 
and who traditionally were less attached to conscription.35 Thirdly, and this is an impor-
tant factor in civil-military relations, military hierarchy and authority simply do not 
work closely with civilians and politicians. It requires more informal connections to 
gain influence. Wilmink probably relied too much on a successful outcome of the Mei-
jer-commission and Van der Vlis deliberately declined to take any political action. This 
puts definite limits on their political effectiveness.  
The recurring decline of the defence budget was an obvious problem for the organi-
sation and the Minister of Defence. Cashing in on the peace-dividend after the Cold 
War led to a constant decline of the defence budget, with the army as main ‘victim’. 
These forces had to incur cuts, mainly on procurement but above all on troops. Ter Beek 
managed to soften cuts by the end of 1992, 380 million guilders instead of 667 million, 
by threatening to resign and at the expense of conscription. Those cuts, together with 
abolition, meant a decline of the army’s relative power position, compared to the other 
two sections, navy and air force. Hillen, MP, indicated that one of the reasons he strived 
for abolition was that he did not want the army to suffer less in disproportion to the 
other two sections. 
The budget formed a structural factor that had the potential to limit the actor’s room 
to manoeuvre, but during the policy process towards abolition/postponement there was 
no sign of a weak minister. On the contrary, when extra cuts had to be made, by No-
vember 1992, Ter Beek was stronger than ever before. With regard to the army it can be 
said that the navy and air force wisely refrained from any active participation in the abo-
lition debate, but there is no evidence that actors in the process regarded the army, or its 
Commander-in-Chief, as less powerful. 
The hypothesis about institutional position finds strong support. The weak actors 
within the sector, i.e. the army generals, and within the organisation, i.e. the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, followed conserving strategies. All strong leaders, i.e. Barth, De Win-
ter, and later in the process Ter Beek, followed reforming strategies. 
 
The Dutch case supports Cortell & Peterson’s assumption that ‘… agents’ perceptions, 
preferences and calculations mediate between a window of opportunity and structural 
change.’36 Agents play a role once a crisis manifests itself. Yet certain nuances must be 
added regarding the different assumptions by Cortell & Peterson as stated in the theo-
retical chapter. Firstly, it appears that almost all four hypotheses are useful to explain 
why policy makers follow a conserving strategy. Actors do not reform if they do not 
sense a crisis. Additionally, it can be said that actors follow a conserving strategy if they 
feel that reform would lead to a crisis. Secondly, the reforming efforts had indeed been 
conducted during an optimal moment within the electoral cycle, which was another as-
sumption by Cortell & Peterson. Yet, it is questionable how important this is, if the sub-
ject is not disputed by a political majority and/or broad public, as it was in the Dutch 
case. The author’s assumption that actors who are weak in the political system can make 
use of a crisis to enlarge their power base in the sector, finds more support. Within the 
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hierarchical military organisation, however, this is a non-option. Thirdly, the inner con-
viction to change is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. A strong inner convic-
tion can prevent change, but even a weaker inner conviction can lie at the base of an 
actor’s behaviour towards change. The fact that conviction is not static, underscores the 
importance for change of the combination of the second – slightly adapted – hypothesis 
(expected gains and damage) and the fourth (policy maker’s position). In the Dutch case 
this had been an important factor for the actors who strived for change. It appears that 
reforming actors have to wait for a second (micro) window or the right institutional 
moment to launch their plans within the window of opportunity opened by an institu-
tional crisis. This second window, or window within a window, was, in the Dutch case, 
the failed ‘coup d’état’ in the Soviet Union and the disappearance of its military threat. 
The reformers within the army were hindered by their position within the hierarchical 
organisation, the more so when they were not at the top of this organisation. On the 
other hand, the institutional setting influenced the reformers’ perceptions at the top of 
the Ministry of Defence, whether they were politicians or civil servants. They had a 
weak political and organisational environment, partially because of the shift of genera-
tions, partially because of the minister’s possibility to exclude certain veto-players, i.e. 
the defence council. We will discuss this more extensively in the next section. 
The Dutch conscription case supports the results of recent crisis management re-
search in the Netherlands. The common reflex of crisis managers is first to try and fix 
the damaged sector within its structures. Policy makers are reluctant reformers. Only 
when the circumstances provide pressure and opportunity, will they use reform-oriented 
strategies.37 Having found evidence for why leaders reform or prevent change, it is time 
to turn to how leaders tried to reform or conserve conscription policy and if they indeed 
made a difference. 
6.4 Reformist and conserving leadership: dissecting the process 
Set I: Defining the situation 
With German re-unification and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Dutch defence pol-
icy makers soon acknowledged the necessity of a new Defence White Paper. Yet, al-
though it acknowledged the large changes in the security environment of the Nether-
lands, it’s the paper’s main conclusion was that the armed forces could be reduced, but 
only down to a level that would guarantee the territorial defence, since the threat by the 
Soviet Union was still existent. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the top of the 
armed forces took the lead in this redefinition. This definition did not match the parlia-
mentary majorities’ view of the situation. The governmental parties’ defence spokesmen 
in particular demanded a re-evaluation of the situation within two years and they de-
manded that a future conscription committee should also analyse the possibility of con-
scription abolishment. From that moment on, two different streams in Dutch defence 
policy would exist: the commission’s definition, which was in line with the army’s 
leaders and the Minister of Foreign affairs, and the line of the top of the Ministry of 
Defence. 
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On the sector level, the conserving leaders regarded further cuts as a threat to the or-
ganisation. Wilmink talked about his fear that the army would be ‘closed during recon-
struction’. The reforming actors on the other hand emphasised the necessity of smaller 
forces, pointing to the vanishing security threat and the changing character of NATO 
and the EU. No reference to a crisis of the organisation could be found. On the contrary, 
the reformers emphasised the chances for task-specialisation and international coopera-
tion.  
It is difficult to conclude to which degree Ter Beek had a better opportunity in con-
vincing his environment because he was new to the sector. What does find support in 
empirics is that those leaders who had been engaged to the sector for a longer period of 
time, had growing difficulties in convincing their environment about the necessity of 
conserving the structures. The more the ‘détente’ became obvious, the more the old 
leaders were associated with the Cold War that was gone. After the change of genera-
tions, the new leaders in the sector had less difficulty uniting with Ter Beek and imple-
menting his plans. 
Set II: Committed leadership teams 
During the process towards postponement of the draft there were several moments when 
actors had the chance to show commitment to their political convictions. Firstly, during 
the making of the Defence White Paper 1991, when there were differences between the 
responsible ministers about some parts of the security analysis, i.e. the threat from the 
Soviet Union and the wish of Van den Broek that there should be some form of guaran-
tee that cut backs would be retracted if the international security situation might worsen. 
Van Brouwershaven (1999) showed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs played quite an 
important role in the making of the Defence White Paper 1991, and that Ter Beek had to 
make compromises, but there is no evidence that Ter Beek played a tough game. It al-
most seems that he used the process towards the White Paper 1991 to gain knowledge 
of the sector and the key actors within it. Furthermore, conscription was an important 
issue in the White Paper, but not abolition as such. The leaders in the sector had the 
same understanding about the continuation of conscription. 
Ter Beek displayed a similar ‘lack’ of commitment during the standing defence 
committee’s session about the Defence White Paper on 10 June 1991. When Van den 
Broek threatened with a political crisis, i.e. withdrawal of the White Paper, Ter Beek 
objected to that interference with his portfolio, but he did not prevent the commission 
from changing the committee’s tasks. The commission demanded that the committee 
should investigate abolition, too, and that there had to be an evaluation of the Defence 
White Paper within two years. 
As far as conscription was concerned, Ter Beek had presented himself for a long 
time as a supporter.38 His views changed during the years to come. Together with a few 
civil servants at his ministry (Barth and De Winter), he began to commit himself more 
and more to large reforms of the defence organisation and slowly but surely to the aboli-
tion of conscription. The reforming trio, however, avoided every over-commitment to 
the latter. Or, as Barth put it: ‘For me it was no Saul turning into Paul situation’39 espe-
cially not in public. There was no public statement found by him. While the NGIZ 
speech at the end of March 1992 stood for very ambitious reforms of the Dutch armed 
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forces, the Minister of Defence avoided the demand for abolition of conscription in the 
same speech. Even five days later, in a Volkskrant interview, he chose very diplomatic 
(vague) formulations, giving the impression that ‘in the near future’ the Netherlands 
would have a professional army, without stating that he was the one who was striving 
for that. 
In the months to come Ter Beek and his inner circle of departmental advisors began 
to push major reforms in the defence sector at large, including abolition. The leaked De 
Winter- memo by the beginning of October 1992 was one highlight in the discussion. 
The next came on 1 November when Ter Beek announced to the military that he wanted 
to change to all-volunteer forces, and by mid November, when he announced it to the 
cabinet and in the parliamentary budget debate. The presentation of the Priority White 
Paper at the end of January 1993 and the discussion about this in May were the next 
moments when Ter Beek showed commitment. During this period Ter Beek repeatedly 
threatened to leave office if the implementation of the Priorities White Paper would be 
delayed. This announcement came at the time when yet another report was leaked, the 
advice by the Council of State about constitutional changes to abolish the draft.40 
All those moments have been recapitulated to show one thing: the moments when 
Ter Beek was committing himself in public were carefully selected. Those were the 
moments when he announced major reforms of the armed forces41 and when he was 
sure of having sufficient political support.42 Additionally, conscription changed from an 
isolated policy issue and became part of the larger reforms as planned in the Priority 
White Paper. This had consequences for the reforming teams around Ter Beek. 
The minister had one small team around him, including Barth and De Winter. It 
turned out to be a successful combination: Ter Beek as seasoned politician, De Winter 
as strategist, and Barth a close confidante of the minister.43 In a next layer of advice, a 
larger group gathered around the minister: the Priority White Paper’s steering commit-
tee, with Van der Vlis and, as writer, his deputy, Van den Breemen. In addition, the 
minister talked to other actors personally, especially the Commanders-in-Chief, when 
they seemed to be necessary in the process.44 
Among the military top officials the situation was quite different. Wilmink commit-
ted himself so strongly to conscription that he hardly left any possibility for his staff to 
anticipate a future different to the one the Commander-in-Chief of the Army had in 
mind. At the scarce moments when Wilmink’s subordinates at least wanted to do some 
thinking aloud about abolition, he forbade it emphatically (Brinkmans’ note) or he em-
phasised to Couzy that he should be more loyal towards the army. 
Van der Vlis held a somewhat different position. On the one hand, he had been en-
gaged in the making of the Priority White Paper. To that end he was part of the reform-
ing team of the minister and he worked closely with his own staff, including the strate-
gic important actor Van den Breemen. Yet, when it came to conscription, the Chief of 
the Defence Staff omitted to make use of this potential in his staff, or to strive actively 
for influencing the minister. As already indicated in the foregoing chapter, conscription 
was no subject of discussion in his staff since his staff knew how Wilmink thought 
about the subject, nor did he discuss it with others. He was well aware of the fact that 
over-commitment, i.e. threatening to resign if conscription would be abolished, was of 
little use: ‘… I concluded that resignation at that moment would be ineffective. Nobody 
would have followed me.’45 
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This part shows two interesting things. Firstly, the (successful) reforming leaders 
rarely committed themselves until a politically auspicious moment. The conservative 
leaders obviously over-committed themselves.46 Secondly, the reforming leaders col-
laborated closely, while those who wanted to conserve conscription did not try to form a 
leadership team, but instead tried to rely on partners outside their own organisation, i.e. 
the committee. The committee in the end turned out to be a weak actor. 
The Dutch case supports the assumption of ‘t Hart that over-commitment to a par-
ticular policy position is a liability for a reforming leader. By being too convinced of 
their ideas, leaders overlook political signals and fail to contemplate alternative futures, 
which they do not like regardless of their probability. More importantly, those leaders 
were more solo than team players. The latter, however, is a prerequisite for successfully 
fighting the multiple front line battles in the political trenches of consensus democra-
cies.  
Set III: Leadership persuasion tactics 
In the Dutch case, having a clearly stated goal at the right moment was decisive for the 
outcome. During the whole policy process, the reformers had a clear vision and a plan, 
at least as far as the Priority White Paper (Defence Priorities Review) was concerned. 
Conscription slowly became part of those reforms. The first plan was the NGIZ speech, 
when Ter Beek, fed by Barth and De Winter, for the first time drew an outline of the 
future of the armed forces.  
The conserving leaders had no clear formula until 30 September 1992, the day the 
Meijer-commission presented its report. The main argument of the report was that the 
evolving security situation did not warrant further reductions of the armed forces and 
that therefore larger armed forces were needed. Those larger forces needed a certain 
yearly amount of recruits, which could not be guaranteed in a situation with all-
volunteer forces. The recruiting argument was essential. Even six months later, when 
debating the Priority White Paper, supporters and opponents of abolition underscored 
this problem. However, the underlying argument that large forces were still needed 
formed a weak spot. This became obvious, not in the least in the leaked De Winter-
memo, where he literally crushed this argument by blaming the committee of exploiting 
a ‘worst case scenario’. De Winter’s memo helped to weaken the report of the commit-
tee, as MP Hillen’s criticism had done shortly after the presentation of the report. 
Little resistance and counterarguments could be found against the Priority White 
Paper with the postponement of the draft as one of its cornerstones. Instead of articulat-
ing a convincing defence of the status quo, the opponents of abolition of conscription 
used negative, political arguments to prevent change. They used the role of blunt veto 
actors instead of exercising conserving leadership. Van den Broek used what Hirshman 
(1992) would call perversity and jeopardy arguments as a reaction to the NGIZ speech. 
Downsizing the armed forces would make the Netherlands more insecure. Above all, a 
Dutch solo-action would jeopardize the precious relation to NATO, as he stated in his 
letter of 6 April 1992: ‘To what extent will there be a structure in the future that is 
suited for ‘traditional’ large-scale combat operations. We cannot seriously expect from 
our allied friends that they have to carry the burden of defending our soil, while the 
Netherlands restrict themselves to operations with a peacekeeping nature.’47  
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The Meijer-commission’s report took a similar line. Largely following the army 
view, the committee saw no room for abolition because of the expected recruiting prob-
lems. There is reason to believe that the army exaggerated those problems. To the five 
conditions the committee set for the evaluation of the various models for the future or-
ganisation of recruitment, the army added another five, which emphasised the negative 
implications of a strictly professional force. Models that might have supported abolition 
were simply ‘not done’. The committee followed those models, which – by the way – 
were classified until the presentation of the report. So, maybe those models had been 
used for internal discussions at the ministry or at the different staffs, but they had not 
been used to convince the public. 
The conserving actors initially had a good point, yet after the changes in the Soviet 
Union it became difficult to defend this conservative vision. Though it is difficult to 
measure the influence of the NGIZ speech, it probably contributed to an opinion change 
in the security and defence communities and in the political arena. Remarkably, how-
ever, neither the reforming leaders nor the conserving leaders actively solicited broad 
public support. Yet, more and more people, especially the parliamentarians, were con-
vinced that the security situation had changed and that major reforms, as stated in the 
Priority White Paper, could be implemented. One important tactic that contributed to 
that had been the depoliticisation approach of Ter Beek, who avoided tough debates by 
keeping conscription off the agenda until the plans for the future armed forces were at 
an advanced stage. And when the next political hurdle had to be taken – the difficult 
constitutional change – he took it from the political into the judicial arena and, in fact, 
kept this on ice until 1995, when the implementation of the Priority White Paper was 
well under way. The process towards the postponement of the draft had already become 
irreversible and Ter Beek himself had left office and had become governor of the Dutch 
province of Drenthe. 
The Dutch case shows that not only the quality of the arguments is of importance, 
but also their timing. Arguments that found broad support today can be futile tomor-
row.48 In the Dutch case this depended on the changed (perception of the) security envi-
ronment and the ability of the reforming leaders to depoliticise difficult subjects. This 
will be elaborated further in the following sections, where leadership by building coali-
tions will be analysed. 
Set IV: Building broad support 
The assumption is that once reformers or conservers have made their plans, they ac-
tively strive for support from other relevant actors. The Dutch case shows that during 
the process only small coalitions were formed. No ‘grand coalition’ in favour of or 
against conscription was ever brought about. 
The most, highly visible actor at the ministry, who debated pro abolition of con-
scription internally and who tried to convince the rest of the senior echelons, was De 
Winter. ‘Endless and endless arguing to convince people like me’, remembered his di-
rect superior Barth.49 At the same time, at least two members of the Defence Staff, 
closely involved in the making of the Priority Paper, were also supporters of abolition: 
R. De Wijk (as writer) and the Deputy Chief Defence Staff, Van den Breemen (as one 
of the coordinators).50 There is no evidence there was such broad and repeated discus-
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sion about conscription in the Defence Staff as there was at Policy Affairs.51 Moreover, 
no evidence could be found for deliberate coalition building between these two staffs. 
De Winter, De Wijk, and Van den Breemen, but also Hilderink (deputy chief of policy 
planning at the Defence Staff) and Barth regularly worked closely together, not only on 
the Priority Paper.52 Though some of them emphasised that there had always been ten-
sions between the directorate Policy Affairs and the Defence Staff53, they had a similar 
aim: the change from old armed forces to new, modern ones. It was no coincidence that 
these people were thinking about the future of Dutch defence. All held posts where this 
commitment was obligatory, but none of them strived for a large, visible coalition to-
wards abolition.  
There is no evidence that Van der Vlis and Wilmink actively lobbied for their con-
serving vision. They had regular contacts with important actors, like the minister or 
members of the committee, but no strategy for coalition building could be identified in 
the source materials. Both actually relied on their position within their own part of the 
organisation. For contacts outside the organisation there were others; for the army 
Couzy as liaison to the committee, for the Defence Staff: Van den Breemen and De 
Wijk. Wilmink indicated repeatedly that Couzy should show more loyalty to the army 
when talking to the committee. Van der Vlis admitted that he was not political. Instead 
of joining the political game that is played at the Ministry of Defence, he remained more 
outside The Hague. 
How about the relation between the minister and the top of the military? In contrast 
to the reformist hypothesis, the minister did not manage to secure early support from the 
implementing actors, in particular the army leadership. Nor vice versa did the military 
leaders show much zeal or will to commit the minister to their position. On the contrary, 
at certain moments the minister bypassed his chief military advisors when it came to 
conscription, or he sent them diffuse signals. After all, in May 1992 the minister gave 
the impression that he considered the mixed model a good solution, and he did not even 
talk with Van der Vlis about the subject until September. Additionally, in the most cru-
cial month, i.e. November 1992, when Ter Beek informed the military top about his 
decision and when he had to win the cabinet in favour of abolition, he had a tense rela-
tion with Couzy. In spite of this, Van der Vlis and Couzy both loyally implemented the 
announced changes.  
Set V: Controlling the process 
The Dutch case shows that procedural leadership was exercised at different stages in 
different arenas. Some actors played in all arenas, like Ter Beek; others had limited 
space to manoeuvre, such as the members of the committee, or Couzy; or they restricted 
themselves, like Van der Vlis and Wilmink. 
Some restrictions to the actors are determined by the hierarchical culture of the de-
fence sector. Some of those who wanted to think about a future without conscription 
were easily muted by their superiors: Brinkman and partially Couzy. But two other pro-
cedural barriers, common to defence, also disadvantaged the military leaders: loyalty 
and secrecy. While securing the survival of the state in wartime by obliging the troops 
to obey their superiors’ orders, loyalty in daily, (bureau)political routine turned out to be 
counterproductive. ‘Loyalty is the backbone of the military organisation. If the chief is 
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indicating that it is over, it is over’54 was an important reason for General Brinkman not 
to think of an alternative future of the army without conscription. 
Loyalty played an important role not only in military-military relations, but in civil-
military relations, too. Couzy succeeded Wilmink as Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
on 1 September 1992. Once Couzy had been freed from the hierarchical constraints dur-
ing his liaison tasks for the committee, he dared to play the game with the same weap-
ons as the political actors did, i.e. in the media. When Ter Beek took the decision to 
inform the cabinet about his plans to abandon conscription, Couzy wrote about those 
plans in a national newspaper and asked for smooth reform in order not to scare off the 
army’s civil and military personnel. Here, however, he touched upon a sensitive issue in 
the Netherlands. What are the boundaries within which civil servants can act? More-
over, what are the rules for the military? 
During Wilmink’s tenure he had the same problem when Wilmink reminded him to 
be loyal to the army when talking to the committee. This brings us to the second limita-
tion of the term loyalty: loyal to whom? Especially senior military officers with tasks on 
the borderline between military management and political management are torn by dif-
ferent loyalties: to the organisational values and interests and to their political superior 
or the political system as a whole.55 
The second self-imposed limitation to successful procedural leadership for the mili-
tary leaders was the culture of secrecy. All models and calculations used for the con-
scription committee had been stamped: ‘Confidential’. Although this is not a high clas-
sification, the military leaders were limited in their ability to make use of those plans 
when soliciting for support outside the committee. Though there might have been in-
formal consultations where they used some of the figures, when addressing a broad pub-
lic they only supported their arguments with generalities, not hard facts and figures. In 
fact, Wilmink seldom talked about the issue in public. One of those scarce moments 
was when he left office on 1 September 1992, but even then, in his farewell speech, he 
only marginally committed himself to the issue.56  
The Meijer-commission had more procedural opportunities. Within the framework 
set by the minister and the parliamentary motions, they had the ability to interrogate 
whomever they wanted and they could use all available sources. On the one hand, the 
committee made use of this ability, by engaging scientific advisors for the labour mar-
ket study, by organising a conference for the security analysis and by talking to many 
societal and military representatives. On the other hand, when it came to the crucial in-
formation of modelling the future armed forces, they limited their own source of infor-
mation and relied on the army’s calculations for all calculations of the need for re-
cruits.57 This in turn gave the army more power and control. It was Couzy and his staff 
modelling the demands set for the future forces, using the frames of the committee but 
anticipating Wilmink’s and probably Van der Vlis’ will. Yet, it appeared that the proc-
ess of the committee was quite separate from another process, which was played and 
dominated partially by other leaders and which gained more and more importance: the 
making of the Priority White Paper.  
This process went on in the political arena, dominated by the reforming leaders. 
They set the pace by keeping issues off the agenda. Though Ter Beek admitted that set-
ting up the conscription committee served also to find consensus, its prime objective 
was to gain time. Time during which he and his collaborators could concentrate on the 
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evaluation of the Defence White Paper 1991, but also time to see which way the wind 
would blow on the issue of conscription. 
Once he knew the direction - because he was more and more convinced of the op-
erational necessity and partially he had figured out where the political majorities might 
be - he used judicial procedures to keep hindrance issues off the agenda. The recom-
mendation of the Meijer-commission to ask the Council of State for advice about the 
necessity for constitutional change gave Ter Beek room to manoeuvre in the debate 
about the Priority Paper. A step that constitutionally was probably unnecessary, as many 
legal experts, like the social democratic MP Jurjens, indicated.58 Instead of being 
trapped in procedural discussions, the minister could concentrate on defending the 
broader plans for the reform of the Dutch defence. 
Ter Beek was the one who played the political game. Instead of soliciting broad 
support, he used the tactic of exclusion. Those who might slow down the process or 
prevent changes were gradually removed from the game: the defence council in the 
making of the Priority Paper; Van den Broek with the NGIZ speech; Van der Vlis and 
Wilmink with the conscription issue, at least during the summer. Or Ter Beek used pun-
ishment, like Couzy who nagged about an implementation time of five years during the 
Battle at Leusden at 1 November 1992 when Ter Beek announced his decision. On that 
date Ter Beek already told him: ‘don’t preach to the converted’. However, the general 
still tried to reach the public and was punished for his article in NRC on November 11. 
Additionally, Ter Beek employed the divide and govern tactic: some information to 
Frinking, like the NGIZ speech; bi-lateral consultations with the Commanders-in-Chief 
and the Chief Defence Staff; and above all: never show any one your real intentions 
until the right moment had arrived to launch your ideas. 
 
Neither in their strategies nor in the outcome do we find evidence for successful con-
serving leadership in the Dutch case. The conserving actors resisted any change rigidly 
and they were sole actors. Instead of offering a clear vision for the future of the armed 
forces, they stuck to large forces, which were outdated, not only financially. More im-
portantly: they lacked the political sensitivity necessary to control the process within a 
political environment. 
The reforming actors acted in quite the opposite way. While they, too, avoided 
building a grand coalition, they proceeded at a moment they had chosen to launch the 
first outlines of their future plans. They acted as team actors and avoided any over-
commitment. Instead they offered ways out of the crisis, including abandoning con-
scription or postponing the draft. Most important, however, was the reforming leaders’ 
ability to control the process towards reforms. Besides political skills, such as timing, 
agenda setting and the control of the forums, it was the leaders’ awareness to pay re-
spect to the constraints of the political environment.59 By trying not to enforce changes, 
but sensing the opportunities the first (1989) and second (1992) window of change of-
fered to overcome domestic resistance to change, the reforming leaders of the Dutch 
defence sector succeeded in the early 1990s.  
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6.5 Passive and active leadership styles 
While some hypotheses receive strong support in this case study, others will have to be 
rejected. There was no crisis consciousness by the leaders that urged reforms. The ac-
tors in the sector only slightly committed themselves to the conscription issue as such. 
Even within the military top nobody connected his personal future in the armed forces 
to the outcome of the process. For some hypotheses the case found mixed support. 
There were plans by the leaders to reform, yet they were not path breaking. The Minis-
ter of Defence’s NGIZ speech is an example of that, when he announced the necessity 
of major changes as a possibility, not a necessity. Those who strived for change, started 
to do so in a later stage of the process and when they did, they followed a different pat-
tern than the theory of reforming leadership might suggest: not actively striving for sup-
port, but making use of the procedural room to manoeuvre and building small, not 
broad, coalitions. 
The same holds true for passive conserving leadership. There were actors within the 
sector trying to prevent changes, yet, they did not develop relevant policy strategies or 
actively strove for support. This part of the study tries to place the relevant leaders 
within the sector in the two-dimensional typology of leadership style and type. The aim 
is to show, that for the Dutch case, active-reforming leadership and active-conserving 
leadership have to be seen in a different light than in Westminster democracies, where 































Figure 8: Types and styles of leadership in Dutch defence policymaking towards postponement of 
draft. Period 1: making of Defence White Paper 1991; period 2: June 1991-summer 1992; period 3: 
September 1992-May 1993. Note that some actors contributed to the outcome of the process not in 
all periods. 
 
During the process towards the postponement of the draft three episodes can be distin-
guished. The first period is the making of the Defence White Paper 1991. In Figure 8 
the relevant actors in this period are marked with a 1. The second period is from June 
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1991, when the debate about the White Paper took place in Parliament until the summer 
of 1992, when the Minister of Defence was interrogated by the Meijer-commission (2). 
The last period is from September 1992 until the parliamentary debate about the Priority 
White Paper 1993, in May 1993 (3). 
In the first period the minister of Foreign Affairs, Van den Broek, and the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army, Wilmink, played a prominent role during the making of the White 
Paper. Both aimed successfully at conserving the territorial defence and conscription. 
Ter Beek, and probably Barth, had similar aims with the future of conscription, i.e. 
maintaining it. Yet, in particular Ter Beek had quite a passive attitude during the mak-
ing of the defence White Paper; the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the conservative 
militaries influenced the process. 
In the second period, the military leaders Wilmink and Van der Vlis60 were highly 
conserving in their aims but refrained from any active strategy to defend conscription 
outside their organisation. On the contrary, though they may have had informal talks 
with other actors, they relied mostly on the committee to do their bidding – with Couzy 
as liaison. Moreover, Wilmink even followed conservative tactics, preventing his sub-
ordinates from thinking about alternative futures. In this period Van den Broek moved 
from an active to a passive conserving style. While he reacted to Ter Beek’s NGIZ 
speech, at the beginning of April 1992, he did not express his conviction in public or 
actively strive for support for his plans.61 
During this second period, Ter Beek and Barth changed their tune. Both were in-
creasingly convinced that the postponement of the draft was militarily feasible. Yet, 
especially Ter Beek was reluctant to strive for this actively. When interviewed by the 
committee, he did not give the impression that he had changed his opinion. Further-
more, Ter Beek first wanted to find out where the political majorities might be, before 
committing himself to any option. Important for their change of mind was the changed 
security environment at the beginning of 1992. Yet, it was necessary that someone took 
the lead, convincing Barth and Ter Beek that the Soviet Union no longer had an aggres-
sive military capability. It was De Winter who helped with putting those plans on paper. 
After the report of the Meijer-commission, Ter Beek took an active reforming 
course, yet his style differed from some of the hypotheses of reforming leadership. He 
relied much more on his procedural strength than on leadership capabilities as stated in 
the theory of ‘t Hart Ter Beek refrained from broad coalition building and a clear com-
munication of his plans. Instead, by again keeping conscription off the agenda, now by 
sending it to the judicial arena, the Minister of Defence had the advantage that political 
or emotional opposition against the abolition of conscription did not thwart the debate 
about the Priority White Paper after its presentation. In the end, conscription was post-
poned. This was, not in the least, a way to win the votes of those who doubted if aboli-
tion was wise. Too many people questioned whether the professional armed forces 
would have the ability to recruit enough young men and women.  
There was, however, some active and even reforming leadership among the military. 
Couzy, in his function as liaison to the Meijer-commission, had the ability to actively 
influence the outcome of this committee. In the second period, while the Meijer-
commission was at work, he was the one presenting the army’s plans and calculations, 
aiming everything at keeping conscription. Yet, already at this stage, it seemed that 
Couzy had his doubts and that he was actually willing to think about reforms, too. Once 
abolition had been announced to an inner circle, on 1 November 1992, the turned Gen-
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eral obviously supported the reforms, when executing the minister’s reforming plans, 
although he had to sign the loyalty statement. However, the implementation of the Pri-
ority White Paper and the postponement of the draft are beyond the aim of this study. 
6.6 Leadership and institutional crisis management in the Netherlands: What 
have we learned? 
‘t Hart already warned that by only looking at top decision makers or persons high in 
the hierarchy one runs the risk of overemphasising their abilities and influence.62 That 
being said, one cannot deny that Ter Beek was not only successful in achieving his pre-
ferred outcome, new modern armed forces, but also in making use of his political skills 
and the procedural space a Dutch Minister of Defence has towards his organisation and 
sector. The Dutch case only partially supports the hypotheses of reforming and conserv-
ing leadership. 
At the beginning of the process, at the end of the Cold War, all actors showed a con-
servation reflex. A second (micro) window was needed that could be used by the re-
formers. The case shows that there is room for reforming leadership within the Dutch 
political system, but when the second window opened, reforming leadership turned out 
to be different from leadership in Westminster democracies. Terry’s and ‘t Hart’s theo-
ries find only partial support. Consensus democracies need a less heroic, more ‘unobtru-
sive’ form of leadership than their hypotheses suggest. The political system of the Neth-
erlands is able to move beyond incremental policymaking. By sensing the politically 
feasible moment and by especially using the room for procedural power, leaders have 
the ability to foster reforms in policy sectors. This is even the case when the policy sec-
tor had been static for forty years, like the defence sector during the Cold War. Almost 
exactly within three and a half years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Netherlands 
decided to postpone the draft and reform the structure of the armed forces. Ten years 
later defence is still reforming and the armed forces are still being downsized. In addi-
tion, recruiting turned out to be an enduring problem indeed. This, however, is beyond 
the reach of the study, as is a judgement about the content of the Priority White Paper 
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Chapter 7: History of conscription in Sweden 
7.1 Introduction 
The history of conscription in Sweden much resembled the history of the Dutch con-
scription from the Napoleonic era on. Both countries experienced a war fatigue after the 
Napoleonic expansion, principally caused by the explosive costs of those campaigns. 
Throughout the 19th century, there had also been a struggle between the King and the 
arising political parties to control the armed forces and lower the tax burden. Like in the 
Netherlands, the rich had the opportunity to buy themselves free from service and war. 
In addition, like the Netherlands, but also like France, the modernisation of the armed 
forces and the change to general conscription occurred around the turn of the 20th cen-
tury. Another important similarity had been the large defence contributions of the 1950s 
and 1960s, followed by a declining defence budget as a share of the GDP from the end 
of the 1960s on. One thing, however, was different from the Dutch experience: the 
Swedes stayed neutral after World War II. 
7.2 The allotment system - ‘indelingsverket’ 
Unlike the Dutch, who were merchants rather than soldiers, the Swedes had a far more 
aggressive policy towards their neighbouring countries until the 19th century. The rea-
sons for that laid for a large part in the geographical position of the country and the feel-
ing of insecurity that resulted from it. Especially Denmark and Russia had frequently 
threatened and invaded Sweden throughout the ages. Economics and the wish for an 
independently growing affluence were other important reasons for the Swedes to have 
and use a developed army and at some stage a standing army. 
In order to understand Swedish military power and the manning of its forces, one 
has to go back in time, even before the Renaissance. As early as the 13th century, the 
King had the right to call men to arms. In those days, Sweden was a Kingdom with in-
fluential nobility and the King needed the approval of the local nobility. In the 13th cen-
tury, every free man had the right to carry arms according to the laws of the provinces. 
With the duty to take part in the defence of the home district, a kind of army may have 
existed.1 
The fleet was organised according to the so-called ‘ledungen’2, where peasants 
formed ship’s crews. With the appearance of knights, however, that system became less 
important for combat by the end of the Middle Ages. Yet, the ‘ledungen’ was still used 
as a tax unit for financing the knights and the defence organisation.3 
With the expanding claim for influence in the Nordic region as a result of the more 
efficient building of the empire4, the Swedish kings needed a better-organised and 
available army than they had in the first centuries of the realm. Until the 1680s, every 
man from the age of 15 had to join the army or navy, if the authorities ordered him to do 
so. However, only a small part of the male population was actually recruited.5 The sys-
tem that would resolve that was the allotment system, which could be explained as fol-
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lows: ‘commissioned and non-commissioned officers alike were allotted, in lieu of sal-
ary, Crown farms where they could support themselves in peacetime’.6 A group of 
farmers, a ‘rotar’ or recruitment unit, was obliged to employ a soldier and give him 
some estate. This system provided the necessary manpower to the campaigns of the 
Swedish crown.7 By supporting a soldier, the farmers paid natural/personal tax. For the 
understanding of the role of conscription within Swedish society, which is a central is-
sue to this study, it is important to elaborate more on the allotment system. 
In 1680 King Karl XI started to change the system to organise and finance the 
army.8 By introducing the allotment system, which had been introduced by the Swedish 
Parliament in 1683, the state taxed its inhabitants and it could establish a standing 
army.9 The soldiers were between 20 and 55 years old and were not only obliged to 
fight in war, but also to train on a regular base. While on duty, their relatives had to take 
care of the crop and when at home, the soldier actually worked for the farmers on a low 
salary.10 
The provinces and counties had to provide an infantry regiment, consisting of ap-
proximately 1,200 soldiers. The whole army had 22 regiments, each consisting of eight 
companies.11 By the end of the 17th century, the Swedish army could mobilise 43,000 
soldiers in the allotment system, with a total army size of 76,000 men.12 By 1880, this 
force decreased to 30,000, with a total period of service of thirty days, which had been 
spread over two years.13  
In the second half of the 19th century, this recruitment system of soldiers came under 
pressure. The introduction of the system of general conscription in 1812 was not the 
actual reason. The relatively weak conscript units were more regarded as militias.14 It 
was social change that put pressure on the allotment system. One of the disadvantages 
of the allotment system had been that some parts of Sweden carried a heavier burden 
than others. 
 There had been a second reason for abandoning the allotment system: the abolish-
ment of the taxes on land. Those who lived on unprivileged land had to pay taxes and 
this covered the farmers who were contributing to the allotment system.15 With the con-
stitutional reform of Sweden in 1865, the Parliament consisted of two Chambers. While 
in the First Chamber the privileged nobility were represented, the Second Chamber con-
sisted for a large part of farmers. Due to their growing influence on Swedish politics, 
this Countrymen party was able to put the issue of unequal taxation on the agenda.16 
The allotment system of the late 17th century not only provided men for the armed 
forces until the end of the 19th century, it also contributed to the acceptance of the armed 
forces by the people. That does not necessarily mean that they were eager to join the 
armed forces. The problems of the second half of the 19th century will show this. Due to 
its local and regional character – a group of farmers provided a soldier, who in turn was 
trained at the regional regiment – the allotment system had already contributed to the 
long tradition of regiments, in which generations of one family had been trained. This 
tradition had been continued and enforced in the 20th century’s conscript system and it 
would play a role in the post-Cold War reforms of the armed forces. 
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The renewal of the conscript system: 1860 – 1918 
The conscript system privileged the wealthy by giving rich conscripts the right to buy 
themselves free from service and be replaced during war. This had several implications 
from a social as well as a military point of view. Firstly, the military burden had been 
unequally spread over society. Only the lower classes served as a private in the army. 
Secondly, there was a lack of men who could be educated as officers in the conscript 
units. Most of the privates had not received the required higher education.17 The abroga-
tion of this system in 1872 marked the beginning of a 30-year struggle towards a gen-
eral conscription system. 
Besides social and fiscal disadvantages, the allotment-militia system also had its 
military limitations, as Nevéus points out. Since the beginning of the 19th century, Swe-
den had a limited conscription for young men between 21 and 25 years. However, the 
attendance of the training, which actually was rather short with its 30 days, fell short. In 
1880 more than one-third of the 60,000 conscripts did not turn up.18 That figure did not 
meet the demand of the armed forces, which in 1875 had proposed to modernise the 
army. To come to a cadre-militia army, they had planned conscripts to join from the age 
of 21 to 45 from ten and a half months up to seventeen months, depending on the type 
of service. A refresher training of 80 days had been planned as an addition to the con-
scription.19 
 The successes of the Prussian conscript-army impressed the Swedish military obvi-
ously in such a way, that the conscription system in Sweden was given a new impulse.20 
Another important reason was that the Swedes, like the Dutch, were aware of the grow-
ing power of Prussia, which had led to a shift of the power balance on the continent. 
Modern mass armies then became imperative to the survival of states. 
How different were politics. It appears that in the years from 1880 to 1885, when the 
change of the conscript system was discussed, the political debate seldom was about the 
foreign and security implications. Central was the already mentioned taxation system, 
which the allotment system was part of, and the political struggle for emancipation of 
the underprivileged class. ‘If the ‘enemy’ is mentioned it is usually a purely imaginary 
power.’21 
Therefore, the compromise reached by the parties in Parliament differed from the 
military’s wishes. The Land Defence Commission proposed in 1882, that the conscripts’ 
training should be prolonged to 90 days. The allotment system should be abolished and 
there should come a new standing force of 25,000 regulars.22 The decision on the pro-
posal led to divisions even within parties, and propaganda campaigns against the pro-
posal had been organised in the rural areas. The aim was the retention of the allotment 
system and the prevention of extension of the military training.23 In the end, government 
and Parliament decided on 9 May 1885 on a compromise: a reduction of 30% of the 
burden of land taxes and allotment system in exchange for an extension of the military 
training to 48 days. Nervéus argues that this compromise ‘did not involve any large-
scale rearmament. Its main value lay in that a deadlock had begun to break and yield 
possibilities of development towards more modern forms of organisation as regards 
both defence and taxation.’24  
In the years after 1885, the political road was paved to create extensive army re-
forms. The more so because the compromise had not really satisfied anyone.25 Several 
new propositions had been put forward in 1891 and 1892, trying – again – to extend the 
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duration for the training period to 90 days. The conscription question, however, had 
been closely connected to the right to vote, as in many other countries. The social de-
mocrats, founded in 1889, propagated the slogan ‘one man – one vote – one rifle’. 
When a person was obliged to serve, he deserved the right to vote, in times where only 
6% of the people, mostly rich, had the right to take part in an election.26  
Already in the 1890s, general conscription had become increasingly important to the 
military organisation, though it took until 1901 for the army reforms to become fact and 
every man was obliged to serve. The 1892 defence resolution meant an important step 
in that direction. The numbers of battalions had risen from 65 to 79 by 1896 and the 
mobilisation time had been brought back to 10-14 days. By 1897, the army could count 
on 151,000 men.27 This modernisation of the army had been a trade-off between the 
conservatives, demanding a stronger defence, and the farmers, getting rid of the land-
taxes.28 
However, by then the issue for the general right to vote had not been solved. Though 
social democrats, liberals, and the leftist bourgeois repeatedly put the issue on the 
agenda, it was not solved before 1907-09 and 1918-21 respectively, when suffrage for 
men and women would be introduced. What had been solved before that, had been the 
half-hearted reforms of conscription. 
It was the newly appointed Minister of Defence, Jesper Crusebjörn, who gave in 
1899 the General Staff the assignment to investigate how the allotment system could be 
abolished and conscription extended to one year. That resulted in a formal directive in 
June 1900 to create a new army structure.29  
On 14 June 1901, known as the birthday of modern conscription in Swedish de-
fence, the Parliament agreed on a compromise.30 The conscripts should come up for the 
first training during 150 days. This had to be followed by three refresher exercises of 30 
days in the second until the fourth year. The conscription age was 21 to 40. The allot-
ment system would be abolished in a stepwise fashion.31 The political struggle, how-
ever, carried on. 
7.3 Conscription and defence policy under neutrality 
Swedish defence policy cannot be understood without prior knowledge of Swedish neu-
trality and the concept of total defence, which has been closely connected to neutrality 
since the end of World War II. 
History of Swedish neutrality 
With the coronation of Karl XIV Johan in 1813, Swedish military expansionism ended. 
The King, formerly the French field marshal Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, steered Sweden 
on a new security and military course. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic era, he radi-
cally changed Swedish foreign policy and brought it more in line with the country’s 
resources.32 Like most European states, the King had learned from the Napoleonic wars 
that expansive campaigns ruin the treasury. Sweden entered into an alliance with Eng-
land and its ancient enemy Russia, gave up its possessions on the continent (Pomerania) 
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and unified in 1814-15 with Norway.33 Instead of warfare and expansionism, the coun-
try started to work towards a Nordic block. 
In the decades to come, Karl XIV Johan and his successors had to create a balance 
between England and Russia, and they did so, by trying not to become aligned.34 That 
was difficult. The way to neutrality was paved with obstacles. The European powers 
had an interest in Sweden being aligned. Swedish governments therefore also worked 
on back-up plans in case neutrality would be violated. Oscar I negotiated in 1853, dur-
ing the Crimea War, with the Western powers about going into war, though Sweden and 
Denmark issued a declaration of neutrality when confronted with instability in the Bal-
tic.35  
The rising power and ambitions of Prussia in the second half of the 19th century36 
made it even more difficult for Sweden to stay neutral. Still during the reign of King 
Oscar I, it was assumed that Germany had more interest in supporting Sweden/Norway 
than had England or France, though it seemed that this hope did not have a solid base.37  
Conscription and the World Wars 
When in 1905 the union between Sweden and Norway ended peacefully, the concept of 
neutrality was no longer reserved for states at war, but ‘started to take over as a maxim 
for everyday politics during times of peace.’38 With the growing political and military 
tensions in Europe, this seemed to be the only option for a country like Sweden, which 
was surrounded by large and military strong powers. 
Shortly before World War I, the Swedes had secret meetings and negotiations with 
the German army, in 1910, but parliamentary resistance to an active foreign policy re-
mained strong.39 Yet, within a few days after the outbreak of World War I, Sweden de-
clared its neutrality. Due to conscription, Sweden had large armed forces at its disposal, 
once they had been mobilised. At the beginning of the First World War, after the trans-
formation to conscription in army and navy had been finished, Sweden had almost 
600,000 conscripts after mobilisation. To that end, the conscription law had been 
changed. In 1914, the basic training had been extended to 250 days and the conscription 
age had been increased from the age of 20 until 42. To the refresher training of 1901, an 
additional training of fifteen days in the unit had been added, plus five days for exercis-
ing in the ‘landstorm’ (land protection force). After the First World War the basic train-
ing had been reduced to 165 days.40  
By that time, Sweden already had become a democracy. After the constitutional re-
forms of the 19th century (in 1840 - the ministerial reform when the government had 
been divided into ministries, and in 1866 – the representational reform when the bicam-
eral Parliament replaced the Four Estates’ Parliament), the first decade of the 20th cen-
tury brought equal male suffrage. It took until 1921 for the expansion to universal suf-
frage. 
Like the Dutch, Sweden managed to stay out of World War I and like the Dutch, 
Sweden welcomed the League of Nations after the war. It joined the League in 1920. 
Though there had been questions concerning neutrality and membership, Swedish poli-
ticians were active in the League. The Swedish foreign policy focus on League of Na-
tions issues had an important implication: ‘[m]atters of security policy were pushed into 
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the background.’41 That became, not in the last place, obvious in the 1925 defence reso-
lution.42 
In this 1925-defence resolution, the government decided to cut the defence budget 
by 30%. A few units had been closed and the cadre had shrunk with 40%. The amount 
of conscripts and conscription training was reduced, too. The training had been reduced 
to 90 days, with two refresher trainings of 25 days.43 Due to a new classification system, 
only half of every levy had been drafted.44  
Those financial and military reductions had been influential on the state of the mili-
tary organisation at the beginning of World War II. Sweden had been very disappointed 
with the bankruptcy of the League of Nations, after the Japanese occupation of Manchu-
ria, and the Italian occupation of Abyssinia in 1935. The tensions of the 1930s led the 
government to a military catch-up during the second half of the 1930s. 
 With the 1936 defence resolution, which was a ten-year plan, Sweden started a 
careful rearmament, with the intention to improve the quality of defence. The duration 
of conscription had been prolonged again. With the 1936 defence resolution, every man 
between 20 and 45 years had to serve 150 days, with the obligation to refresh once for a 
period of 25 days. The 1936 defence resolution, however, soon needed extra money, 
due to the rapid changes in Sweden’s security environment.45 The Soviet-German non-
aggression pact and the attack on Finland by the Soviet Union in 1939 made clear to the 
Swedes how vulnerable the country was. Until that time the Swedish government had 
been convinced, that the great powers of Germany and the Soviet Union were lurking at 
each other and that they therefore had no time and resources for and interest in the small 
Northern countries. Therefore, the 1942 defence resolution had been taken already after 
five years, instead of ten. It boosted the defence rearming effort of the realm. In 1937 
the country had 403,000 men for the armed forces at its disposal, of which 186,000 
were militia. Eight years later, 600,000 soldiers – almost 10% of the total population – 
were in the armed forces, with no militia at all and the navy had 126 vessels and the air 
force even 1,000 airplanes.46  
At the same time, the Swedish government changed the conscription law that would 
remain with only minor changes until 1994. In this 1941 conscription-law, the length of 
the basic training had been set to 360 days. To the already in 1939 introduced extra 
readiness exercise of 30 days two refresher trainings of 30 days were added, four and 
nine years after the basic training, and another 30 days nineteen years later. Other im-
portant changes were additional readiness exercises, with a maximum of 180 days over 
the whole conscription time, and the abolition of the ‘landstorm’. 47  
In the end, neither the Germans nor the Russians had occupied Sweden during the 
war. Johansson & Norman point out Sweden’s situation during World War II very well 
when they write: 
 
‘Exaggerating slightly, we may say that whereas in the First World 
War the Swedish government did what it could to assert the rights of 
the neutral state, especially in the field of commercial policy, in the 
Second World War Sweden witnessed a trial of her ability to live up 
to her obligations as a neutral state.’48 
 
The authors refer to the power imbalance in the Nordic region, after the Germans had 
occupied Denmark and Norway. The government steered a pragmatic course of neutral-
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ity. It did not resist the demands of the Germans to have their troops from Norway pass-
ing through the country on holiday leave to Germany, or for movements to the Finnish 
border to fight the Soviets after the outbreak of the war between Germany and the So-
viet Union in June 1941. That clearly was a breach of neutrality according to the Hague 
Conventions, though it was declared by the government that it was an isolated event.49 
Towards the end of the war, with growing allied successes, Sweden’s policy became 
more and more pro-allies. 
Post 1945: The armed forces and the total defence strategy  
Sweden entered the United Nations after World War II was over. Contrary to member-
ship of the League of Nations, the country applied without prior interior political de-
bates.50 Sweden adhered to the principle of neutrality. Different from the era between 
the two World Wars, Sweden decided to guarantee its independence with increased 
military efforts. The realm continued with rearmament, which had already reached a 
considerable size at the end of the World War. 
Though Sweden had been neutral, the strife for a power balance, or stability, in the 
North was not over. Already before World War II, discussions had taken place about a 
Nordic defence alliance. After 1948, when Finland signed a friendship treaty with the 
Soviet Union, Sweden had three choices: follow Norway into a Western alliance, con-
tinue neutrality, or search for a collective Northern security.51 In the end, the objectives 
of the Scandinavian countries turned out to be incompatible: Norway wanted explicit 
security guarantees from the United States; Denmark wanted cooperation but pointed at 
the Swedish-Norwegian contrast. After Sweden rejected cooperation and the Swedish 
minister of Foreign Affairs declared that Sweden should stay out of the alliance, in Feb-
ruary 1949, Nordic defence cooperation had no priority anymore.52 In April of the same 
year Denmark and Norway joined NATO. 
In a speech in February 1949, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs had already 
pointed to the fact that staying out of any defence cooperation would demand a lot from 
Swedish defence.53 One important concept that is inseparably connected to those mili-
tary efforts of the neutral country after World War II, is ‘total defence’. This concept 
was important for the will of the population to defend the country and it was in this way 
important for the legitimacy of conscription in Sweden during and after the Cold War, 
though the concept underwent some change in the 1990s. The total defence concept is, 
like the allotment system and neutrality, central to the Swedish defence and conscrip-
tion. 
The first aim of Swedish defence was to avoid any war against Swedish territory. 
That meant that defence had to be so strong that the costs of a possible attack against 
Sweden would exceed possible strategic advantages.54 In case, however, Sweden were 
to be forced into war, the main task for defence would have been to prevent anyone 
from setting foot on Swedish soil. An official leaflet from 1963 stated: ‘Today, how-
ever, war is not solely a confrontation between the weapons of different nations. The 
present-day war is a total war, in which country and population are central. A total de-
fence is indispensable to resist the total war successfully.’55 Total defence included 
military, civil, economic, and psychological forms of defence. 
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The Commander-in-Chief’s proposition for the first defence resolution after World 
War II, the FB 48, used strong language to underscore Sweden’s ability for keeping up 
neutrality. Examples are: ‘defence had to rely on military strength, which is the first 
instrument of security policy’, and ‘[T]he struggle has to be fought to the end even in a 
hopeless situation. It was even a matter of life or death.’56 The defence committee and 
the government agreed on a budget of almost SEK 1 billion in 1949 prices, which re-
sembles 3,4% of the GDP or almost 12,5 billion in 1992 prices.57 
In the mid 1950s the defence budget as share of the GDP reached its climax with 
over 4%. After this time, the armed forces never reached the size of the defence organi-
sation of the hay days of the Cold War, as Table 10 shows. After 1964, the defence 
budget reduced its share of the GDP, though the budget rose continuously from 1964 
SEK 30 billion to almost SEK 40 billion in 1992 prices.58 
 
Unit 1948 1964 1972 1982 1992 
      
Infantry Brigades 30 20 20 20* 7 
Tank/Mech. Brigades 6 6 6 4 5 
Norrlands Brigades - 4 4 4 5 
      
Destroyer/Frigate 18 17 13 2 - 
Other Surface Warship 15 36 33 34 30 
Submarines 24 20 22 12 12 
      
Fighter Squadrons 33 30 23 12 11 
Attack airplane/Bomber Squadrons 12 12 10 5,5 5,5 
Reconnaissance Squadrons 5 8 5 6 6 
      
Personnel  









      
Table 10: Parts of the armed forces war organisation 1948-1992. Source: Pallin 1998: 79. * Only 
eight of the 20 brigades were classified as modern (suited for attacks). 
 
With the 1968 defence resolution, the political consensus about defence started to erode. 
The bourgeois parties resigned from the defence commission, which was preparing the 
defence resolution. It reacted to the social democratic government’s decision to cut 8% 
on the defence expenditures in order to balance the state’s budget.59 In years to come, 
national economical problems and international détente led to further economics in mili-
tary spending.60 Even when the bourgeois parties held power from 1976-82, they could 
not change back to a higher defence budget because of the economically difficult times. 
Pallin also points to a clash of interests between the military and the politicians from 
the second half of the 1960s, which led to a different view on the role of defence as part 
of Swedish security policy. The change of the political generation to the post-World 
War II generation, the influence of the social democratic antimilitaristic wing and the 
peace movement in general had been important reasons for that.61 
The financial cutbacks since the end of the 1960s and the changing attitude of the 
social democratic party towards the role of military and defence in the national security 
concept did not lead to a direct downsizing of the organisation. Cuts in refresher train-
ing of the conscripts and fewer investments in new material had been the consequence. 
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By the end of the Cold War, most brigades existed and equalled the size of the wartime 
personnel on paper. In reality, fewer and fewer well-trained conscript soldiers had to 
work with more and more insufficient and old material.  
The Cold War and the role of conscription 
With the end of the Second World War, the regime for the individual conscript had been 
eased. In 1947, the duration for the first basic training period had been set to 330 days 
and one year later to 270 days. In 1949 the conscription age had been extended. Every 
man between 19 and 47 was obliged to fulfil military duty. The hands on exercises had 
been prolonged to 270 days, which would already be reduced to 180 one year later. Also 
the refresher training had been changed: to three exercises in the combat unit of 30 days, 
instead of per levy.62 Ericson points to the fact that ‘[w]ith this the conscripts’ training 
adjusted, in fact for the first time since 1901, to the need and the structure of the war-
time organisation.’ During the Korean War (1950-53) the basic training had been in-
creased to 304 days and there had even been a large refresher exercise with no fewer 
than 125,000 conscripts.63 By 1954 the minimum serving age had been brought down to 
18 years. 
Since the defence resolution of 1968, the defence budget effectively declined. The 
government had already in 1966 decided to cut the military expenditures with 8%. The 
reasons for that were disappointing results in the local elections for the government - 
social democrats and agrarians - in combination with negative economical prospects. 
One year later, the budget had been frozen at the previous year’s level. The financial 
situation of the armed forces became so difficult, that the bourgeois members of the 
defence commission that traditionally prepared the defence decision, resigned from the 
assignment by January 1968. The final defence resolution foresaw, among others, the 
nullifying of the yearly price compensation for material procurement.64 
In the following years of defence resolutions, not just the budget for weapons’ pur-
chase or procurement of equipment declined, but also the number of training and re-
fresher days. With the 1972 resolution, the training days were reduced to 227. On paper 
the refresher training increased, in reality it declined during the 1970s: ‘Rehearsal train-
ing as a budget regulator became an often used instrument.’65 Table 11 gives an over-
view of the individual burden for the conscripts during the Cold War until the big duty-
law reform in 1995. 
In Table 11 the ideal figures had been stated. Yet, in the late 1980s especially the 
number of refreshers differed from the official figures. While in 1986 45,863 persons 
joined refresher training in the army combat unit, the figure dropped to 17,183 in 1988. 
In 1990 the figure had been high again, up to 36,246, still 9,500 less compared to the 










Refresher training Remarks 
1947 20-47 330 Two of 30 days + a 
after-training exer-
cise of 30 days + 
readiness exercises 
Refresher training was in 
year four and nine after  
basic training, the after-
training exercise 19 years 
later. Total amount of 
readiness exercises could 
not exceed 180 days 
1948  270   
1949 19-47  Amount of readi-
ness exercise days 
to 270 
 
1950   Three exercises in 
the combat unit of 
30 days, readiness 
exercises down to 
maximum of 180 
days, again 
Switch to the system of 
exercises in combat units, 
instead of exercises per 
levy 
1951   Additional com-
mand exercise of 10 
days 
 
1952  304   
1954 18-47   Constant trainings contin-
gents 
1966  255 Five exercises in 
combat unit of 18 
days + five special 
exercises for com-
mand + five mobili-
sation exercises + 
readiness exercises 
The changes followed the 
1960 conscript committee 
1972  227 Like 1966  
1986  227 Five exercises in 
combat unit of 21 
days each 
Rest like 1966 
1992  227  1992 defence resolution 
(conscripts not needed in 
the wartime organisation 
are placed in a so called 
training’s reserve)68 
1995 16-70 Conscription 
maximal 615  
Civil duty 
maximal 320 
Maximal 240 days. 
Basic training and 
refresher exercises 
together must not 
exceed 700 days. 
The 1995 law on total 
defence duty. The obliga-
tion to serve can be ful-
filled in the form of con-
scription (18-47 year), 
civil duty or general ser-
vice duty (with high readi-
ness).  
Table 11: Overview of conscription laws. Source: Tånneryd 2002: 44-45 
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7.4 Conscription through the ages: a summary 
Due to the allotment system, the role of serving the country in the military as a form of 
natural taxes became much more obvious. Throughout the ages, the rulers not only 
needed a large army to defend the country’s interest, but they used the recruitment sys-
tem to populate the large country and to ensure a constant agriculture and with that 
availability of food. For one century that system even existed parallel to the modern 
form of recruitment, conscription. After the Napoleonic wars, the King introduced con-
scription, yet its military use had been low, since the conscripts only served in the ‘land-
storm’ (land protection force). 
It was the arising bourgeois class and the party of the Countrymen, which started to 
question the ancient allotment system. To them, as well as to the social democrats of the 
late 19th century, conscription had been part of the bargain to become emancipated. Like 
in the Netherlands, the conscript army had not been popular in the military. With the 
successes of the Prussian conscript army, however, they changed their opinion. The 
political exchange of modernised armed forces and the reform of the land tax marked 
the starting point for the modern conscript system in Sweden. Though there always had 
been a certain element of tradition in fulfilling military duty, until 1901 conscription 
had not been popular. 
Until the First World War, the country made up much ground with regard to the 
armed forces. After World War I those efforts had slipped. Much more than in the 
Netherlands, the belief in the abilities of the League of Nations had been influential on 
the 1925 defence resolution and this led to impressive reductions in the defence budget. 
One of the victims of that decision had been conscription and the condition of the con-
script army. Sweden, however, started to catch-up by the mid 1930s, after the League of 
Nations appeared to be weak. At the end of World War II the country had such numbers 
of armed forces at its disposal, which it would have needed at the beginning of the war. 
Yet, the country had not been occupied, which influenced the choices for the security 
policy and the armed forces. 
With the choice to stay neutral, influenced partially by the failure to build up a Nordic 
defence, Sweden invested a lot in a strong national defence. The core of that defence 
had been modern material, produced by its own defence industry, and conscription. By 
drafting large parts of every levy, by training them for a long time and by having regular 
refresher training, Sweden had the possibility of mobilising up to 850,000 soldiers. Af-
ter the financial decline of the armed forces, induced by a policy switch of the social 
democratic party and forced by economical problems, the strength of the Swedish 
armed forces had existed merely on paper during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, unlike the 
Dutch, serving the country did not become unpopular. During the Cold War conscrip-
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Chapter 8: From general to special conscription in Sweden 
8.1 Introduction 
This study started with the question why the Netherlands abandoned military conscrip-
tion soon after the Cold War, while Sweden has retained it to the present day. In the 
foregoing chapters, it was shown that in the Dutch case reforming leadership made use 
of the security, financial, and political climate to overcome structural constraints, bureau 
political struggles, and, above all, conservative obstruction. The Dutch Parliament de-
cided in 1993 to retain conscription, but to postpone the draft. 
Like the empirical chapter on conscription in the Netherlands, the structure of this 
chapter on Swedish military conscription is chronological. The Swedish empirics by far 
exceed the Dutch in terms of time. One important reason to compare those cases is that 
they are representing outliers in the history of conscription after the Cold War. An over-
view of the institutional leaders will be given in the analytical chapter, which will facili-
tate and validate the comparison between the two cases. The Swedish way of defence 
policymaking is so different from the Dutch case, that it is necessary to describe it be-
fore addressing empirics.  
During the fourteen years after the collapse of communism, the number of con-
scripts went down from more than 44,000 in the 1980s to fewer than 15,000 by the year 
2002. The actual figures differ, in particular the recent figures of draftees and dropouts. 
There is a discrepancy between official and unofficial figures, which is one of the issues 
central to this chapter. As early as the 1980s, but accelerating after the end of the Cold 
War, the number of army units had diminished from 28 brigades to six. However, mili-
tary conscription still existed in spite of tremendous economical problems and a restruc-
turing of the armed forces from territorial defence to network centric warfare with im-
proved capabilities to participate in international operations. 
Throughout the 1990s, different Ministers of Defence came up with suggestions to 
maintain the institution of the military draft. There is still an ongoing debate in Sweden 
about the possibility of even enlarging the number of young men and women serving 
their country and society in a military or civil way. 
Forced by the big financial problems of the late 1980s, fewer and fewer young men 
of an annual intake had been drafted. While at the beginning of the 1980s almost every-
body who could, also fulfilled his duty, at the beginning of the 1990s the proportion of a 
levy actually serving, reached below 75%: only 41,871 of the 57,833 enrolled men.1 By 
1991, a first inquiry about the future of conscription in Sweden after the Cold War was 
started. Initiated by the social democratic Minister Roine Carlsson, this so-called ‘1992 
Total Defence Duty Inquiry’ never had the task to abandon conscription, but to find 
ways to reorganise the system. One year later, the inquiry came with a recommendation 
to draft only the number actually needed, instead of a surplus with no military use. The 
surplus of young men, who were able to serve but for whom no posting had been avail-
able, should be placed in a so-called training’s reserve, a pool which would enable the 
authorities to train them in a short period in case of insecure times. The inquiry also 
advised the centre-right government, in office from autumn 1991 until the autumn of 
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1994, to combine different military and civic duty laws to one total defence duty. The 
law came into effect by January 1995.  
During and after that inquiry, financial problems forced the Swedish government to 
cut spending. The armed forces were one of the main retrenchment areas, which led to a 
further reduction of conscripts. This posed a dilemma on defence policy makers and 
military leaders, in particular the Commander-in-Chief. The dilemma was where to save 
money: by cutting back on procurement or by calling up fewer young men? The latter 
option was strongly rejected by the social democratic Minister Thage G. Peterson 
(1994-1997), who saw conscription as a core ingredient of the concept of people’s de-
fence. 
Björn von Sydow, the social democratic Minister of Defence from 1997 until 2002, 
instigated a new inquiry into conscription. By the end of 2000, the 1998 inquiry com-
mittee came up with the advice to compensate economically those few drafted and give 
them more civil credit for their military activities. This inquiry also recommended mak-
ing military service more attractive for women. The committee marked another impor-
tant stage in the process to be analysed. 
By the year 2003 Sweden has gotten a special conscription instead of a general one. 
Though every man who is able to serve is conscripted, only those who are willing to 
serve are actually drafted. It is no longer difficult to avoid service for conscious objec-
tors or those who simply do not want to serve the country. The Commander-in Chief 
Johan Hederstedt, and the Minister of Defence Leny Björklund, both emphasise that 
defence is still the people’s defence, but new tasks and ever diminishing armed forces 
only provide postings for the best.2 After 14 years of post Cold War security and de-
fence policy, Sweden has a recruitment system that is best described with the sociologi-
cal term ‘voluntarism based on conscription’. This chapter will show how it came about 
Sweden, up to the present time arrived at this rather unsocial democratic system of elit-
ist selection of soldiers. Before turning to that the Swedish defence policymaking proc-
ess will be introduced. 
8.2 The organisation of Swedish defence policymaking 
Swedish politics in brief 
Years Prime Minister Party Government Support 
1988-1991 Ingvar Carlsson SAP SAP 156 
1991-1994 Carl Bildt Conservatives Cons., C, Lib., CD 170 
1994-1996 Ingvar Carlsson SAP SAP 161 
1996-1998 Göran Persson SAP SAP 161 
1998-2002 Göran Persson SAP SAP 131 
Table 12: Government composition in Sweden. With a total of 349 seats, 175 seats form the major-
ity, Source: Arter 1999, Tatsachen über Schweden 2001 
 
During the period under study, 1989 until 2002, Sweden was governed by minority 
governments, which is not unusual for the country. For the foreign observer, however, 
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some explanations might be necessary to understand the way of policymaking in Swe-
den. 
Though Sweden is known as a traditional social democratic country, it regularly 
knew centre-left governments. That happened for example in the second half of the 
1970s and, important to this study, from 1991-1994. During the rest of the 1990s the 
country had social democratic dominated governments (Table 12). 
All governments of the 1990s have been minority cabinets, which is in Sweden 
rather the rule than the exception.3  
 
 
Party 1988 1991 1994 1998 
Left-Communists 5,9 4,5 6,2 12,0 
Social Democrats 43,2 37,7 45,3 36,4 
Liberals 12,2 9,1 7,2 4,7 
Conservatives 18,3 21,9 22,4 22,9 
Centre Party 11,4 8,5 7,7 5,1 
Christian Democrats 2,9 7,1 4,1 11,8 
New Democrats - 6,7 1,2 0,1 
Greens 5,5 3,4 5,0 4,5 
Table 13: Swedish general election results 1988-2002 in % of votes. Source: Tatsachen über Schwe-
den, December 2001 
 
Since the Swedish system of policymaking differs markedly from the Dutch one, it is 
worth representing it in some detail first. Executive decision-making within a ministry 
is not delegated to a single minister, but is expected to express the entire cabinet’s 
views. Yet, department ministers have ‘substantial control over routine matters as well 
as over the budgetary process.’ 4 Defence policymaking in Sweden is traditionally based 
on broad consensus. Like most Western democracies, the Swedish parliamentary work 
is facilitated by the work of standing committees. In the Swedish standing defence 
committee, government propositions for the budget, defence resolutions, and other rele-
vant bills will be debated. Parliamentarians can amend bills by putting forward motions. 
 
 
Minister Supreme Commander outline planning 
Defence  Committee 
armed forces plan 
Minister report 
Parliamentary  Defence 
Committee 
bill proposal (amendable) 
Voting in parliament 
 
Figure 9: Defence policymaking until the 1990s. Defence committee subset of Parliamentary de-
fence committee 
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Defence policy planning 
What makes the Swedish defence system special is the way in which propositions for 
the different bills are made. Until the beginning of the 1990s, the main policy paper for 
the Swedish defence had been the five-year plan, the so-called defence resolution. After 
a ministerial outset, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces would present an 
analysis of military needs for the upcoming five years. This document is often called 
‘planning for the armed forces’ or ‘armed forces investigation’. 
 
This analysis served as a starting point for the parliamentary process. As an important 
tool to reach consensus about defence, defence committees had been appointed every 
time anew to investigate publicly the five-year military plan. All political parties in Par-
liament had been represented, though it should not be confused with the parliamentary 
defence committee. The report of the investigation committee served as a base for the 
Defence Minister’s proposal, which in turn was debated about by the standing parlia-
mentary committee of defence. Salient detail: the members of the investigation commit-
tee also had a seat in the parliamentary standing committee. The bill they decided on 
became the defence resolution. The five-year plan is in a way the Swedish defence 
White Paper. 
However, at the beginning of the 1990s, this process – the traditional way of making 
defence policy – came under severe pressure. Significant economical problems and the 
changing world order after the fall of the Berlin Wall put structural constraints on the 
decision making process. The situation was even worse than in 1968. At the same time, 
the political climate in Sweden was changing. The centre-right parties gained momen-
tum and strategic non-cooperation in the committee served election purposes. This led 
to only minor reports and a failure (and in the end ‘implosion’) of the committee.5 
It was the defence committee appointed by the government in 1988, which failed. 
When the committee published its security report ‘Swedish security policy in a chang-
ing world’ in January 1990, it had no chance to foresee the German unification and the 
agreements between the German Chancellor Kohl and the Soviet Union leader Gorbats-
jov about troop reductions in the former GDR.6 In addition, Sweden was facing a severe 
economical and financial crisis by the end of the 1980s.  
Especially this latter crisis had severe political consequences. While the social de-
mocratic led-government tried to manage the crisis between August 1989 and Septem-
ber 1990, its own rank and file, i.e. the labour party and trade unions, thwarted the ef-
forts ‘that demanded sacrifice from consumers and workers.’7 The public opinion was 
turning in favour of the bourgeois opposition consisting of Conservative Party, Liberal 
Party, Centre Party, and Christian Democrats. In addition, the Moderate Party, led by 
Bildt, demanded, as the Commander-in-Chief, a significant increase of the defence 
budget.8 For the opposing centre-right parties, obstructing the defence policy process 
was a strategic choice in the light of the upcoming election of September 1991. In the 
end, the committee never delivered a final report.9 
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The post Cold War era: A new Swedish Defence Commission 
The conservative Minister Anders Björck decided not to revitalise the defence commit-
tee. Instead, he used a reduced group of parliamentarians as a sounding board during the 
making of his defence resolution. This commission was to inform the opposition about 
the government’s plans.  
In 1994, when the social democrats regained power, this commission consisting of 
parliamentarians of all parties supported by a civil servant from the ministry of Defence 
was upgraded. The social democratic minority government needed a broad consensus on 
the future four-year plans that provided a quicker reaction to environmental changes. 
They used the commission as a forum for consultations10. 
Different from the prior committee, where the members voted on the outcome, the 
chairman of the new commission would decide on the outcome. This led to the need to 
gain broad consensus, since neglecting the opposition’s will too often would make the 
commission superfluous.11 Yet, the commission was an important ‘forum for consulta-
tions between representatives of the government and representatives of the political par-
ties of Parliament.’12 The report(s) of the committee served as a base for government’s 
proposals, which would be debated upon in the standing committee. They would form 
the basis for the new defence planning, where defence resolutions regularly referred to, 
which led to a variable planning time of three to five years. During the last few years 
this commission has also released many debate papers, among others, concerning new 
threats and new tasks for the armed forces.  
The main difference with the foregoing system is, that the ministry of Defence be-
came much more influential and, above all, responsible for defence resolutions. 
Whereas the former method of defence planning had given a lot of responsibility to the 
parliamentarians, who in the main not only prepared decisions, but also decided upon 
them, the new consultations played the ball back to the ministry. This is especially re-
flected in the role of the secretary of the commission, who is employed by the ministry 
of Defence. 
The inquiry system 
A third important way of making policy in Sweden is inquiries13. Requested by either a 
ministry, a government authority or an advocacy group, an inquiry will be started about 
a technically and/or politically difficult issue. The government, i.e. the responsible Min-
ister, sets the terms of reference for the committee. Those terms very clearly restrict the 
task of the committee. They also set the duration of the committee’s work and the par-
ticipating members. This inquiry committee consists of experts in the field and some-
times politicians. After the inquiry, where more experts can be heard or authorities will 
be asked, the committee comes up with an official report called ‘Statens Offentliga 
Utredning’ (State’s Public Inquiry – SOU)14. Advocacy groups, relevant authorities and 
other stakeholders now have the chance to react on this report in an official reply proce-
dure15. Their reactions, the committee’s ideas and the government’s ideas about the fu-
ture bill are then combined in a government’s proposal. In this proposal, the government 
explains why it agrees or disagrees with the committee’s report or the considerations of 
the other relevant stakeholders. It comes up with its conclusions and the draft of a bill16. 
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The government’s proposal is then discussed in the standing committee, in this case the 
standing committee of defence. The Swedish inquiries serve as a political panacea, due 





Defence Committee Swedish Defence 
Commission18 
Inquiry 
Members Parliamentarians  Parliamentarians Parliamentarians Experts and politi-
cians of all levels 
(national, regional, 
local) 
Composition 17 members and 17 
alternate members, 
representing parties 
in proportion to 
seats in Parliament 
 8 members, of all 
parliamentarian 
parties 
Depending on task 
Tasks Preparation of 
business before 
final decision in 
Parliament 
Prepare the 5 year-





the government and 
representatives of 
the political parties 
of Parliament’. 
Prepares the new 
defence resolution 
In 1992 to merge 
different total 
defence duties; 
In 1998 to raise 
motivation of 
those who should 
serve  
Issues Military and civil 
aspects of total 













All societal issues. 
In this study rele-
vant the two total 
defence duty 
commissions, 
trying to advise on 
military, financial, 
social, juridical 
and political issues 
Other Permanent organ of 
the parliamentary 
work 
Stopped in 1990 
after political crisis 
Started in 1994 
Due to rapid 
changes in the secu-
rity environment 
long-term plan is 
regularly checked 
and if necessary 
changed. Duration 
of defence resolu-
tion 5 years down to 
3 years 
Stakeholders can 
react to the report. 
Those reactions 
are referred to, but 
not necessarily 










Table 14: Overview of commissions and committees in Swedish defence policy process 
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To conclude, the defence commission is an important consultation and policymaking 
tool on a regular basis. The inquiry committees are used for important decisions about 
political, societal, juridical, or technical matters. The standing committee on defence is a 
parliamentary body that prepares the decisions on all governmental proposals, which are 
often based on the work of the foregoing two bodies. 
Important defence organisations 
The Swedish executive is quite decentralised. At the ministry of Defence in Stockholm 
there are only 130 people working. Much of the work is done by decentralised authori-
ties. 
Pliktverket. For conscription, the most important decentralised organisation is the 
National Service Administration (Pliktverket), until 1995 called ‘Värnpliktverket’. It is 
responsible for the enrolment and testing of those obliged to serve. Since the merge of 
various total defence laws in 1995, the authority not only enrols the military conscripts, 
but everybody who might serve in the total defence. The organisation provides all rele-
vant authorities, i.e. the military, civil defence authorities, and other organisations and 
companies with the personnel they need. This is done by matching the demands with the 
data of the approximate 2 million men and women who are registered in detail.19 
ÖCB/KBM. Until 2002 the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning (ÖCB) 
had been the ‘state agency responsible for the overall coordination of activities aimed at 
strengthening society’s capacity to deal with emergencies.’20 The coordination of the 
civilian defence, in which many civil agencies had been involved, also maintained close 
relations to the armed forces. The fields of activity included firstly: monitoring the in-
ternational environment for identifying relevant developments. Secondly, the agency 
deployed many international activities to build confidence, especially within NATO’s 
partnership for peace (PfP). Thirdly, ÖCB developed plans and structures for crisis 
management and trained decision-makers. Fourthly, the agency worked closely together 
with the industry to ensure the industrial supply of the country during emergencies. Fi-
nally, the agency would have the responsibility of ensuring sufficient transport during a 
crisis. Throughout the years, ÖCB had been an important stakeholder in the defence 
sector, not in the least since it had to advise the government and different committees 
about the manning of the civil defence. ÖCB was replaced by the Swedish Emergency 
Management Agency – (SEMA or in Swedish KBM) in July 2002. Since that time it has 
also taken on some of the tasks of the National Board of Psychological Defence. The 
latter is also responsible for conducting and publishing national opinion polls on secu-
rity and defence matters. 
Conscript’s Council. The Conscript’s Council (Värnpliktsrådet) is the interest repre-
sentation of the conscripts. It started as a reaction to and a solution of the problems of 
conscripts in military training and to improve their social circumstances. While until the 
1970s protests often had been spontaneously organised on a local level, the conscripts 
started to be more organised in conferences and working groups to share experiences. 
During the 1970s the conscript movement became more concrete. It demanded, among 
others, a voice for the conscripts, guaranteed by law, abolition of arrest, constant night 
permission and higher demobilisation payments. In 1980 the conscripts’ conference 
decided to found a conscript union, which changed its name into Conscripts’ Council in 
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1984.21 The annual conference is an important forum for all conscripts, with the Com-
mander-in-Chief and the Minister of Defence as speakers. It receives the attention of the 
national media. 
Society and Defence. The Swedish organisation ‘Folk och Försvar’ (Society and De-
fence – FoF) is an independent association of national organisations supporting the total 
defence. Its task is foremost to serve as a forum for those organisations and the citizens, 
with the aim to strengthen the bonds between them. The organisation informs the popu-
lation about important decisions by Parliament and government concerning security and 
defence policy. To that end, it publishes information about all subjects related to de-
fence and security, including foreign policy. Society and Defence organises courses and 
seminars, but its most important event is the annual conference. During four days in 
February, top decision makers, the military leaders and almost all stakeholders within 
the sector meet to share their ideas about important defence and security issues. It is a 
major networking and socialising event; the more so as the attendants not only discuss, 
but also socialise and enjoy themselves.22 
8.3 Coping with the end of the Cold War 
The rapid political changes in the communist world, including the German unification, 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union placed the neutral country of 
Sweden for some problems. While many NATO countries, including the Netherlands, 
reduced their armed forces relatively quickly and decided, at least in the case of Bel-
gium and the Netherlands, to abandon conscription, Sweden was reluctant to reduce its 
armed forces. 
Though there had been a reduction trend since the 1980s - the number of brigades 
for example went down from 29 to 21 - the Swedish defence policy slowed down fur-
ther reductions. At the beginning of the 1990s the centre-right government even raised 
the investments in the invasion defence. The future had been too insecure to forecast for 
the majority within the sector. Aside from the insecure prospects for Sweden’s security, 
the traditional way of Swedish defence policymaking prevented faster adaptations to the 
new environment. The traditional five-year plan of defence had been decided two years 
before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
The next decision was expected in 1991, when a financial and economical crisis hit 
the country, which would lead to a change of government. The Social Democrats were 
replaced by a centre-right government. The new conservative coalition concentrated 
more on defence than its left-wing predecessor, though the choice for procurement was 
a trade-off between equipment and the size of the organisation. Consequently, the num-
ber of young men drafted further declined, to three-fifth of an annual levy. In the plans 
of the policy makers it would eventually take the Swedes until 1995 to reach the real 
end of the Cold War. 
The 1988 Armed Forces Investigation: selective placement of conscripts 
It is imperative to start with the defence decision 1988 and the plans made by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, General Bengt Gustafsson, to understand the role that conscription 
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played in the post Cold War defence reorientation. He was the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Swedish armed forces from 1986-1994, which exceeded the regular six-year term by 
two years. Already in the beginning of his term, an ever-decreasing defence budget led 
to old equipment and an only partially functional organisation. One of the consequences 
had been a surplus of conscripts. There had not been enough wartime postings in the 
armed forces for every young man of the levies of approximately 50,000 young men a 
year. This section will describe the 1987-defence resolutions. Though the first of these 
resolutions falls outside the period under investigation, it is necessary to refer to it, since 
already at that time financial problems influenced the manning of the armed forces. The 
ideas General Gustafsson proposed concerning conscription were contested by different 
actors. 
As early as the 1980s, budget cutbacks by the government forced the armed forces 
to economise and reduce from 29 to 21 brigades. The large Cold War armed forces of 
the 1950s and 1960s became financially less bearable. That became obvious, not in least 
in the equipment. What once used to be modern was outdated in the mid 1980s and par-
tially decrepit. 600 Swedish tanks, which could only fire in a stationary position, and the 
Swedish Viggen airplane were about to be replaced. 
The share of the defence budget in the GDP decreased from almost 4% by the end of 
the 1960s to 2,7% in 198723. At the same time, the general trend in growing affluence 
and as a consequence growing income during the 1970s, also hit the armed forces. The 
personnel costs had exploded within 20 years, though the number of employed persons 
had decreased by approximately 20% and the training days for conscripts had decreased 
by approximately 35% since 1970.24 The costs for the employees on the other hand had 
increased by 55% since 1970 and the costs for conscripts had gone up in real prices with 
150% to almost 1 billion crowns a year.25 During the two decades, 1970s and 1980s, 
when the costs for personnel went up, the quality of the equipment went down. 
While the navy and the air force had been reduced in size, which enabled a moderni-
sation of the equipment, the army stayed at the same level of units. This had severe im-
plications for the quality of the personnel. There was not enough money to train every-
one sufficiently and especially the refresher training suffered. Together with the old 
equipment, the state of the army deteriorated. 
The financial developments led to an imbalance between the main components of 
the armed force’s organisation. While in 1970 those four components, i.e. personnel, 
conscripts, material endurance and readiness training, used to be balanced, the Com-
mander-in-Chief observed a shift towards a disadvantage of the two latter ones. His aim 
therefore was to rebalance those components. Especially the refresher training should be 
strengthened again.26 
The Commander-in-Chief’s solution 
The main task of the Commander-in-Chief should be the presentation of a long-term 
plan for the army, complementing the 1987 Defence Resolution and mainly covering 
the training’s system and the peacetime or basic organisation. It would exceed the focus 
of this study to present the Commander-in-Chief’s investigation in-depth. Instead, the 
implications for the conscript system should be central. And it was central to the Armed 
Force’s investigation 1988.27 
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The defence investigation 1988 (FU88) was one of three major plans, which General 
Gustafsson presented at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.28 It was a 
supplement to the 1987-defence resolution by the government, by its social democratic 
Minister of Defence, Roine Carlsson. While the planning for the navy and the air force 
had been delivered on time, i.e. 1987, the planning for the army was difficult to do, be-
cause of the budgetary situation. This is why the plan was dated 1988, though it referred 
to the defence resolution 1987. 
To meet the demands of the state’s finances as well as those of the general conscrip-
tion (i.e. that every capable man between 18 and 47 should fulfil his military duty) the 
Commander-in-Chief recommended a shortened training period for some of the con-
scripts. One-third of a levy should be trained to secure installations, which were impor-
tant to the total defence concept. 
General Gustafsson argued that due to technical improvements in the defence indus-
try strategic attacks became a greater possibility. Possible aggressors had the equipment 
to attack strategic objects, total defence’s infrastructure and large accumulations of peo-
ple with short military warning. According to the Commander-in-Chief, there was no 
force in Sweden available that could be on the spot in a short time to provide sufficient 
protection to strategically important targets. For this reason he introduced the so-called 
protection force in his plans. 
 
Unit Type  Number of units/men 




Mix of both Op-
tions 
(less preferred) 
Home Guard 125,000 125,000 125,000 
Protection Force 110,000 110,000 110,000 
Basic Training 2,5 2,5 2,5 
Territorial Defence 120,000 175,000 165,000 
Basic Training 7,5 5 5 
Divisional Unit 108,000 110,000 110,000 
Norrland Brigade 5 5 5 
Norrland Mech. Brigade 1 ++ 1 1++ 
Brigade G 1+ 1 1 
Mech. Brigade S 4 4 4 
Infantry Brigade 3 8 4-8 
Tank Brigade 2 0 2-0 
Table 15: Alternative options for army units and personnel. Source: FU 88, XV 
 
Along the regular territorial forces and the home guard, a briefly trained protection force 
of 110,000 men should be set up. With a trainings period of five months this force 
would be able to protect the 4,000 targets in the country, which warranted protection. 
The Commander-in-Chief introduced different models, wherein the size of the home 
guard and the protection force remained the same, viz. 125,000 and 110,000 respec-
tively. What changed were the numbers of the territorial forces, reaching from 120,000 
up to 175,000, and their corresponding number of brigades (16-18). 
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Resistance 
The protection force, officially presented as an important strategic innovation, but unof-
ficially designed to cope with the surplus of conscripts, which were not needed in the 
wartime organisation, was only short-lived. A short-term training had been introduced 
as a test by the social democratic Minister of Defence, Roine Carlsson. Within a period 
of five months conscripts would be trained to guard strategic targets. By the end of 
1991, the new Minister of Defence, the conservative A. Björck, abandoned this training. 
To him those forces were of very limited military use.29 
The Commander-in-Chief, General Gustafsson, was very disappointed that his con-
cept of a protection force, but also the short-term training, had been abandoned. Even 
more than ten years later, he was convinced that the bulk of the army, especially the 
Chief of the Army Åke Sagrén, had been lobbying against his plans. General Gustafsson 
got the impression that the army almost thought that it was he who endangered con-
scription and not the choices of the politicians: ‘They did not believe that the politicians 
would do anything against the conscription system, because the politicians had talked 
about conscription so nicely in the past.’30 Though the General was a politically very 
experienced man, his ideas about the protection force, which especially should contrib-
ute to the continuation of a high number of conscripts, had no chance. 
In an interview with Dagens Nyheter at the beginning of 1995 the army chief, Gen-
eral Sagrén, admitted that he was no supporter of short-term training. When the subject 
had been put on the agenda, again, he pointed explicitly to the test of a short training in 
the beginning of the 1990s: ‘We found five months very short already, almost immoral 
to accept.’31 
His Chief of Staff, Lennart Rönnberg, remembers that the plans of the Commander-
in-Chief split the army. On the one hand, there had been slightly modernised units; on 
the other hand, there had been units with less training and with the material leftovers of 
the old brigades. The training those soldiers received felt short, because they had not 
even learned how to move the units in case of an enemy’s attack. ‘Sagrén and I thought 
it was not right.’32 When Björck abolished this training, however, Rönnberg tried to 
prevent it, appealing directly to the Minister of Defence. An important reason for that 
had been that those young men would be facing unemployment.33 
8.4 The armed forces own plans for the future forces 
Between the 1992 Defence Resolution and the earlier one of 1987, the security envi-
ronment of Sweden had changed rapidly. Due to the break-up of the bi-polar world or-
der and the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, the security of Sweden became less 
predictable. At the start of the 1990s the instability in the former Soviet Union in par-
ticular put a mark on the Swedish security definition and the armed forces. The Com-
mander-in-Chief admitted that the immediate risk of a confrontation between the super 
powers had disappeared and that the situation was hopeful, but that the developments 
were characterised by unpredictability and insecurity the more the Soviet Union disinte-
grated.34  
At the same time, interior political and financial problems delayed and even altered 
the traditional way of Swedish defence policymaking. Due to Swedish economical and 
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financial problems in combination with the political tactics of the non-socialist opposi-
tion in the light of the upcoming national elections in 1991, the defence resolution had 
been delayed by one year, to 1992. Commander-in-Chief Gustafsson presented his 
document for the Defence Resolution 1992, in June 1991 – three months before the na-
tional elections. 
The government, the social democrats, Roine Carlsson, as Minister of Defence, and 
his Junior Minister, Jan Nygren, instructed the Commander-in-Chief to come up with an 
armed forces investigation, calculating three alternatives: a lower (C), stable (B), and a 
higher budget, with an increase of 3% a year (A) (Figure 10). Those budgets incorpo-
rated different forms of ambition level, ranging from the traditional tasks, like the de-
fence of the Swedish territory, without the possibility to modernise, up to the a broader 
range of tasks, including the possibility to conduct the necessary modernisation of the 
armed forces. The latter one was also important for the support of the Swedish defence 
industry that always played an important role in the Swedish independence from other 
powers, an important condition for neutrality. In fact, the instruction assumed un-
changed resources for defence for the upcoming five years, i.e. 30,68 billion crowns a 
year (in February 1990), which would resemble 32,05 billion crowns a year at February 
1991-prices.  
 














alternative A (38,5 with 3% annual raise)
alternative B (36,2)
alternative C & D (32,1)
 
Figure 10: Alternatives A, B, C and D in billion crowns a year (without reservations) (source: ÖB 
92: III) 
 
However, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces added one alternative. He had 
been aware of the fact that the directives of the government aimed at alternative C with 
a lower financial and ambition level. With the recent financial problems in mind, the 
Commander-in-Chief did not exclude the possibility that the budget in the end would 
decline even further. That is why he introduced the possibility of drafting fewer young 
men each year. This way the armed forces could be better prepared35 and the support for 
the defence industry could be continued, ‘because there are not enough resources to 
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keep both, a general conscription and a large Swedish defence industry.’36 That, how-
ever, could be considered a bluff, since the General in fact was a huge defender of con-
scription. He even proposed to have twenty brigades, ten very well equipped and ten 
less equipped, share equipment during training, to keep up the number of conscripts.37 
The Minister reacted fiercely to this advice, which he had not sought and which did 
not suit his preferences. Even the media were astonished that Roine Carlsson was furi-
ous, since they generally portrayed him as a reserved politician. In a letter to the Com-
mander-in-Chief the Minister reminded him that he only should deliver the investiga-
tions the government desired and ordered, which was translated by one of the biggest 
newspapers in Sweden to ‘I don’t want to hear that anymore. Keep quiet until I ask 
you.’38 His Junior Minister, Nygren, emphasised in the same article, that the govern-
ment never asked for such a statement from the Commander-in-Chief and that they were 
not allowing themselves to be forced into a debate on the issue. 
Just one month before, on 6 May 1991, the Minister of Defence gave a directive to 
start an investigation about the modernisation and restructuring of conscription. Its brief 
was to merge the laws and regulations of different military and civil duties within the 
total defence and to come up with recommendations how to handle the surplus of con-
scripts. In the light of that directive it should be no surprise that the government was not 
amused that shortly before the elections the subject came back on the agenda. 
And then came the 1991 national elections resulting in a centre-right government 
that supported the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief to invest more money in the armed 
forces equipment, than towards the expenses of conscription. The conservative Björck 
saw the necessity – like the Commander-in-Chief - to buy new material to modernise 
the armed forces. Almost within a month, the Minister agreed that the armed forces 
would get 9,5 billion crowns over five years. Contrary to the Commander-in-Chief’s 
plans, the number of conscripts had to decrease by 6,000, according to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army Sagrén. 
The army’s own plans 
Until the 1st of July 1994 the Commander-in-Chief during peacetime had been more like 
a ‘primus inter pares’ than a real commander. The commanders of almost 120 different 
military authorities had direct access to the ministry of Defence. In particular, the chiefs 
of the three different forces played an important role. In all investigations carried out 
regarding a five-year plan they had conducted the investigation for their own forces. In 
the end, the Commander-in-Chief used those as a base for his own investigation. The 
commanders of the three forces, however, had the possibility to write a dissenting opin-
ion on that document and in 1991, all three took that opportunity. 
The Chief of the Air Force, Lars-E. Englund, criticised that the Commander-in-
Chief in his financial calculations had not considered the importance of the air force in 
the future defence, as emphasised by the government. Navy Chief Dick Börjesson re-
jected further reductions of his organisation. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, 
Sagrén, on the other hand, proposed an even further reduction of his organisation with 
modernisation of the material in return. 
The General proposed to reduce the units of the army to 16 brigades, to expel 6,000 
conscripts from training, and to use the resources freed by those measures for the im-
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provement of the training and the renewal of the material.39 For the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army, battle tanks featured on top of his priority list. After becoming Chief 
of the Army, in 1990, the General had already announced his wishes to the Minister. 
The 600 Swedish tanks, type S, from the 1950s and the British Centurion, about the 
same age, had to be replaced, preferably by American Abrams M1-A1. This demand 
was extra important to the General, since the air force and navy already had new equip-
ment.40 
Compared to the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was 
much more willing to sacrifice numbers of conscripts to modernise his organisation. 
Supported by the new conservative Minister of Defence, new battle tanks were pur-
chased, indeed to the expense of the number of conscripts.41 The Commander-in-Chief 
Gustafsson tried to convince Björck of his plans, which would contribute to increased 
numbers of drafted conscripts. The Minister had other plans: largely these would be the 
changes as proposed by the Commander-in–Chief of the Army Sagrén.  
8.5 The centre-right government 1991-1994 
On 4th of October 1991, when the centre-right government took office, the new conser-
vative Minister of Defence, Björck, ran out of time for deciding on a new defence reso-
lution. Actually, the resolution following the 1987 defence resolution should already 
have been decided upon by 1 July 1991. He had to come up with a new resolution be-
fore 25th February 1992, which was the time limit for the Parliament to decide upon. 
One of the options that had been offered was the prolongation of the current five-
year Defence Resolution by one more year. This would have bought the new Defence 
Minister some time to prepare the new Defence Resolution more carefully. Björck re-
jected this option determinedly. To him politically the delay of the defence resolution 
1991 was very advantageous. In the hypothetical case that this resolution had been de-
cided upon by the social democrats as early as 1991, the conservative Minister of De-
fence would have been forced to work with it for the following four years. Instead, 
Björck had the opportunity to put his mark on the future policy.42  
Björck and Prime Minister Bildt, an experienced security and defence thinker, asked 
Michael Sahlin to be the Junior Minister of Defence. To most people this came as a sur-
prise. Sahlin was a civil servant and a career diplomat and he had twice acted as secre-
tary of defence commissions. He had been previously associated with the Social De-
mocratic Party, which, after his time as a Junior Minister in a conservative government, 
had put him on a political sidetrack. 
When asked by Björck, even Sahlin had been pessimistic about the schedule.43 In 
the Minister of Defence’s view the international developments were going so rapidly, 
that a defence resolution had to come sooner rather than later. In addition, the economic 
situation of the Swedish defence industry demanded political decisions.44 Whatever 
resolution had to be taken, one thing was certain: the minority government needed sup-
port by either the social democrats or the right-wing populist newcomer, the New De-
mocratic Party. 
The slogan: ‘Smalare men vassare’ – leaner but meaner – became central to that 
resolution, focusing on the modernisation of the Swedish armed forces. On the one 
hand, the forces had to be cut in size, but on the other hand, the budget would have to be 
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raised to modernise their equipment. The main task of the armed forces, according to 
the proposition of the government, was still to resist an armed attack, with brief military 
warning, notwithstanding the direction the attack might come from. The defence in-
cluded territorial, air, and naval forces. 45 
Björck described in an open letter the situation and the choices of his government as 
a compromise: 
 
‘The defence resolution in spring will be … an encounter between the 
recognition of the fact that a traditional enemy threat vanished and the 
change into instability and insecurity, between modern material and 
trooping the regiment’s colour, between a remaining Swedish defence 
industry and one totally depending on abroad.’46 
 
In addition to the reduction of the organisation to sixteen brigades, one of the measures 
of the new conservative Minister of Defence was the introduction of a functional price 
compensation system. Traditional long-term planning, especially the purchase of weap-
ons, came under pressure because of inflation of the Swedish crown. According to 
Björck, this had killed many five-year plans with the result that many defence projects 
could not be fulfilled.47 The resolution foresaw to increase the defence budget every 
year with 1,5 % for defence material, not for salary or day-to-day operations. Another 
important matter, according to the Minister, was that government and Parliament finally 
decided to continue the new Jas fighter project and buy new main battle tanks.48 The 
proposition foresaw to that end a budget of 8,2 billion crowns for army material (3,3 
billion for the year 1992/93) and more than 10 billion crowns (7,5 billion for 1992/93) 
for buying air force material.49 Strengthening the morale and the efficiency of the army 
had been important reasons for buying those tanks.50 
The 1992 defence resolution had not been reached easily. One reason had been the 
requirement of the minority coalition government to gain support from opposition par-
ties. Another important reason lay in the fact that it was not so much a case of interna-
tional and national security considerations that steered the defence debate, but rather 
regional and local economics, employment issues, and tradition. 
Already before the presentation of the defence resolution to Parliament, parliamen-
tarians, regional and local politicians expressed the need to keep the local regiments. It 
even got to the point that county heads, such as the county head of Skåne, incited and 
joined locals to protest against any closures of regiments.51 During the debate about the 
final proposition, which took twelve hours, many motions asked for the continuation of 
regiments in certain regions. Sometimes politicians of opposition and government par-
ties tried to save a regiment.52 Those motions had been mainly put forward by locally 
oriented politicians.53 The debate had clearly been dominated by local politics and less 
by security issues.54 In the end, the centre-right government succeeded with its proposi-
tion. Analysts observed no surprises in the decision and the budget for the year 1992/93 
was set at 34,67 billion crowns a year, which meant a real increase of 900 million 
crowns a year.55 
The Conservative Party, which held the posts of Prime Minister and Defence Minis-
ter, obviously concentrated more on security grounds than on local issues for the de-
fence decision. That is at least noteworthy, since in particular the Conservative Party 
had been very traditional: one province - one regiment!56 According to the Minister of 
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Defence, it had been a hard fight, since the regiments also had a cultural purpose, with 
their military music and supportive tasks such as clearing the roads from snow. 
Björck admitted that his plans never would have succeeded without the support of 
the Prime Minister Bildt. The foreign and defence expert of the Conservative Party used 
to be a very active member of the parliamentary standing committee of defence, among 
others. In this committee Bildt had not only shown his great knowledge of the subject, 
but also his will to modernise the armed forces. Repeatedly he criticised the social de-
mocratic Ministers of Defence for their choice to diminish the defence budget regarding 
the expenses of the armed forces before he became Prime Minister.57 
Björck, however, pointed at the same time to his relative autonomy in defence mat-
ters. The Prime Minister supported him, but never took over business. That would have 
been difficult, since Bildt was the leader of a minority coalition government. That meant 
that he had his hands full with other politics.58 
Conscription under the centre-right government 
At first sight, one important issue had been dealt with only marginally: conscription. 
According to Anders Björck, one important reason was the Brännström-committee, the 
1992 inquiry on conscription, which started in 1991. ‘We should wait until we see his 
suggestions before we finally take a decision about this.’ And when asked if the com-
mittee acted in this way to wait and see which way the wind would blow, the former 
Minister of Defence admitted: ‘Yes.’59 
Yet, Björck had already taken decisions about the future of conscription, before the 
commission came with its report by the end of 1992. Shortly before Christmas 1991, the 
Minister of Defence decided to send home 2,500 conscripts who had been drafted for a 
short training period of five months to serve as guards for strategically important ob-
jects. According to the Minister, they had a very limited military use, because they 
could not handle the modern weapons the Swedish armed forces was about to get.60 
A second decision, which turned out to be very important for the future of conscrip-
tion in Sweden, was the change of the drafting criteria for conscripts. Already before the 
end of the inquiry, the centre-right government proposed in spring 1992, that only those 
conscripts should be drafted, who were necessary for the armed forces and peacetime 
readiness.61 The necessity of drafting only those needed was a by-product of the deci-
sion to reduce the number of army brigades from twenty-one to sixteen. Both policy 
changes, the downsizing of the armed forces and the modification of the basic conscrip-
tion paradigm that every able man had to serve were the important points of the 1992 
defence resolution with regard to the subject of this study. 
Where did the idea to draft only the required conscripts come from? Why had it 
been suggested at that moment, in spring 1992? There was still the 1991 inquiry com-
mittee on conscription, which was supposed to come up with a practical solution for the 
problems in the conscription system. Those problems had accumulated during the late 
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, due to less money in a shrinking organisation. 
The decision to put the surplus of young men in a so-called training’s reserve was 
closely connected to the wishes of the conservative Minister of Defence and Prime Min-
isterBildt to modernise the armed forces. Björck defended the reduction of the con-
scripts, though he admitted that the choice felt uncomfortable. According to the Minis-
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ter of Defence, the shrinking organisation made it necessary to let the need determine 
the number of young men drafted. However, this was in sharp contrast to the principle 
of general conscription. That did not have to be a problem, as the Minister stated: ‘By 
raising the physical and psychological demands for the conscripts, we can sort out those 
we do not need by objective criteria.’62 If the budget for conscription would decline 
even further, the Minister continued, the question of general conscription had to be 
openly discussed. 
The centre-right government knew that financing the modernisation of the armed 
forces could only been done at the expense of the size of the organisation and at the 
expense of the general conscription. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Sagrén, 
understood that. The Minister of Defence told his Commander-in-Chief, Gustafsson, 
when the latter for the last time tried to convince Björck of his plans: ‘I don’t have time, 
I already talked to other politicians that we do the 1992 changes’, which meant ‘leaner, 
but meaner’ with regard to general conscription.63 
In the autumn of 1992, another severe financial crisis hit the Swedish economy. To-
gether with the entire Swedish budget the plans for the renewal of the army came under 
pressure too. The crisis made clear that new remedies had to be found, like the renewal 
of the conscript system. It catalysed the downsizing process of the number of conscripts 
and the work of the inquiry about the total defence duty that had started almost a year 
before. 
8.6 1992 Inquiry on total defence duty  
The beginning 
On 6 May 1991, the social democratic Minister of Defence, Roine Carlsson, gave a di-
rective64 that initiated an inquiry about the basis of the personal duty for the Swedish 
total defence. At that time, different laws were regulating parts of the total defence duty, 
such as the 1940 military conscription law, the 1960 law on the civil defence duty, that 
stated that all citizens living in Sweden from 16 till 65 years should contribute to the 
civil defence, or the general duty law for everybody between 16 and 70. There was also 
the law regulating alternative duty for those who refused to carry weapons65. 
The inquiry was conducted by a committee composed of parliamentarians from dif-
ferent parties, experts from the military and societal relevant organisations, and legal 
experts from the ministry of Defence. Its mandate was to present a system that com-
bined all the different duties. The expectation was that this would strengthen the total 
defence and that the human resources could be better used (SOU 1992:139: 195). The 
concrete directives for the committee stated that it had to investigate, among other 
things: 
 
o How one law for the total defence duty could be made (p. 
195); 
o Very practical things like the maximum age to serve, the 
length of the training and the share of conscripts that should 
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be trained for a wartime posting in the military defence (p. 
196); 
o How conscripts in larger numbers could carry out tasks in 
support and service, mainly in food and supply; 
o The possibilities for the formation of a so-called direct re-
cruiting of the conscripts to the civil parts of the total defence 
(including the medicinal and associated parts).66  
 
One important reason for the inquiry can be found in the second point: the share of con-
scripts in the army. Already by the end of the 1980s, the armed forces had no possibility 
to recruit every young men of a year class. Due to financial cut-downs, the organisation 
was too small to provide everyone with a training position. That became already clear in 
the Commander-in-Chief’s analysis by the end of the 1980s. The 1992 duty inquiry had 
to find a solution on what to do with the surplus of recruits. The expectation was that in 
the 1990s the share of active serving young men would be reduced even further.67 
The committee met for the first time on 17 September 1991, under the lead of its 
chairman, the social democrat Roland Brännström. Since the social democrats were at 
that moment the largest party in Parliament, this position had been reserved to them. 
When the centre-right government of Bildt took office, on 4 October 1991, the conser-
vative Minister of Defence, Björck, changed neither the assignment nor the composition 
of the group68. According to the Minister, it was important to find a broad consensus on 
such an important question as conscription: ‘It would not have been politically possible 
to change the whole conscript system without the agreement, at least a tacit understand-
ing, of the Social Democrats.’69 
 
Name Party Other relevant function 
Roland Brännström Social Democrat Chairman, Member of Parliament 
Thomas Eneroth Social Democrat Social Democratic youth organisation 
Jan Jennehag Left Party (vänster) Member of Parliament 
Robert Jousma New Democrats 
(NyD) 
Member of Parliament 
Henrik Landerholm Conservatives (M) Member of Parliament 
Hans Lindblad Liberals Member of Parliament 
Sven-Olof Petersson Centre party Member of Parliament 
Tuve Skånberg Christian Democrats Member of Parliament 
Karin Wegestål Social Democrats Member of Parliament 
Bengt Andeberg Expert, military General major armed forces 
Ann-Louise Eksborg Expert, legal Director General legal affairs department MoD  
Björn Janson Expert, legal Legal director MoD 
Bo Riddarström  Expert Ministerial Council 
Hans Wehlin Expert, Crisis Director of department ÖCB 
Sven Rune Frid  Secretary of the committee 
Table 16: Members of the 1992 Pliktutredningen  
 
Due to the 1991 elections, there had been fluctuations in the Parliament composition. 
Yet, the Social Democrats kept their three posts in the commission. Those changes hap-
pened during the work of the commission. In Table 16 only the members, who signed 
the final report are mentioned plus the experts. 
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The contacts with different (semi) official authorities had been important for the 
work of the committee. The Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish armed forces pro-
jected a need of 35-37,000 conscripts a year. That official figure in the 1992 Defence 
Resolution was used as a base for the committee’s calculations. Taking into account an 
annual levy of approximately 50,000 young men, a growing surplus of conscripts was 
foreseeableFor the committee another figure became very interesting too: the dropouts. 
According to the official figures of the armed forces, 80% of a levy passed enrolment. 
Before the start of the training 5% of those dropped out, due to not clearly specified 
reasons. In the end, 75% started with the basic military training, of which 8% were leav-
ing during training70.  
In Table 17 the numbers and changes over the years are stated. 
 
 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91* 
Completely freed 3,4 4,0 4,5 5,7 6,1 
Total conscientious objector 0,5 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,9 
Applied for weapon free service 0,9 0,9 0,7 0,7 1,2 
Temporarily freed from service 3,0 3,2 3,5 3,9 4,3 
Other reasons 3,9 3,8 3,8 3,0 1,9 
Total not completing basic training 11,7 12,6 13,2 14,0 14,4 
Table 17: Percentage young men of all drafted not completing basic training, * 1990/91 preliminary 
figures 
 
Especially the number of young men completely released from basic military training 
increased over the years. There have been several reasons for that e.g. health reasons, 
economical problems, or disappointment about the military training as such, because it 
did not comply with expectations. There is also reason to believe that the enrolment had 
been used to filter the surplus of a levy. By raising the medical and psychological de-
mands, the enrolment board had been able to fulfil political directives.71 The amount of 
dropouts of 14% meant that even fewer people would fulfil their military duty. This fact 
contributed in this way to the growing inequality between those who serve and those 
who do not serve. 
The Results 
On 16 December 1992, the committee ended its work with an official report, the state’s 
public inquiry 1992:139.72 In this SOU, the committee concluded that a military attack 
still would be the greatest threat to national security – regardless of the direction from 
which it would come – and that it remained the main point of departure for the Swedish 
total defence. The total defence’s civil part contained of three main tasks, including the 
protection of the civil population against the consequences of acts of war. 
The system had to be adapted, especially the personnel and recruitment system, 
which indeed presented the main focus of that inquiry. The main conclusion of the 
committee’s inquiry can be summarised in one sentence: ‘the need shall steer’. 73 The 
inquiry proposed to accept what already had been fact and law (remember, the relevant 
law had already been approved in 1991). There were not enough training postings for 
everybody of a year’s class in the wartime organisation. Though the principles for the 
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total defence stayed unchanged, not everybody had to fulfil the actual training. All citi-
zens between 16 and 70 years old still should be involved in the total defence, all Swed-
ish men between 18 an 47 years old still should be obliged to fulfil the military service, 
and the possibility to fulfil an alternative, weapon-free service had been mentioned. The 
surplus of men, however, for which no trainings or wartime postings would exist, 
should be placed in a so-called trainings reserve. The selection would take place at the 
recruiting office. The recruits should stay in the training’s reserve until they were 30 
years old. The reserve should be used as a pool for the civil and military authorities to 
enlarge or complete units and to give authorities, companies, and organisations the pos-
sibility to have certain employees appointed as so called key-persons. The advantage of 
that reserve would be that everybody in it had been enrolled and tested, so that their 
abilities were known. Due to that, suitable persons could be recruited and trained in case 
of an (military) emergency within short time.  
Another important point in the report was the calculation for the future need of mili-
tary and civil personnel. A yearly average need of 12,000 persons, of whom 8,500 
should be trained during peacetime, was expected by the inquiry.74 The aim was to have 
250,000 persons trained eventually for civil defence. The inquiry committee expected 
that every year between 5,000 and 9,000 young men would join the training reserve.  
 
Type 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1. Personnel       
o 18 year old men 49 48 46 48 49 47 
o Naturalised men between 18-24 
years 
+ 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 
o Men who are not enrolled - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 
o Men who leave during or after en-
rolment but before active duty  
- 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 
o Recruited women + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 
       
Sum influx 48 48 47 50 52 51 
       
2. Need of draftees with examination       
o Civil defence 4 4 6 6 8 8 
o Military defence 37 36 36 36 35 35 
       
Sum need 41 40 42 42 43 43 
       
3. Training’s reserve       
o Drafted (difference between 1. and 
2.) 
7 8 5 8 9 8 
o Leavers from military training + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 
o Drafted for civil defence - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 
       
4. Training’s reserve (accumulated) 6 13 17 24 32 39 
       
Table 18: Personnel inflow and need of duty personnel in the total defence for the years 1994-99 (x-
1000; source: SOU:139: 136) 
 
The Swedish Commander-in-Chief expected a need of 35,000 to 37,000 draftees a year, 
as was stated in the official Defence Resolution 199275. In this figure the so-called 
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dropouts - young men leaving due to medical, social, and/or mental reasons, between 
the enrolment and the end of active duty – were included. This personnel was needed 
for the sixteen brigades and sixteen squadrons of the air forces. For the army it was ex-
pected that 160,000 draftees were needed between 1991 and 1997. The committee ex-
pected a real average need per year of around 30,000 conscripts for the 1990s.76It al-
ready excluded the possible dropouts. In Table 18, those figures are listed in an over-
view. 
The estimated figures above relate to the demographical data. The number of 18 
years old Swedish men, who had to be enrolled/inspected - the enrolment age would be 
kept at 18 - varied between 50,000 and 55,000 in the period from 1986 till 1991. The 
expectations were that after a low in 1994 (48,000) and 1996 (46,000), the numbers 
would increase again up to 55,000 in 2006. 
It is interesting to note that the SOU 1992:139 was one of the few, maybe the first 
official, public inquiries that had been delivered without a law proposal. That, however, 
had apparently no political reason77. Yet, it led to two follow-up reports, SOU 1993:36 
and SOU 1993:101, that were written solely by legal experts and that were concerned 
only with the conversion of the political SOU 1992:139 into a total defence law pro-
posal. 
The members of the committee acknowledged that there had been a lot of common 
ground and a good cooperation across all parties. This was not in the least due to two 
very experienced members on the subject, but also in the parliamentary work: the 
chairman, Brännström, and the liberal H. Lindblad. They had both been representing 
two opposing blocks. The social democrat Brännström had been a supporter of con-
scription, whereas the liberal Lindblad had been more sceptical about it. As T. Eneroth, 
member of the committee, remembered, ‘their way to function together was very impor-
tant, because it made it possible that things we agreed on in the committee were also 
possible to make up in the Parliament.’78 In this sense, the inquiry fitted the search for 
broad consensus in Swedish defence policymaking. 
A long goodbye to the Cold War 
While the core of the paradigm of Swedish defence remained the same in the first pe-
riod after the Cold War until 1994, i.e. defend the nation against an invasion, two re-
markable developments took shape during that same period. On the one hand, a large 
modernisation of the invasion forces by the bourgeois government at the beginning of 
the 1990s. On the other hand, a reduction of the armed forces and the army from 21 (29) 
brigades to 16 and a decline of conscripts from 45,600 in 1988, resembling 81% of the 
levy79, to 37,330 for the period 1993/94, 63% of the levy.80 
The centre-right government of the first half of the 1990s had been the first in 
twenty years that had the intention to raise the defence budget. Before a second finan-
cial crisis hit Sweden in the autumn of 1992, but also shortly before leaving office in 
autumn 1994, the Minister of Defence indeed purchased material mainly suited for terri-
torial invasion armed forces, i.e., tanks and fighter planes. The conservatives in the be-
ginning of the 1990s finally saw the chance to realise their defence policy of the 1980s. 
It was easy therefore to choose between size and equipment to finance that policy. In 
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this sense, the political choices contributed deliberately to the conservation of the para-
digm and the structure of Swedish defence policy. 
At the same time, these political choices contributed to a shift of the paradigm of 
conscription. The inquiry on conscription, initiated by the social democratic Minister of 
Defence, Roine Carlsson, an outspoken defender of conscription, changed the organisa-
tion of conscription by merging different duties. It contributed to the rationalisation of 
the drafting process. The conservative Minister of Defence, Björck, initiated that only 
those needed should be drafted, which actually codified developments already started in 
the 1980s. Both the Minister of Defence and the Junior Minister, Sahlin, had concen-
trated on material. To them the commission served as a tool to keep the issue off the 
agenda. 
Almost all actors, the political leaders and the military ones, the politically rather 
weak Commander-in-Chief, Gustafsson, and the influential Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army, Sagrén, pretended that the paradigm of having a people’s defence had not been 
changed. On a closer look, it seems that in fact that was not the case and the following 
had happened. The acknowledgement that there would be no training posting for every-
one, neither in the military nor in the civil defence, together with the choice not to allo-
cate the financial resources to that aim, contributed to the erosion of the paradigm of 
having a people’s defence with a general conscription.  
In years to come, up to the moment this study is finishing, the social democratic 
government’s policy plans to uphold conscription as a part of the anchoring of the 
armed forces in society, turned out to be an impossible job. They tried to renovate and 
embellish a building, when the fundaments had already been eroded by the political 
choices and the military interventions of the beginning of the 1990s. 
8.7 The social democratic return to power 
The 1994 national elections brought the social democrats back into government. During 
the election’s campaign, defence had been an important issue. The oppositional social 
democrats announced to save 1 billion crowns a year on the defence budget, in case of 
victory. To them every sector had to save money after the two financial crises in 
1989/90 and again in 1992, so why not defence too. The people’s party even tried to top 
that amount with additional annual savings of 9 billion crowns. It would have been al-
most 25% of the yearly 40 billion defence budget!81 
Those far-reaching plans provoked an open letter of the Minister of Defence Björck 
in which he outlined a threat scenario in case of further savings: Sweden was to become 
a member of the NATO.82 The social democratic leader, Ingvar Carlsson, swept this 
away as rubbish and pointed to the upcoming EU membership.83 In the end the social 
democrats won the elections and they continued as a minority government with a full 
agenda: making a good start as a member of the EU by the 1st January 1995, consolidat-
ing the state’s finances, and reducing the defence organisation. 
What follows is the story of defence policy planning in the second half of the 1990s, 
which heralded the definite end of the Cold War for Sweden. It is also about the diffi-
cult relation between the social democratic Minister, Thage G. Peterson, and the new 
Commander-in-Chief, General Owe Wiktorin, who came into office by the 1st of July 
1994. This relationship can best be described as a clash of generations: the traditional 
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social democrat believing in a defence embedded within society, and the air force com-
missioned officer, a fighter pilot, who saw it as his task to lift the armed forces from a 
territorial defence to flexible armed forces equipped with advanced devices.  
The new Minister of Defence 
One of the first public appearances of the Minister of Defence, Thage G. Peterson, led 
not only to a public conflict with the Commander-in-Chief about the choice between 
new weapon purchases and conscription, but also to the comment of an observer that the 
new Minister of Defence really had to learn about economics.84 Commander-in-Chief 
Wiktorin proposed to the Minister to call up 10,000 conscripts less, in order to finance 
reductions of 5,7 billion crowns for 1995 and 1996. By not calling up new personnel, 
stopping the refresher training, stopping building projects, and cancelling a big exercise 
in 1995, defence could save 1,7 billion of that sum. The reaction of the Minister, via the 
media, was: ‘Out of the question. Basic training and conscription are so central - even 
an ideological question - that this is out of the question. Eventually we can save the 
money at the cost of material purchases’.85 
Defence had to cut down its budget with almost 10% of the annual budget after fi-
nancial crises and devaluation of the crown. Military equipment bought abroad became 
much more expensive and homemade weapons, like the JAS-fighter and the missile 
system Bamse, turned out to be more expensive too. In addition, defence had to cut an-
other 1,8 billion crowns, as demanded by the Minister of Finance.86  
During the next two years it became obvious that the Minister of Defence and the 
Commander-in-Chief had opposite concepts about the future of conscription. Minister 
Thage G. Peterson was a traditional social democrat, for whom conscription was insepa-
rably connected to society. Considering his public statements, not at least in the defence 
resolution, he saw himself as a defender of conscription. The Minister even wanted a 
mini conscription of twelve weeks, as he stated at the annual conference of ‘Folk och 
Försvar’87, which immediately provoked the reaction of the Commander-in-Chief at the 
same conference: ‘Out of the question’.88 
Thage G. Peterson distrusted the military and he maintained traditional social de-
mocratic views on defence policy. In his memoirs, he presented himself as the first Min-
ister of Defence to refuse to pay for the military’s miscalculations.89 He had conflicts 
with the Commander-in-Chief about women in the army, the voluntary organisations, 
and the three-month short-term training.90 The Minister was a supporter of everything 
that served the people’s will to defend the country. Raising the number of those fulfill-
ing civil duty would be another important example of this concept obviously supported 
by Prime Minister Göran Persson.91 Thage G. Peterson also maintained his close rela-
tion with the conservatives and the media, who were critical to social democratic de-
fence and security policy, against the Commander-in-Chief.92 Still, he and Commander-
in-Chief Wiktorin managed to present a defence resolution 1997-2001. 
The Minister of Defence wrote in his memoirs, that the presentation of the defence 
resolution was more important to him than to have the Commander-in-Chief replaced.93 
The Commander-in-Chief said that he shared the government’s ideas about the restruc-
turing of the armed forces, though they were half-hearted. In his opinion he repeatedly 
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criticised the government’s financial choices, but he never dared to cross the boundaries 
of political loyalty.94  
Thage G. Peterson presented the upcoming Defence Resolution 1997-2001 in two 
phases. It was a new way of making the Defence White Paper for a new period. In the 
autumn of 1995, Peterson presented proposition 1995/96:12, which outlined the princi-
ples for the security and defence policy, the total defence objectives and the structural 
and economical scope of the defence system. It was passed on 6 December 1995. The 
second part, the proposition 1996/97:4, had been presented by the autumn of 1996 and 
debated by Parliament in November and December of that same year. It concentrated 
more on the role and content of defence: the principles of total defence and the anchor-
ing of the armed forces in society. They marked the definitive end of the five-year plan-
ning, since they comprehended a shorter planning period in order to be able to adapt 
quicker to international security changes and implicitly to national economics. It is im-
portant to note that both resolutions had been worked out in close cooperation with the 
Centre Party, which was necessary for the minority social democratic government. 
The new security definition 
The 1995 proposition had been very important for the new security definition of Swe-
den. In his introduction, Thage G. Peterson wrote that the old threat against the security 
of the country had disappeared or reduced. The 1995 proposition is the first total de-
fence proposition and a broad security concept, reaching from non-military threats or 
risks up to armed attacks, to steer the total defence tasks. The ability to change the cir-
cumstances of the security policy would be a basic demand for the total defence. The 
promotion of international peace and humanitarian tasks would remain a regular task for 
the total defence. 
In his security analysis, the Minister pointed to the fact that - with the end of the 
Cold War - the danger of Sweden being dragged in a war between the super powers had 
drastically decreased. ‘An armed attack against Sweden not connected to a war of great 
powers is unlikely. This formed always a point of departure for the Swedish defence 
planning.’95 The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the regained free-
dom of the Baltic States, and the re-unification of Germany created good conditions for 
a broad cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Sweden’s neutrality still preserved one 
important issue, which clearly influenced the defence: ‘Sweden’s non-participation in 
military alliances with the aim of making it possible for our country to be neutral in the 
event of a war in our vicinity remains unchanged. Through our non-participation and by 
maintaining an adequate defence system, Sweden will continue to contribute to the se-
curity and stability in the area around the Baltic Sea and in Northern Europe.’96 Yet, 
although there were many positive developments, some old risks remained and new 
ones were looming at the horizon, such as regional conflicts, environmental damage, 
and the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.97 
In short, those changes in the Swedish security environment made it possible to re-
duce the budget tremendously. The proposition, 1996/97:4 renewed the 1995 parliamen-
tary decision of a 10% annual saving of SEK 4 billion (4,000,000,000), which should be 
reached by 2001. The Minister gave two reasons for that large cut-down: the change of 
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the security situation and ‘the not unreasonable demand that defence costs should be 
subject to the same stringent scrutiny as other social expenditure.’98  
Total defence redefined 
The renewal of Sweden’s defence stood for a redefinition of the concept of total de-
fence. Instead of the four different defence forms, i.e. military, civil, economic, and 
psychological defence, four governing principals became more important. Those gov-
erning principles were: adaptability, a unified view, internationalisation, and a democ-
ratic defence. This section will describe the first three governing principles. The govern-
ing principle of democratic defence, which concerns conscription, will be described in 
the next part at greater length. 
The principle of adaptability entailed the end of the territorial defence. In a bi-polar 
world with the threat of an attack on Sweden, the old concept foresaw huge territorial 
forces with 29 brigades all over the country. The new concept on the other hand was 
more suited to the ill-defined threats of the future. The total defence system should be 
able to adapt to changing threats. In the long term, it might be necessary to counter an 
armed attack. That would mean that within a reasonable time, one year, a territorial de-
fence could be back. In the short term, the government wanted the total defence forces 
to: 
 
o ‘Maintain [Sweden’s] territorial integrity; 
o Be able to deal with the consequences of crises and conflicts in 
[Sweden’s] immediate vicinity; 
o Take part in international peace support and humanitarian opera-
tions; […] 
o Strengthen [Sweden’s] ability to cope with severe emergency 
situations in peacetime.’99 
 
To be able to fulfil those tasks, good information would be needed, which meant in-
vestment in intelligence. Another important factor for guaranteeing a quick adaptability 
would be to have qualified personnel at hand. For this reason the government intended 
300 fulltime officers to be employed, ‘over and above the immediate requirements of 
the war organisation.’100 
With the 1996 defence resolution, Sweden broadened its definition of security, as is 
expressed in the governing principle ‘unified view’. Additional to classical military 
threats came new non-military threats, ranging among other things from radioactive 
fallout, to serious attacks on radio and TV stations and severe epidemics and terror-
ism.101 An implication of these broadening threats to Sweden’s security was the expan-
sion of the tasks of the total defence, so that they would be able to support peacetime 
society. 
Though Sweden had a long history in peacekeeping operations, the 1996 defence 
resolution saw the broadening and deepening of the activities as an important principle. 
Sweden should be able to participate in a broad range of operations, from ‘providing 
armed personnel for peace support operations to civil and relief missions to strengthen 
local competence for reconstruction work after conflict.’102 Therefore, the resolution 
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foresaw a broad range of activities to prepare the total defence forces. Intended meas-
ures were, among others:  
 
o Creation of a rapid reaction force, 
o Improvement of Sweden’s preparedness to participate in interna-
tional humanitarian operations, by extending and intensifying 
PfP cooperation. […]103  
 
In the next part the fourth governing principle, which actually stood in third position of 
the proposal, will be presented in depth: the democratic defence. It is central to the 
study since these had been the plans of the social democratic Minister of Defence for 
the future of conscription.  
Conscription conserved? 
Thage G. Peterson emphasised that the government would preserve a democratic peo-
ple’s defence. ‘We will never accept that our conscript defence will be replaced by a 
professional army. Therefore the government will try to prevent a development, where 
fewer and fewer conscripts fulfil their basic training, bearing the risk that this leads to a 
professional army.’104 It was very important to him that the Swedish population would 
feel responsible for and able to defend their country. He was convinced that this would 
be best achieved with a defence based on national service. Important arguments were 
the size of the country, which needed a large defence; the diversity of recruits, providing 
the organisation with a broad range of knowledge and experience; and that conscription 
satisfied the deep rooted defence principle in the people. ‘A professional army cannot 
create the will to resist and the strength that a national defence system requires.’ 105 
To that end, the Minister planned 30,000 recruits a year to be trained in the military 
defence and 10,000 in the civilian defence. Yet, he admitted that in recent years this 
figure had never been reached and that the armed forces reported a requirement of 
28,800. He also was aware that due to a reorganisation of the defence system, the num-
bers in 1998 and 1999 would be temporarily reduced. Again, the idea of a three-month 
training for the home guard, should be introduced, by way of experiment. The resolu-
tion foresaw that about 10,000 young people should be placed in the civil defence, of 
which the number trained would be increased to 5,000 a year over the next four years. 
One central issue had been the economical circumstances of the recruits. Already 
between 1993 and 1995, regular protests by the conscripts’ organisations had pointed to 
the bad financial situation of the conscripts, the growing number of dropouts, and the 
abuse of conscripts as grey labour.106 This might be the reason for the announcement 
that the benefits of those who served would be improved. The demobilisation allow-
ance, already raised by 715 crowns in 1993, would rise with another 500 crowns to 
4,500 from 1 January 1997. The housing supplement was increased by 100 crowns per 
month. The government also proposed immaterial benefits, such as easier access to a 
university place or the recognition of the basic training for civilian qualifications.  
Three other items had been explicitly named in the proposition. Firstly, the role of 
voluntary organisations: 24 in number ranging from soup kitchens to a female military 
drivers organisation, which were all exempt from the government’s cutbacks. Secondly, 
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the home guard and increased security patrol had been named. The government wanted 
to revitalise the home guard and aimed at 125,000 people, which explains the short 
training trial of three months. The security patrolling should consist of conscripts who 
have fulfilled their duty, assisting the police’s reserve when necessary. The government 
aimed at 40,000 people in special platoons and 15,000 in police reserve. Thirdly, the 
government wanted to increase the number of women in the armed forces. 
The plans and figures in the defence resolution showed how seriously the defence 
Minister took conscription and the people’s will to defend the country. He not only 
searched for ways to raise the number of those who fulfilled the duty, whether or not in 
the military, he even had been aware of the necessity to compensate those who were 
drafted. To the Minister conscription was the historical and uniting element in Sweden’s 
democracy.107 It is difficult to translate the Swedish prices of 1997 to recent figures. 
However, an increase of the allowance in that order has to be considered special. 
Throughout the ages, draft never aimed at making draftees rich. Quite the opposite had 
been the case. Those who were obliged to serve the country had been granted only hous-
ing and food as an allowance. Every additional handout had been nothing more than a 
small amount enabling draftees to buy some extras not provided by the state.  
It was difficult to bring the policy plans for conscription, which the social democ-
ratic Minister had presented in his defence resolution, into reality. The number of mili-
tary conscripts and those who fulfilled civic duty, one of the central points of the 1992 
investigation, dropped even further. By 1997, the year the 1996 defence resolution came 
into effect, only 25,651 young men had been drafted for active military duty. 1,574 
young men joined the civil duty and almost 14,000 young men were allotted to the 
training’s reserve, but were in fact never to be drafted for any service at all. The num-
bers of active serving men declined further, as did the size of the armed forces. In years 
to come, it would turn out that sixteen brigades did not represent the bottom line. 
8.8 Major military reforms put pressure on conscription 
In 1997 Von Sydow took office as Minister of Defence. During his term from 1997 to 
2002, the Swedish armed forces made the definite transition from the mass army of the 
Cold War to small, flexible and versatile forces. Those changes had implications for 
conscription: fewer men were needed for fewer units. One of the effects had been an-
other inquiry on the total defence duty. In the following sections, the Minister’s plans 
for the future armed forces will be presented in depth, starting with Von Sydow’s rele-
vant ideas about conscription.  
In the beginning of his term, it seemed that the Minister did not show much interest 
in the conscript system, which became obvious when he declined to address the con-
scripts at the annual conscripts’ council meeting. Traditionally the Minister and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces would address the representatives of the con-
scripted soldiers, announcing policy plans for the future or referring to problems of the 
conscripts. In March 1997 the new Minister did not want to appear at the congress at all. 
After being criticised by the conscripts and the Commander-in-Chief, Von Sydow did 
show up to talk to the conscripts personally, he mingled and talked to the newly chosen 
members of the conscript council.108 
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Until the summer, the Minister of Defence did not noticeably give his opinion about 
conscription. The ‘Riksrevisonsverket’ (Swedish National Audit Office – RRV), how-
ever, did. On 9 June 1997 it published its report about the financial consequences of 
current conscription practices of the period 1990-1996 and how they might be improved 
in the future.109 Important conclusions were: 
 
o There was a considerable and growing surplus of conscripts: 27% 
in 1990/91 compared to 38% in 1994/95; 
o There was the risk that the best suited would not be drafted, be-
cause they were placed by chance in the training’s reserve after 
their enrolment; 
o 11% of the conscripts had not been trained for wartime posting 
but fulfilled so-called support duties.110 
 
If the right measures would be taken, like rationalisations and only drafting the person-
nel needed, defence might save up to 2,4 billion crowns a year.111 
The report of the RRV was an important trigger for the Minister of Defence to insti-
gate a revision into the system. Another inquiry into the total defence duty should bring 
resolve. Beside the financial effects, this inquiry could also investigate social conse-
quences of conscription, such as the constant high number of dropouts, almost 13% in 
1995,112 and conscription for women. Before the committee started its work in March 
1998, financial problems in the defence budget loomed on the horizon, and they would 
influence the agenda of the inquiry throughout the years. 
The defence budget crisis  
In the beginning of December 1997 a financial crisis in the defence budget had been 
brought to light.113 For quite some time - weeks and months - rumours had been spread-
ing, but there had been no confirmation. The alarming figures, a gap of 2 billion crowns 
for the 1998 budget and an overall shortage of 13 billion crowns until 2002, had been 
adduced by the opposing moderate party during a debate of the Swedish Parliament on 
5 December about the forthcoming budget. The conservative defence expert, Henrik 
Landerholm, blamed the government that already four months after the social democrats 
and centre party decided on the 1996 defence resolution, the Commander-in-Chief had 
reported a deficit of 300-500 million crowns. Now, the oppositional politician contin-
ued, the debt would probably increase to 13 billion until 2002. He accused the govern-
ment of delaying the issue until the 1998 elections would be over.114 
Landerholm was not the only Member of Parliament referring to the financial gap. 
Overall, the debate concentrated on the forthcoming defence budget, though Lennart 
Rohdin from the people’s party talked about a scandal and he repeatedly summoned the 
Minister to talk about the subject.115 Von Sydow refused to talk about the issue, how-
ever, arguing that he had not spoken to the Commander-in-Chief and therefore he did 
not know what the Commander-in-Chief had to say about the issue.116 Table 19 gives a 
chronological overview of the crisis having its climax in spring 1998. We shall describe 





March 1997 Commander-in-Chief hands in document for the budget planning report-
ing a gap of 300-500 million crowns a year (± 1,25%)117 
August 1997 On government’s demand armed forces give reason for deficit 
11 September 1997 Defence budget proposition (within regular budget cycle, yet, with com-
plement skrv. 1997/98:4), states that the government finds circumstances 
striking and serious118 
25 September 1997 Minister of Defence orders to start the second inquiry on total defence 
duty of the 1990s. The ‘1998 års pliktutredning’, should investigate the: 
enrolment system, postponement rules, training’s reserve, duration of the 
different trainings, female conscription, resignation/dropouts, training’s 
merits and disciplinary system. On 17 June 1998 and 4 November 1999 
additional directives. 
8 October 1997 Commander-in-Chief gives presentation to Minister announcing a total 
deficit of 9,9 billion crowns over the planning’s period 1997-2001119  
21 October 1997 Defence committee gets the information that the deficit might be 9,9 
billion crowns 
20 November 1997 Budget proposal in defence committee. Government decides to abort 
purchase of the asset control system Sirius. At the moment of decision, 
the exact amount of deficit had not been known, according to the gov-
ernment120 
5 December 1997  Debate in Parliament, in which opposition states deficit 13 billion 
crowns over the 1997-2001 period. Minister declines demands for debate 
about the problems, since he had not talked to the Commander-in-Chief 
about the problem at that moment. 
The budget proposition is accepted though there are doubts 
10 December 1997 Minister of Defence demands from Commander-in-Chief a report about 
the reasons for the deficit  
11 December 1997 Prime Minister publicly expresses his confidence for Commander-in-
Chief121  
12 December 1997 Commander-in-Chief hands over report: 10,6 billion crowns deficit. 
Reasons: further demands for reduction by government and Parliament 
and a miscalculation by the armed forces about needed resources. For 
the time being, the positions of the chiefs of army and air force had not 
been under discussion.122 
17 December 1997 Signs are pointing to the fact that the positions of the chiefs of army, air 
force, and navy will be abrogated [there were plans about a reorganisa-
tion before the crisis, but both subjects had been regularly connected to 
each other in the media] 
18 December 1997 Minister of Defence gives order to Commander-in-Chief to come up 
with a plan how to save conscription by introducing shorter training. 
Minister sees growing training’s reserve as danger for duty system. 
Minister gives also order to come up with plan for restructuring the HQ 
command structure.123 Possibility, that the posts of the chiefs of army, 
navy, and air force will be transformed to inspector generals.124 
15 January 1998 Commander-in-Chief presents plans. Among others: short training for 
3,000 recruits (4,5 months instead of 7,5); premature demobilisation of 
those actually in training125  
19 January 1998 Disagreement within the armed forces leadership about plans. Com-
mander-in-Chief wants shorter training, but chief of the army wants a 
total stop for 5,000 conscripts.126  
2 February 1998 Re-structuring of the armed forces will become fact by 2001. Com-
mander-in-Chief gains more power, since the commanders in chief of 
army, navy, and air force will become inspectors general. The persons 
holding that posting at that moment, however, would retire or become 
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regional commanders.127 
4 February 1998 Defence commission of ministry of defence presents (partly) reports 
about security in a changed environment (Ds 1998:9) 
16 February 1998  Commander-in-Chief presents plans to government. Among other 
things: 3,650 conscripts less a year, shorter training128 
26 February 1998 Government doubts that the plans of Commander-in-Chief are realistic. 
Minister of Defence increase pressure by asking 12 concrete questions 
about the financial effects. Wants the answers within four days: Sunday 
1 March 1998, 14h00.129 
19 March 1998 The government comes with proposition 1997/98:84, signed by Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence, blaming the armed forces for the 
deficit. Proposal foresees reductions in material of 1,2 billion crowns 
and in organisation and basic training 900 million. 3700 less conscripts 
shall be drafted a year, which would bring the total to 17300.130 
Commander-in-Chief finds the proposition ‘insulting and offensive’ for 
the armed forces.131 
17 April 1998 Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence interrogated by the con-
stitutional committee132 
7 May 1998 Defence committee debates Proposition 1997/98:84. All motions from 
opposition rejected by social democrats and centre party (?)  
27 May 1998 Parliamentary debate  
Table 19: Chronology of defence budget crisis 1997/98 and other relevant policy issues, different 
sources (see footnotes table) 
On 10 December 1997 the Commander-in-Chief had been called to the Minister of De-
fence to explain the deficit in the defence budget of more than 5%. The central question 
to analysts and parliamentarians was: who is responsible, who is to blame?133 Analysts 
were quick with their conclusion. There was a trend in the forces to calculate costs 
lower than they actually turned out to be. They admitted that it was always a problem to 
foresee exchange rates and price indices in a five-year plan, but the main responsibility 
rested with the government. The politicians were responsible for the budget control of 
defence, but also for the purchase of new weapon systems, which repeatedly turned out 
to be expensive, like the JAS-fighter.134 This is why several defence politicians de-
manded to further reduce the armed forces or the JAS-fighter project had to be slimmed 
down.135 
Two days later, the Commander-in-Chief handed over the report about this record 
deficit in the defence budget to the Minister of Defence. While the Minister of Defence 
said that at that moment it was not obvious who was responsible for that, the Prime 
Minister, Göran Persson, declared his confidence in the Commander-in-Chief. Like the 
Commander-in-Chief, the position of the Army and Navy Commanders-in-Chief had 
not been discussed so far.136 
Crisis resolution: trading off on conscription  
It took another week until the Minister came with a rescue plan: shortening the training 
time for conscripts. Von Sydow intended to achieve two goals: save money and save 
conscription. He gave the directive to the Commander-in-Chief to investigate the possi-
bilities and to come up with a solution within three months.137 At the same time, the 
Minister of Defence was careful not to sacrifice conscription entirely. Quite the oppo-
site: the Minister wanted to avoid further reductions of conscripts every year. To him 
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especially the so-called training’s reserve endangered the quality of the conscripts and 
the conscript system in general138: ‘The growing training’s reserve is a danger for our 
duty system. It is therefore important to me that this procedure will be investigated.’139 
Two days later the Minister even deepened the subject, when emphasising in the spirit 
of his predecessor, Thage G. Peterson, as one analyst observed, that ‘[i]t is a mistake 
that one demands a long duty fulfilment from one part, but zero from others who would 
also be suited.’140 The search for a solution continued. 
In the beginning of 1998 Commander-in-Chief Wiktorin presented his plans to solve 
the financial crisis. Among other things, he planned that 3,000 conscripts should fulfil a 
short-term duty of 4,5 months instead of the minimal 7,5. Those who were to be drafted 
in the near future could leave earlier. The training in qualified units, i.e. the expensive 
training in mechanised units, should be cut down.141 These plans became more concrete 
by mid February 1998. To save 10,6 billion crowns during the budget years 1998 until 
2001, the armed forces should: 
 
o Draft 3,650 conscripts fewer a year; 
o Shorten the training time for those who are drafted: two weeks 
for army and air force, four weeks in coastal artillery, and seven 
weeks in the navy;  
o Dismiss 600 professional officers and 40 civil employees; 
o Lower the war units’ readiness; 
o Prolong the build-up time to full capacity in case of threat to 1-2 
years for many units; 
o […] 
o Reduce the training in the home guard by 30%; […]142 
 
In addition, the Commander-in-Chief demanded publicly a new defence resolution, be-
cause the last one from 1996 had been completely outdated.143 
Von Sydow doubted the effects of the plans of the Commander-in-Chief and raised 
twelve concrete questions about expected results. One important reason for that had 
been the government’s concern about the consequences for the defence readiness of the 
conscripts. This answer had to be delivered by the Commander-in-Chief within four 
days: on Sunday 1 March 1998, 14h00.144  
Three weeks later, the government delivered its own reconstruction of and resolve 
for the crisis, the proposition 1997/98:84. In its reconstruction of events, the govern-
ment argued that a large part of responsibility for the crisis lay with the armed forces 
themselves. The government pointed to the ambiguity of the military’s documents. On 
the one hand, the military had stated that the mistakes in their first calculations had led 
to a financial crisis anyway, even without the changes made by government and Parlia-
ment in the armed forces proposal, FMP 97.145 On the other hand, the government was 
referring to the same armed forces document of 12 December 1997, in which the Com-
mander-in-Chief stated that the financial risk taking of his proposal for the planning’s 
period 1997-2001, the FMP 97, had grown due to the parliamentary defence resolution 
96. 
The government, instead, claimed that its decision, based on the FMP 97, had been 
financially balanced and repeated that the armed forces themselves admitted that the 
changes between FMP 97 and the definite resolution, which had been decided upon by 
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Parliament and government, had no influence on the imbalance.146 Instead, the govern-
ment stated:  
 
‘In the state’s budget process the government has to rely on the fact 
that the documents of the authorities are correct and carefully con-
trolled by those authorities. This holds also true for the armed forces, 
although their activities differ from the rest of the state’s administra-
tion in size and complexity. It has now become obvious that the 
armed force’s document for the defence resolution 96, the FMP 97, 
did not meet that demand. Instead, the plan contained an imbalance 
between the planned activities and the financial resources the Par-
liament had decided upon earlier. The government considers this as 
very serious.’147 
 
The government proposed several measures. It would exercise more stringent account-
ant control for certain construction projects than it had done in the past. The armed 
forces needed the government’s approval for projects over 10 million crowns instead of 
20 million.148 The government also wanted to reduce procurement, saving 1,2 billion 
crowns for the year 1998, with an outlook on further reductions and even the eventual 
stop of the development of rocket and other systems.149 In addition, the reductions in the 
organisation and basic training should provide 900 million crowns. 
In the 1996 proposition that led to the defence resolution 96 and that stated that 
25,000 young men should be drafted, the government had already announced that 4,000 
conscripts a year less might be drafted. Due to the crisis, the government proposed in 
the proposition 1997/98:84 that for the training’s year 1998/99 only 17,300 men should 
be drafted, a further reduction of 3,700 conscripts, thereby following the armed forces 
proposal. In its proposal, the government underscored that conscription was of great 
importance for the individual citizen and society as a whole. ‘The duty anchors and con-
tributes to defence in society and it gives the individual citizen the possibility to con-
tribute to the defence of his country.’150 The abilities of the duty personnel comprise a 
broad variety of the abilities of society and they contribute to the broad knowledge and 
experience in society.  
In a first reaction, the Commander-in-Chief, Wiktorin, said on national television 
that the proposition of the government was ‘insulting and offensive’ for the armed 
forces.151 He found the criticism of the government without nuance, unjust, and too 
hard-hearted. According to Swedish television, Wiktorin had been enraged, because the 
government did not follow his advice to cut on the home guard, but instead tried to save 
40 million crowns at the expense of the air forces. The Commander-in-Chief remem-
bered five years later only a disagreement between him and Von Sydow about the ambi-
tion level between quality and quantity.152  
The issue was so serious that it was debated in the constitutional committee of the 
Swedish Parliament. On 17 April 1998 the Commander-in-Chief, General Wiktorin, his 
chief of the planning staff, Admiral Torsten Lindh, and later that day the Minister of 
Defence, Von Sydow, appeared before this important parliamentary committee. Its task 
was, among other things, to scrutinise the work of the government and its ministers. 
The Commander-in-Chief and the chief of the planning staff gave different reasons 
for the financial problems. The armed forces had always been accustomed to calculating 
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with some unforeseen developments, yet it had been difficult to foresee the effects of 
rationalisations, which became necessary to save 2,8 billion crowns in the budget. As 
soon as the armed forces found out that there was a deficit of 300-500 million crowns, 
in March 1997, they reported it to the government. Another reason for the deficit was 
that the government had changed the rules for accounting interest and amortisation of 
loans during the budget period. According to the military, another reason was caused by 
the political demands for the defence resolution that differed from the military’s plan-
ning. Especially the continuation and closing of garrison places differed. Another reason 
mentioned by the military was the uncertainty about the level of interest rates. With 
200-250 million crowns a year in interest payments, the slightest change in rate could 
cost tens of millions of crowns, which was unforeseeable.153 
Like the military, the Minister of Defence started his appearance at the committee 
with an overview of the events. This overview resembled largely the government’s re-
construction of the crisis, proposition 1997/98:74, which had been referred to previously 
in this study. Afterwards, the Minister had been sharply interrogated, especially by the 
former Minister of Defence, the conservative Björck. Two questions were central: con-
trol of the military and political responsibility. Von Sydow explained that during the 
crisis the relations and the control of the military had been good on all administrative 
levels. The Minister had confidence in the Commander-in-Chief and he was satisfied 
with the information he received from him. To Von Sydow it had been obvious that the 
whole government had taken responsibility for the result of the crisis. Asked by Björck 
what his personal responsibility had been, the Minister of Defence answered: ‘My re-
sponsibility is that I worked within the government to decide on the aim to solve the 
problem that hit us.’154 
It is important to note that the search for the reasons of that crisis by the constitu-
tional committee, the following defence committee debate and the parliamentary debate 
in May 1998, neither led to the dismissal of the Commander-in-Chief nor to the resigna-
tion of the Minister of Defence. In fact the Commander-in-Chief came out even stronger 
and more powerful than before, by announcing the abolishing of the posts of the Com-
manders-in-Chief of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. This became even more obvious, 
when the next financial crisis within defence presented itself, by the autumn of 1998. 
The crisis in the defence sector did not directly lead to the re-structuring of the 
command in the armed forces. Due to the downsizing of the organisation, a leaner 
command structure would probably have followed anyway. Yet, there is reason to be-
lieve that the crisis expedited the process. Many material projects had also been post-
poned. Also, the number of conscripts was reduced again in the plans of the policy 
makers. There have been differences in those plans. The Commander-in-Chief preferred 
material purchases and the quality of the training to maximising the number of con-
scripts. The Commander-in-chief of the Army even topped that. Instead of introducing 
the Commander-in-Chief’s short-term training, he wanted to expel 5,000 young men 
from service. Both these positions were at odds with the preferences of the Minister of 
Defence. 
Although Von Sydow had had nothing to tell to the conscripts in the beginning of 
his term in 1997, he turned out to be a defender of the institution during the subsequent 
crisis. The policy choices the government proposed had been supported by the tradi-
tional social democratic arguments about the role of conscription in and its meaning for 
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society, though even the government had to announce a reduction of the training in the 
light of the financial crisis in the armed forces.  
Additional cutbacks 
In the beginning of 1998 the defence commission of the ministry of defence had pub-
lished its report ‘Swedish Security Policy in the Light of International Change’ (Ds 
1998:9). It was the first report on Sweden’s security policy orientation since ‘The Re-
newal of Sweden’s Defence’ (I and II) from 1995 and 1996. In those reports the Swed-
ish security policy orientation changed from the immediate Cold War threat to a more 
diverse threat scenario. With this change came a reorientation from invasion defence to 
adaptable defence. The report contained only one part. Another part should already have 
been published during 1998. However, this report could not be published until the be-
ginning of 1999. The commission stated difficulties in preparing the overhaul and the 
national elections as reasons for this delay.155 
The struggle concerning lacking money fresh in mind the main political and military 
actors started to quarrel again after the summer of 1998. However the Commander-in-
Chief already started the arguments in June. Guided by ‘The renewal of Sweden’s De-
fence’ and in anticipation of the upcoming security reports, the Commander-in-Chief 
gave a preliminary view on the new armed forces in June 1998. General Wiktorin de-
manded publicly from the politicians that for the coming reform plans, which were ex-
pected in spring 1999, they would have to choose between general conscription and a 
full defence industry.156  
 
Alternative Policy plan 
A • Concentrate on research/development 
• 18,000 men conscript training 
• 8-10 units shut down  8-6 brigades left 
B • International tasks 
• Reduced procurement 
• 10-12 units shut down  6-4 brigades left 
C • No research 
• Shut down building projects 
• 18,000 conscripts full-time training 
• 17,000 short-term training (3 months) 
Table 20: Alternative futures of the armed forces presented by Commander-in-Chief 12-10-98, 
sources: SVT 12-10-98, DN 13-10-98 
After the summer recess and the parliamentary elections (20 September 1998), which 
resulted in a continuation of the social democratic government under Persson, the 
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Commander-in-Chief repeated his demands and gave his concrete vision on the future 
armed forces. On 12 October, the Commander-in-Chief presented three alternative 
models for the armed forces to the Minister of Defence (Table 20). 
 
The Minister did not react to those plans in detail, but he was not amused by the figures, 
especially regarding the fact that only 17,000 might be called up.157 The oppositional 
defence specialist, former Prime Minister Bildt, had a very outspoken reaction to those 
ideas and demanded a new defence resolution: ‘The defence resolution which the social 
democrats and the Centre Party have hatched up actually failed. All this talk about an 
overhaul is actually hypocrisy.’158 In the long run, the former Prime Minister continued, 
Sweden would have to join NATO.159 The People’s Party supported a reduction of the 
number of conscripts to stop wasting money. The Christian democrats, as well as the 
social democrats, emphasised that the anchoring in society was important and that con-
scription was a cornerstone. Though the social democrat Christer Skoog added that con-
scription had an important meaning for democracy, he did not comment further on the 
Commander-in-Chief’s plans.160 In the weeks and months that followed, General Wik-
torin publicly criticised the government, which announced further reductions of the 
budget by 9 billion for the next three-years period.161  
After the 1998 parliamentary elections the social democratic Prime Minister, Pers-
son, found support on the left side of the political spectrum: the Left party and the envi-
ronmental party became the supporters of the budget from the social democratic gov-
ernment. This cooperation came with its price for the armed forces: a further reduction 
of the defence budget, which had been a classical demand of all three parties throughout 
the years. 
When it became obvious that the exact amount of reductions had gone up to 9,3 bil-
lion, the Commander-in-Chief demanded a ‘conscript-free’ year with only 6,000 con-
scripts drafted, 27% of the regular planned number of 22,500.162 Wiktorin also intended 
to stop many weapons’ purchases. That measure would have endangered the future of 
several Swedish weapon producers. The Minister of Defence once again rejected the 
plans of the Commander-in-Chief to draft fewer conscripts: ‘I put a big question mark 
on those plans, because we need a conscript defence in the future and we need to mod-
ernise it, reform it.’163 
The Commander-in-Chief had been disappointed that after the financial crisis of the 
previous year, he had the task to come up with a new plan and when he presented it, that 
plan almost immediately disappeared in the waste bin due to political choices.164 How-
ever, in the main not as many people seemed to be as alarmed by the Commander-in-
Chief’s plans at first sight, as the media wanted people to believe.165 The government 
had to prepare the next year’s legislative proposition that should steer the armed force’s 
future reductions. Necessary for this proposition had been the postponed overhaul of the 
security definition. Before the government had the chance to focus on that, the Com-
mander-in-Chief’s words started to have an effect. Contrary to the media’s suggestion, 
that General Wiktorin’s words didn’t have any effect, the Parliament started to act, 
which even led to an internal fight between the Ministers of Finance and Defence. 
Alarmed by the drastic measures of the Commander-in-Chief, the Parliament’s de-
fence committee tried finding a solution to prevent further reductions of conscription 
and material purchases. The social democrats tried to find 6 billion crowns with possi-
ble support from the bourgeois parties. The proposed solution was an accounting trick, 
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i.e. by writing off the money, which the defence department had loaned from the state to 
purchase materials. The environmental party’s speaker, who was not even a member of 
the defence committee, strongly resisted that more money would go to defence: the 6,3 
billion crowns had to be used to reduce the state’s financial deficit.166  
It appeared that quite soon the environmental party got support from the social de-
mocratic Minister of Finance, Erik Åsbrink.167 The differences escalated when the Min-
ister of Defence, Von Sydow, tried to back the efforts of the committee to find a solu-
tion. On Monday 23 November 1998 Prime Minister Persson even called back his de-
fence Minister from a Nordic Ministers of Defence meeting to solve the crisis. Accord-
ing to Swedish television the three top-politicians were negotiating for days.168 
When after three days the politicians still had not found a solution, they decided to 
postpone the matter for one week. According to the media, Von Sydow had the difficult 
task to come up with a solution by negotiating with the Left and the Environmental 
party, both strong opponents of supporting defence.169 By the end of November, a po-
litical solution seemed to be possible. While the bourgeois parties and the left party saw 
political room to manoeuvre, the environmental party still had some difficulties.170 
Though the spokeswoman of the environmental party explained that ‘defence also has 
to learn that there are current budget estimates,’ the social democrats, left and environ-
mental party came to an agreement: defence could borrow up to 2 billion from its own 
material estimates.171 
Despite the fact that the Prime Minister assured that the decision made by the left 
parties would have no negative consequences for the traditional broad consensus about 
Swedish defence policy in the long run, the moderate party remained irritated and re-
jected the offer of the Defence Minister to talk about the savings. Landerholm, chairman 
of the parliamentary defence committee, found it useless to talk to the Minister without 
having an idea of the Minister’s intentions, though the moderates had no intention to 
leave the defence commission, which still was an important institution since it guaran-
teed a broad support for Swedish defence policy. 
With the budget decision of the left parties, the politicians played the ball in fact 
back to the Commander-in-Chief172, who shortly before Christmas came forward with 
the proposal to expel 5,000 young men from conscription, which would have brought 
the figures down to between 17,500 and 18,000.173 The Swedish Defence Commission’s 
report about the reformed defence, which served as a base for the next defence resolu-
tion, had yet to come.  
Security policy redefined  
On 12 January 1999, the Swedish Defence Commission presented its report ‘A Chang-
ing World – A Reformed Defence’ to the Minister of Defence. The postponed follow-up 
of the Ds 1998:9 report was an important document for the overhaul of the current de-
fence Resolution of 1996, serving as a tool to adjust Sweden’s security and defence pol-
icy to actual events and setting out the proposition, which should be presented by the 
government in March 1999. 
One important conclusion had been ‘that the commission sees no threat of any inva-
sion of Sweden … within the next ten years, provided that Sweden retains a basic de-
fence capability.’174 According to the 1996 resolution, the Swedish total defence’s aims 
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were still to repel an armed attack, the defence of territorial integrity, contributing to 
international peace and security and supporting the population in national emergencies. 
‘The Defence commission concludes, however, that it is now possible to reduce the part 
of the armed forces that is structured to fend off an invasion of Sweden.’175 As a conse-
quence, the wartime organisation could be reduced and the armed forces in general 
should be more flexible and mobile. The armed forces had to re-structure in such a way, 
that they would be able to regenerate a territorial defence in case of growing threats. 
The Commission was in favour of the conscript system. It gave two arguments for 
that. On the one hand, the need for popular support of Sweden’s defence, which is guar-
anteed by conscription. On the other hand, conscription served as an important recruit-
ment tool. It continued: 
 
‘However, the Commission states that it is the requirement of the to-
tal defence system that will determine conscription needs in the years 
to come. Pending the results of further inquiries, the Commission 
sets the number of conscripts required at the present figure of 
18,000.’176 
 
With ‘inquiry’ the commission referred to the ongoing 1998 Total Defence Inquiry, 
which will be discussed later.177 The commission based its calculation for the require-
ments on figures provided by the armed forces, which delivered three alternatives: 
 
A) Eighteen thousand conscripts a year trained, placed in combat 
task force after training. Plus a protection force of 30,000 men, 
fed by the task force. 
B) Like A) plus the ability to use 1,500 conscripts for peace enforc-
ing, followed by peacekeeping operations. 
C) Eighteen thousand conscripts with full training, like alternatives 
A) and B). Seventeen thousand conscripts with short-term train-
ing of 3-5 months needed to fill the protection force of 40,000.178 
 
With this follow-up report of the defence commission, there was enough consensus for 
the government to come up with the proposition that served as a starting point for the 
1996 defence resolution. Before the government delivered its main document for the 
overhaul the proposition 1998/99:74, the Minister had to work hard to keep the item of 
conscription and the work of the 1998 Total Defence Inquiry off the agenda. 
At the annual conference of the Association Society and Defence, conscription 
should have been one of the main issues.179 Shortly before the conference, the Minister 
of Defence halted the 1998 Total Defence Duty Inquiry, which was about the organisa-
tion of conscription, among other things. Too many changes in the armed force’s tasks 
and structure were imminent for the inquiry’s work to make sense at that moment.180 
Von Sydow not only put it on ice, as the newspaper Dagens Nyheter stated, but he also 
summoned the chairman of the Inquiry, the Landshövdning Ulf Lönnqyvist, not to ap-
pear at the conference of Society and Defence in Sälen.181 While the Minister used his 
address to the conference to propound his view on the future of conscription, limited 
training to six months and 17,500 young persons, no one else got the chance to join this 
discussion. Neither the general secretary of the organisation, Olle Frack, nor the Com-
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mander-in-Chief Wiktorin, nor the member of the Inquiry, Jan Jennehag (v), were con-
tent with the decision, since they had been wanting to talk broadly about conscription.182 
The conservative Landerholm on the other hand found it a smart move to put the In-
quiry on ice, where it probably never would be picked up. The bourgeois parties were 
going to continue their negotiations with the social democrats about the future of de-
fence. 
Defence policy redefined 
Just one month after the conference of Society and Defence, the government presented 
its proposition 1998/99:74, based on the Defence Commission’s report ‘A Changing 
World – A Reformed Defence’. The centre party had supported the proposition, yet 
there had been some open and constructive talks with the people’s party, the liberals, the 
Christian democrats and the conservatives, who had all negotiated with the social de-
mocrats from 12 January to 2 February 1999 about the document.183 
The government considered the report of the Commission an important document. 
The changed security situation, with lower threat to an occupation of Sweden or a large-
scale attack against the country, gave room for large-scale reforms of the Swedish 
armed forces. Important points of the proposal were: 
 
o The invasion defence had to be replaced by a more flexible de-
fence, able to react to a broader variety of threats than in the past; 
o The armed forces could downsize, but had to keep the ability to 
regain its strength; 
o The yearly defence budget could be 4 billion crowns lower than 
the 2001 defence budget: from 43,281 billion SEK in 1999 to 
42,464 billion SEK in 2001 and finally to 37,624 billion SEK a 
year for 2001-2004.184 That resembled a reduction from almost 
39 billion crowns to 34 billion for the armed forces.185 
 
The government differed from the commission’s report, however, not in the least in the 
ambition and figures of the conscripts’ system. The government only wanted to draft 
15,000 conscripts in 2000 and 2001. The number of those fulfilling civil duty would be 
almost half of the actual figures.186  
The Commander-in-Chief needed to set out a new planning for the armed forces on 
the grounds of the proposition 1998/99:74. In May, he delivered the personnel planning 
for drastic reductions, downsizing the armed forces with approximately 50%: 
 
o The number of conscripts should be reduced from 18,500 to 
15,000 in 2000 and 2001. The figure should increase in 2002 to 
16,350; 
o A few thousand soldiers should be offered a short term contract 





Figure 11: Former and future defence budgets (at 1999 prices); source: Prop. 1998/99:74, part 6.2  
 
Especially the second proposal provoked many reactions and dominated the discussion 
about conscription almost until the end of this study. Offering conscripts a contract for a 
limited time was in the eyes of the critics a step into the direction of a professional 
army. The Federation of Officers saw the end of conscription with only 15,000 young 
men drafted and demanded 18,000 to 20,000 with a shorter conscription.188 The Minis-
ter of Defence reassured that the social democrats would protect conscription: ‘Re-
cently, one hears rumours that a professional army is to come and that the anchoring in 
society slowly languishes. This is not the case and it will not be the case. A social de-
mocratic government will not introduce a defence manned with professional soldiers. 
We will never sacrifice the people’s defence spirit.’189 
Two months later in an interview, Von Sydow had to admit, however, that 18,000 
young men – the figure actually drafted – was the limit. If the number would drop be-
low this threshold, it would be difficult to maintain any longer that general conscription 
still existed.190 
The armed forces restructured 
In the autumn of 1999, after the Commander-in-Chief’s plans, the Swedish Defence 
Commission presented the report ‘European Security – Sweden’s Defence’191. After 
establishing that the threat scenario had been unchanged since the spring 1999 report, 
the Defence Commission concluded that the armed forces’ restructuring to increase the 
operational capability for peacemaking had to be conducted faster. ‘In order to do this, 
priority should be given to measures that enhance our international capabilities, while 
measures that are only of importance for developing the national defence capability will 

















An important condition for the future armed forces and their international tasks 
would be a new way of thinking about personnel issues. The Defence Commission 
pointed to the rapid changes in military and civil technical affairs by the end of the mil-
lennium and presumably in future. This required skilled personnel. The basic organisa-
tion of the armed forces had to comprise the foremost pool of knowledge and skills to-
gether with the new operational task force.193 In the personnel section, the Commission 
did not refer to conscripts or to the conscription system, though a revision of the per-
sonnel supply had to follow.194 
The report of the Swedish Defence Commission formed a significant input towards 
the government’s bill 1999/00:30 ‘The new Defence’. In it, the Minister of Defence 
announced radical re-structuring of the armed forces. The main tasks of the armed 
forces stayed the same as in the 1996 defence resolution.195 On the other hand the or-
ganisation changed to enable it to fulfil the international tasks in a better way, without 
losing the capacity to reconstruct and mobilise strong territorial forces, if such a need 
would arise. The organisation would not only be reduced from thirteen to six brigades, 
it should also be modernised according to the demands of modern warfare. 
However, the government left no doubt that conscription had to stay central as the 
basis for the renewed armed forces: ‘We can now create a modern, flexible, and versa-
tile defence on the basis of national service.’196 The government gave three important 
reasons for that choice: a territorial, a motivational, and a qualitative one: 
 
‘A country like Sweden, with a large area and a small population, 
can require a relatively large defence in numerical terms. This is best 
ensured through a system of compulsory military service. A profes-
sional force cannot create the will and strength to resist that defence 
of the entire country requires. As conscripted personnel represent 
disparate social sectors, the system also contributes to broad compe-
tence and general experience.’197  
 
The basic organisation should be organised in such a way that 16,350 conscripts could 
be trained and possibly even more.198 Compared to Von Sydow’s own words, that 
meant farewell to general conscription. 
 
Billion SEK     
Year 2001a 2002b 2003b 2004b 
Total defence budget proposition 46,1 45,1 43,1 42,1 
Changes:     
Decreased budget limit  - 4,0 -4,0 -4,0 
Contribution for transition  3,0 1,0  
Reward compensation 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,4 
Table 21: Economical limit of Defence for budget proposition 2000, source: prop. 1999/00:30, part 
3.2; note a at year 2001 prices, b at 2002 prices 
One of the consequences of the government’s plans was that the current inquiry on the 
total defence duty, which had already started in 1998, received a second additional di-
rective. One reason had been that for the future organisation a new recruiting system 
had to be introduced, with a growing tendency for voluntarism.199 The government also 
announced financial measures to make the service more attractive, without waiting for 
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the results of the ongoing inquiry. It raised the daily allowance of conscripts from SEK 
40 to SEK 50.  
The plans of the ministry of Defence contradicted the financial prospects of the 
proposition 1998/99:74, which had foreseen a reduction of the yearly budget of 4 billion 
crowns for the years 2002-2004. The government intended therefore to introduce a 
‘compensation for the transition’ of SEK 3 billion in 2002 and SEK 1 billion in 2003 
(Table 21). 
It can be concluded that by the end of the 1990s Sweden had made the transition 
from large invasion armed forces to a small and flexible defence. At the same time, the 
country had changed the system for manning that defence from general to a specialised 
conscription.  
8.9 Implications for conscription: The total defence duty inquiry 1998 
As a consequence of the large reductions, less than one third of every levy was used in 
the wartime organisation. By the end of the decade, another total defence duty inquiry 
had the task to come forward with solutions that would compensate the few that would 
actually be drafted for military or civil duty. Starting in budgetary restless times, it took 
the inquiry commission two years to deliver its report. 
While the first inquiry of 1992 dealt with principle questions of how to handle the 
growing surplus and how to integrate all different duties, the second inquiry at first sight 
was more of an administrative character. It mainly dealt with the reward system for the 
conscripts and how to motivate young men to join the forces, by increasing its drawing 
power. After a short overview of socio-economic figures - the structural considerations 
for the inquiries - this part proceeds with the directive for the inquiry and its results.  
Background of the 1998 Duty Inquiry 
During the second half of the 1990s the number of actively serving conscripts further 
declined. While at the beginning of the decade only 18% of the levy did not have to 
fulfil military conscription, by 1998 this had been almost 50%. Table 22 shows that in 
that year 20,026 young men out of 48,503 were placed in the training’s reserve.  
 
 1994 1996 1997 1998 
Total examined (18 y. or older) 57,588 49,207 41,577 48,503 
Enrolled in posting for conscription 33,588 31,092 25,651 24,824 
Enrolled in posting for civil duty 7,151 1,055 1,574 3,338 
Enrolled in training's reserve 4,485 16,527 13,943 20,026 
No obligation for any duty 12,086 533 409 315 
Table 22: Enrolment figures. Source: Pliktverket (nb 1994 figures, 1997 change of the system  
partly counted in 1998) 
Around the same time, different interest groups of the conscripts, like the conscript 
council, put the economical, social, and educational problems of conscripts on the 
agenda.200 Though the former Minister of Defence, Thage G. Peterson, had already 
taken a closer look into that and actually raised some of the conscripts’ rewards, it was 
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not enough.201 The financial reward had hardly increased, which in combination with 
the devaluation of the Swedish crown led to an economical deprivation of those who 
had to serve. At the same time, an increased number of men enrolled ran the risk of los-
ing their university study position or professional training place. The reason for that 
could be found in the delayed decision on where to be placed: in active duty or the train-
ing’s reserve. There were also other problems requiring a satisfactory solution, such as 
the disciplinary system for conscripts and the number of conscious objectors who had 
been convicted. 
The 1998 total defence duty inquiry: the beginning 
On 25 September 1997 the Minister of Defence, Von Sydow, gave the directive to start 
with an inquiry. The committee, which was later called ‘1998 års pliktutredning’, 
should investigate the: 
 
o Enrolment system 
o Postponement rules 
o Training’s reserve 
o Duration of the different trainings 
o Female conscription 
o Resignation/dropouts 
o Training’s merits and disciplinary system202 
 
The Minister stated in the directive that the total defence authorities, primarily the 
National Service Administration (Pliktverket), the Swedish Agency for Civil Emer-
gency Planning (ÖCB), and the armed forces pointed to different deficiencies in the 
application of the total defence system. Those deficiencies were for example that both 
the system for testing and enrolment and the system of the training’s reserve had to be 
evaluated. The authorities also pointed out problems with large numbers of young men, 
dropping out between enrolment and draft or during the training. Other items had been 
the possibility to postpone conscription for those with a civil job, and a review of the 
discipline system. One important authority had been the national audit board, which 
stated in its report that a more efficient conscript system could save up to 1 billion 
crowns.203 
The different perspectives of those authorities above, and other not mentioned here, 
led to a very broad task for the committee. On the one hand it had to handle very techni-
cal questions, but also psychological ones - like how to make service more attractive - 
and juridical - like the punishment for total objectors - and political - like conscription 
for women. It should be no wonder then that this inquiry took two years, using fourteen 
different experts. 
During the work of the inquiry - the commission met for the first time on 4 March 
1998 - financial problems of the armed forces would lead to two additional directives. 
On 17 June 1998, the inquiry’s task had been adapted to recent developments in the 
Swedish security and defence policy, such as the need for soldiers for international 
tasks, or the possibility to fulfil the duty closer to home. On 4 November 1999 the Min-




Name Party Other relevant function 
Ulf Lönnqvist Social Democ-
rats 





Environmental party youth organisation* 
Henrik Lander-
holmII 





City council Borås 
Runnar Patriks-
son 
People’s Party Member of Parliament 
Christer Skoog Social Democ-
rats 
Member of Parliament 
Anders Svärd Centre Party Former Member of Parliament 
Oswald 
Söderqvist 
Left Party Former Member of Parliament, member differ-
ent rescue and readiness organisations 
Karin WegestålII Social Demo-
crats 
Member of Parliament 
Sven Rune Frid 
II 
 Secretary of the committee 
Table 23: Members of the 1998 Duty Inquiry, without experts. * Replaced Ångström just a few 
months before the end of the commission. II Already member of the 1992 Duty Inquiry 
 
As can be seen in Table 23, the commission not only consisted of parliamentarians, but 
also of local and regional politicians. The chairman, Ulf Lönnqvist, for example used to 
be head of the county of Blekinge, in the south of Sweden. Two of the parliamentarians, 
Landerholm and Wegestål, were ‘veterans’ of the 1992 total defence duty inquiry, as 
was the secretary, Sven Rune Frid. 
The results 
The committee delivered its report almost exactly two years later, on 22 March 2000. 
The report of the inquiry started with an appeal that the defence of Sweden is a matter 
for everybody. That is why the members rejected professional armed forces. The rea-
sons for that were the need to mobilise a large number of men in case of emergency and 
the high quality of conscript personnel. The issue of quality is also the reason why the 
duty should be extended to women.204 
The members of the inquiry were aware of the fact that fewer and fewer men were 
drafted, corresponding to the need of the wartime organisation. To reverse the negative 
consequences for the defence willingness of the population and the declining motivation 
of those who had to serve, they proposed certain financial and educational measures. 
An important way for softening the inequity between those who have to serve and 
those who avoid the service is to pay a higher allowance. The daily fee should be raised 
to 66 crowns a day, which resembles the daily allowance for students and approxi-
mately two glasses of beer in a cheap pub in Stockholm. Those who serve should also 
get a higher demobilisation fee. Instead of 4,500 crowns, the conscripts should receive, 
at the end of their service, 2,000 crown for every month served plus an extra fee for 
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long-term serving. According to that calculation, those who serve for 15 months will 
receive SEK 40,000 crown, for 12 months the amount will be 24,000 crown and the 
lowest demobilisation fee would be for the 7,5 month conscripts, i.e. 15,000 crown.205 
Those who face unemployment after conscription should receive an allowance from 
the unemployment agency. Certain merits of the military training should be recognised 
for those who will be starting or continuing their civil study at a college or university. 
an example would be the recognition of the ability to lead others or work in groups. 
This latter option would be especially interesting for the longer-serving conscripts, who 
were trained to become conscript officers. Other issues that were dealt with by the in-
quiry were questions about compensation in case of personal damages during duty and 
the disciplinary system. 
Apart from financial measures to increase the motivation, the inquiry also proposed 
educational measures. The embedding of total defence in the population, often called 
the anchoring, was still central. With declining numbers, in the eyes of the inquiry it 
would be important to enlarge the knowledge about the embedding in the young genera-
tion. To that end a way had to be found in which all authorities engaged in total defence 
might contribute to the dissemination of knowledge. One important way might be an 
information office. This office should organise, among other things, total defence days 
in high schools. 
A deeper knowledge and regained acceptance by the young population became nec-
essary, after years of decline in the number of conscripts. Since the armed forces only 
needed 18,000 conscripts a year and the civil defence authority, ÖCB, 900 conscripts, 
the members of the inquiry pointed to the need for more voluntarism. ‘The fact that now 
only a limited part of a levy is drafted for basic training duty requires measures to moti-
vate as many men as possible to fulfil the training voluntarily.’206 
After the usual ‘round’ during which stakeholders in the sector comment on the pro-
posal, the statements of opinion, the ministry of Defence presented its bill proposal on 
26 September 2001 to the Parliament. The Bill differed only slightly from the inquiries 
proposal. The government fully followed the reward system for conscripts. Important 
for the proposal, too, were the concept of ‘motivation’ and the trainings reserve. The 
latter more or less lost its meaning as a surplus pool. Instead, a difference had been 
made between those who really would make a chance to be drafted and those who 
would definitely not be suited for a longer training. That was the majority. Those few 
who were to be drafted should not only be selected on grounds of their physical and 
psychological abilities, but also on their motivation. The government emphasised, like 
the inquiry that only the best suited should be drafted for conscription. ‘The personal 
motivation shall be a very important reason to determine who is best suited to fulfil the 
duty.’207 
That rule, however, placed the enrolment authority Pliktverket for some very practi-
cal problems. The motivation of young men and women is not stable. It often undergoes 
changes within a short period. ‘When talking to us’, Björn Körlof, the director of 
Pliktverket explained, ‘the young men and women are often very motivated, but a few 
months later their life has changed.’ Normally the potential recruits are in a phase where 
they are leaving high school and starting a grown-up life. With the changes in their 
lives, however, their motivation often also changes.208 Another problem that Körlof 
pointed at is the over-motivation of some persons, leading to so-called ‘Rambo behav-
iour’ or political extremism. 
 187 
8.10 Towards the erosion of conscription? 
After more than a decade of restructuring the armed forces and two inquiries on con-
scription, 1991/92 and 1998-2000, the decline of the young persons serving in the total 
defence had not stopped as can be seen in Table 24. 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total examined (18 y. or older) 46,209 47,655 46,359 44,626 
Enrolled in position for conscription 19,066 16,658 16,948 16,216 
Enrolled in position for civil duty 2,190 1,639 1,126 695 
Enrolled in training's reserve 24,744 22,940 25,148 6,745 
No obligation for any duty 209 135 40 
Not suited for longer training    20,970 
Table 24: Enrolment figures 1999-2002; since 2002 another figure had been introduced ‘not suited 
for longer training’. Source: Pliktverket statistics 1996-2002 
  
It is actually wrong to conclude that of the 16,216 young men enrolled in the basic train-
ing in 2002, everybody had fulfilled his service. The number had been much lower, ap-
proximately 12600, including about 270 women.209 Not only the number of conscripts 
decreased, but also the number of those contributing to the home guard. By the end of 
2001, approximately 69,000 men joined the home guard, much less than the 90,000 the 
government was aiming at.210 
In future it might be that another pillar of the total defence duty would also decline 
further: the civic duty. In 2002 only 695 men enrolled, a long way from the 10,000 men 
the social democratic Minister of Defence, Thage G. Peterson, once had in mind in 
1996. In September 2001 the government announced that the training for the civil duty 
airport fire fighters would be abandoned by 2004.211 That would mean that as from that 
date only the civic duty for the requirement of the municipalities and the power grid 
would exist. 
However, the politicians in Sweden, especially the social democratic ones, have come up with new 
ways to man the armed forces and to ensure the will of the people to defend the country. The latter 
seemed to have suffered over the years. At least it seemed that it is no longer a matter of course to 
serve one’s country. The population is dissociating itself from the idea of a people’s defence that is 
based on (immaterial) ideals such as seeing conscription as a civic duty.  
Figure 12 shows that more and more people think that serving in the armed forces 
should be compensated.  
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Service is a civic duty
Don't know
 
Figure 12: Opinion on fulfilling military duty, SPF Opinion 1999 table 45 
 
While in 1995 the opinion was almost even, 45% thought that military service should be 
compensated, whereas 47% saw it as a civil duty. These numbers clearly changed in the 
following years. By 1999, 63% of the Swedes pleaded for compensation, against 31% 
who still considered it a duty.212  
Two measures of the social democratic Minister of Defence, Björklund (2002- ), to 
fill the ranks for international tasks and to secure the people’s will to defend Sweden, 
are noteworthy. Firstly, there are plans to offer conscripts temporary contracts up to 
three or four years after they have fulfilled their duty. When Wiktorin first presented 
this idea in 1999 a lot of people rejected it.213 Since the beginning of 2003 this idea has 
been debated repeatedly by policy makers and the military, like Björklund and the 
Commander-in-Chief Hederstedt. The latter had even talked about abandoning ‘de 
facto’ conscription and replacing it with better-trained contracted soldiers: 5,500 a 
year.214 It seems that the military paying lip service to conscription, but internally, in 
their planning, they probably have abolished it already.215 The debate about conscription 
is not over, yet. 
 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Applied 390 614 504 499 511 836 
Recruited 289 341 242 204 271 396 
Drop out (estimates) N/A 21% 14,5% 14% 14% 13,5% 
Table 25: Women in the armed forces, source: statistics Pliktverket 
Secondly, there is the ongoing discussion about women in the armed forces. While in 
the beginning of the 1990s the issue was difficult to be accepted by the armed forces, 
nowadays it is becoming more common. Especially the 1998 Total Defence Duty In-
quiry paved the way for a female defence. The reasons for the advocates are different. 
Some support women serving in the army voluntarily, as part of emancipation. Recently 
the debate concentrated more on the conscription for women as duty. That would be the 
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ultimate emancipation. Yet, the majority of women are not keen to join the armed 
forces, though there is a growing number of applications (Table 25).  
Critics also point to the fact that less than 15,000 postings are available in the war 
organisation for the approximate 50,000 young men every year. With almost the same 
amount of young women as potential conscripts, the percentage of those actually serv-
ing would be below 15%. That would contribute to an even greater inequity between 
those who are obliged to serve and those who are not.  
It seems that for the moment conscription in Sweden is turning towards the volun-
tary army based on draft. Still every young man (and in future woman?) will be enrolled 
and physically and mentally examined. Only those, however, who really want to serve, 
will then be drafted. The enrolment and examination has the advantage that everybody 
is given the opportunity to serve. This is not an unusual method for recruiting soldiers 
and it also was an option proposed by the Dutch Meijer-commission in its final re-
port.216 It is one possibility of guaranteeing sufficient qualified soldiers in (small) states. 
In countries where only conscription exists without examination, the recruitment of 
qualified soldiers turns out to be a problem, like in the Netherlands. 
However, the examination leads to other problems. As already pointed at in the pre-
vious sections, voluntarism and motivation to serve is difficult to measure for seventeen 
year-olds and because of that it is still difficult to make plans. This, however, is a neces-
sary procedure for the modern Swedish forces aiming at high-tech warfare abroad, 
while still dreaming of the broad anchoring of defence in society. In years to come the 
issue will repeatedly resurface, until draft in Sweden will be abandoned and military 
ambitions will meet financial support. A study of leadership in reforms is yet to come. 
For the moment, we will turn to an analysis of leadership in Swedish defence reform in 
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Chapter 9: The silent goodbye to general conscription: piecemeal 
leadership incrementalism in Swedish defence policy 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In a manner of speaking, the Cold War ended in Sweden in 1995. Due to its neutrality 
the country relied for decades on its own ability to defend itself. With the end of the bi-
polar world order, long neglected problems in the defence organisation came to the fore: 
old weapons and turgid personnel figures. Those problems were homemade after almost 
twenty years of economies on defence spending. 
In the early 1990s financial and economic crises in the country brought power to the 
bourgeois parties, who finally saw a chance to enact their longstanding defence policy: 
modernisation of the territorial forces and modern air power by procurement at home 
and abroad. However, continuing financial problems thwarted those ambitions, and 
when the social democrats returned to power in 1994, the modernisation of the armed 
forces towards small, high-tech forces began. 
Whatever party in government, whatever defence policy those governments envi-
sioned, each defence reform plan nibbled away at conscription. The more severe the 
cuts in the defence budget, the more rapidly the numbers of those actually serving 
shrank. This occurred notwithstanding the notion – in particular of social democratic 
politicians – that the people’s defence should never vanish. The actual figures contra-
dicted political rhetoric. From over 80% of a cohort in the beginning of the 1980s the 
number of conscripts went down to less than 25% by the turn of the century and this 
tendency has not yet stopped. 
In this chapter the leadership’s efforts to reform and conserve the Swedish conscript 
system will be analysed. The case differs from the Dutch situation, not only in time, but 
also in the numbers of actors and organisations involved. More actors were influential 
in the policymaking process than in the Dutch case. This is partially due to the long du-
ration of the process (more than thirteen years) and partially because of the more for-
malised defence policymaking process. The Swedish political system and its culture of 
defence policymaking offered the military actors involved more room to manoeuvre 
than was available to their Dutch counterparts. At the same time, Swedish military lead-
ers to some extent also displayed greater skill in playing the political game. 
The structure of this chapter resembles the analysis of the Dutch case. First, we look 
at the outcomes in terms of the extent of organisational change and the success of lead-
ership to re-legitimise defence policy, the organisation, and conscription. In this part the 
strategies of the leaders in the sector will be shown. Next we will show why leaders 
might reform or conserve and how they did so with regard to Swedish conscription. In 
the concluding parts we will show the scores of those leaders on the style and type di-
mension. 
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9.2 Setting the stage: actors, strategies and outcomes 
Policy outcomes 
Within fourteen years after the end of the Cold War, the Swedish armed forces saw an 
impressive transition from territorial forces with a sizeable manpower and outdated ma-
terial to small, flexible well-equipped forces suited for crisis management abroad. After 
the social democrats regained power in 1994, they decided to invest 50% of the defence 
budget in procurement, at the expense of conscription, rehearsal training and prepared-
ness for classic territorial defence. The proactive, high-tech systems are a compensation 
for the decline of the forces’ manpower.1 The number of conscripts declined to no less 
than 25% of the Cold War situation. 
The outcome of the Swedish case differs less from the Dutch case than seemed to be 
the case at the outset of the study. While Dutch policy makers codified the end of con-
scription in law, Swedish policy makers avoided this final and symbolic step: they abol-
ished general conscription ‘de facto’ and it is arguable in how far the momentary situa-
tion differs from postponement of the draft for the largest part of a year school. Having 
everybody conscripted and vetted for military service serves as a recruiting tool. In 
practice it boils down to a voluntary army based on draft. Only few youngsters join the 
forces and those who show no commitment are exempted. 
Therefore, assessing the degree of change of the Swedish case poses some analytical 
problems. On the one hand, one might say that the changes over the years depict only 
incremental changes of the prevailing policy – or in terms of Lindgren it would be a 
change of means: conscription still exists in Swedish defence. However, with the major 
strategic change away from large territorial forces towards a highly professional net-
work-centric defence, which serves international crisis-management tasks, the use of 
conscription changed, too. Only professional soldiers or those who prolong their con-
scription period voluntarily - paid at market level wages - are actually used in the cur-
rent Swedish defence forces abroad. Already at the outset of the 1990s the beginning of 
the end of general conscription was initiated, when Swedish policy makers, social de-
mocrats and conservatives, codified what had been a rule of thumb on the shop floor: 
only the need shall steer. In fact, when taking the history of conscription during the pre-
vious forty years into consideration, when more than 85% of an age cohort served - be-
cause it was necessary to defend the large country with many brigades and much man-
power - this codification could be interpreted at first sight as a goal change. 
However, the fact that the territorial defence for and by the Swedish people became 
a secondary policy objective at the end of the 1990s and the fact that promotion of in-
ternational peace by enforcing it2 became much more salient in Swedish defence policy, 
meant that this actually led to much further changes. The organisation of the territorial 
defence, that only concentrated on a very small area of Sweden, became secondary: 
‘…priority should be given to measures that enhance our international capabilities, 
while measures that are only of importance for developing the national defence capabil-
ity will have to wait.’3 It is therefore fair to say that the people’s defence, which for 
decades had been the strong fundament of Swedish total defence, formally started to 
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erode. The way to organise the manning of the forces changed in such a dimension, that 
those changes actually led to a paradigmatic change of procedures. 
This, however, was never an official policy, though politicians were involved in 
those changes and even took the lead, like Von Sydow from 1999. On the contrary, al-
ternatives to military conscription were developed and promoted by the supporters of 
general conscription, but they made little difference. Civic service declined more and 
more and is still in decline: in 1995 it was expected to grow to 10,000 persons a year, 
but at present probably less than 500 persons a year serve in this capacity. The same 
holds true for the home guard. Although no statistics about the age structure of the 
60,000 soldiers are available (1995 plans expected 90, 000), it is reasonable to believe 
that this form of serving the state is also in decline, when taking into account that this 
was the trend of the last decade. 
The outcome shows that the decline is not necessarily due to the de-legitimisation of 
the armed forces. On the contrary, the national defence is still seen as an important part 
of the Swedish state and defending the country is still regarded as a civic virtue. Yet, 
service to the state is no longer self-evident or idealistic. Opinion polls indicate and an 
advisory committee recommended that those who serve should be better compensated. 
The armed forces are gradually becoming less visible in Swedish society. While in the 
1960s almost every family had members who served, since the 1990s the armed forces 
have become increasingly isolated from society. Only a few people are drafted. Instead 
of being anchored in society and part of the Swedish society, the armed forces are at 
risk of becoming a marginal phenomenon.  
To a great extent this development was the product of political choices. Political as 
well as military leaders sacrificed conscription when budget choices had to be made. 
They made a strategic change to reform the armed forces towards a small high-tech 
army. Garrisons were shut down, and fewer and fewer recruits were drafted at moments 
when the peace-dividend was cashed in, e.g. during the elections in 1994 and 1998, or 
when a financial crisis loomed within the defence sector, as in 1997/98. From the sec-
ond half of the 1990s onwards the forces were modernised and downsized according to 
new threat scenarios and foreign policy and national defence interests. 
The end of the Cold War did not contribute to the de-legitimisation of conscription 
in Swedish society. Political and military leaders did not hesitate to re-invigorate the 
defence sector after it had been put under pressure by different crises, however, they 
saw no reason to defend conscription other than in name. In terms of crisis management 
it can be said that, although many politicians adhered to a conserving strategy, i.e. keep-
ing conscription alive, their actions ultimately did produce a reform of the institution. In 
terms of the Boin & ‘t Hart (2000) typology, this outcome of the critical period of post-
Cold War defence reorientation can be characterised as an unintended change.  
Actors and strategies 
In a period of almost fifteen years many different actors were engaged in Swedish de-
fence policymaking. Like in the Dutch scenario, three different types of leaders are of 
interest to our analysis: political, military, and bureaucratic. Since the organisational 
change in Swedish defence policymaking in the mid-1990s (as described in chapter 
eight) this latter type met the public eye more often. Some personal statements of top 
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civil servants and associated scientists were published.4 However, in the Swedish case it 
was difficult to find evidence for the engagement of senior civilians in leadership roles.  
At the political level, the social democrat Roine Carlsson was Minister of Defence 
until 1991. With regard to his relation to conscription not a lot of material has been 
found, except for a few newspaper articles and a defence decision made before 1989, in 
which he clearly followed a conserving strategy with regard to conscription. In the 
analysis we will therefore only refer marginally to him. The conservative Minister 
Björck and his Junior Minister Sahlin (1991-1994) followed a conserving approach. 
They started to modernise the territorial armed forces in the spirit of the Cold War strat-
egy, but tried to avoid the subject of conscription. The subject was, however, high on 
the agenda of the next Minister, Thage G. Peterson (1994-1997). At least in public he 
repeatedly defended the institution, offering various plans to conserve it. His successor, 
Von Sydow, initially showed less interest in conscription, but in public came out more 
and more as a defender of conscription. The current Minister of Defence, Björklund, 
seems to be the first social democratic Minister of Defence to consider an explicit, de-
liberate reform of conscription, whilst nevertheless trying to avoid the impression that 
she is aiming at a full-scale professional army. 
Different strategies can be discerned at military level. In the beginning of the 1990s 
conscription found a supporter in Gustafsson as Commander-in-Chief, who tried to find 
ways out of the decline of conscripts. His successors Wiktorin (1994-2000) and 
Hederstedt (2000- ) had fewer problems to modernise the armed forces at the expense of 
conscription (Wiktorin) and they have been thinking about new, more professional ways 
to fill the few posts left in the armed forces (Wiktorin and Hederstedt). 
In the Swedish system of defence policymaking there is also some room for leader-
ship to be exercised by parliamentarians, like the chairmen of the conscription commit-
tees or the members of the defence committees in Parliament preparing the White Pa-
pers. With the change of that system towards the defence commission, bureaucrats also 
exposed their opinion more and more in public, like Michael Moore.5 However, not 
much leadership could be discerned at this level.  
The puzzle 
Given the strong conviction of the social democrats that conscription is an inseparable 
part of citizenship, it is astonishing that this institution declined to a point where the 
continued existence of conscription is debatable. Although all social democratic Minis-
ters of Defence paid lip service to conscription, the outcome was change. Since eco-
nomics seem to play an important role in the defence policymaking process, especially 
when triggered by financial crises throughout the 1990s, it is tempting to neglect the 
role of individual actors. This impression seems to be supported by the highly formal-
ised way of reaching consensus in this policy sector, which many actors consider to be 
vital to the neutral state. 
Although Sweden is still a neutral state that officially relies on its ability to defend 
itself, the changes of the Swedish forces since the mid-1990s are astonishing. If neutral-
ity is indeed important for maintaining conscription, as the state needs sufficient per-
sonnel for its defence, one wonders why the Swedish forces not only downsized exten-
sively but also hardly held any units in reserve. 
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Empirical evidence raises doubt if this structural approach provides sufficient expla-
nations for the decline of conscription and the defence policy changes of the 1990s. Dif-
ferent governments, i.e. conservatives and social democrats, made different choices 
throughout the decade. While structures and procedures suggest constraints leading to 
slow, incremental changes - which are typical for many Western democracies according 
to Lindblom (1979) - nevertheless, we see far reaching alterations at certain moments. 
Those changes cannot be explained without taking a closer look at the actors involved 
in the policymaking process. In particular, we should focus more on the manoeuvring 
and interactions of military and political leaders in the Swedish defence sector of the 
1990s. 
9.3 Leadership opportunities and actor calculations 
Leader’s crisis awareness 
Swedish defence organisations and defence policy makers faced a crisis at the end of 
the 1980s, due to three factors. Firstly, there was a lack of money to replace old equip-
ment in the large army organisation, which led to less usable brigades. Secondly, there 
was a surplus of conscripts not needed in the wartime organisation, which rose every 
year. Finally, there had been the implosion of the traditional consensual defence poli-
cymaking, due to a severe financial and economical crisis and subsequent political cal-
culus of the bourgeois parties. 
The crisis awareness amongst the actors in the defence sector with regard to the fu-
ture of conscription differed. The Commander-in-Chief Gustafsson had the feeling that 
the conscription system faced some serious problems.6 Especially the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army, Sagrén, and his Chief Staff, Rönnberg, concentrated more on the 
state of the defence equipment.7 The army was supported in its approach by the conser-
vative government. Neither the new Minister, Björck, nor his Junior Minister, Sahlin 
felt that the disappearance of the bi-polar world order had eliminated threats to Swedish 
security.8 On the contrary, they sensed that the world was becoming more insecure. The 
failed ‘coup d’état’ in the Soviet Union by the end of 1991 increased this feeling.  
By the mid-1990s this feeling had gone. New threats were identified, which called 
for a restructuring of the armed forces. These included regional conflicts, environmental 
damage, and the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.9 According to the 
then Commander-in-Chief, Wiktorin, the constant downsizing undermined the territorial 
defence structure.10 Many brigades existed only on paper. Without sufficient money to 
keep them going, the system was hollowed out. The Commander-in-Chief thought it 
was better to make a clear cut and remodel the territorial defence structure into new, 
smaller and flexible forces. These forces were more suited to face modern threats and to 
serve the national and international commitment of the Swedish state. 
What we see in the Swedish case were three different levels of crisis awareness. On 
the national level, the changed security environment led to the fact that conserving lead-
ers were more aware of a security crisis of Sweden. In contrast, the reforming leaders 
had to convince their constituencies that this crisis was over, in order to downsize the 
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armed forces. On the organisational level, the crisis awareness was induced due to a 
lack of money. The conserving actors concluded that the budget had to be raised, while 
the reforming actors were convinced that the organisation had to be downsized and to-
tally restructured. The changed crisis awareness in the security environment supported 
the reformers’ plans from 1995 onwards.  
The same pattern can be discerned with regard to conscription. The conserving ac-
tors who were aware of a crisis of conscription, emphasised the territorial threat for 
Sweden. According to them, only conscription could guarantee the large territorial 
forces to defend the country. Those leaders who wanted to reform conscription had to 
convince the public that there was no crisis at all, not in the security environment, not 
for conscription or in the defence organisation as such. They had to ensure that the in-
ternational security environment allowed room to reform. 
The case supports the hypothesis by Cortell & Peterson with regard to conserving 
and reforming actors.11 In particular Björck and Wiktorin exploited the window of op-
portunity, because they sensed that doing nothing would raise the costs. From 1991 
Björck had invested large sums in procurement to lower the perceived threat potential of 
the insecure post-Cold War order. In 1998, after the Armed forces’ financial crisis, 
Wiktorin pushed reforms through since he sensed that the half-hearted changes since 
1995 would endanger the whole Swedish security policy in the end. 
Political calculus of the expected gains and damages 
During the analysed period all governments, whether they were bourgeois or social de-
mocratically dominated, were minority governments. As predicted by the hypothesis, 
this limited the manoeuvring room of the Ministers of Defence. Björck found support 
for his procurement plans in the early 1990s from the New Democratic Party. Björck 
wasted no time and initiated the changes immediately after coming into office. In terms 
of the election cycle and possible electoral accountability the timing was ideal. Yet, as 
Björck indicated, without at least the tacit understanding of the social democrats, he 
could not have changed the conscription system into a system based on demand.12 
His social democratic successors had to negotiate defence plans to a greater extent 
with the supporting centre and left parties. Without going too deeply into budget policy 
– this will be discussed further on in the section entitled Institutional position of the 
leaders – it becomes clear that the social democratic Ministers of Defence had limited 
space within their respective cabinets. In particular Von Sydow had little support during 
the 1997/98 financial crisis of defence. The left parties who supported the government 
were not willing to invest in defence at the expense of social security. 
During the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary election campaigns, the left and liberal par-
ties emphasised cuts in the defence budget up to 10% a year, but none of the parties or 
political leaders connected those cuts to institutional reforms. During this latter cam-
paign, however, the defence commission postponed a follow-up report about the re-
newal of Swedish defence. An important reason was the upcoming election.13 The gov-
ernment wanted to focus on the upcoming budget proposal before concentrating on re-
forms. This was in fact the only evidence that could be found in the Swedish case that 
elections prevented or fostered defence reforms. The electoral cycle plays only a minor 
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role in the Swedish case. This is supported by the fact that even shortly after the elec-
tions Von Sydow kept the issue off the agenda. We will discuss this later. 
What about conscription? Conscription was and is to a great extent a non-issue in 
Swedish society. Only few politicians repeatedly discussed the subject in public, but 
there was no broad debate. Even the conservatives, who were more and more inclined 
towards abolition in order to professionalise the armed forces, refrained from initiating a 
broad debate. Björck emphasised it was ‘one of the holy cows’.14 The former social-
democratic Junior Minister of Defence, Nygren, states: ‘The political system will not 
challenge the status quo if it is not absolutely necessary. And there is a lot of space to do 
things under the headline of a conscript system’15 In short, the expected political gains 
for anyone to demand abolition seem to be nil. Quite the opposite, it appears that the 
expected political damages are large, at least for the politicians. 
On the military level the expected gains were high, however, different than antici-
pated in the operationalisation. Instead of personal career gains, the military leaders 
initiated reforms to secure their organisation, at the expense of conscription. In the be-
ginning of the 1990s, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army gained procurement of 
modern equipment in exchange for the decline of the number of conscripts. Later in the 
1990s the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Wiktorin, had the opportunity to 
modernise the forces, again at the expense of conscription. He did not hesitate to sacri-
fice this institution to prevent the armed forces from becoming technically marginalised. 
With regard to the hypothesis that elites may be more likely to seek structural re-
form the more secure they are in their positions and the longer it takes until they are 
held accountable for their actions, the Swedish case is diffuse. On the one hand, we find 
evidence that even leaders in minority governments can initiate change (Björck), though 
the change was aimed at conserving the territorial defence. On the other hand, actors are 
limited in their space in minority governments, in particular when leftist parties support 
them. Besides, regardless whether a government is a minority or oversized coalition, the 
political colour of this coalition and the issue at stake has to be considered. 
 As far as accountability is concerned, elections play a minor role. There is evidence 
that leaders initiated military change immediately after elections (Björck), but also that 
they were still reluctant to put reforms on the agenda at a comparative moment in the 
election cycle (Von Sydow at the end of 1998). It was the public opinion that interested 
the leaders. Respondents indicated that as long as there is no need in Sweden to ques-
tion the system in public, none of the leaders would do so. In short, calculated gains and 
damages are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to explain why leaders reform 
or conserve, the more so as it is difficult to apply to non-political actors. In the conclud-
ing chapter, we will try to re-formulate this hypothesis.  
Inner convictions regarding necessity of change 
The modernisation of the invasion armed forces stood high on the agenda of the conser-
vative party. Before the fall of the Berlin wall, the conservative leader, Bildt, repeatedly 
criticised the cuts made in the defence budget by the social democratic government. To 
Björck, Bildt, and Sahlin, conscription was a secondary problem. Björck confirmed that 
the Brännström-committee served his purpose of keeping the issue off the agenda. Still, 
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he was one of the few in his party who started to think about abolition. However, not in 
public: his party was too traditional for that.16 
His social democratic predecessors and successors had a different view. They 
wanted to conserve conscription, preferably in its most comprehensive form. Little evi-
dence could be found for Roine Carlsson’s (Minister of Defence until 1991) conviction, 
except for some news articles. In general, for none of the leaders under scrutiny could 
evidence be found about their inner conviction before they came into the office they 
held during the period analysed. The reasons they gave for their attitude towards con-
scription was often given in retrospective, like the Junior Minister of Defence Nygren 
(until 1991) or the Minister of Defence Thage G. Peterson (1994-1997) in his memoirs. 
The latter was very explicit in his memoirs that conserving conscription was very 
important to him because of his social democratic background. The public statements 
during his term - the newspaper articles as well as the two-phase defence decision 
1995/96 - support this impression. When by the end of 1994 Wiktorin suggested saving 
money at the expense of conscription, Thage G. Peterson rejected this with the words: 
‘Out of the question. Basic training and conscription are so central to Swedish defence, 
it is almost an ideological question, and so this is out of the question. Eventually we can 
save the money on procurement’.17 His other public statements, policy plans and his 
memoirs confirm his strong ideological conviction that conscription is part of Swedish 
society and defence.18 Yet, he could not prevent the decline of the people’s total de-
fence, of which conscription was an important part. 
Von Sydow and Björklund were probably the first social democratic Ministers of 
Defence, with a more pragmatic attitude towards conscription. Neither of them was de-
fending a large number of conscripts at any price. At some stage Von Sydow seemed to 
defend conscription with traditional social democratic arguments, when he emphasised 
that the so-called training’s reserve endangered the quality of the conscripts and the 
conscript system in general19: ‘The growing training’s reserve is a danger for our duty 
system. It is therefore important to me that this procedure will be checked up on.’20 
Moreover, he even tried to defend conscription much like his predecessor, Thage G. 
Peterson, had done, when he said that ‘[i]t is a mistake that one demands a long duty 
fulfilment from one part [of a cohort, JEN], but zero from other parts.’21 Nevertheless, 
Von Sydow seldom expressed a similarly strong conviction. He saw the necessity of a 
further modernisation and therefore downsizing of the armed forces22, a concept that did 
not fit high numbers of conscripts. In addition, Von Sydow faced growing financial 
problems and cutbacks.  
The fact that Björklund began her term by talking about a prolongation of contracts 
for conscripts, points to a similar sense of pragmatism. However, she was still defend-
ing the principle of conscription and emphasising that every comparison with profes-
sional forces would be misleading. Her very willingness to ‘think along’ with Com-
mander-in-Chief Hederstedt about this concept, which had not been negotiable for her 
predecessor in 1999 when Wiktorin proposed it23, underscored her more pragmatic fo-
cus. Likewise Håkan Juholt’s (chairman of the Swedish Defence Commission – Förs-
varsberedningen) views on conscription are evidence of the de-ideologisation of the 
social democrats on this point. When asked why he wanted to uphold conscription, he 
gave technical reasons, quality reasons and emancipation reasons. When asked if he 
might think of any other reasons to uphold conscription, he answered: ‘No, no ideologi-
cal reasons, no (…) no there is no ideological reason, for me. It is just quality.’24 With 
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the latter, Juholt refers to conscription as a tool to select the best recruits, a view that 
was unthinkable for a social democrat even at the end of the 1990s. Back then, the so-
cial democrats in the 1998-conscription committee prevented every elitist form of con-
scription. Instead, they aimed at an average of every cohort to be recruited.25 
All military leaders repeatedly underscored the importance of conscription in public 
statements. Commander-in-Chief Gustafsson was most outspoken in his view. More-
over, contrary to his successor(s) he tried to come up with plans to keep the conscript 
numbers at a high level. Even when retired, he wrote articles in favour of conscription, 
trying to introduce social conscription. 
Wiktorin was less committed. To him conscription was important as a means of 
manning the armed forces. Yet, contrary to Gustafsson, he was not convinced that it had 
to be general conscription. It was not an ideological issue to him. In fact, he saw more 
room for a selective form of conscription. This much better suited the downsized armed 
forces he was aiming at than the large contingents that the old system produced. That 
became obvious, not in the least, when he repeatedly proposed to downsize the annual 
draft in order to modernise. As early as 1999, he was the first senior military who offi-
cially toyed with the option of offering short-term contracts to conscripts after their 
duty. Hederstedt’s suggestions about the future of conscription point in the same direc-
tion. He, too, preferred a selective form of conscription, as is evident from his proposal 
to draft only 5,500 young men and women a year.  
The Swedish case shows that most conserving leaders had a strong inner conviction 
towards conscription, while those who reformed the sector had a much more pragmatic 
attitude. For those leaders, conscription was still part of society, but there were no ideo-
logical hurdles for not thinking about new forms of conscription.  
Institutional position of the leaders 
Being the Defence Minister in a multi-party minority government was a handicap for 
Björck in advancing his political aims. Yet, his government could rely on the support of 
the populist New Democratic Party, which came into Parliament in 1991, when mod-
ernisation of the armed forces was considered. In addition, Björck’s position was 
strengthened by personal support from Prime Minister Bildt. Very important to the Min-
ister of Defence’s position within the sector was the implosion of the traditional defence 
policymaking process at the beginning of the 1990s. The absence of an institutional 
counterweight paved the way for Björck’s ambitious plans to modernise and strengthen 
the armed forces. In the traditional system the finding of a consensus for defence policy 
would have taken several years. Björck pushed his defence decision through the system 
within several months. 
Although the traditional system of defence policymaking changed – Björck changed 
the committee into a commission that was informed about the government’s plans – by 
the mid-1990s that commission had regained some of its power. Instead, however, of 
being part of the parliamentary decision-making, this commission was organisationally 
placed under the Minister of Defence, although MPs were members. Still, Björck’s so-
cial democratic successors had a relatively weaker position within the system. Both 
Thage G. Peterson and Von Sydow had to reform the armed forces – now that the Cold 
War was finally over in Sweden – as part of a social democratic minority government. 
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However, the ongoing financial problems complicated matters and, from 1998 on, there 
was also the need to keep the left parties on board (the centre party had stopped support-
ing the social democratic government). Those parties wanted to cut the defence budget 
even more than the social democratic Minister of Finance already intended. Although 
the financial crisis of 1997/98 within the armed forces created a window of opportunity 
to reform, which was exploited by the Minister of Defence and the Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces, the institutional setting was not favourable to abolish con-
scription, the more so as the leftist parties were a defender of conscription. 
The new Commander-in-Chief, Wiktorin, had the advantage that when he came into 
office in July 1994, the structure of the sector had been changed. The Commander-in-
Chief was the military cornerstone of the defence organisation and every other defence 
official had to contact him first before communicating with the Minister.26 Wiktorin 
admitted that ‘… in my opinion it would never have been possible to make the dramatic 
change from the invasion structure to the new structure, without having the authority 
that was given to the Supreme Commander in 1994.’27 
In addition, he came into office shortly before the new Minister of Defence, Thage 
G. Peterson. This gave him time to settle in before being confronted with a political 
superior with whom he often disagreed and sometimes openly argued with, especially 
about conscription. Despite these collisions, Wiktorin was never fired. Peterson wrote in 
his memoirs that the new defence resolution was more important than the firing of the 
Commander-in-Chief.28 
With the next Minister, Von Sydow, Wiktorin had acrimonious exchanges. Despite 
the financial crisis of 1997/98 and an interrogation by the constitutional committee, he 
was not sacked. Why not? Like Thage G. Peterson, Von Sydow needed Wiktorin for the 
renewal of the armed forces. The former fighter pilot had the will and the authority to 
change the organisation. From 1997 on, the institutional strength of the Commander-in-
Chief had partly been increased by the weakness of his political superior, who was 
bound in a political struggle about the budget.  
The hypothesis that strong actors conserve or reform, finds support in this case: both 
Björck (conserve the territorial forces and change conscription) and Wiktorin (reform 
the forces at the expense of conscription) initiated and implemented change. A strong 
institutional position of the leaders, or – like in the Swedish case – a weak institutional 
environment was an important - though unnecessary - condition to initiate change or 
conserve the structure of the sector. Weaker actors had the chance to make use of their 
procedural abilities to improve their position. We will come to that in greater detail in 
the next part. 
 
In the Swedish case, the hypotheses that were formulated after the theory by Cortell & 
Peterson (1999) found different support. Again, all hypotheses would support the rea-
sons why policy makers followed a conserving strategy. As far as crisis awareness was 
concerned, actors conserved the forces if they regarded the international situation as 
insecure. With regard to conscription, the strategies depended on the developments in 
the international security environment. Only after the international environment 
changed, the reforming actors regarded reforms an option resulting from the organisa-
tional crisis of the armed forces. The political calculus was different than expected in 
the hypothesis. Not so much elections or accountability were important, but the calculus 
toward the parties which supported the government and the (bureau political) calculus 
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of the military concerning their organisation’s integrity. This latter was secured by re-
forms. In addition, all reforming actors – or those who strived for reforms – had a prag-
matic attitude towards conscription. They gained from their strong position within the 
system, but some of them did not hesitate to alter their position using their procedural 
abilities and personal skills. We will see this in the next section, where the ten hypothe-
ses concerning reforming and conserving leadership will be tested. It will turn out to be 
a much finer tool to analyse actors’ strategies to cope with crises than the theory of Cor-
tell & Peterson (1999) could be. 
9.4 Reformist and conserving leadership: dissecting the process 
Set I: Defining the situation 
Several defence resolutions and policy papers gave the political and military leaders the 
opportunity to redefine the security situation and thus the aims and means of defence 
policy. The conservative leaders, Björck and Sahlin, emphasised the insecure situation 
in the post-Cold War world. With growing instability in Middle and Eastern Europe, 
there was no room for army reductions. Björck also saw a danger for the independent 
Swedish defence industry if no investments were made. According to him, there was, 
however room to downsize the forces according to the security situation. It served the 
conserver’s plans to modernise the large territorial forces. Conscription was only a part 
of the framing or of the solutions they offered, as long as they referred to the necessary 
downsizing of the forces in order to finance new heavy armour. 
To their social democratic successors, it was imperative not to frame the situation as 
a crisis, or being a threat to Swedish security in terms of a large-scale attack. Otherwise, 
it would have been difficult to downsize the armed forces to the extent they did. Pub-
licly none of them referred to the situation for conscription as critical. Even when the 
second conscript committee of the 1990s, the 1998 inquiry, was initiated, Von Sydow 
avoided any statement that conscription might approach a dead end, now that fewer and 
fewer men were drafted. In the installation directive of the committee this issue was 
glossed over, by referring to it almost casually, as a secondary point in the argumenta-
tion. The social democratic leaders repeatedly emphasised, however, the necessity of 
conscription for democracy. They implicitly suggested that the absence of conscription 
would endanger democracy, the state, and the citizens’ virtues.  
The military leaders defined the situation regularly as a threat to the defence capa-
bility of Sweden, yet, from different perspectives and with different solutions. While in 
the beginning of the 1990s Gustafsson framed the situation as a crisis if conscription 
would not be saved and more money would be invested, his successor, Wiktorin, 
framed the general situation repeatedly as a crisis, if nothing would be done. And the 
solutions he offered hollowed out the conscription system. 
Around the social democrats came back into power, Wiktorin became the new 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. He did not frame the international situation 
as a crisis, but regularly pointed to new military threats, demanding different, modern-
ised armed forces. Additionally, when several economic rounds (or unexpected financial 
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crises) doomed on the horizon, he did not hesitate to exploit the situation by framing the 
situations as crises to the defence organisation, which needed strong resolve by making 
political choices: either fewer conscripts or giving up the reforms of the armed forces 
and the endangering of the Swedish defence industry. 
To conclude, all political actors, except for the conservatives at the beginning of the 
1990s, refrained from framing the international situation as a crisis. The military actors 
on the other hand did not hesitate to make use of the situation, framing it as a threat to 
the organisation, which needed firm resolve. 
Set II: Committed leadership teams 
In the Swedish case we twice saw teams who collaborated closely to reach their aims. In 
the beginning of the 1990s a successful conserving team and at the end of this decade a 
successful reforming team. In the beginning of the 1990s the Ministers of Defence and 
their undersecretaries collaborated, or at least they were trying to reach similar aims. 
The social democrats Roine Carlsson and Nygren had similar objectives when keeping 
conscription off the agenda. Yet, shortly after they had installed the conscription com-
mittee, the social democrats lost power, so not much political commitment of Carlsson 
and Nygren can be analysed.  
As far as the modernisation of the large territorial forces was concerned, the conser-
vative Minister of Defence, Björck, and his Junior Minister collaborated closely. The 
latter was asked by the conservatives because of his ability to plan a new defence con-
cept. Supported by the Prime Minister the duo dedicated itself to a higher defence 
budget and the procurement of modern heavy weapons. Conscription did not actually 
feature on their agenda and they were content that the conscription committee of 1991 
helped to keep the issue off the agenda. Björck was the experienced politician who 
communicated the plans that were made by Sahlin.  
There was a high congruency between the publicly announced plans of the conser-
vative team and their actual deeds, though even their own constituency was not spared. 
The downsizing of the forces came along with the closing of many garrisons, which 
were held in high esteem, in particular by the supporters of the conservative party, be-
cause of tradition, but also due to their economical importance for the region. 
Thage G. Peterson came on the scene as a traditional social democratic Minister of 
Defence, who was very committed to conscription and the concept of total defence. Yet, 
the actual policy diverged quite clearly from his public statements, considering that 
none of the figures he proposed for the different services have been reached. Consider-
ing the empirical data, there is little doubt that Peterson was very committed to con-
scription. However, his ideas and plans with regard to the organisation of the Swedish 
defence differed too much from what was financially feasible and organisationally sen-
sible. 
In his memoirs, Thage G. Peterson referred to the difficult relation with Wiktorin. 
Still, he and Wiktorin set a first, important step towards a new security structure, and 
the Minister admitted that he had needed Wiktorin for that. Yet, their aims for the future 
organisation differed extremely. So much so, that there is little reason to believe that 
they formed a close collaborating reforming team. 
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The combination Von Sydow-Wiktorin on the other hand was much more like a 
team. Their plans to finance the armed forces differed, but their aims for the future of 
the Swedish security and defence policy and its forces were much more complementary 
than during Thage G. Peterson’s term. Both were not strongly committed to conscrip-
tion, although Von Sydow followed at some stage the official party policy. Yet, Wik-
torin and Von Sydow shared the ideas about the future network-centric warfare: ‘…he 
and I had a very fruitful cooperation and a very good relation during the rest of my pe-
riod. And the only point where we were not at the same level was when we were dis-
cussing the ambition level, which means the economy. But for the rest it was working 
very smoothly.’29  
It is interesting to note that Björck/Sahlin formed a conserving conservative politi-
cal-civil servant team, whereas Von Sydow/Wiktorin formed a reforming political-
military team. And this combination turned out to be fruitful for the far-reaching re-
forms at the end of the century. There was some political and organisational resistance 
to downsize and restructure the armed forces. They fitted the budget plans of the social 
democrats and the left parties and most political resistance came from the conservative 
party spokesmen, who repeatedly criticised the low defence budget. In the next section, 
we will see how the leaders convinced their environment of the feasibility of their plans.  
Set III: Leadership persuasion tactics 
The Swedish mode of defence policymaking facilitates leadership persuasion tactics. 
The periodical making of the defence resolution offers an opportunity to the top of the 
ministry, but also to the Commanders-in-Chief within the parameters set by the Minis-
ter, to present well specified plans. Most of the leaders studied here made use of this 
opportunity by initiating armed forces investigations or presenting defence resolutions. 
What differed was their argumentation to support those plans. 
The bourgeois defence policy makers Björck and Sahlin used threat scenarios, when 
defending the modernisation of large territorial forces, applying at that stage a conserv-
ing strategy. According to the proposition of the government, the main task of the 
armed forces in 1991 was still to resist an armed attack, with short military warning, 
irrespective of the direction the attack might come from.30 To them, the territorial forces 
of the Cold War had proven their value and since the developments in the East were far 
from predictable, it would be wise to stick to those territorial forces – leaner but meaner. 
This was, according to our operationalisation, a purely conserving argument, fitting 
conserving leadership. 
In addition, they communicated those plans extensively. ‘There had been numerous 
TV and radio programs and, articles; it is hard to believe today how many TV programs 
we had about the question whether we should buy new battle tanks or not. Today one 
can laugh. Everybody was indeed his own expert. I have never seen so many experts in 
Sweden … But, what happened was … the army accepted that we downsized, if they 
got the main battle tank and other equipment instead.’31 
However, during the 1994 elections, Björck used jeopardizing arguments when try-
ing to react to the plans of the social democrats and liberals to cut in defence spending.32 
According to him, further downsizing would endanger Sweden’s security and defence 
autonomy: ‘There will be dramatic changes, with consequences for the defence indus-
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try, difficult transitional problems for a large number of garrison places and the end of 
general conscription …’33. According to the Minister, this would lead to Sweden’s 
membership in NATO. This tactic was aimed at the population’s resentments against 
another membership, in a year when EU-membership was high on the political agenda. 
Yet, those arguments were too weak to succeed. Firstly, after several financial crises, 
when Sweden stood at the eve of deciding whether or not to join the EU, defence did 
not stand high on the political and public agenda. The future of the welfare state was 
more important. Secondly, precisely in the year 1994 the Swedes felt more secure than 
in the years before and in the year after.34 
During several budget cuts and the 1997/98 financial crises within the armed forces 
Wiktorin made the political decision makers choose between stopping the modernisa-
tion of the armed forces and downsizing the number of conscripts. Practically a non-
choice, since it was technically impossible at that stage to stop the reform process of the 
forces without jeopardizing it. 
The social democratic Ministers of Defence, Thage G. Peterson and Von Sydow, of-
ten reacted with irritation to the plans of Wiktorin, who proposed to solve economical 
and financial problems in the defence budget at the expense of conscription. Firstly, 
Peterson underscored the importance of conscription to defend the large country, which 
fitted a conserving strategy; at the same time he initiated a further downsizing of the 
armed in the same proposition 1995/96:12, which is really a contradiction. Secondly, 
being aware of the clear majority in Sweden against professional forces,35 he empha-
sised the possibility of professional forces. Yet, none of those arguments prevented a 
further decline of the number of conscripts. In addition, Peterson’s plans to encourage 
alternative services, like the ‘landstorm’ and civil defence, did not convince the execu-
tive, the armed forces. None of those plans have been successfully implemented. 
With regard to conscription Von Sydow had no well-defined specific plan or 
counterarguments against Wiktorin. In fact, he reacted more to the environment instead 
of coming up with a clear plan or vision. This occurred, for example, in June 1997, 
when the Swedish National Audit Office (RRV) published its report on the waste of 
money in the defence sector because of its personnel policy. This was one of the main 
triggers for the second conscription inquiry in the decade. The second occasion took 
place around the same time, when an amount of 12 billion SEK was missing in the de-
fence budget and Wiktorin proposed to solve the crisis at the expense of conscription. 
The Commander-in-Chief was very successful with his publicly announced cuts in the 
conscript figures. He not only succeeded in getting the figures down to the level he sug-
gested and managed to save the budget in this way, he also triggered the government 
and the left parties to come up with a solution to the 1999 financial plans. The media 
were important for those tactics, in particular since the Commander-in-Chief and the 
military in Sweden appear to be more outspoken than in many other countries.36  
However, with regard to reforms of the armed forces in times of large budget cuts, 
Von Sydow and Wiktorin presented inevitable and feasible plans. Whenever there as a 
left majority in Parliament, each plan aimed at raising the defence budget was doomed 
to fail. The more so as the national audit report had shortly before shown how the or-
ganisation could save almost five percent of the budget a year by making good use of 
conscription. Instead, the leaders aimed at a total reform of the armed forces, away from 
invasion forces and towards forces with international crisis management capacities. 
Those smaller forces were not only cheaper, notwithstanding an extra budget for the 
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transitional phase, they also met the Swedish (leftist) ambition to promote peace in the 
world. 
To conclude, the case supports the hypothesis that reforming leaders have to present 
well-specified plans, which are feasible and inevitable. Besides, Wiktorin was very 
good in presenting his plans at the right moment for gaining support. All his options to 
guarantee an efficient and effective defence occurred at the expense of conscription. 
The conserving actors on the other hands had well specified plans for the future of the 
armed forces. However, firstly, in the case of the conserving social democrats, their own 
plans for conscription did not fit those defence plans. Secondly, their conserving tactics 
for saving the people’s defence often changed into conservative tactics, with arguments 
not strong enough to find broad political support. Instead of preventing far-reaching 
changes of the sector because the leaders were convinced of the values, beliefs, and in-
tegrity of the sector, their arguments tried to prevent changes as an aim in itself. This 
also holds true for the conserving tactics of the bourgeois government at the beginning 
of the 1990s. While in 1992 the defence resolution was a well-defined plan which met 
the demands of the insecure times, in 1994 Björck had nothing more to offer than jeop-
ardizing arguments against the proposed budget cuts. 
Set IV: Building broad support 
Until the beginning of the 1990s, the policymaking process in Sweden was highly insti-
tutionalised. The system of reaching a defence resolution guaranteed that the military 
and political actors collaborated. The Minister of Defence ordered the Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces to come up with an investigation, which was then further pre-
pared in the defence committee and debated in the parliamentary committee on defence. 
With the dissolution of the defence committee and the establishment of its successor, 
the defence commission, this process became less formal.37 In addition, the ministry 
became more responsible for the defence policymaking, whereas before that time Par-
liament had been much more influential.  
 There was no clear connection between those changes in the defence policymaking 
and the changes of the political-military relations. However, from that time, there was a 
noticeable tendency for military and political leaders to voice their disagreement pub-
licly during the making of defence policy. It started with Gustafsson and reached its 
climax when Wiktorin was Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. 
Yet, on crucial moments, once important decisions about the future of the armed 
forces had been taken, the military supported those plans and helped to solicit support. 
Little is known about the early 1990s. With regard to conscription Gustafsson and 
Björck had very different interests. Björck even cancelled the short training that was 
introduced to keep high conscript figures. However, Björck codified what already was 
the rule in conscription routine, viz. that it was not the supply by conscripts but the de-
mand of the forces that should be decisive for the actual number of draftees. For that, 
however, Björck needed the support of the social democrats, as he indicated himself. 
One important way Björck got that support was by allowing social democrats influential 
positions in the 1991 conscript committee. It was not only generosity but also political 
calculus.38 In addition, he had the support of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, 
because their plans were congruent and, in the end, of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
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armed forces. Though Björck’s plans were not good for conscription, he still invested in 
the forces.  
Little is known about Thage G. Peterson’s pursuit of support for his reform plans of 
the armed forces. It is known that he omitted to incorporate the military in his plans for 
the future of conscription and the total defence service. None of those plans have been 
implemented, the figures dropping constantly. That, however, would have been neces-
sary if Peterson wanted his plans to succeed, the more so as he removed the budget for 
those plans from the defence budget. The armed services were not amused.39 
In the second half of the 1990s, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces ac-
tively solicited broad support for the defence plans in the political arena and within his 
organisation. As already mentioned, the Minister of Defence, Von Sydow, and the 
Commander-in-Chief, Wiktorin, developed those plans together, though they differed 
about the budget. Yet, Wiktorin remembered that he and his close collaborators at the 
armed forces had a lot of contact with all political parties in Parliament. They invited 
them to HQ, informed them, discussed with them and presented their ideas. In addition, 
to convince a broader audience of the large scale reforms, Wiktorin and his ‘colleagues 
went out and held speeches, four to five speeches a week. We were talking and talking 
and trying to convince people.’40 
Though the government and the political parties supported Wiktorin, he faced a lot 
of resistance. ‘We are talking about closing down old regiments. The opposition within 
the armed forces itself.’41 Videoconferences were an important tool with which Wik-
torin could get support of his organisation. In a direct, internal Armed Forces broadcast 
on 19 March 1999, 30 September 1999 and 20 October 1999, he explained the implica-
tions of the reform plans for the future of the garrisons and the personnel simultane-
ously to all troops all over the country. Even parliamentary members who at that mo-
ment were staying in the countryside joined the broadcast in the barracks, which was 
greatly welcomed by the general.42 During those occasions, conscription was referred to 
only in a broader sense.  
Even though there were only a few examples, the Swedish case showed that leaders 
indeed actively built broad support. Little is known about Von Sydow, but Wiktorin 
used many different channels to communicate the reforms with many stakeholders in 
the sector. He not only lobbied in the political arena for support, but also in his own 
organisation. By using live broadcasts on an internal circuit, he created a type of per-
sonal care for his subordinates. The case showed that the process of support building 
indeed started at the political level, and went from other stakeholders to the people in 
the defence organisation. Yet, as far as the central subject of this study is concerned, i.e. 
conscription, it is fair to state that there was only little common ground between the 
social democrats and the military leaders and only little military support for the social 
democratic plans to keep a people’s defence. 
Set V: Controlling the process 
The formalised defence policymaking process in Sweden puts constraints on the Minis-
ter of Defence’s ability to control the process. The Swedish defence sector is open to 
many stakeholders and their relations are very horizontal, since many authorities share 
equal influence in the process. Like in many Western countries, the defence organisa-
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tion as such is very hierarchic, in particular since the organisational changes in 1994 and 
1998, when the Commander-in-Chief gained increasing power. In addition, the Com-
mander-in-Chief is expected to be politically loyal to the government. Yet, the Swedish 
case showed that the Commander had informal space to manoeuvre, especially in his 
relation with the Minister of Defence. 
The Minister sets the parameters for the armed forces investigation that is used for 
the preparation of the defence decision. Therefore, he is able to set the agenda of what is 
decided upon, but the commission is preparing the decision and afterwards societal ac-
tors and stakeholders in the sector can comment on that. Though it is the Minister of 
Defence, who is preparing the final law proposal, he has to take other systemic con-
straints into account. For instance, he has limited room to manoeuvre in a minority gov-
ernment, which from the second half of the 1990s was complicated by the fact that the 
social democratic minority government was supported first by the centre, and later by 
the left parties. Defence policymaking was therefore more complicated. In the 1998 
financial crisis, the left parties supported the cutbacks of the social democratic Minister 
of Finance, while shortly afterwards the centre-right parties were negotiating with the 
Minister of Defence about the next step in the reform of the armed forces.  
There were several moments when the Ministers of Defence had the opportunity to 
control the decision-making. Björck and Sahlin used the vacuum in defence policymak-
ing that existed after the traditional way of policymaking imploded at the beginning of 
the 1990s. They sped the process, by presenting a defence decision within three months 
after they came into office.  
In addition, the conscript committee, initiated by Björck’s predecessor, served the 
purpose of keeping conscription off the agenda. Yet, Björck’s procedural influence on 
its composition was limited. When the bourgeois parties came into office, the commit-
tee changed its composition, because new parties came into government. Still, the social 
democrats had three members in the committee, because Björck needed the support of 
the social democrats to change the conscript system.43  
With changing political majorities in 1994 and the enlarged power base of the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces within the defence organisation, the procedural 
abilities of the Minister of Defence seemed to deteriorate. Though Thage G. Peterson 
managed to present plans for the renewed armed forces, he never saw chance to gain 
support for the large conscription he was aiming for. At the same time the defence 
commission replaced the traditional defence committee. It was necessary to guarantee 
the traditional broad consensus about defence policy, but adapt at the same time to a fast 
changing security environment, which demanded a faster policymaking procedure than 
the five-year plans could have provided. Though the Ministry of Defence became more 
influential on this committee, it was yet another limitation to the Minister’s room to 
manoeuvre. Now he had to come up with a defence resolution every three to four years, 
which gave less room for long-term planning.  
With regard to conscription, there are only a few moments when Von Sydow exer-
cised procedural leadership. When setting the agenda of the 1998 conscript committee; 
when reformulating the tasks during the process; when postponing the work of the 
committee, since a reorientation of the security and defence policy was coming up, 
which led to another impressive downsizing of the armed forces; and when keeping this 
issue off the agenda during the 1999 meeting of the organisation FoF (People and De-
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fence). It helped the Minister and the social democrats to prevent an open debate and a 
possible unintended change.  
Formalised policymaking and the limited room to manoeuvre for the minority gov-
ernments in the second half of the 1990s made it difficult for reforming leaders to con-
trol the process. Still, political leaders had the chance to do so, although not every 
leader used this chance.  
9.5 Passive and active leadership styles 
The Swedish case, like the Dutch case, shows an inconsistent picture with regard to the 
hypotheses. The factors that are influencing actors’ perceptions once a window of op-
portunity has opened (Cortell & Peterson 1999) fit most conserving leaders and some-
times the reforming leaders. Most of the leaders who reformed or conserved the sector 
considered the costs of taking no action high. However, only the traditional ideologist, 
who wanted to preserve conscription in an extensive form, was blind to the extensive 
costs. An example is Thage G. Peterson, who defended conscription; however, apart 
from his policy plans, there is little evidence that he strived for the support of those 
plans. In particular those leaders who wanted to reform the armed forces had a very 
pragmatic relation to conscription. In addition, once they decided to reform the forces, 
e.g. Von Sydow and Wiktorin, they developed well-defined plans and tried to alter sys-
temic constraints. 
The same inconsistency can be found with regard to the hypothesis of reforming and 
conserving leadership. Some of the actors indeed strived actively for reform or actively 
tried to conserve the sector. Like Björck and Sahlin who defined the situation as critical 
and the country had to stick to the territorial, yet modernised, forces. Björck actively 
communicated those plans and controlled the process at some stage. In Figure 13 Björck 
and Sahlin are placed in the active conserving sector. Except for building broad support 
they scored high on the hypotheses, although more evidence was found for an active 
Björck. 
On the other side, in the active-reforming sector, are Von Sydow and Wiktorin. 
Since Wiktorin had been working on the reform of the armed forces since 1994 he can 
be found in three different stages during the process: (W1) from 1994-1997 were he 
worked with Thage G. Peterson on the change of the forces to have greater crisis man-
agement capabilities; (W2) from 1997-1998 in the transitional phase from invasion 
forces towards more and more flexible forces, but now together with Von Sydow; (W3) 
from 1999-2000, after the internal financial crisis and further cuts, he strived for the end 
of the territorial forces towards the network-centric warfare capability. With every 
phase, Wiktorin met more of the hypotheses for reforming leaders, which is expressed 
in the dynamical arrows. 
In the third phase, after the financial crisis, Von Sydow backed Wiktorin more. That 
became clear, not in the least, when he dissented with the Minister of Finance in 1999. 
Without the intervention of Prime Minister Göran Person another crisis almost came 
about. Another example was when he kept the issue off the political and public agenda. 
During his term the conscription figures dropped drastically, from over 30,000 to under 
17,000. Von Sydow never actively strived for abolition. The 1998 conscript inquiry 
served the Minister of Defence to keep the issue off the agenda. After its installation, he 
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twice added new tasks to the committee’s directive and at the end of 1998 he even post-
poned its work, since a drastic reform of the armed forces was on its way. Apart from 
those instances, Von Sydow did not act in favour of conscription according to one of the 
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Figure 13: Styles and types of leadership in the Swedish defence sector 
 
On the contrary, almost all actors who wanted to conserve conscription can be placed in 
the passive-conservative corner of the typology. Those are all social democratic Minis-
ters. The only actor who followed an active-conserving strategy was Gustafsson. How-
ever, his plans came too late. The new centre-right government invested in heavy ar-
mour, at the expense of the armed forces’ size, the conscripts, and Gustafsson’s protec-
tion guard. 
The case shows that large-scale reforms are possible in Sweden. There even seems to be 
room for active-reforming leadership, as shown by Wiktorin, and Von Sydow to a cer-
tain extent, at least in reforming the armed forces. For the abolition of conscription none 
of the military or political leaders wanted to be the instigator. The large reforms of the 
defence sector and the Swedish system made a silent goodbye possible. For as long the 
public is supporting the ever-growing inequality between those who serve and those 
who do not, no reforming leadership in the spotlight seems to be necessary. 
9.6 Leadership and institutional crisis management in Sweden: What have we 
learned? 
The Swedish case shows that policy officials and entrepreneurship is not restricted to 
elected state officials. There is room to initiate change and reform for bureaucratic and 
also respective military leaders. While in the British electoral reform of the 19th century 
Cortell & Peterson identified the lack of a parliamentary majority as an institutional 
obstacle44, it seems that in particular this lack of parliamentary majority for the politi-
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cians in the Swedish case of this study gave the military leaders more room to manoeu-
vre. While the politicians of any government in the 1990s had to find support for their 
defence policy plans at non-governmental parliamentary parties, the Commander–in-
Chiefs of the armed forces or the army had the possibility of bringing large parts of their 
plans into reality. Finding majorities in Swedish defence policy had been complicated 
by the fact that from 1998 on the social democrats needed the support of the left parties. 
Together with the social democratic Minister of Finance they wanted to cash in the 
peace dividend even more than the social democratic Minister of Defence.  
The Swedish case supports Cortell & Peterson’s theory that elites are seeking struc-
tural change the more secure their positions are. Evidence could have been found for 
weaker actors instigating change, yet the weaker the actor, the more conserving the 
strategy was. 
Another point that should be highlighted is accountability. While accountability for 
politicians might be relatively easy operationalised, i.e. electoral defeat or parliamentary 
support, bureaucratic accountability in the Swedish case was difficult to discern. For-
mally the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces is accountable to his political supe-
rior, yet, especially from 1994-2000 it seemed that the social democratic Ministers had 
few possibilities to enforce political loyalty or administrative accountability. An impor-
tant identified explanation was their weak political position. The Swedish case supports 
what was already an assumption of ‘t Hart: a consensus democracy like Sweden gives 
policy actors who do not stand in the spotlight more room to manoeuvre. However, dif-
ferent from ‘t Hart’s expectations, the Swedish defence sector left little room for leaders 
from decentralized organisations to influence the process.  
’t Hart’s theory of reforming leadership, however, also finds some support in the 
Swedish case. The reforming actor, i.e. mainly Wiktorin, does not hesitate to frame the 
situation as a threat to the organisation. He was not over-committed to conscription but 
committed to reforming the armed forces towards network centric warfare. More often 
than not he had the better arguments when financial problems urged decisions by the 
policy makers. His arguments were also decisive, since the arguments of the conserving 
leaders were rather weak, like those of Thage G. Peterson and Von Sydow who wanted 
to keep the conscription numbers high. Though the Commander-in-Chief often differed 
in opinion with the two social democratic Ministers of Defence, it appears that this 
combination - the social democrats and the general - was a fertile cooperation for the 
large reforms of the armed forces: from large territorial forces towards small flexible 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This study started with a quest for possible factors that lead to the abolition of conscrip-
tion in Western Europe. The key question was why some Western European countries 
abolished military conscription after the Cold War and why some did not. Though Karl 
Haltiner1 provided us with a cross-national quantitative analysis of this question, his 
conclusion - that abolition of conscription depends on the combination of defence alli-
ance membership, the degree of national military threat, and frequent participation in 
international missions - was unsatisfactory. It could, for example, not account for differ-
ences in the timing, speed, and depth of military changes that exist among West Euro-
pean countries. Haltiner’s study ‘black-boxed’ the policy process, which is where the 
key to explaining these differences lies. In an attempt to supplement and refine 
Haltiner’s analysis the following question became central to this study: Why did the 
Netherlands abandon conscription soon after the Cold War and why did Sweden not do 
so?2 In studying the policy process in these two countries we focused particularly on the 
importance of leadership in reform efforts. 
Assuming that the end of the Cold War made large territorial forces obsolete and 
thus lead to critical challenges for the armed forces and in particular for the territorial 
armies, the conscription reform attempts were placed in the wider context of crisis and 
reform literature. This study argued that the nexus between political and bureaucratic 
leadership is a key factor that accounts for the timing, speed, and depth of reforms in the 
defence sectors of the two countries. The first empirical question in this study was under 
which conditions leaders might decide to reform or not. The theory of Cortell & Peter-
son guided the quest.3 Additionally, by combining this theory with ‘t Hart’s4 notion of 
reforming leadership and deepening Terry’s5 concept of conserving leadership, a theo-
retical framework was developed. It was argued that when policy sectors are confronted 
with external or internal threats resulting in institutional crises, most senior policy mak-
ers tend to be inclined to conserve the status quo.  
Moreover, the claim was made that it is difficult to apply ‘t Hart’s theory, which 
was developed on the basis of studies of reforming leadership in Westminster democra-
cies, to consensus democracies like the Netherlands and Sweden, even though ‘t Hart & 
Gustavsson tried to do so in their article.6 Instead, it was expected that, when leaders in 
consensus democracies do choose to strive for reform, they will be more inclined to do 
so unobtrusively, or otherwise phrased: more passively. The activist type of reformer is 
rather rare in these systems, and likely to remain confined to crucial moments within 
ongoing, slow-moving processes of policy change. 
Using the cases of military conscription in the Netherlands and Sweden, this study 
showed that both countries differed on outcomes (which is why they were selected – 
although during the progress of the study those outcomes became more similar than 
anticipated), but also on process (particularly timing). The Netherlands postponed the 
draft within four years after the end of the Cold War, with a prominent reforming role 
for political and bureaucratic leaders. In Sweden, young men are still drafted to serve 
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the country, though the draft’s benefit to the armed forces is deteriorating. Quite con-
trary to the Netherlands, it was not politicians who took the lead in reform but military 
leaders. While in the Netherlands the armed forces and, in particular, the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army tried to conserve conscription, it was the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Swedish armed forces, Wiktorin, who sought to modernise those forces even at the 
expense of conscription. 
In this concluding chapter we will first answer the question why actors tend to 
change policy. It was possible to show the conserving reflex of many actors who sensed 
a crisis for the sector if changes would be made in the armed forces and conscription. 
Secondly, we will compare leadership types in both countries using the ten hypotheses 
about reforming and conserving leadership, to compare how leaders in both countries 
acted. One of the remarkable outcomes of this comparison is the different attitudes and 
political behaviour of the military in both countries. Finally, we will compare the lead-
ers in both countries on the dimensions ‘style’ and ‘type’. This classification will help to 
understand reforms in consensus democracies. 
10.2 Conserving reflex vs. pragmatic reforming leadership 
Cortell & Peterson7 argue that international and domestic triggers can create a window 
of opportunity that will alter the perceptions of policy makers to capitalise on those 
windows for change. The degree of change depends on the size of the window. Non-
crisis events, defined here as ‘environmental pressure that create localised costs or offer 
elites only minimal autonomy from political concerns’8 open micro-windows. On the 
other hand, crisis events open macro-windows, with crisis defined here as ‘environ-
mental pressure that highlight wide-spread inefficiencies in extant domestic institutions 
or afford elites wide-ranging autonomy from short-term political constraints’.9 Four 
factors (crisis awareness, political calculus, inner conviction and institutional position) 
can influence leaders’ preferences to exploit those windows, however, those agents are 
still limited by the structures they operate in. 
In this study we tested Cortell & Peterson’s theory on the Dutch and Swedish de-
fence sectors after the Cold War, supposing that this event opened a macro window for 
the leaders in those institutional settings. Widening this concept to non-political actors 
too, i.e. senior civil servants and senior military leaders, it turned out that leaders on 
different levels within the respective administrations did indeed sense different win-
dows of opportunity. The theory provided us with good insights about leaders’ percep-
tions. In particular, it could account for the conservative attitude of leaders conducting 
no or only micro changes. This section will systematically report the empirical findings 
in a consecutive pattern, starting with an overview in Table 26.  
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Table 26: Comparison of leaders’ perceptions  
Crisis awareness 
In both countries we saw similar effects after the Cold War with regard to the crisis 
awareness of the leaders within the sector. In the beginning, many actors perceived the 
threat to the countries’ security high and as a consequence they conserved the status 
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quo. Yet, the approaches to conserving the status quo were slightly different. While in 
the Netherlands the conserving actors did not want the size of the organisation to shrink 
below a certain threshold, the Swedish leaders accepted size reduction in exchange for 
investment in the modernisation of the forces. 
Around the same moment when those investments were decided upon in Sweden, in 
the beginning of 1992, some of the Dutch leaders changed their perception. Under the 
impression of the failed ‘coup d’état’ in the Soviet Union and encouraged by yet an-
other cashing in of the peace-dividend, they considered the costs of doing nothing high. 
That is why they strived for a change of the tasks, modernisation and downsizing of the 
forces and – as a consequence – the abolition of conscription.  
It took the Swedes exactly six years longer to come to the same decision. Under the 
impression of a vanishing threat in the security environment and confronted with yet 
another cashing in of the peace-dividend, the reforming actors strived for a change of 
tasks, the high-tech modernisation and further downsizing of the forces, but no abolition 
of conscription. Actually, the period from 1994 until 1997, with the social democratic 
Minister of Defence Thage G. Peterson, was a period in which Sweden slowly adapted 
to the changed security environment. The Minister admitted that times had changed, but 
he still wanted a large people’s defence as a back up. 
The trigger’s (i.e., the end of the Cold War) influence on the leaders’ perceptions is, 
in both cases, a necessary and sufficient condition to conserve. In an insecure situation 
the actors had difficulties calculating the costs of their actions, respectively, there were 
barely any alternative calculations available. Yet, the trigger was insufficient to alter the 
leaders’ perceptions on initiating change. A second trigger was necessary to induce 
leaders to reflect on alternative futures for the armed forces. Either way, the hypothesis 
alone cannot sufficiently indicate the directions the leaders have chosen. That is why we 
have to turn to the three hypotheses based on the theory of Cortell & Peterson. 
Political calculus of the gains and damages 
In both countries elections and accountability played a minor role. Only in Sweden, in 
1998, did the Defence Commission decide to postpone a report about the future security 
policy because of upcoming elections. Partially that can be explained by the fact that 
defence and conscription only played a minor role on the public agenda. The domestic 
and international political calculations seemed much more important. In general, how-
ever, it was difficult to isolate the leaders’ position using this hypothesis since it is 
closely intertwined with the fourth hypothesis, i.e. leaders’ position within the system. 
According to this hypothesis reforms were fostered or prevented to improve or stabilise 
the power and position of leaders. In the Dutch case, however, we saw that a leader, i.e. 
Ter Beek, attempted to improve his position within the institutional setting in order to 
be able to reform. Three findings are worth noting here. 
Firstly, the political calculus of the gains and damages by the leaders were not re-
stricted to the national arena. In the Dutch case, being part of a defence alliance played 
an important role for the conserving actors. In particular the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
repeatedly referred to the consequences of the Dutch position within NATO if the coun-
try would downsize the forces and – closely connected to that – abolish conscription.  
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Secondly, such calculi were not restricted to the political leaders. Bureaucratic and 
military leaders were found to reason in similar, although more restricted, ways. The 
assumption was that their calculus was centred on the prospects for their current job 
satisfaction and personal career. In the end, limited evidence could be found for this. 
Many of the military leaders tried to preserve or improve the position of their own ser-
vices. All Commanders-in-Chief of the Armies (Sagrén, Wilmink, Couzy) assessed pos-
sible policy changes in terms of the gains and losses for their organisation, i.e., in terms 
of funding, task structure, and bureau-political status. The same holds true for the Com-
manders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Van der Vlis and Wiktorin) although they were 
much more concerned with the military organisation as a whole. That approach made it 
easier for them to support reforms. For example, Van der Vlis supported the abolition of 
conscription in the end, prioritising the implementation of the Priorities Paper, since he 
knew that he would not gain a majority for upholding conscription. Another example of 
this is Wiktorin, who initiated reforms for the sake of the whole organisation even at the 
expense of conscription. 
A third finding that is worth mentioning is the ‘security’ of a leader’s position, op-
erationalised in the size of the governmental coalition. It emerged that leaders in a coali-
tion with a larger majority had some room to manoeuvre, like Ter Beek in the Nether-
lands. However, that does not mean that minority governments offer no room for policy 
change. In 1991, the centre-right minority government in Sweden was able to raise the 
defence budget while supported by the right-populist party New Democrats. With the 
extra money it managed to conserve the territorial defence of the Cold War. In 1995 
Thage G. Peterson slowly started the transition of the forces. However, although this 
transition started under the pressure of spending-cuts, the changes went only halfway: 
partly new tasks and still a territorial defence. In 1998, the Minister of Defence in a so-
cial democratic minority government had difficulties finding extra spending after a 
budget crisis in the armed forces. The Minister of Finance, a social democrat, but also 
the two left parties supporting the government, refused to invest money in defence at the 
expense of traditional left policy sectors. With the lack of money and the cut in the 
budget came major reforms. This illustrates that the size of a government (coalition) on 
its own is of little explanatory value without taking the wider policy context and the 
colour of a government into account. 
Inner conviction 
In none of the cases was there a leader who wanted to abolish conscription or restruc-
ture the armed forces in a direction that differed from their territorial defence capacity 
or invasion defence before the end of the Cold War. Even at the beginning of 1992, in 
both countries many leaders were reluctant and preferred to stick to the traditional 
forces. The cases contradict the hypothesis by showing that well-formed views on a 
needed reform are not a necessary condition for initiating change.  
Contrary to the theory’s anticipation, ‘ideological ballast’ of many actors in the field 
prevented them from reforming. This may explain their conserving behaviour. 
Particularly the military leaders with roots in the Cold War, Gustafsson, Wilmink, 
and to some extent Van der Vlis, had problems with the quick changes. It was a similar 
case for the older generation of Swedish social democrats, like the Ministers of Defence 
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Roine Carlsson and Thage G. Peterson. The less ideological the leaders were, the more 
they were willing to initiate change. De Winter was a non-ideological reformer guided 
by reason. Wiktorin was not only very pragmatic, but he also was an Air Force pilot 
from a younger generation than Gustafsson. This meant that he neither had the ideologi-
cal ballast of the Cold War nor was he attached to the Army, which suffered most from 
the post-Cold War changes. 
The question remains why Ter Beek eventually initiated reforms in spite of the fact 
that he was and remained ideologically predisposed to support conscription even after 
he had instigated reforms. The answer will be given in the next part, when the last factor 
influencing leaders’ perceptions for change will be discussed. 
Institutional position 
Both the Dutch and Swedish case support the hypothesis that the policy maker’s posi-
tion within the institutional setting can affect his perception on whether to make use of a 
window of opportunity or not. The Dutch case shows additionally that leaders not only 
need to have a favourable institutional position at the beginning, but that they also have 
the ability to improve their position in order to reform. 
In the Swedish case, Björck had the advantage that he came into office at a moment 
when the social democrats were weak, the traditional policymaking process imploded 
and the international security situation was insecure, at least in the eyes of many 
Swedes. Ter Beek, on the other hand, had a much more unfavourable institutional set-
ting to reform. At first this was not a problem since Ter Beek did not intend to reform. 
Once, however, he changed his mind, in the beginning of 1992, he started to alter the 
institutional setting. He had already excluded the defence council from the making of 
the Priorities Paper, but after the failed ‘coup d’état’ in the Soviet Union he bypassed 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, excluded those militaries who might slow down the 
reform process and he carefully watched the changing political majorities in Parliament. 
This institutional change helped to effect his plans to abolish conscription. 
The Swedish case of Von Sydow was similar. Regardless of the fact whether tradi-
tional social democrats believed in conscription or not, when he came into power, he 
inherited Thage G. Peterson’s plans. However, the moment he had developed his own 
policy and when he was convinced of the direction, he started to alter the setting. In 
particular his strategies to keep conscription off the agenda are remarkable. We will 
discuss this in greater detail in the next parts, when we look at the ‘how’ of leadership in 
reform. 
The Dutch case also showed that some actors at least tried to initiate reform, al-
though their institutional position was unfavourable, like General Brinkman. The Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army Couzy tried to improve his position so that he could pre-
vent politically desired reforms that he considered too early and too far-reaching. How-
ever, both men ran head-on into a brick wall of resistance, since they were not in a posi-
tion to alter the rules of the game.  
Yet, their Swedish colleague succeeded where they failed. Wiktorin profited from 
the fact that when he came into office, his authority within the military institution had 
improved.10 And it improved even further in 1998 when the posts of Commanders-in-
Chief of Army, Navy and Air Force were abolished. At the same time he had the advan-
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tage that the social democratic Minister of Defence had a weak position within a social 
democratic minority government, supported by leftist parties.  
 
The case findings show that one factor alone cannot account for the influence of actors’ 
perceptions once a window of opportunity to change has opened. It is the combination 
of the four factors that provided us with a good insight into the rationale beyond lead-
ers’ willingness to initiate or prevent changes. However, certain nuances have to be 
added. 
While the first two factors found strong support in the cases, the ideology factor did 
not. Well-formed views were important, but when they turned out to be firm beliefs 
they led to a more rigid conserving behaviour. The number of cases is still too small to 
weigh the different factors and to generalise their influence. However, even if we would 
raise the numbers, one of the limits of this theory is that it is still too rough a measure to 
understand if leaders are making instrumental use of a crisis, or if they were really con-
vinced that a crisis had occurred that would need firm resolve. In other words, the bal-
ance between leaders’ calculus and their ideological ballast, as we called it, has to be 
calibrated with finer tools than the theory can provide.  
The cases also show that the factors given by Cortell & Peterson still depict political 
actors very much as subjects that fully depend on their institutional surrounding. The 
authors anticipated this finding in their article, when demanding further research to fo-
cus on the statement of ‘when agents can effectively alter those structures’.11 This study 
finds evidence that even if the conditions are not as favourable as theory might expect, 
some actors do not hesitate to alter existing structures, to make more active use of their 
personal (political) capacities, and to strive for changes even if they themselves had 
never expected that beforehand. After finding scientifically sufficient, but also satisfac-
tory, answers why actors initiate or prevent change, we will turn in the next part to the 
issue of how actors initiate change, where we will gain more insight in opportunities 
when leaders have room to manoeuvre – even within consensual democracies – and 
under which conditions.  
10.3 From conserving to reforming leadership 
Defining the situation 
In both countries the conserving actors tried to frame the changes in the security envi-
ronment as a threat to the country or at least as an unpredictable and instable situation. 
To them every change in the sector that would excavate the status quo of the territorial 
defence was dangerous. In the Netherlands of the immediate post-Cold War period 
many actors in the sector supported this definition. Yet, at the same time they started to 
downsize the organisation. In Sweden there was only a small majority supporting the 
plans of the government to invest in procurement, which, according to the latter, was a 
necessity given the security situation. Moreover, while the failed ‘coup d’état’ in the 
Soviet Union marked a turning point in the security definition by an ever-growing group 
of reformers in the Netherlands, the same event led to a conservation reflex in Sweden.  
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Though in the Netherlands the process towards the reform of the armed forces al-
ready started in 1992 and in Sweden not before 1995, reformers in both countries fol-
lowed the same strategy. They had to define the situation as secure enough to strive for 
major changes. In addition, they had to convince their environment that a hypothetical 
threat to the countries would not occur within ten to fifteen years. This would be time 
enough to rebuild the territorial defence capacity in case of changes in the international 
environment, which was in both countries guaranteed with reserve forces and weapons. 
There were two differences. Firstly, in 1999 the Swedish reformers had to convince 
their environment that after all the budget cuts the territorial defence had been so exca-
vated, that a far-reaching reform towards network-centric warfare was the only chance 
to save the armed forces. Secondly, in the Netherlands postponing the draft was an ex-
plicit part of the reforms of the armed forces. In Sweden conscription repeatedly was 
put on the agenda, but never in the sense that it was necessary to abandon it as part of 
the reforms.  
The cases contradict the hypothesis that conserving actors have to frame the situa-
tion as a non-recurring event, while the reformers have to frame the situation as a crisis, 
which needs firm resolve. However, this is understandable given the nature of the sec-
tor. For security policy and the defence sector the hypothesis should be seen the other 
way round. The different strategic positions of the countries and the neutrality of Swe-
den can partially explain the differences in the reactions of the conserving leaders – in 
the Netherlands the downsizing and in Sweden the downsizing and the procurement of 
heavy armour. The Soviet troops were only a few hundred kilometres away from Swe-
den, in the Baltic States, and Sweden had to rely on its own defence if the situation in 
the Baltic region would destabilise. There was, however, another important reason: after 
years in opposition the conservative policy makers finally saw their chance to imple-
ment their Cold War defence policy. Since the mid-1990s this insecure feeling changed 
extensively and – given the policy process towards network centric warfare and low 
conscription figures – the fact that Sweden is not a member of an alliance played a mi-
nor role. Neutrality proves to be an unimportant factor in explaining the Swedish de-
fence policy of the late 1990s. 
What finds support is that the reforming actors were relatively new in the sector, 
which made it easier for them to de-institutionalise the existing order. Those who had 
their roots in the Cold War had difficulties adapting to the changing times and to the 
idea of new armed forces, with fewer or even without any conscripts. 
 
Committed leadership 
The cases offer support for the hypothesis. Those leaders who formed cohesive units, 
whether reforming or conserving, were more successful than the solo players. In addi-
tion, those leaders who committed themselves only at politically auspicious moments or 
showed congruency between word and deed were more successful than those players 
who committed themselves to a policy that became unfeasible during the process. 
Whether they were politicians, like Thage G. Peterson, or soldiers, like Gustafsson, 
Wilmink and Van der Vlis, they all lost their influence on the policy process because 
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they all were so convinced of their plans, that they failed to develop contingency plans 
or alternative futures. The soldiers were taken by surprise when they heard that the offi-
cial policy line differed from what they had anticipated. Moreover, the Dutch military 
leaders not only neglected alternatives, they explicitly or implicitly forbade their subor-
dinates to develop alternative models for armed forces without conscription. Instead of 
using the potential of those subordinates to take the lead in the discussion and offer re-
solve, they trusted their influence on the conscript committee. No incongruence between 
their words and deeds could be found. This is in contrast with Peterson, who produced 
plans to stop the decline of the draftees, but failed to implement them.  
All the ‘successful’ political leaders, such as Björck, Ter Beek and Von Sydow had 
the advantage of surrounding themselves with one or more persons who actively nur-
tured their policy plans and helped them find support for those plans. Although in the 
case of Von Sydow, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Wiktorin was quite 
self-willed, they still developed the plan for the modern forces together. 
Once the units had developed their reforming or conserving (Björck/Sahlin) plans, 
they did not hesitate to defend those plans in public and to present them explicitly as the 
solution to the problems, respectively crisis. Björck/Sahlin raised the budget, downsized 
the forces and shut down many garrisons to finance the procurement for the invasion 
forces. Though they faced resistance, to them this was the right answer to the insecure 
situation and they carried out their plan. To Ter Beek and his unit of changing members, 
depending on the moments in the process, the answer to the changed environment was a 
changed task for the armed forces in which conscripts no longer played a part. Once 
they had developed this plan, they waited for a political feasible moment to commit 
themselves to those plans, or they created those moments themselves. Little is known 
about the commitment of Von Sydow, but Wiktorin invested a lot of time, energy and 
inventiveness to convince the sector of their plan. 
Persuasion tactics 
All reformers eventually had well-specified plans that they tested with trial balloons 
(NGIZ, Wiktorin’s ‘spontaneous’ models in the media). In contrast, Björck in 1991 was 
the only conserver who had a well-specified plan. All other conserving actors either did 
not have well-specified plans (Björck in 1994), or had unfeasible plans (Thage G. Peter-
son), or failed to communicate them to the relevant actors in the sector, i.e. parliamen-
tarians or the public (Dutch Army). What all ‘unsuccessful’ conserving actors had in 
common was their often reactionist argumentation and the omission to test those argu-
ments in public before presenting them as the ultimo ratio. 
While in 1991 the conserver Björck had a desirable and feasible plan to overcome 
the insecure situation by procuring heavy armour and strengthen Sweden’s ability to 
defend itself, the ‘unsuccessful’ conserver Björck of 1994 only had a ‘rhetoric of reac-
tion’ against a social democratic (budget cuts) future defence policy. Like Van den 
Broek in 1992 in his reaction to Ter Beek’s NGIZ speech, the Swedish Defence Minis-
ter jeopardised the consequences of further downsizing for the sake of Swedish security. 
Both Ministers had little public and political impact with their warnings. The public 
climate changed towards a more secure feeling (Sweden). And in times of cashing in the 
peace dividend by investing in social security - which in Sweden was accelerated by 
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financial crises - defence did not stand high on the public agenda. Moreover, after the 
Kuwait-Iraq crisis of 1990/91 and the conflicts in the Balkan, the definitive dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact and the democratisation in the former East and Central European 
countries, large territorial invasion forces just did not make sense anymore. The more so 
as they had been hollowed out after decennia of economics (Sweden) and required 
many young men who preferred to work on their civil career (Netherlands). 
In this situation the arguments of those who had the vision to reform these large, 
anachronistic forces had the more desirable and feasible proposals. Those plans seemed 
almost inevitable, considering the changes in the international environment and within 
the state, such as the growing inequality of those who were drafted, which in both coun-
tries became a political problem. Yet, the choices that were made with regard to con-
scription differed, though leaders came up with similar answers: installing an advisory 
committee. 
Well-defined plans are a necessary condition for reformers and conservers, yet this 
in itself is not sufficient. The main arguments have to be tested and it appears from the 
cases that negative, reactionist arguments have less effect than positive, landmark ar-
guments, which took environmental changes plus the expectations of the majority in the 
different arenas into account. At those moments when reformers (or conservers) were 
not sure about the effects, they tested them first and once they were convinced, they 
invested in the communication of their plans in case the majority was not certain. In the 
Swedish case the conservers and reformers had to work hard to convince their constitu-
ency and organisation. They did this extensively, not in the least via the media and, in 
particular, the television. This is closely connected to the actors’ strategies for building 
broad support. 
Building broad support 
Building broad support does not appear to be a necessary condition for reform plans, but 
it enhances the chances for successful conserving leadership. However, some caveats 
must be born in mind here. Empirical findings are very limited and the systemic charac-
teristics between the two cases are so different, that conclusions cannot be easily drawn. 
In the Netherlands the policy planning with regard to conscription was limited to 
very small groups with little exchange. On the one hand, there were the reformers 
around Ter Beek, who waited to announce their plans until a majority was within reach. 
On the other hand, there were the armed forces and in particular the army, who had in-
tensive contact with the conscript committee, but only seldom with the Minister. The 
military leaders saw little reason for that. Wilmink relied on the committee and Van der 
Vlis was a non-political soldier. Moreover, the latter received signals from the Minister 
that the army’s model would be favoured and in a later stage he misinterpreted the Min-
ister’s plans. 
Even with regard to the realisation of the general defence policy’s course - the mak-
ing of the Priorities Paper - the circle of those, who actively worked on it, was limited to 
the absolute necessary minimum. The Commanders-in-Chief of the different parts of the 
armed forces only had influence on their respective sections. This process can be ex-
plained by the previous experiences Ter Beek had with the writing of the Defence White 
Paper 1991, his personal policy style, and the procedure of the Dutch defence policy-
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making. In the Netherlands, Defence Ministers have a great influence on the persons 
who work on defence plans. They point out the importance of actors involved. This fit-
ted Ter Beek’s personal style of working in small groups and it met his wish to avoid 
large negotiation organs, which delayed the process, as had happened in the defence 
council two years before. 
The Swedish defence policy process is quite different. It is traditionally an open 
process that involves many stakeholders and is based on broad consensus. Even in 1991, 
when the traditional method of defence policymaking had changed, the leaders would 
solicit support for their plans, in particular at their constituency. No evidence could be 
found that Björck, the Swedish Minister of Defence 1991-1994, built a coalition among 
civil servants, and only little evidence for his doing so in relation to the military. He 
simply expected them to support him, the more so as he invested in procurement. The 
codification that ‘only the need shall steer’ appears not to have taken place in close co-
operation with Commander-in-Chief Gustafsson. Thage G. Peterson was another good 
example of a conservative leader who did not engage in coalition building, at least with 
regard to conscription. He planned the revaluation of the total defence service, which 
included civil and military defence, not only without consulting the military, but also at 
the expense of their budget. None of the Minister’s planned figures were ever achieved.  
The Swedish Commander-in-Chief Wiktorin was the only reforming leader who in-
vested extensively in building broad support, in particular within his own organisation. 
Above all, he did so by publicly showing commitment to his organisation and by re-
peatedly criticising the policy plans of the government that would be implemented at the 
expense of the organisation. In this way he gained more internal acceptance for the 
changes that he did want to make. We saw a similar effect in the Netherlands with the 
open letter of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Couzy, in which he appealed to the 
government to consider a five-year transitional period when abolishing conscription. In 
particular, due to the fact that he had to sign a declaration of loyalty, he gained stature 
and trust in his own organisation, which was necessary for the major reforms he had to 
execute. 
When used in moderate doses, creating an ‘us versus them’ feeling vis-à-vis the po-
litical superiors appears to be an effective tool for military leaders. Political leaders on 
the other hand should be more careful with this strategy. Within a policy system of 
changing majorities and dependency on many veto players such a strategy can be coun-
terproductive. What all cases showed was that notwithstanding the (lack of) coalition 
building strategies, all successful actors would gain by their ability to control the proc-
ess. 
Controlling the process 
The defence sectors in both countries differed in their openness and formality of the 
policy process. Although the Dutch defence sector has an element of societal involve-
ment through the Societal Council, which delivers reports about societal relevant issues 
in the armed forces, the policy process in the sector is relatively closed. Only a few ac-
tors are officially involved, like the Parliament, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (only as 
far as foreign affairs and security analysis is concerned), the cabinet and the (Junior) 
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Minister(s) of Defence. As far as the internal organisational policy process is concerned 
the Minister has a great influence on the appointment of the advisors.  
In Sweden the sector is much more open than in the Netherlands and the policy 
process is much more formalised. Stakeholders, in particular decentralised agencies, are 
officially involved in the process. Not only are they regularly asked for their opinion, 
they are also invited to react to any policy plan before it becomes an official proposal. 
In the case of the reforms of conscription and the armed forces after the Cold War, the 
main actors were the Civil Emergency Agency and the Recruiting Office. Moreover, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has to prepare a report for every defence 
decision within the parameters set by the government and until 1998 the Commanders-
in-Chief of the different branches had the opportunity to write a dissenting opinion. Par-
liament is closely involved in all stages.  
Although the defence sectors in both countries differed from each other, some simi-
lar processes could be discerned. In both countries particularly the strategies of the re-
forming actors on coping with the subject of conscription were comparable. The Dutch 
Minister of Defence Ter Beek and the Swedish Minister of Defence Von Sydow were 
able to keep the issue off the agenda while preparing their policy plans for the radical 
reforms of the Armed Forces. The conscription committees served this aim very well. 
As long as the committees were busy, it was not necessary for the leaders to take con-
scription into account. Originally the tasks of the committees in both countries were 
similar, in particular when comparing the Dutch committee with the Swedish 1998 in-
quiry. Both committees had the task of coming up with recommendations on how to 
make military service more attractive. During the parliamentary debate the Dutch com-
mittee was also given the task of investigating the feasibility of abolition. 
Von Sydow repeatedly postponed the work of the committee or altered its task in 
order to gain time, and in the beginning of 1999 he prevented a whole congress from 
debating the subject. The committee’s report was not presented before the proposal of 
the armed forces’ reform. At one stage, when Ter Beek had been forced to talk to the 
committee because of his NGIZ speech, he softened the tenor of that speech and depo-
liticised the situation. Actually this was rather an accident, since the press based their 
comments on a written version in which Ter Beek was more outspoken about abolition. 
When holding the address he was much more diplomatic. Other than that, he managed 
to keep the two processes of reform and conscription separate and since there were only 
a few actors involved in the Priorities Paper process, there was little chance that the ac-
tors of both circles would meet too often. That the dual process was enforced upon the 
committee by Parliament was actually a minor problem to Ter Beek. In the end, aboli-
tion was better suited to the new armed forces that were being used for crisis manage-
ment tasks abroad.  
There were also differences between the two leaders. Von Sydow obviously had 
more difficulties with his Minister of Finance and with his restriction of the Swedish 
Commander-in-Chief than Ter Beek had had. The Dutch Minister of Defence threatened 
to resign and with that managed to ease the pain of the next economics round. Yet, Von 
Sydow made use of the opportunity to command the Commander-in-Chief and to pub-
lish governmental inquiries. He did the same during the 1997/98 financial crisis. Re-
peatedly he ordered Wiktorin to report the problems and in the end he came up with an 
extensive report that exonerated the Minister. Though the constitutional committee in-
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terrogated the Minister and Wiktorin, Von Sydow used all his procedural power to show 
Wiktorin who was the boss. 
Ter Beek excluded everyone who could slow down or oppose the reforming process, 
including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Commanders-in-Chief. He punished 
Couzy when he tried to influence the implementation of abolition via the media. And it 
was a welcome coincidence that at exactly the same time, in 1992, many of the key ac-
tors of the old Cold War generation were routinely replaced. Their successors did not 
appear to be a personal choice by Ter Beek, the more so as only a few men were suited 
for the vacant posts. 
The Dutch Minister of Defence had the advantage that the Commanders-in-Chief in 
the Netherlands were not only comparatively new to their office, but that they also acted 
loyally and a-politically, except for the aforementioned Couzy. In Sweden the Com-
manders-in-Chief had little formal power, but they had much more opportunity to use 
informal means. In 1992 the Dutch Commander-in-Chief held little official power and 
in addition he refrained Van der Vlis from playing the political game. For Wiktorin the 
transition from a horizontal defence organisation towards a more hierarchical organisa-
tion, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was advantageous in 
1994. This made him influential during the reform process in his own organisation. In 
particular after 1998, when the posts of the two other Commanders-in-Chief were abol-
ished, his position was strong and he would not have managed to be successful without 
this authority. 
Though the setting of the leadership’s environment is very important for the policy 
outcome, the political leaders in particular have the ability to control the process, even 
in consensual democracies. The cases support the hypothesis by ‘t Hart & Gustavsson 
that procedural leadership is important.12 In particular keeping the issue of conscription 
off the agenda served Ter Beek and Von Sydow well in pursuing their large-scale re-
forms. In 1991 Björck had the same advantage when he had to convince his constitu-
ency that investments in weapons were more important than personnel. 
To summarise, the cases did not support all hypotheses of the leadership model for-
mulated in chapters 2 and 3. However, the direct comparison of these two consensual 
democracies provided us with more insights about the relation between actors and their 
political environment. In Table 27 the results are presented in an overview. Both cases 
show that in order to reform military sectors, aimed at drastic task restructuring and 
downsizing, it was necessary that the leaders convinced political stakeholders that the 
international environment was quite safe. The moment the reformers considered the 
threat to the country to be low, they started to reform the sector. It made no great differ-
ence if a country was part of a defence alliance or not, though it helped to explain the 
difference in timing. Contrary to what Haltiner expected the NATO-membership had 
almost slowed down the process in the Netherlands, since the conserving actors did not 
want to change the national structures without consultation. As far as Sweden is con-
cerned, given the tremendous downsizing of the territorial forces, not being a member 
of an alliance did not seem to be considered a security problem. The Dutch reforms 
quickly aimed at intensive international cooperation. Nowadays, this concept is quite 
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Table 27: How leaders reform or conserve in Sweden and the Netherlands 
 
The second hypothesis, committed leadership, is confirmed by both cases. Commitment 
is a necessary condition and it is important that leaders should form teams. However, 
over-commitment seems to be counterproductive. It appears that most conserving actors 
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were more or less solo players, who failed to prevent change (except for Björck/Sahlin, 
1991). The third hypothesis, persuasion tactics, is also confirmed. The tactics – if any – 
of the conservers (again, except Björck/Sahlin) were restricted to reactionist, rhetoric 
and unfeasible plans. If leaders, however, wanted to succeed, they needed well-defined, 
feasible plans. In both cases it was helpful when the leaders tested their plans or the 
direction of their initiatives first. Ter Beek did so with his NGIZ speech. In Sweden it is 
part of the process to invite comments on proposals, but Wiktorin especially was suc-
cessful in testing the margins, in particular when it came to conscription figures. Al-
though each time when Wiktorin gave low figures, the Minister of Defence struggled in 
public, the end-outcome always went in the direction Wiktorin had proposed. 
Building broad support by the leaders, the fourth hypothesis, appears to be a sys-
temic condition and not a leadership quality trait. In the Netherlands it turned out to be 
helpful to limit the number of actors involved in the policy to a minimum and there 
even was no recrimination over the fact that the implementing actors had been more or 
less excluded. Building broad support is an unnecessary condition in this country. It 
proved more important that the leadership ability scored high on the fifth hypothesis. In 
Sweden, however, building broad support would have been part of the regular policy 
process anyway. In the beginning of the 1990s, Björck was certain of the support of the 
centre-right parties and the support of the army for his plans. Instead of the implement-
ing actor’s support, he needed to strive for support from the Swedish population, sup-
port that was used to cutback in defence, particularly in financially difficult times. In 
addition, Björck needed the support of the social democrats to downsize the forces and 
codify that ‘the need shall steer’, since a simple majority would not be sufficient for this 
societally far-reaching issue. Wiktorin and Von Sydow also managed to build broad 
support for their plans. It was not uncommon for the social democratic minority gov-
ernment in Sweden to receive support for the low defence budget from the left and sup-
port for the concrete defence policy plans from the centre-right. The 1999 plans, how-
ever, were so far-reaching that the government needed a temporary raise of the budget 
for their implementation. The support of all parties on both sides was required for this 
and Wiktorin and Von Sydow succeeded in achieving broad support to increase the 
budget. In addition, Wiktorin invested much in the support of his organisation.  
The fifth hypothesis finds support in both countries. Successful reformers have to 
control the process. The agenda setting capability of the reformers proved very impor-
tant. Von Sydow and Ter Beek had to keep conscription separated from the large-scale 
reforms and they succeeded in achieving this. The capacity of appointing actors to cru-
cial positions was less important. No proof can be found that when Ter Beek had to fill 
the vacant posts of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Army - which 
came in at an opportune time and proved useful for the necessary reforms since this 
staff change represented a change of generations - he made deliberate choices for the 
successor. Although the empirical evidence supported many of the hypotheses, it be-
came clear that the exchange between the leaders and their environment is an important 
factor in explaining policy outcomes. Certain behaviour of actors could be explained by 




10.4 Leadership and institutional reform in consensus democracies 
In this study the leadership’s environment and the type and style of leadership were ex-
pected to be influential for the outcome of the policy processes in the Swedish and 
Dutch defence sectors after the Cold War. Yet, as anticipated by Bovens et al., systemic 
constraints can differ per sector. 
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 9. Laws are subject to a 
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their constitutionality 
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 10. Independent central 
banks 
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Table 28: Conscription policy in the Netherlands and Sweden after the Cold War and the room for 
reforming leadership. + = positive environment for leadership, - = negative environment, +/- = does 
not apply or not influential 
 
Not all systemic characteristics identified in 2.5, were important for policymaking in the 
Dutch and Swedish defence sectors, traditionally considered to be ‘high politics’, after 
the Cold War (Table 28). The social democratic dominance in combination with the 
minority government in Sweden was influential in the process. On the one hand the so-
 235 
cial democrats had the will to cut defence spending, in particular since they were sup-
ported by the leftist parties in the second half of the 1990s, while on the other hand the 
same social democratic dominance prevented the ‘de facto’ abolition of conscription. 
Leadership had enough room to downsize and modernize the forces, yet abolition seems 
to have been a bridge too far.  
In the Netherlands reforming leaders had a lot of room to manoeuvre, the more so as 
the social democratic Minister of Defence had the support of the defence experts of the 
coalition party and – at a later stage – from his own party, who demanded a broader task 
for the commission and helped the minister organise majorities. Secondly, although it is 
very difficult to change the Dutch constitution, it was possible to develop new conscrip-
tion laws. Actually, the rigid constitution served the reformers in gaining time by keep-
ing the issue off the agenda while the larger reforms of the Armed Forces, the Priorities 
Defence Paper, was guided through Parliament. In particular in the second example the 
actions of leadership turned out to be influential. By using the systemic constraints to 
reach their aims, the leaders managed to almost entirely separate two policy processes, 
which otherwise might have slowed down the entire process. Instead of running smack 
into a brick wall, the leaders pulled back and waited for the right moment. 
Before turning to the types and styles of the different leaders, it is worth mentioning 
that constitutional rigidity was the only characteristic in the federal unitary dimension 
that played a role in the process. Defence traditionally is task of the government, 
whether it is federal or unitary. In the Dutch case there was some debate in the First 
Chamber, yet, the main debates took place in the permanent defence or joint defence 
and foreign affairs commission in Parliament, the so called Second Chamber. In the 
executive-party dimension almost all characteristics were important for the process. 
However, although both countries are traditional corporatist and although in both coun-
tries the military personnel is organised in unions, corporatism was obviously of no im-
portance. 
Types and styles 
In the two defence sectors central to this study the actions of political and bureaucratic 
leaders were constrained by their environment. We also found evidence that they had 
the opportunity to shape their environment and leave their mark on the system. When 
looking at Table 29 we see that almost none of the actors were static in style and type 
throughout the process, except for the Swedish Minister of Defence, Thage G. Peterson, 
and partially the Swedish General Wiktorin (throughout the process he remained an 
active reforming leader).  
The two Ministers of Defence Ter Beek and Von Sydow are examples of the chang-
ing relationship between the leader and his environment. In the beginning of their term, 
both were neither willing nor able to strive for reforms. Ter Beek was a relative outsider 
in the sector and slowly but steadily grew into office, which is a normal process within 
political systems. The large-scale reforms actually accelerated this process. Once Ter 
Beek saw a chance to reform the armed forces, he used his political skills and abilities 
to overcome systemic constraints. The same holds true for Von Sydow. He tried to 
change the armed forces as far as necessary within the paradigm of the Swedish defence 
sector, i.e. territorial defence. Once, however, the system turned out to be too unfavour-
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able to the sectors’ demands – remember chapter 2 in which one of the factors for insti-
tutional crisis identified was the fact that the institution just did not live up to the expec-
tations of its environment – Von Sydow reformed the armed forces. He did so in quite a 
similar way to Ter Beek by keeping conscription off the agenda/out of the policy 
stream, with the exception that he did not raise doubts about conscription, but let it si-
lently deteriorate.  
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Von Sydow 1999 
Wiktorin 19962000 
Ter Beek since 1992 
Von Sydow before 1999 
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Table 29: Types and styles of leadership in the two case studies 
 
In both cases, politicians were actively involved in sectorial reforms. The environ-
mental changes were so profound that their implications for the military needed the at-
tention of the political leaders, this was conceived a crucial condition for both paradigm 
shifts and paradigmatic procedure changes. Organisational leaders could not have im-
plemented those changes on their own, more legislation had to be involved. One of the 
consequences was that the political involvement limited the room to manoeuvre for 
those military leaders who wanted to conserve the status quo. This came in addition to 
the regular environmental constraints military leaders (and top civil servants) might 
face, i.e. political loyalty. In the case of conscription this holds true for the Command-
ers-in-Chief Gustafsson (S), Wilmink (NL) and Van der Vlis (NL). However, in particu-
lar, the latter two are examples of leaders who did not even try to strive actively to con-
serve conscription, regardless of their environment. Although the Dutch system of the 
early 1990s was more unfavourable to reforming or conserving military leadership than 
the Swedish system of the late 1990s, the Dutch military leaders limited themselves 
more than the existing structural constraints demanded. The cases show that personal 
choices lead to this self-limitation. 
The seemingly inconceivable category of a passive-reforming leadership style 
turned out to be an important asset for those political actors under scrutiny who wanted 
to reform the defence sectors in Sweden and the Netherlands. At first those actors had to 
play the system and their environment, before they were able to take a more active role 
during the reforming process. However, in both cases conscription remained a sensitive 
issue. Even in the Netherlands the leaders had to de-politicise the issue as long as possi-
ble in order to foster reforms of the armed forces.  
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10.5 What have we learned  
As mentioned in chapter 3, the design and case selection of this study make it impossi-
ble to produce generalising conclusions. However, the theories used in this study, and 
with it our knowledge about reforms in policy sectors, can gain from the insights of this 
study. It was not so much the intention to falsify these theories, which would have been 
an easy task, since they were developed using insights from a different political system, 
i.e. Westminster democracies. Besides finding answers to the empirical question, this 
study wanted to see to which extent the theories of Cortell & Peterson, ‘t Hart and Terry 
are transferable to policy sectors in consensual democracies. Do politics and leaders 
matter in these complex, multi-layer systems with many systemic constraints and veto-
players? To answer this question we must first turn back to the concept from which the 
study departed and which was hypothesised to be an important factor to explain change, 
i.e. crisis. 
Many terms in crisis research and policy studies are borrowed from other disci-
plines, like the term ‘crisis’ itself, which refers to a certain – indeed critical – medical 
condition. The same holds true for the term ‘window of opportunity’. Taken from space 
travel, the term refers to an ideal moment to launch the rocket: the crew sits in the cap-
sule and space control is ready to countdown. As predicted by the highly advanced me-
teorological advice, the dense cloudbank above space-centre is breaking open and there 
it is: the ‘window of opportunity’ to launch the shuttle. 
When on 9th of November 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, everybody in the Western 
world was taken by surprise, including the Armed Forces of the West and their intelli-
gence services. At that time nobody had seriously anticipated the end of the Cold War 
and the rockets that stood ready to be launched were equipped with nuclear heads. 
There were no ‘policy rockets’ ready to be launched; no reforming plans in the drawers 
of policy makers or the military waiting for the right moment to be implemented. Even 
the Dutch air-borne brigade, one of the trade-offs given to the Army for the postpone-
ment of the draft, was intended as a weapon in the Cold War. And so were the plans for 
the Swedish defence by the conservative party in 1991. For years they had waited for 
the moment to launch those plans.  
Exploiting a ‘window of opportunity’ on ideological, well-formed views appears 
only to be possible when policy ideas and sometimes even well elaborated plans have 
already been formulated. In particular in sectors, where certain actors are not content 
with either the official policy or the organisation’s integrity and thus anticipate an op-
portunity to launch their plans, this concept may be of explanatory value.13 However, 
this was not the case in the Western defence sectors at the end of the 1980s. After a sec-
ond window of opportunity, however, the reforming actors saw a chance to exploit it. 
The first window initiated the quest for well-formed views and those actors who had 
those views were prepared when the second window opened. This is in accordance to 
Cortell & Peterson’s theory, which expected that the institutional capacity of the leaders 
would improve after a second window had opened. According to the authors, officials 
who are lacking the capacity will be provided with autonomy to overcome their institu-
tional obstacles.14  
The theories of reforming and conserving leadership shed light on the policy process 
in the Swedish and Dutch sectors. As expected these theories formed a good supplement 
to Cortell & Peterson’s theory, which on its own had difficulties explaining how leaders 
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act during change processes. All theories in turn gained from the focus on the leader-
ship’s environment, in this study illustrated by Elgie’s interactive method. In the theo-
retical part it was hypothesised that the theories at stake focussed too strongly on lead-
ership in Westminster democracies while neglecting the more hostile leadership’s envi-
ronment in consensus democracies. This is why a distinction was made between the two 
systems and it was shown that leadership in reform could prosper in consensus democ-
racies. 
The more the actors perceived reforms as feasible and the more they were willing 
and capable of striving for those changes - in short, the more active they were - the more 
they had a chance to succeed. Those actors who relied solely on their arguments without 
promoting them or who refrained from active lobby work - those who were over-
committed or stuck in their noble but inapplicable ideology - had no chance of playing 
an important role in the outcome of the policy process. This study confirmed what the 
theory already expected: the less reformers are ideological, the less the existence of 
over-commitment is. Ideology or basic ideas about how the world is and should look 
like are necessary reference points in the momentary outlook, in particular, they can 
provide guidance in turmoil times, but they should not lead to rigid behaviour. 
What stands out in both cases is the practical absence of crisis. The end of the Cold 
War was necessary to open the window of opportunity, yet none of the actors explicitly 
considered this to be a crisis to initiate changes and only few actors used crisis to pre-
vent reforms. Although the number of cases and the research design allow no statistical 
inference, the results of this study make it worthwhile to consider the possibility that 
crisis is not a necessary condition for reforms in consensus democracies. Policy makers 
in both countries reacted to the end of the Cold War, the anticipatory policy climate in 
both cases, the institutional design and above all leadership help us understand the 






1 Haltiner 1998 
2 An in-depth case study of the policy process has to be limited. Sweden and the Netherlands are selected, 
because they are relatively comparable in size and socio-economical structure, but differ on outcome. 
Compare for further explanations chapter 3 (M&T) 
3 Cortell & Peterson 1999 
4 ‘t Hart 2000 
5 Terry 1995 
6 ‘t Hart & Gustavsson 2002 
7 Cortell & Peterson 1995 
8 Cortell & Peterson 1999: 191 
9 Cortell & Peterson 1999: 191 
10 It would take until 2002 for his Dutch counterpart to get similar authority 
11 Cortell & Peterson 1999: 202, their italics 
12 ‘t Hart & Gustavsson 2002 
13 Compare Cortell & Peterson 1999: 189; ‘t Hart & Gustavsson 2002, Resodihardjo forthcoming  
14 Cortell & Peterson 1999:190 
 
 
Appendix 1: Conscription and the military in the Dutch public opinion  
 
In a yearly poll the Foundation Society and Armed Forces (SMK - Stichting 
Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht) and the Dutch Institute for Public Opinion (NIPO) inter-
views a representative sample of the Dutch population about its opinion on the Dutch 
armed forces1. In December 1991 they conducted a survey in which the Meijer-
commission participated. In that research certain questions about conscription and a 
possible professional army were included. The outcome of that poll was presented in 
Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht (February 1992), the journal of SMK and in the appendix 
of the Meijer-report. This appendix presents the most relevant findings of the study. 
 
The Armed forces are 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Necessary 48 44 38 38 39 42 
Necessary evil 34 33 33 28 41 23 
Hardly necessary 7 11 11 16 10 18 
Unnecessary 8 9 10 11 5 10 
No opinion 3 3 9 7 5 7 

















Figure 14: Necessity of armed forces 
 
Since the 1980s the opinion that the armed forces are a necessity decreased slowly but 
steadily. Whereas 82% of the population found the armed forces necessary or a neces-
sary evil in 1985, that figure decreased to 65% in 1991. The only exception in that trend 
was found in 1990, during the Gulf crisis. 
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At the same time the conscription in the Netherlands lost more and more of its le-
gitimacy. Whereas 49% of the population supported that institution in 1989, only 32% 
was in favour in 1991 (Table 31, see also 1 above). 
 
 1989 1990 1991 
Military conscription 49 44 32 
Voluntary armed forces 36 43 55 
No opinion/indifferent 15 13 13 
Table 31: Conscription or voluntary armed forces. Source: report committee 
 
It seemed that only 15% of the population would change its opinion if voluntary armed 
forces turned out to be more expensive. Apparently the pro or con abolition choice was 
connected to the political preferences of the population. Green-left voters were pro abo-
lition. Of the voters of the liberal parties, VVD and D’66, respectively 65% and 67% 
were pro voluntary armed forces. The social-democratic voters were 52% pro voluntary 
army and 32% pro conscription. Only the CDA supporters came close in both choices: 
46% pro voluntary armed forces and 40% pro conscription. Compared to the year 1990, 
a clear shift in the opinion of CDA and VVD voters and a minor shift in the opinion of 
the PvdA and D’66 voters could be noticed. The public opinion made a clear difference 
between the tasks conscripts and volunteers had to fulfil. Especially when it came to 
peacekeeping missions/crisis control (70% volunteers, 45% conscripts) and warfare 
outside Western Europe (53% volunteers, 25% conscripts), the majority favoured vol-
unteers. 
Overall, it can be concluded that within three years the Dutch opinion on the subject 
had clearly changed. By the end of 1991 the majority of the population was pro aboli-
tion of conscription in the Netherlands. Considering the date when the important out-
comes of the poll were published, February 1992, it is very likely that the political top 






Appendix 2: Conscription and the military in the Swedish public opinion 
 
 
The Swedish public opinion about the armed forces has only slightly changed over the 
years. It is interesting to note that the newspapers paid regular attention to the armed 
forces and conscription. The coverage on the issues, especially around the presentation 
of reports or debates in Parliament, was higher compared to the Netherlands. Yet, it is 
arguable that a larger portion of the population was interested in the subject. There is 
reason to believe that, especially during the last years, the interest diminished, though 
not vanished. This appendix presents the results of public polls. They show that during 
the last year the population’s attitude towards the armed forces and conscription has 
changed in the direction of volunteer forces, although there is no majority for that as 
yet.  
Secure feeling 
Over the last twenty years the feeling of being militarily threatened decreased. In 1986, 
28% of the population was convinced that during the next ten to fifteen years the mili-
tary situation would become more threatening for Sweden, whereas 56% expected no 
change. Except for a few peaks, e.g. during the unsuccessful ‘coup d’état’ in the Soviet 
Union in 1992, this feeling changed. In 2002 only 11% of the population expected fu-
ture military threats, against 73% expecting no change2. 
The reasons that the opinions on Swedish security changed can probably be found in 
the diminishing military threat from Russia. Another possible reason, however, might 
be the conviction of the Swedish population that other powers would come forward and 
assist Sweden in case of an attack. 
 
 

























Figure 15: Sweden assisted by other countries in case of attack (source SPF 2002: 37) 
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Figure 15 shows that in 2002, 64% of the population was more or less convinced that 
other powers would help Sweden. This figure becomes striking, when one considers the 
Swedish attitude to a military alliance. When asked if they wanted to join NATO or 
preferred to stay out of any alliance, 62% of the population chose the latter option in 
2002, a quite stable figure throughout the years. 
Declining people’s defence 
Though the Swedish population felt less threatened and they trusted more on military 
assistance, they emphasised the need for their own military forces. In 2002, 66% an-
swered that Sweden absolutely ought to have a military. That number was only higher 
in 1984 and 1998, namely 71%, with an all-time low of 47% in 19953. 







1998 32 56  
2000 42 49 10 
2001 40 50 9 
2002 41 52 8 
Table 32: Professional armed forces or conscription. SPF Opinion 2002, Table 37 
 
The Swedish Authority for Psychological Defence (SPF) also asked if the Swedes 
would prefer professional armed forces or conscription. After a jump between 1998 and 
2000, the figures remained stable (Table 32). A slight majority of the Swedish popula-




1 1,000 persons aged 18 or older were interviewed at home. 
2 SPF 2002, table 19. The questions asked changed slightly over the years.  
3 SPF 2002 table 35 
 
 
List of Interviews1 
 
The Netherlands 
Barth, D. Director General Policy Affairs Ministry of Defence, The 
Hague, May 31st 2002 
Beek, A.L. ter Minister of Defence, Social Democrats (PvdA), Assen, 
May 29th 2002 
Beuningen, F. van Ministry of Defence, Directorate of General Policy Af-
fairs 1989-1994, The Hague, February 20th 2002 
Brinkman, J.W.  Vice-chief planning at the Army staff, Wassenaar, De-
cember 20th 2002 
Couzy, H.A. Vice Commander-in-Chief Army until September 10th 
1992, since September 10th 1992 Commander-in-Chief 
Army, The Hague, March 19th 2002 
Doel, M.Van van 
den 
Senior Officer on leave working as military strategy re-
searcher at the Clingendael Institute 1991-1994, The 
Hague, April 11th 2002 
Folmer, G.J. Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee 
in Permanent Session 1991-1994, The Hague, May 17th 
2002 
Frinking, A.B.M. Defence Spokesman CDA, Rijswijk, April 18th 2002 
Hilderink, C.G.J. Vice Head Conceptual Affairs, Breda, February 13th 2003 
Hillen, J.S.J. Defence Spokesman CDA, The Hague, April 3rd 2002 
Huyser, G.L.J. Army General (ret.), member of conscription commission, 
Leideschendam, April 16th 2002 
Jager, M. Mayor Wageningen, member of conscription commission, 
Lelystad, Liberals (D66), March 20th 2002 
Kombrink, J.C. Director General Finances and Economy, Ministry of 
Defence, Rotterdam, April 2nd 2002 
Kreemers, H.P.M. Spokesman of minister Ter Beek, June 17th 2003, The 
Hague 
Lehning, P.B.M. Professor of Political Theory and Public Policy Erasmus 
University Rotterda, member of conscription commission, 
Rotterdam, March 20th 2003 
Mazel, L.V. Vice Secretary General Ministry of Defence and member 
of conscription commission, The Hague, March 21st 2002 
Montfrans-
Hartman, G.W. van 
Major Katwijk, member conscription commission, Chris-
tian Democrats (CDA), Broek in Waterland, March 18th 
2002 
Reitsma, R. Head Restructuring of the Army Office, Staff  of the 
Commander-in-Chief Army, Soest, January 27th 2003 
Schoonoord, 
D.C.L. 
Senior Officer at the Directorate of General Policy Affairs 
of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff, Am-
                                                 
1 Without military or academic titles. Only (former) functions relevant to the research are listed.  
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sterdam, January 14th 2003 
Vlis, A.K. van der Commander 1st Dutch Army Corps, from May 1992 on 
Chief of the Defence Staff, Rijnsburg, May 13th 2002 
Voorhoeve, J.J.C. Head Netherlands Institute for Foreign Affairs (Clingen-
dael), Member conscription commission, The Hague, 
March 22nd 2002 
Voorst tot Voorst, 
B.J.M. Baron van 
Junior Minister of Defence, Maastricht, April 12th 2002 
Wijk, R. de Head Conceptual Affairs in Staff of the Chief of Defence 
Staff, Leiden, March 19th 2002 
Wijk, R. de (Former) Head Defence Concepts, Defence Staff, Leiden, 
March 19th 2002 
Wilmink, M.J. Commander-in-Chief Army, Leimuiden, August 13th 
2002 
Winter, J. de Deputy Director General Policy Affairs, Voorschoten, 
March 28th 2002 
Zijlstra, M. Member of Parliament 1989-2002, Social Democrats, The 




Andeberg, B. Military advisor 1992 conscript commission, Stockholm, 
April 9th 2003  
Björck, A. Minister of Defence 1991-1994, Member of Parliament 
(conservatives) 1968-2002, First Deputy Speaker of Par-
liament 1994-2002, March 14th 2003 
Börjesson, D. Commander in Chief Central Joint Command (ret.), 
Stockholm, March 31st 2003 
Eneroth, Th. Member of 1992 conscription commission, Stockholm, 
April 9th 2003 
Ericson, S. Member of Parliament (social democrats)  1969-1994 and 
head of ÖCB 1996-2002, Stockholm, March 26th 2003 
Fältström, H. Political Advisor Security and Defence Policy Conserva-
tive Party, Swedish Parliament, Stockholm, March 3rd 
2003 
Frisk, L. Deputy Chief Joint Training and Management HQ, Stock-
holm, April 2nd 2003 
Gustafsson, B. Commander-in-Chief Armed Forces (1986-1994), Stock-
holm, March 25th 2003 
Janson, B. Deputy Director Ministry of Defence and Legal Advisor 
of the 1991 conscription commission, Stockholm, April 8th 
2003 
Juholt, H. Member of Parliament, Chairman Försvarsberedningen, 
Stockholm, May 22nd 2003 
Körlof, B. Head Pliktverket (Swedish National Service Administra-
tion), Stockholm, April 9th 2003 
Krönmark,  Army Department and Training Division, Stockholm, 
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April 2nd 2003 
Landerholm, H. Member of Parliament Conservative Party 1991-2002, 
member of 1992 and 1998 conscript commission. Since 
2002 President of the National Defence College, Stock-
holm, March 18th 2003 
Magnusson, G. Armed Forces Finance Staff, Stockholm, March 17th 2003 
Mohr, M. Secretary of 1992 and 1998 conscript commission, secre-
tary of the Swedish Defence Commission, Stockholm, 
April 2nd 2003 
Neretnieks, K. Commandant of the National Defence College 1998-2002, 
Stockholm, April 11th 2003 
Nygren, J.  Social Democrat, Junior Minister of Defence 1988-1991, 
Member of the Group Management SAAB AB, Stock-
holm, April 1st 2003 
Rönnberg, L. Chief Army Staff (1990-1994), Stockholm, April 3rd 2003 
Sahlin, M. Junior Minister of Defence (1991-1994), Secretary and 
head of office Standing Committee of Defence Swedish 
Parliament (1987 - 1991), Stockholm, April 8th 2003 
Stütz, G. Director of Research, National Board of Psychological 
Defence, Stockholm, April 1st 2003 
Wegestål, K. Member of 1992 and 1998 conscript commission, Member 
of Parliament Social Democrats, Hjärup, April 15th 2003 
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Leiderschap en institutionele hervormingen in consensus democratieën. De Neder-
landse en Zweedse dienstplicht na de Koude Oorlog 
 
Het einde van de Koude Oorlog betekende niet noodzakelijkerwijs het einde van de 
dienstplicht in Westerse democratieën. De reactie van verschillende landen op het einde 
van de Koude Oorlog (of: de val van het IJzeren Gordijn) wordt gekenmerkt door een 
grote mate van variatie. Nederland en Zweden hebben ten opzichte van elkaar zeer ver-
schillend gereageerd ten aanzien van de dienstplicht. Terwijl Nederland al in 1993 be-
sloot de opkomstplicht op te schorten (wat de facto de afschaffing van de dienstplicht 
betekende) houdt Zweden tot op de dag van vandaag aan deze militaire institutie vast. 
De empirische vraag van dit onderzoek luidt dan ook: Waarom heeft Nederland de 
dienstplicht (vrij) snel na de Koude Oorlog afgeschaft en Zweden niet?  
De veronderstelling die in deze studie centraal staat is dat na de Koude Oorlog grote 
legers voor de landsverdediging overbodig werden. Dit stelde de defensieorganisaties 
voor grote uitdagingen. Daarom wordt het onderzoek in de bredere context van crises en 
hervormingsliteratuur geplaatst. De vraag is hoe de actoren binnen de organisaties op de 
veranderende veiligheidsomgeving hebben gereageerd. Het is de verwachting dat de 
beantwoording van de empirische vraag nieuwe inzichten verschaft in complexe her-
vormingen en beleidsveranderingen binnen consensus democratieën. Een bijzondere rol 
binnen deze veranderingsprocessen wordt hierbij aan leiders toegeschreven. Het argu-
ment luidt dat de relatie tussen politieke en administratieve leiders een belangrijke fac-
tor is voor de timing, snelheid en omvang van hervormingen in de defensiesectoren van 
Nederland en Zweden. Bovendien wordt verondersteld dat de meeste leiders voor een 
conservatieve strategie kiezen. Dat wil zeggen dat zij de status-quo en de integriteit van 
een institutie zo lang mogelijk willen bewaren en hooguit incrementele verandering 
nastreven. Het onderzoek concentreert zich op de vragen waarom leiders hervormen, 
hoe zij het doen en wat de uitkomsten zijn, met betrekking tot beleidsveranderingen en 
de effectiviteit van crisismanagement.  
 
Condities voor hervormend en conserverend leiderschap 
Internationale en nationale gebeurtenissen, zoals crises, kunnen de percepties van be-
leidsmakers beïnvloeden om kansen, die door deze gebeurtenissen ontstaan, te benutten 
en veranderingen door te voeren. Niet-crises gebeurtenissen, dat wil zeggen gebeurte-
nissen die maar beperkte kosten veroorzaken of politieke elites maar minimale hande-
lingsvrijheid verschaffen, scheppen een beperkte ruimte voor verandering. Crises creë-
ren kansen voor verandering doordat zij grote inefficiënties aan het daglicht brengen of 
de institutionele beperkingen voor leiders opheffen. Cortell en Peterson formuleren vier 
hypothesen hoe de keuze van leiders om al dan niet van een beleidsraam (window of 
opportunity) gebruik te maken beïnvloed wordt: het crisisbewustzijn, politieke afwegin-
gen, innerlijke overtuiging en de institutionele positie van de leider.  
Deze studie bevestigt de meeste hypothesen van Cortell en Peterson. Opvallend is 
dat de hypothesen vooral helpen de strategieën van conserverende actoren te begrijpen: 
zowel in Nederland als in Zweden leidde een verhoogd crisisbewustzijn – het einde van 
de Koude Oorlog verhoogde de onzekerheid met betrekking tot de internationale omge-
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ving – tot een conserverende strategie bij politici en militaire leiders. Men wilde de sta-
tus quo van de Koude Oorlogsorganisatie vrij lang instandhouden. Pas toen het gevoel 
van dreiging verminderde waren sommige leiders bereid hervormingen door te voeren. 
 
Hypothesen Nederland Zweden Toetsing Hy-
pothesen 
Crisisbewustzijn Conserverende actoren 
vreesden een crisis voor 
de organisatie bij afschaf-
fing dienstplicht; 
Hervormende actoren 
vreesden geen crisis in de 
nationale veiligheid, maar 
verwachtten hoge kosten 
voor de organisatie. 
1991: Conserverende 
actoren vreesden crisis 
voor de organisatie   
vermindering personeel, 
investeringen in zwaar 
materieel;  
1998: Hervormers vrees-
den geen crisis in de 
nationale veiligheid, 
maar eisten veranderin-
gen omdat zij uitholling 
van de organisatie vrees-
den  









Politieke voordeel voor 
hervormers werd pas in 
een laat stadium van het 
beleidsproces duidelijk 
(verbetering van de insti-
tutionele positie van de 




regering gesteund door 
rechtse partij, conserve-
rende strategie door 




1995: innen van het vre-
desdividend 
1998: geen steun voor 
investeringen door de 
linkse partijen, bezuini-
gingen maar grote orga-
nisationele hervormingen 
(wel dienstplicht houden)  















Minister van Defensie 
groeit in zijn ambt; 
Verzwakkende positie 




1991: Sterke Minister 
van Defensie; 
Politiek zwakke militaire 
leiders 
1995: Zwakke Minister 
van Defensie 
Sterke en politiek geori-
enteerde militaire leider 
1998: Zwakke Minister 
van Defensie 
Sterk politiek opererende 
militaire leider 
(+) Aanvulling 
voor theorie: ook 




Tabel 1: Condities voor leiderschap: de proposities van Cortell en Peterson getoetst 
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In Nederland waren dit vanaf 1992 de minister van Defensie R. ter Beek en de topamb-
tenaren D. Barth en J. de Winter; in Zweden vanaf de tweede helft van de jaren 1990 
vooral de opperbevelhebber O. Wiktorin en later de sociaal-democratische minister van 
Defensie B. von Sydow 
Politieke afwegingen speelden eveneens een rol, zij het dat in Nederland het voor-
deel  voor de hervormers (met name een sterkere positie voor de minister van Defensie 
binnen de sector) pas in een laat stadium van het hervormingsproces duidelijk werd. Dit 
hing dus nauw samen met de institutionele positie van de betrokken leiders (hypothese 
vier). In de loop van het hervormingsproces groeide de minister van Defensie Ter Beek 
in zijn rol. Hij ging (het pleit tegen) de generaals en de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken 
niet langer uit de weg. In Zweden lag vanaf de tweede helft van de jaren negentig de 
winst voor de hervormers vooral in het verwerven van steun voor de sociaal-
democratische minderheidsregering door de linkse partijen. Omwille van deze steun 
werd op de defensiebegroting bezuinigd, hetgeen ten koste ging van de dienstplicht. 
Binnen de sterk afgeslankte Zweedse strijdkrachten, die zich bovendien bijna uitsluitend 
op crisismanagement concentreerden, was geen plaats meer voor een groot deel van de 
rekruten. Minder dan 25% van een cohort moest tegen het einde van de vorige eeuw 
daadwerkelijk opkomen.  
Eén hypothese wordt in deze studie echter niet bevestigd. De innerlijke overtuiging 
van de leiders speelt een andere rol dan verwacht. Het blijkt dat in Nederland vooral die 
leiders tot hervorming overgingen die een pragmatische instelling hanteerden. Met na-
me de Nederlandse minister van Defensie was, ondanks zijn herhaaldelijk geuite steun 
voor de dienstplicht, op het moment dat het politiek voor hem voordelig leek bereid 
deze steun te laten varen. Ideologie en innerlijke overtuiging vormden vooral een keurs-
lijf voor conserverende leiders. Het werd op gegeven moment zo strak, dat zij blijkbaar 
niet meer flexibel genoeg waren om binnen een opponerende institutionele omgeving 
tactisch te handelen, zoals bij de Bevelhebber der Landmacht R. Wilmink en de Chef 
van de Defensiestaf A. van der Vlis het geval was. Ook in de Zweedse casus bleek dat 
de sociaal-democratische leiders die té krampachtig aan een grote volksdefensie vast-
hielden, zoals de minister van Defensie T. G. Peterson (1994-1997), de invloed op het 
proces kwijtraakten. 
 
Van conserverend naar hervormend leiderschap 
De theorie van Cortell en Peterson is minder geschikt om het daadwerkelijke handelen 
van leiders tijdens een beleidsproces te bestuderen. Hun theorie verschaft voornamelijk 
inzicht in de vraag waarom leiders conserverend dan wel hervormend handelen. Daar-
om wordt in deze studie gebruik gemaakt van de theorie van hervormend leiderschap 
van ’t Hart. Deze theorie omhelst vijf hypothesen, die de communicatieve en de strate-
gische, coalitievormende dimensie van leiderschap beschrijven. Bij de communicatieve 
dimensie horen hypothesen met betrekking tot de ontmaskering van de staus quo, de 
communicatie van wilskracht en het propageren van de oplossing. De strategische di-
mensie bevat hypothesen met betrekking tot de coöptatie van de uitvoerders en de con-
trole over et spel. 
Tegelijkertijd worden er kanttekeningen bij deze theorie geplaatst. Anders dan ’t 
Hart’s theorie doet vermoeden, blijkt uit deze studie dat de meeste leiders in defensie-
sectoren aanvankelijk probeerden de integriteit en de status-quo van de sector na de 
Koude Oorlog te bewaren. Zowel in Zweden als in Nederland domineerden conserve-
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rende actoren bij het definiëren van de situatie (hypothese 1). In Nederland drukte voor-
al de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken H. van den Broek zijn stempel op de Defensieno-
ta 1991. Volgens zijn veiligheidsanalyse waren er in de wereld nog te veel onzekerhe-
den om veranderingen door te kunnen voeren. In Zweden slaagden de conservatieve 
minister van Defensie A. Björck en staatssecretaris M. Sahlin begin jaren negentig erin 
om nieuw, zwaar materieel te kopen en onderstreepten zij aldus het blijvende belang 
van territoriale defensie. In hun ogen was de wereld door het uiteenvallen van de Sovjet 
Unie juist onzekerder geworden. Pas wanneer de dominante opinie geloofde in een 
duurzame vrede lukte het de hervormers ruimte te creëren voor de opschorting van de 
opkomstplicht (Nederland in 1992) respectievelijk de opkomst onder een zodanig ni-
veau te laten zakken dat er nog maar met moeite van een algemene dienstplicht kan 
worden gesproken (Zweden na 1996).  
In de vergelijking tussen Nederland en Zweden zijn te weinig voorbeelden van de 
door ’t Hart benadrukte ‘leiderschapstandems’ gevonden om de theorie te steunen dan 
wel te verwerpen (hypothese 2). Opvallend is wel het solistische optreden van conserve-
rende leiders. In Nederland en Zweden waren voorstanders van de dienstplicht vaak zo 
overtuigd van hun gelijk dat zij het zoeken van medestanders achterwege lieten. Een 
uitzondering vormt de combinatie Björck/Sahlin, die in het begin van de jaren negentig 
de technologische vernieuwingsplannen kon doorvoeren, die de burgerlijke partijen 
reeds in de Koude Oorlog hadden ontwikkeld.  
Björck en Sahlin investeerden veel tijd om politieke tegenstanders en burgers te 
overtuigen van de wenselijkheid van moderne territoriale strijdkrachten (hypothese 3). 
Alle andere conserverende leiders, zowel in Zweden als in Nederland, hadden óf hele-
maal geen plannen, óf presenteerden reactionaire, politiek onhaalbare plannen. De her-
vormende leiders maakten daarentegen herhaaldelijk gebruik van proefballonnen om de 
wenselijkheid van hun plannen te testen. Ter Beek deed dit met strategisch getimede 
toespraken en de Zweedse opperbevelhebber Wiktorin met optredens in de (mas-
sa)media. 
 
Hypothesen Nederland Zweden Toetsing hypothesen 
Definitie van de 
situatie 
Conserverende actoren: 
Bedreiging voor land, het 
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schillende kanalen, veel 
politiek werk; 
Conserverende actoren: 
reactionair, geen duidelijk 
plan in het publieke de-
bat, geen sterke argumen-
ten tegen de plannen van 
de hervormers, overdrij-
ven van problemen in 
plannen voor intern ge-
bruik of voor commissie 
haalbare opties om de 
staus quo te versterken; 
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Hoe sterker de insti-
tutionele positie 
leider des te onbe-
langrijker deze hypo-
these 
Controle over het 
spel 
Besloten informele struc-
tuur  sector, hiërarchisch, 
zwakke institutionele 
positie Chef Defensiestaf, 
dualistisch parlement 
Open formele structuur 










Tabel 2: Hoe leiders in Nederland en Zweden hervormen of conserveren: de theorie van ’t Hart 
getoetst 
 
Voor het belang van de coöptatie van de uitvoerders, de vierde hypothese, zijn voor 
beide landen verschillende uitkomsten gevonden. De uitkomst was afhankelijk van de 
institutionele inrichting van de sector en minder afhankelijk van het vermogen van een 
leider. In Nederland was het aantal besluitvormers dat betrokken was bij totstandko-
ming van het defensiebeleid tot een minimum gereduceerd. Bovendien kon er geen na-
delig effect voor de beleidsimplementatie (opschorting) worden vastgesteld ondanks de 
uitsluiting van de implementerende actoren van het proces. In Zweden worden traditio-
neel veel actoren reeds in een vroeg stadium bij de totstandkoming van beleid betrok-
ken. Het parlement en de opperbevelhebber van de strijdkrachten schrijven regelmatig 
rapporten, meestal naar aanleiding van een voorzet door de minister van Defensie. Deze 
rapporten liggen vaak ten grondslag aan de uiteindelijke beleidsnota’s en wetsteksten. 
Maatschappelijke organisaties en gedecentraliseerde bestuursorganen, zoals de dienst 
voor de militaire keuring (Pliktverket) of de civiele crisis management autoriteit (ÖCB), 
worden expliciet uitgenodigd wetsvoorstellen te becommentariëren (zogenaamde re-
miss). Dit in combinatie met een brede steunverwerving binnen de strijdkrachten voor 
het beleid van Björck/Sahlin (nieuw materieel en inkrimping) en later van Wiktorin 
(nieuwe taken en inkrimping), heeft ervoor gezorgd dat er weinig weerstand was bij de 
implementerende actoren. 
De laatste hypothese gaat over procedureel leiderschap: het vermogen van beleids-
makers om de regels van het politieke spel om beleid te controleren. Vooral het beheer-
sen van de politieke en publieke agenda blijkt in beide landen van groot belang te zijn. 
Zowel de Nederlandse minister van Defensie Ter Beek als zijn Zweedse ambtsgenoot 
Von Sydow slaagden erin het onderwerp dienstplicht  uit het publieke debat te houden 
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zo lang zij het politiek noodzakelijk achtten. Dit deden zij voornamelijk door het instel-
len van commissies (waarbij de samenstelling als zodanig van ondergeschikt belang 
was) en door actoren, zoals bijvoorbeeld de militaire leiders in Nederland vanaf de zo-
mer 1992, bewust buiten de besluitvorming te houden. In Nederland was de inbreng van 
militaire leiders ten aanzien van het onderwerp beperkt en in Zweden boycotte Von Sy-
dow een breed aangelegd congres over de toekomst van de dienstplicht 
 
 
De politieke context van leiderschap: hervorming in consensus democratieën  
De studie laat zien dat naast persoonlijke leiderschapskwaliteiten eveneens de structure-
le beperking of ruimte van de sector van invloed is op hervormingen. In navolging van 
Lijphart wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de regering/partij dimensie en de federa-
lisme/eenheidsstaat dimensie. 
Vooral voor de tweede dimensie lijkt maar een enkele factor voor het Nederlandse 
hervormingsproces van belang te zijn geweest, namelijk de moeilijkheid om de consti-
tutie te veranderen. Tijdens het hele beleidsproces dreigde de afschaffing van de dienst-
plicht vooral stuk te lopen op het vinden van de benodigde meerderheid voor een 
Grondwetswijziging. Pas tegen het einde van het proces werd de benodigde meerder-
heid gevonden door in plaats van afschaffing de opkomstplicht op te schorten. Dit was 
voornamelijk een tegemoetkoming aan diegenen, die vreesden dat in geval van een toe-
komstige bedreiging van Nederland niet voldoende soldaten opgesteld konden worden. 
De hervormers speelden handig in op deze grondwettelijke beperking. Doordat zij her-
haaldelijk juridisch advies inwonnen, ook door de Raad van State, slaagden zij erin het 
onderwerp uit het politieke debat te houden. Voor Zweden is geen enkel bewijs voor het 
belang van deze dimensie gevonden. 
De regering/partij dimensie lijkt veel meer aan de behoeftes van de hervormers (Ne-
derland) respectievelijk de tegenstanders van afschaffing (Zweden) tegemoet te komen. 
De Zweedse sociaal-democraten hadden in de tweede helft van de jaren negentig en de 
steun van de linkse partijen om op defensie te bezuinigen en de organisatie te verklei-
nen. Dezelfde partijen waren echter zulke grote voorstanders van de dienstplicht, on-
dermeer omdat zij een professioneel leger niet vertrouwden, dat ze elk debat over af-
schaffing tegenhielden. In Nederland bood vooral een meerderheid van sociaal- en 
christen-democraten ruimte voor opschorting van de opkomstplicht, waarbij soms het 
parlement (via moties), soms de regering invloed op het proces had. Voor de sociaal-
democratische minister van Defensie bood vooral de steun door de christen-
democratische parlementariërs, die grote voorstander van afschaffing waren, de kans om 
zijn beleidsruimte ten opzichte van de christen-democratische minister van Buitenlandse 
Zaken als ook ten opzichte van de premier en de CDA fractievoorzitter te vergroten. 
Lubbers en Brinkman dachten vooral over de mogelijkheid van een combinatie dienst-
plicht – sociale plicht na. 
 
 Consensus democratie Nederland Zweden 
Regering-partij dimensie 1. Machtsdeling regering in 
meerpartijen coalitie 
+ - 
 2. Uitgewogen machtsba-
lans regering-parlement 
+ +/- 
 3. Meerpartijen systeem + - 
 4. Proportionele representa- +/- - 
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tie 
 5. Gecoördineerde en cor-
poratistisch belangen-
groepsysteem met als 
doel elkaar te consulte-





6. Federale en gedecentrali-
seerde overheid 
+/- +/- 
 7. Verdeling wetgevingsbe-
voegdheid tussen twee 
even sterke maar ver-
schillende kamers 
+/- +/- 
 8. Starre constitutie die 




 9. Wetten kunnen door 
rechters aan de grond-
wet getoetst worden 
+/- +/- 
 10. Onafhankelijke centrale 
bank 
+/- +/- 
Tabel 3: Dienstplichtbeleid in Nederland en Zweden na de Koude Oorlog en de ruimte voor her-
vormend leiderschap. + = positieve leiderschapsomgeving, - = negatieve omgeving, +/- = niet van 
toepassing of niet belangrijk 
 
In beide cases is de manoeuvreerruimte van leiders beperkt door het sectorale beleids-
systeem. Deze studie vindt echter wel bewijzen dat leiders in staat waren het systeem te 
bespelen. Bijna niemand van de actoren volgde een statische leiderschapsstijl of was 
een statisch leiderschapstype. Het valt op dat hoe actiever een leider zich opstelde, dwz 
voluit. hoe eerder hij bereid was zijn plannen te verdedigen, politieke meerderheden te 
verwerven door goed gecommuniceerde plannen, kortom de beperkingen die in het sys-
teem besloten liggen te overwinnen, des te groter zijn kans was de sector te hervormen 
dan wel te conserveren. Dat dit geen open doel is, of dat deze tactiek niet vanzelfspre-
kend is, wordt aangetoond door de ‘verliezers’ van het hervormingsproces in Nederland 
en Zweden. Het succes van Björck in 1991 bleek in 1994 verdwenen. Tijdens de verkie-
zingen van 1994 was niemand meer overtuigd van een reële dreiging zoals in 1991. De 
succesvolle Van den Broek van de defensienota 1991 speelde tijdens het proces vooraf-
gaande aan de Prioriteitennota 1993 nauwelijks een rol van betekenis. De militaire lei-
ders in Nederland, die weliswaar duidelijke plannen voor de toekomst van de strijd-
krachten en de dienstplicht hadden, communiceerden deze niet breed genoeg en elk de-
bat over een alternatieve toekomst – zonder dienstplicht – werd ontmoedigd. De met 
betrekking tot de dienstplicht zeer rigide minister van Defensie Peterson, bleef onafge-
broken op hoge opkomstcijfers hameren, terwijl de werkelijkheid al een heel andere 
ontwikkeling liet zien. De casus laten zien dat veel actoren zich meer beperkten in hun 
keuzes dan door het systeem, of te wel de institutionele inrichting van de sector, was 
voorgegeven. 
Wat in beide landen opviel, is de afwezigheid van crisisbesef. Het einde van de 
Koude Oorlog was noodzakelijk om het ‘raam’ voor hervormingen te openen, maar 
geen van de actoren voelden of communiceerden dit als een crisis die hervormingen 
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noodzakelijk maakten. Maar weinig actoren gebruikten een dreigingsanalyse om veran-
deringen tegen te houden. Alhoewel het aantal landen en aan het aantal leiders te be-
perkt is om algemene uitspraken te doen, is het toch mogelijk te veronderstellen dat 
crises geen noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor hervormingen in consensus democratieën 
zijn. Beleidmakers in beide landen reageerden op het einde van de Koude Oorlog en het 
gunstige beleidsklimaat voor hervormingen van de defensie sectoren in beide landen. 
De bestudering van het gedrag leiders helpt ons de veranderingen in de Nederlandse en 
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